- Foursquare Labs, Inc. v. Mimzi, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 19, 2020 · IPR2019-01287 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution on claims 1–19 in place because the challenged prior-art and priority arguments did not show an abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Id. The Board applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a decision on a petition for rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“As an initial matter, we first note that we determined in the Institution Decision that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over Ramer3 and Hayashi.4 Inst. Dec. 28–32. Patent Owner does not seek rehearing of that determination. Thus, even were we to agree with Patent Owner that Yoo is not prior art, we conclude that Patent Owner has not shown that the Institution Decision should be modified because we still would have instituted an inter partes review based on the Ramer/Hayashi ground. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (prohibiting institution “unless the Director determines that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); cf. Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018- 00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two dependent claims out of twenty challenged claims); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7, 42–43 (PTAB Jan. 3 Ramer, US 2007/0061302 A1, published Mar. 15, 2007 (Ex. 1004, “Ramer”). 4 Hayashi, US 2007/0255831 A1, filed Apr. 28, 2006, published Nov. 1, 2007 (Ex. 1005, “Hayashi”). 24, 2019) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two claims out of twenty-three challenged claims).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportOther
“governing statute was 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2013), as amended by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”). Inst. Dec. 13–19. On the record available at the time, we agreed with Petitioner that the ’981 Patent included claims with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013, the effective date of the AIA amendment to § 102. See id.; Reply 1–2; AIA § 3(n)(1). Specifically, we determined (preliminarily) that the challenged claims are not adequately supported by the written description of U.S. Patent Application No. 12/181,956 (“the ’956 Application”), and, thus, could not claim priority to the ’956 Application, the only application in the priority chain that was filed before the AIA’s relevant effective date. Inst. Dec. 17–19. Under post-AIA § 102(a)(2), a published patent application of another inventor (like Yoo) is prior art if it “was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” Yoo was filed on May 6, 2008. Ex. 1003, code (22). Consequently, under post-AIA § 102(a)(2), Yoo would qualify as prior art because its filing date is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.2 Ex. 1001, code (60). 2 We note that Yoo’s effective filing date precedes all of the possible effective filing dates listed on the face of the ’981 Patent, including the July 29, 2008 filing date of the ’956 Application. See Ex. 1001, code (60). As noted above and discussed further below, however, whether the claims are supported by the ’956 Application relates to the threshold issue of whether post-AIA § 102(a)(2) applies to Yoo.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“As an initial matter, we first note that we determined in the Institution Decision that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contention that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over Ramer3 and Hayashi.4 Inst. Dec. 28–32. Patent Owner does not seek rehearing of that determination. Thus, even were we to agree with Patent Owner that Yoo is not prior art, we conclude that Patent Owner has not shown that the Institution Decision should be modified because we still would have instituted an inter partes review based on the Ramer/Hayashi ground. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (prohibiting institution “unless the Director determines that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); cf. Chevron Oronite Co. v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018- 00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two dependent claims out of twenty challenged claims); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7, 42–43 (PTAB Jan. 3 Ramer, US 2007/0061302 A1, published Mar. 15, 2007 (Ex. 1004, “Ramer”). 4 Hayashi, US 2007/0255831 A1, filed Apr. 28, 2006, published Nov. 1, 2007 (Ex. 1005, “Hayashi”). 24, 2019) (informative) (exercising discretion to deny institution because a reasonable likelihood of prevailing was shown for only two claims out of twenty-three challenged claims).” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,128,981 - General Electric Co. v. University Of Virginia Patent FoundationRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 19, 2017 · IPR2016-00357 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the final written decision holding all challenged claims unpatentable under § 102(b) and/or § 103(a).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDecided for petitioner
