- PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00762 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 and 8–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Koskinen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.6 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Additionally, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known and been familiar with information elements (IEs) that specified an RLC reordering timer value based on (1) general knowledge that IEs carried information in RRC messages and (2) that 3GPP TSs describe an IE carrying recording timer duration information for the RLC layer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 151; Ex. 1014, 219–20. Accordingly, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art “that the PDCP timer information, which used similar variables as its RLC counterpart (Koskinen, ¶¶37-38), would also be carried in a PDCP configuration IE.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 151.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,863,573 - PTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00545 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 3–11, 13–21, and 23–30 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1, 3–11, 13–21, and 23–30 of the ’904 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“F. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2024). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Id. at 18–19. Petitioner also notes that “[a] person could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Id. at 19. Patent Owner does not offer a definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the field of the invention reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’904 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“1. Rationale for proposed combination Petitioner asserts Merriman061 teaches that it is “highly desirable to target advertisements to the appropriate potential customer base” and discloses “techniques for gathering profile information about users and 26 1:52–53, 1:64–2:3, 2:6–30, 4:44–5:7, 5:50–59, 7:46–8:30, 8:39–46; Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). According to Petitioner, Jaye “recognizes the importance of collecting profile information for targeted advertising” and discloses “techniques for combining profile information from multiple local websites visited by users into more comprehensive global profiles that may be shared with ‘interested outside parties, such as advertisers.’” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1005, code (57), 1:18–38, 2:6–10, 2:6–8, 2:15–3:40, 5:5–19, 6:1– 7:45, 8:40–10:41,14:22–25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “incorporate Jaye’s techniques for collecting and combining profile information to enhance and improve Meriman061’s ad targeting by providing more information about the users to whom the ads are targeted.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). Having reviewed the arguments and evidence included in the Petition, including the Houh Declaration, which are not substantively addressed by Patent Owner at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that it would have been obvious to combine Merriman061 and Jaye in the manner set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,494,904 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00698 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–11, 18–20, 23–25, and 28 on all petitioned grounds, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’539 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’539 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’539 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysisbelow. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “no construction should be necessary to institute this petition.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner “requests that the Board adopt the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Having considered the record, we determine that, at this stage, no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We note, however, there may be some claim terms below whose constructions that the parties may wish to address during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“and “how” the references would have been combined. As the Petition explains, Krummacher discloses radiation scattering particles having a size range of 50 to 1000 nm. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1107 ¶ 39). Petitioner further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would use Stokes teachings to further refine that size range to optimize the particle size to preferentially scatter blue light. See id. at 26–27. Petitioner further provides reasons, suggested in Stokes itself, why a person of ordinary skill would have made this modification to Krummacher. See id. at 27–28 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:17–26; Ex. 1102 ¶ 128). Petitioner provides sufficient evidence that such a particle size selection was within the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 122–128, 140–144; Ex. 1108, 7:1– 17; Ex. 1124 ¶¶ 80–81. We note that we have reviewed the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Schubert, but this testimony does not, at this stage, diminish the weight we give to Petitioner’s expert. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes accounts for this limitation and that a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’539 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,614,539 - PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00260 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1 and 11–14 on all asserted grounds and consolidated the proceeding with IPR2024-01357.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In our Institution Decision in IPR2024-01357, we analyzed claim 1 of the ’678 patent in light of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. ’1357 IPR, Paper 17, 23–28. We concluded, after reviewing the arguments presented there, that “Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that the combined teachings of Basin-2005 and Basin-2007 render claim 1 unpatentable as obvious.” Id. at 28. In this proceeding, Petitioner has presented a challenge to claim 1 based on those same references that it represents is a “verbatim” copy of its previous challenge to claim 1 in the ’1357 IPR. Pet. 1–2, 28–35. Petitioner supports its challenge with expert testimony. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 107–125.7 Patent Owner has not submitted a response on the merits of this challenge. For the purposes of this Decision, and for the reasons given in the Petition, we adopt the analysis in our Institution Decision in the ’1357 IPR (at pp. 23–28), where we determined that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness challenge to claim 1 based on Basin-2005 and Basin-2007. Turning now to Petitioner’s challenge to claim 11, Petitioner relies on Basin-2007 and Stokes for the particle size limitations added to claim 1 by that dependent claim. Pet. 35–39. Thus, Petitioner asserts that “Basin-2007 discloses a light scattering material with an average TiO2 particle size that is ‘sub-micron’ (less than 1000 nm).” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 5). 7 Exhibit 1002 appears to be a duplicate copy of Dr. Doolittle’s declaration from the ’1357 IPR. Petitioner concludes, “Basin-2007 renders obvious claim 11 by literally disclosing the selection of average particle sizes that preferentially scatter blue light.” Id. Further, “to the extent that the claim language ‘an average particle size that is selected such that [it preferentially scatters blue light]’ requires an average particle size selected for that reason (rather than an average particle size that leads to that outcome), this claim element is rendered obvious by Stokes.” Id. at 38 (citing Doolittle Decl. ¶ 45) (alterations in original). Petitioner explains that “Stokes explicitly discloses the selection of an average particle size ‘such that the particles preferentially scatter blue . . . LED light as compared to yellow . . . light from the luminescent material.’” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1008, 7:1–4) (alterations in original). Petitioner provides a motivation for combining Stokes with Basin- 2007 with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 38–39. Petitioner explains that “[t]o the extent that claim 11 is understood to also claim the basis for selecting a particular average particle size, a [person of ordinary skill] would have had reason to use such a basis for selecting average particle size as taught by Stokes.” Id. at 38 (citing Doolittle Decl. ¶¶ 46–48). Further, “a [person of ordinary skill] would have been motivated to apply this principle to Basin-2007, because it would increase the conversion of blue light to yellow light and improve the uniformity of the light source.” Id. at 39 (citing Doolittle Decl. ¶ 48). At this stage, Patent Owner does not provide an opposition to Petitioner’s evidence or arguments on the merits. For the reasons given by Petitioner, including those summarized above, we determine that Petitioner” slip op. at 6
- Director reviewOther
“On June 12, 2025, the Acting Director issued a decision denying the request and referring the Petition to the Board “to handle the case in the normal course, including by issuing a decision on institution addressing the merits and other nondiscretionary considerations, as appropriate.” Paper 16, 3. The Acting Director further instructed the Board, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the Board shall consolidate this proceeding with IPR2024-01357.” Id.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As noted supra, the Acting Director of the USPTO has instructed the Board, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the Board shall consolidate this proceeding with IPR2024-01357.” Paper 16, 3. Due to the similarity of the parties, counsel, subject matter, and asserted prior art between IPR2024- 01357 and this proceeding, and in view of the Acting Director’s guidance, we exercise our discretion to consolidate this proceeding with IPR2024- 01357. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(a).” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 8,604,678 - Tessell, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00298 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–36 under both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with two years of academic and/or industry experience with database technologies.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–70). Patent Owner has not proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art and does not dispute Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Bhattacharjee and not disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner has not proposed an express construction for any claim term. Neither has Patent Owner. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim term. C.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenInstitutedInstituted
“Because the inputs are used by the processor to create the database, the inputs must be received by the processor prior to creation of the database. Creation of a database is a way of provisioning a database, as explained in the specification of the ‘818 patent. Ex. 1001, 3:41–43 (“Database provisioning services involve creating and/or associating databases with the database system for management and use.”). The SLA then protects the database “after” it is provisioned (per limitation [1D]) and a snapshot may be captured “after” the database is provisioned (per limitation [1E]). For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that claim 1 would have been obvious over Sivasubramanian and Zha. 4. Dependent Claims 2–7, 22, 23, 28–30 Claims 2–7, 22, 23, and 28–30 each depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Ex. 1001, 40:31–57, 42:17–22, 42:35–53. Patent Owner does not present arguments for these claims separate from those it submits for claim 1, which we have rejected above in the context of claim 1. We have reviewed Petitioner’s submissions and determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing obviousness of claims 2–7, 22, 23, and 28–30 over Sivasubramanian and Zha.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“With respect to limitation [1E], Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to incorporate into Sivasubramanian Zha’s feature of user input of the frequency for retrieving snapshots and user input of the “times during the day” for retrieving snapshots. Pet. 52–54. Patent Owner does not dispute the assertion. We have reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, and agree on this record that Sivasubramanian and Zha reasonably would have suggested limitation [1E]. With respect to limitation [1F], Petitioner notes that Sivasubramanian already discloses a user interface to receive the first, second, and third inputs, and asserts that if there are fourth and fifth inputs based on an analysis of limitation [1D], then one of ordinary skill would have used the same interface to receive the fourth and fifth inputs. Pet. 54–55. Patent Owner does not dispute the assertion. We have reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, and agree on this record that Sivasubramanian and Zha reasonably would have suggested limitation [1F]. With respect to limitation [1H], Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) “would have understood that the purpose of accepting these inputs [first through fifth] is to use them to ‘create’ a database based on these inputs and based on the amount of storage determined from the user input.” Pet. 57 (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not dispute the assertion. We have reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, and agree on this record that Sivasubramanian and Zha reasonably would have suggested limitation [1H], provided that limitation [1D] regarding fourth and fifth inputs is met.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,860,818 - Google, LLC. v. Escapex IP LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00337 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 based on five § 103 grounds involving Fuloria and Andler with additional references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We, therefore, grant Petitioner’s request to institute inter partes review of the challenged claims on the asserted grounds.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar field and three years of professional computer programming experience, including experience with networked media and databases, where additional education can substitute for experience or vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31). The level of ordinary skill in the art is usually evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, and thus, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “to the extent that [the term “engagement”] requires construction, it should be construed as ‘an indication that a user should be distinguished with respect to the content over another user.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:53–55; Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). Based on the record before us, we see no need for express construction of any term for the purposes of this Decision. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 9
- BurdenInstituted
“We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence. Fuloria teaches “a mechanism for user to promote social networking objects to other users.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 1. Fuloria displays a news feed containing social media content items. Id. at code (57), ¶¶ 6, 27. Users in Fuloria may like a piece of content or “for a given price” the user may turn their like into a “super-like.” Id. ¶ 37. “The ‘super-liked’ story is priced and directed toward users in a similar manner as a social ad. In particular embodiments, sponsored story system 304 may also add a weight to the story to alter its direction toward users.” Id. ¶ 39. Petitioner argues that “[t]his functionality represents uncapped engagement . . . because Fuloria places no limitation on how many times a user can super-like a piece of content.” Pet. 24–25. Dr. Bederson supports Petitioner by noting that Fuloria does not “place any limitation on how many credits a user can spend to increase the reach of the content.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 76. Further, Dr. Bederson states that “[m]ultiple different users can also promote the same content item. By allowing users to promote or ‘super-like’ content which also increases engagement with that content by other users, Fuloria’s system also facilitat[es] uncapped engagement with that content.” Id. ¶77. We find these arguments to be persuasive. The ’687 patent states that “[s]o long as the user has sufficient resources, the user may promote herself or others with uncapped (i.e., unlimited) engagements, which may facilitate getting noticed by other users, whether with respect to a social media content item.” Ex. 1001, 2:6–10. Similarly, Fuloria allows users to expend their resources and to have the super-like displayed according to the amount paid for the super-like. Ex. 1004 ¶ 57 (“In particular embodiments, the advertisement system adjusts the display of the ‘super-liked’ story based upon social factors as well as the real-world value of the credits paid.”); see also id. ¶ 38 (“[T]he social networking system may deduct the credits based on a cost per impression (CPM), effective cost per impression (eCPM), cost per click (CPC), or cost per action (CPA) pricing model”). Fuloria teaches likes from any number of users which is argued to disclose the multiple users recited in the claim. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 82 (discussing Fuloria’s display of engagement by a user and pointing out that Figure 9A shows 1,884 likes); see also id. ¶ 87 (“Fuloria teaches that ‘super-likes’ are available to users in general (and thus to first, second, third, etc. users).”). As to the number of engagements displayed by the first, second, and” slip op. at 16