“The Final Written Decision acknowledged the disclosure in the ’182 Application of the objective of lengthening usable echo train durations while achieving desired image contrast characteristics. Final Dec. 22 (citing Ex. 1014, 4). We concluded this disclosure was similar to the disclosure of the key feature in Purdue Pharma. Id. (citing Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1327). UVAPF disputes that conclusion, arguing that the comparison with Purdue Pharma is not “meaningful,” because we purportedly overlooked the importance of lengthening the usable echo train duration while achieving comparable image contrast, and the relationship between this “primary objective” and the echo time ratio. Req. Reh’g 8–9. The Final Written Decision, however, specifically considered this “primary objective” described in the ’182 Application—including both the echo train duration and image contrast aspects. Final Dec. 22. We further concluded the alleged relationship between that key feature and the echo time ratio, which is not described in the ’182 Application, was insufficient to direct a skilled artisan to the recited echo time ratio limitations. Id. As we explained, the patent in Purdue Pharma similarly described a key feature and claimed a particular ratio related to that feature, but the court held the written description was inadequate because it failed to describe that ratio or ascribe any particular importance to that ratio. Id. at 20–22 (citing Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1326–28). The same is true of the claimed echo time ratio and the disclosure of the ’182 Application, which does not identify any such ratio much less describe its significance. Id. UVAPF has not identified any argument or evidence we have overlooked, nor has UVAPF shown our application of Purdue Pharma was erroneous.” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“not have been considered because they were untimely. Req. Reh’g 9–11. GE did not cite the Purdue Pharma case until the Petitioner Reply. See Paper 27, 13–14. We disagree that GE’s arguments were untimely, however, because Purdue Pharma was cited to rebut arguments made by UVAPF in its Patent Owner Response. In the Patent Owner Response, UVAPF argued that a person of ordinary skill would have been able to derive the full range recited for the echo time ratio limitations based on an example provided in the ’182 Application. Paper 21, 55–58. GE argued in the Petitioner Reply that UVAPF’s position is precluded by Purdue Pharma, which held that whether a claimed ratio can be derived from the written description is immaterial if the disclosure does not describe the ratio or direct a person of ordinary skill to the ratio as a part of the invention. Paper 27, 13–14 (citing Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1328). Thus, Purdue Pharma was cited to respond directly to arguments made by UVAPF in its Patent Owner Response, and GE’s arguments based on Purdue Pharma were not untimely. In addition, UVAPF also contends GE untimely raised its arguments that the ’182 Application does not provide sufficient support for the “at least twice” aspect of the echo time ratio limitations. Req. Reh’g 11–13. To the contrary, GE argued in the Petition that the ’182 Application failed to adequately support the “at least twice” limitation. Pet. 11–12 (“[N]owhere does the ’182 application make a comparison of the [effective echo time] of a pulse sequence derived according to the disclosed method, much less delineate a range with a boundary of ‘at least twice’ that of any other echo time.”). Thus, GE’s arguments regarding the “at least twice” limitation were not untimely.” slip op. at 6
§ 112 disclosure - Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-01155 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Windy City’s rehearing request, finding its challenge to termination untimely and its objections to Facebook’s joinder unsupported or not previously raised.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. See id. Windy City requests rehearing of two decisions, each of which it contends was an abuse of discretion. First, Windy City contends that our decision to terminate as to Microsoft, but not as to the entire proceeding, exceeded our statutory authority. Req. Reh’g 7–10. Second, Windy City contends we exceeded our statutory authority by joining Facebook to this proceeding despite that Facebook challenges only a portion of the claims originally challenged by Microsoft. Id. at 10–13. As explained below, neither contention is supported by the relevant authorities, and the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedDecided for petitioner
“First, § 315(c) does not recite any limitations on the challenges presented by the party seeking joinder. To the contrary, § 315(c) states that “any person who properly files a petition under section 311” may be joined, requiring only that the petition “warrants the institution of an inter partes review.” The statute does not address the specifics of challenged claims, asserted grounds of unpatentability, evidence relied upon, etc. Rather, such considerations are left to the Director’s “discretion” (and, thus, the Board’s discretion by delegation). 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (stating “the Director, in his or her discretion, may join”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122. Thus, far from failing to provide authority or discretion (Req. Reh’g 11), § 315(c) expressly provides for such discretion.” slip op. at 9