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,474,687 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01281 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 13 would have been obvious over Cornett, Paatela, and Nelson.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of non-obviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A Person of Ordinary Skill in The Art (“POSITA”) in Sept. 2007 would have had a working knowledge of network communications techniques and highspeed packet processing technologies. Ex.1003, ¶20. A POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent training, and approximately two years of work experience in network communications. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Ex.1003, ¶20. Pet. 13. We use this definition for purposes of this Decision because it appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and the ’471 patent.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that no terms require express construction. Pet. 13. We do not expressly construe any terms at this time. Realtime, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“As to the claim requirement that the direct memory access device concurrently write the packet buffer memory and the protocol stack layer memory, Petitioner asserts that neither Cornett nor Paatela explicitly describes the timing of packet writing. Pet. 42. Petitioner asserts, however, that Nelson discloses writing a packet header separately and in parallel with writing the entire packet. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 6:66–7:4; Ex. 1003 ¶ 89). Indeed, Nelson explains that the parallel storage action “avoid[s] having to read the frames out of the [larger frame] buffer” when reading a header, which eliminates the need for a separate reading step and “allows the routing decision to be made before the [frame] buffer becomes available.” Ex. 1006, 2:1–22 (containing the quoted language), 7:1–4 (describing “parallel . . . storage”). Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to write the packet header at the same time as writing the entire packet in Cornett, because Cornett, Paatela, and Nelson are concerned with speed, and writing in parallel would increase speed (vs. writing serially). Id. at 43–44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 90); see also id. at 26 (similar argument). Reviewing Petitioner’s position with respect to independent claim 13, we determine that Petitioner has addressed each limitation in sufficient detail and with adequate citations to the record. Petitioner has also provided sufficient reasons for combining the teachings of Cornett, Paatela, and Nelson with a reasonable expectation of success. Reviewing the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 13 would have been obvious in view of Cornett, Paatela, and Nelson.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,738,471 - PTAB · Mar 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01347 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–27 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). We must also consider the non-exclusive factors set forth in Becton, Dickinson and Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential in relevant part), which “provide useful insight into how to apply the framework” under § 325(d). Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 9. Those non-exclusive factors include: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesNo construction neededOther
“1. Means-Plus-Function Terms Challenged claim 26 recites elements using the word “means.” See Ex. 1001, 21:6–22:5. The use of the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies.9 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claim 26. See Pet. 6–8; see generally Prelim. Resp. a. “system firmware means for detecting loss of lockstep (LOL) for a processor in a multi-processor system” (Claim limitation [26a])” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that these terms “should be construed to include both mismatch errors and errors that may eventually result in mismatch errors constituting a ‘precursor to lockstep mismatch’—including at least one of (1) detecting a lockstep mismatch error; and (2) detecting an error that may eventually cause a lockstep mismatch error.” Pet. 6. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he specification provides detecting these two types of errors as examples of detection of LOL.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:40–3:6, 7:25–36; Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 34–36). Petitioner further asserts that this construction “is consistent with the undisputed construction in the IPR challenging U.S. Patent No. 7,502,958.” Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., LLC v. Foras Techs. Ltd., IPR2023-01373, Paper 18 at 2 (PTAB July 12, 2024)). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s position or discuss claim construction in the Preliminary Response. meaning of these claim terms that would affect this Decision. Therefore, we determine that at this stage, we do not need to expressly construe these claim terms to resolve a controversy. 3. Summary and Conclusion For the reasons given, we determine that at this stage, we do not need expressly to construe any claim term for this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803)).” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“alleged invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture design, including fault-tolerant computer architecture design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 4 (citing Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 28–30). At this stage, Patent Owner does not respond to this contention. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’302 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,624,302 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2024 · IPR2024-00604 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8, 15–22, and 29 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim based on the Rusert grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.§ 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’714 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’714 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Based on the foregoing arguments, which lack specifics and do not sufficiently map the particular teachings from Rusert relied on by Petitioner to the disclosures of Han, Tai, and Huang, we do not find Rusert to be cumulative of these references. Further, even if all of Rusert’s teachings relied on by Petitioner can be found in Han, Tai, and Huang as a collection of separate partial teachings from each, that still does not demonstrate Rusert as a cumulative reference. The quality of disclosure simply is not the same if three references have to be combined to yield what Rusert itself discloses.” slip op. at 63
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“Although we do not think 30 claims are too numerous for one petition to cover, many claims in the ’714 patent are extraordinarily lengthy and include numerous limitations. For example, claim 6, which depends from claim 5, which depends from claim 1, is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. The length of claim 20, which depends from claim 19, which depends from claim 15, also is more than one column long in the ’714 patent. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that the subject matter of the ’714 patent is complex. We further agree with Petitioner that the division of claims among the two petitions, i.e., encoder claims in IPR2024-00604 and decoder claims in IPR2024-00605, is a structured division which helps to facilitate the handling of two petitions. Patent Owner has not presented arguments urging that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is excessive. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the filing of two petitions by Petitioner against the ’714 patent is reasonable under these circumstances. We decline to exercise discretion to deny either petition on the ground of the Petitioner filing an excessive number of petitions against the ’714 patent.” slip op. at 67
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Creusere and not 11 The record does not include any evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,536,714 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00620 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–8, 14–22, and 25 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Tobita obviousness grounds and declining General Plastic denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a relevant technical degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Materials Science, Physics, or the like, and experience in active matrix display design and electroluminescence.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 36). Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s proposed definition because it “entails only general ‘circuit design’ experience with no experience in active matrix display design and electroluminescence, the subject matter of the ’593 Patent.” Id. at 17; see also Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 38–39 (Dr. Wolfe’s testimony regarding the same). In particular, Patent Owner argues that “[i]mportant aspects and considerations of the pixel circuit design are unique to the context of active matrix display design and to electroluminescent displays.” Prelim. Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 38). Patent Owner additionally notes that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the ITC Investigation adopted Patent Owner’s definition. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2018, 12). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Although “[t]he challenged patent pertains generally to the field of OLED displays,” it is directed “more particularly to the circuitry used to drive and control the pixels that comprise the light-generating elements of the display.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 29; see also Ex. 1001, 1:16– 18 (describing the Field of the Invention as relating to “a stage circuit and an organic light emitting display using the same”). Moreover, we note, for example, that claim 1 does not include any limitations directed to “active matrix displays” or any other particular type of display, which suggests that an ordinarily skilled artisan need not have had specific experience designing such displays. See Ex. 1001, 9:43–45 (reciting “[a] stage circuit”). In addition, Patent Owner’s proposed definition is imprecise because it does not quantify the amount of experience possessed by an ordinarily skilled artisan. Therefore, at this stage, we adopt Petitioner’s definition because we find it to be more consistent with the teachings of the ’593 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we apply the same construction as the ITC ALJ, i.e., that controlling the voltage of the second node does not require the voltage of the second node to be determined by the first driver alone. This is supported by contrast with another limitation in claim 1, which expressly recites direct control: “the signal of the third input terminal directly controls.” Ex. 1001, 9:58 (emphasis added). This is also supported by a paragraph in the Specification of the ’593 patent explaining that the Specification uses the word “directly” in contexts where the same is intended. Id. at 4:19–26. Further, as noted by the ITC ALJ, the Specification of the ’593 patent states that the second driver “controls the voltage on the first node” where such control is accomplished in conjunction with the outputting unit. Ex. 2018, 31–32 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:60–62, claims 1, 15). This supports the ITC ALJ’s understanding with respect to the first driver, i.e., that control can occur in conjunction with other elements.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Specifically, Petitioner relies on the timing diagram in Figure 21B of Kimura to illustrate the operation of the circuit in Figure 27C. Pet. 19 (reproducing Ex. 1004, Fig. 21B). Petitioner acknowledges that the timing diagram “is not specific to the device of Figure 27C.” Id. Still, Petitioner contends the Figure 27C circuit “would (or at least obviously could) be supplied with input signals in the same manner and with the same timing” because it includes “the same input and output lines and many of the same transistors as Kimura’s other circuits.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 160–165). According to the timing diagram, the potential of node 13 (V13) is shown at its highest level during period D. See Ex. 1004, Fig. 21B. Petitioner also cites Kimura for teaching that “the potential of the node 13 becomes an H level.” Pet. 18 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 256). Yet Kimura describes the Figure 27C circuit’s operation at period D differently: “[I]n a period D, the potential of the node 13 can be lowered. Therefore, dielectric breakdown or deterioration of the transistor connected to the node 13 (e.g., the transistor 102, the transistor 203, the transistor 205, or the transistor 206) can be prevented.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 286 (emphasis added). And Petitioner cites this very teaching in its analysis of limitation [1-B]. See Pet. 20–21. This inconsistency undermines Petitioner’s argument that “the device of Figure 27C . . . would (or at least obviously could) be supplied with input signals in the same manner and with the same timing.” Id. at 19. In light of this inconsistency, and in the absence of a sufficient explanation as to why Kimura’s teachings about different circuits apply to the Figure 27C circuit on which Petitioner relies, we find Petitioner’s analysis of claim 1 to be deficient. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Kimura.” slip op. at 26
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDecided for petitioner
“presents facts that are different from those in General Plastic because Petitioner here did not use a prior Board decision or a prior preliminary response as a roadmap. Given the lack of road-mapping specific to our proceedings, we find that Factor 3 weighs strongly against exercising discretion to deny institution. Further, we note that “factors 1–3 only weigh in favor of discretionary denial when there are ‘road-mapping’ concerns under factor 3 or other concerns under factor 2.” Code200, UAB v. Bright Data Ltd., IPR2022-00861, Paper 19 at 5 (PTAB Aug. 23, 2022) (precedential) (“Code200”). Although Patent Owner alleges concerns under Factor 2 insofar as Petitioner knew or should have known of the asserted references at the time of the petition in IPR2023-01221 (Prelim. Resp. 9–12; PO Prelim. Sur-reply 2), we find such concerns to be of minimal significance where there is no road-mapping. Thus, we consider Factor 1 in conjunction with Factors 2 and 3 (see Code200 at 5) and find that Factors 1– 3 weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution. Similarly, the timing of the second petition in relation to the filing of the first petition (Factor 4), and when petitioner learned of the prior art (Factor 5), are more pertinent to the situation where the second petition is filed by a party using prior art allegedly newly discovered after receiving the Board’s unfavorable decision, as was the case in General Plastic, or after a preliminary response was filed in the first case. General Plastic at 10. That is not the situation before us here. We also do not agree with Patent Owner (see Prelim. Resp. 4–9) that the interplay between the instant case and the ITC Investigation implicates the same concerns from General Plastic about abuse or gamesmanship from multiple, staggered petitions. See General Plastic at 16–17. As in Code200, we find that “Patent Owner’s concerns of fairness are outweighed by the benefits to the patent system of improving patent quality by reviewing the merits of the challenges raised in the petitions, which have not been addressed to date.” Code200 at 6. Thus, we determine that Factors 4 and 5 do not weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. Regarding Factor 6, Patent Owner argues that “[t]he Board should not expend its finite resources to endorse Petitioner’s second bite at the apple.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Nevertheless, because the earlier proceeding was terminated at Petitioner’s request, the Board has not previously considered the merits of Petitioner’s unpatentability contentions, and the Board’s involvement in the parties’ disputes related to the ’593 patent has been minimal up to this juncture. In the absence of meaningful efficiency concerns, we find that Factor 6 does not weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. For Factor 7, we know of no reason why we could not meet the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination within one year of institution, so we also find that this factor does not weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution. After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s arguments, we conclude that the General Plastic factors weigh against exercising our discretion to deny review.” slip op. at 61
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,330,593
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.