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“motion was an abuse of discretion because 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) does not “provide authority or discretion to join a party to a portion of an inter partes review.” Req. Reh’g 10–11. Although it filed an Opposition to the Motion for Joinder, Windy City did not argue that joinder was improper or contrary to § 315(c) because Facebook only challenged a subset of the claims challenged by Microsoft. We could not misapprehend or overlook an argument that was never made. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing cannot be used to advance new arguments not previously presented, and Windy City has waived this argument as a result. See, e.g., Sophos, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc., Case IPR2015-01022, slip op. at 5, 7–10 (PTAB Jan. 28, 2016) (Paper 9) (denying a request for rehearing because the arguments had not been previously made).” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 8,694,657 - Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-01067 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Windy City’s rehearing request, finding no legal error or abuse of discretion in terminating Microsoft alone and joining Facebook to the proceeding.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Id. Windy City requests rehearing of two decisions, each of which it contends was an abuse of discretion. First, Windy City contends our decision to terminate as to Microsoft, but not as to the entire proceeding, exceeded our statutory authority. Req. Reh’g 6–9. Second, Windy City contends we exceeded our statutory authority by joining Facebook to this proceeding despite that Facebook challenges only a portion of the claims originally challenged by Microsoft. Id. at 9–12. As explained below, neither contention is supported by the relevant authorities, and the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedDecided for petitioner
“First, § 315(c) does not recite any limitations on the challenges presented by the party seeking joinder. To the contrary, § 315(c) states that “any person who properly files a petition under section 311” may be joined, requiring only that the petition “warrants the institution of an inter partes review.” The statute does not address the specifics of challenged claims, asserted grounds of unpatentability, evidence relied upon, etc. Rather, such considerations are left to the Director’s “discretion” (and, thus, the Board’s discretion by delegation). 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (stating “the Director, in his or her discretion, may join”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122. Thus, far from failing to provide authority or discretion (Req. Reh’g 10), § 315(c) expressly provides for such discretion.” slip op. at 9
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“Joinder of Facebook Windy City contends our decision granting Facebook’s joinder motion was an abuse of discretion because 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) does not “provide authority or discretion to join a party to a portion of an inter partes review.” Req. Reh’g 10. As noted above, however, Windy City did not oppose Facebook’s joinder motion. Despite having an opportunity to file an opposition, Windy City did not do so, nor did it otherwise present any arguments that granting joinder would be improper under § 315(c). We could not have misapprehended or overlooked an argument that was never made. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing cannot be used to advance new arguments not previously presented, and Windy City has waived this argument as a result. See, e.g., Sophos, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc., Case IPR2015-01022, slip op. at 5, 7–10 (PTAB Jan. 28, 2016) (Paper 9) (denying a request for rehearing because the arguments had not been previously made).” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 8,407,356 - Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-01141 · APJ J John Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Windy City's rehearing request, holding that its termination and joinder decisions were consistent with governing law and that the rehearing arguments did not warrant modification.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“DISCUSSION A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it contends were misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Id. Windy City requests rehearing of two decisions, each of which it contends was an abuse of discretion. First, Windy City contends our decision to terminate as to Microsoft, but not as to the entire proceeding, exceeded our statutory authority. Req. Reh’g 5–9. Second, Windy City contends we exceeded our statutory authority by joining Facebook to this proceeding despite that Facebook challenges only a portion of the claims originally challenged by Microsoft. Id. at 9–12. As explained below, neither contention is supported by the relevant authorities, and the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDecided for petitioner
“First, § 315(c) does not recite any limitations on the challenges presented by the party seeking joinder. To the contrary, § 315(c) states that “any person who properly files a petition under section 311” may be joined, requiring only that the petition “warrants the institution of an inter partes review.” The statute does not address the specifics of challenged claims, asserted grounds of unpatentability, evidence relied upon, etc. Rather, such considerations are left to the Director’s “discretion” (and, thus, the Board’s discretion by delegation). 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (stating “the Director, in his or her discretion, may join”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122. Thus, far from failing to provide authority or discretion (Req. Reh’g 9–10), § 315(c) expressly provides for such discretion.” slip op. at 9
NonePatents in suitUS 8,458,245 - PTAB · Apr 28, 2017 · IPR2015-01664 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Ericsson’s rehearing request, leaving intact its final written decision that claims 8–12 and 18–22 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“On rehearing, the burden of showing the Decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s Request is denied.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“Petitioner provided no details in its Reply regarding how “within the limits of” adds additional confusion, or why a construction including such language would be inappropriate. The Patent Owner Response demonstrated Patent Owner’s clear disagreement with Petitioner’s position that the proposed prior art combination teaches transmitting the entirety of a broadcast channel in an OFDMA core-band. Nevertheless, in its Reply, Petitioner provided neither an explanation of its understanding of the alleged plain meaning of the disputed limitation nor an explicit statement that transmitting only a portion of a broadcast channel in an OFDMA core-band would be sufficient to meet the disputed limitation. Accordingly, we did not misapprehend or overlook Petitioner’s generic argument for adopting an unspecified “plain meaning” of the disputed limitation. We evaluated all arguments and evidence submitted by both parties, and we determined that the proper construction of the disputed limitation precluded transmitting any portion of the recited broadcast channel outside the OFDMA core-band.” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“As discussed in the Decision and above, we provided a preliminary construction of the plain meaning of the disputed term in our Institution Decision, Inst. Dec. 11, and Patent Owner contested that preliminary construction in its Patent Owner Response, see PO Resp. 14–16. Nevertheless, as explained above, Petitioner merely provided unsupported assertions that the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed limitation should apply and argued Patent Owner’s proposed construction generated more confusion than clarity. See Pet. Reply 2, 3–5. Petitioner did not identify evidence to demonstrate the preliminary construction was correct. We are unable to find—and Petitioner does not cite—any portion of the Petition or Reply identifying the full bandwidth preamble to which Petitioner now refers, much less discussing its relevance to any issue. The panel questioned the parties extensively at the hearing regarding what it means to “transmit a broadcast channel in an” OFDMA core-band. See Tr. 10:4–21:4, 24:16–25:4. Petitioner never pointed to the now-cited disclosure in the specification, let alone argued that such a disclosure was relevant to the proper construction of the disputed limitation. Moreover, the technology is complex, and the record during trial lacks briefing from the parties or testimony from either party’s expert declarant on the portion of the specification now raised by Petitioner. We decline to consider Petitioner’s untimely argument presented for the first time in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,787,431 - Asustek Computer, Inc. / Asus Computer International v. Avago Technologies General IP (Singapore) Pte. LtdRehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 8, 2017 · IPR2016-00647 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s request for reconsideration and added institution of the §102 Cioffi challenge to claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. CONCLUSIONS For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that our Decision to Institute overlooked or misapprehended the matters discussed in this Decision, and that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its challenge as to the patentability of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 as being anticipated by Cioffi. The Board has not made a final determination on the patentability of any challenged claims or the construction of any claim terms. Our final decision will be based on the record as fully developed during trial.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,430,148 - DISH Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00499 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution in place only for claims 1–4, 7–10, and 13–14 on Goldwasser-based grounds; Truog-based grounds and Ground 10 remain denied.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“personal knowledge as to when and how the Truog thesis was made available to the public, and his testimony also is insufficient evidence of the library’s specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers in the relevant time period between Truog’s purported publication in 1989 and the ’444 patent’s 1992 priority date.” Dec. 11. For reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded of error in this determination. Mr. Bender’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence of either general library practice or the specific facts surrounding the purported publication of Mr. Truog’s thesis.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“personal knowledge as to when and how the Truog thesis was made available to the public, and his testimony also is insufficient evidence of the library’s specific practices as to indexing and cataloging papers in the relevant time period between Truog’s purported publication in 1989 and the ’444 patent’s 1992 priority date.” Dec. 11. For reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded of error in this determination. Mr. Bender’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence of either general library practice or the specific facts surrounding the purported publication of Mr. Truog’s thesis.” slip op. at 5
- Other 314aInstitution denied
“10 over the teachings of Goldwasser, Yifrach, and Ulmer (“Ground 10”). Req. Reh’g 12. We exercised our discretion and declined to institute on this ground. Dec. 19. Petitioner does not direct us to anything that was” slip op. at 8
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 5,930,444
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.