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  • PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00860 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Dilley, Pai, and Wang combination renders the claims obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’573 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the field of content delivery management or networks. Work experience can substitute for formal education and additional formal education can substitute for work experience. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 70). Patent Owner asserts that “the Board does not need to resolve the appropriate level of skill for a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] for purposes of deciding institution because the Petition fails under any articulation of a POSA.” Prelim Resp. 10. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’573 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that no claim terms need to be expressly construed by the Board and all terms should be given their ordinary meaning. Pet. 12. Patent Owner agrees that the Phillips standard applies. Prelim. Resp. 10. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this juncture. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

      “We consider the disclosures of the Provisional Application, which refer to cases 1 and 2, in which requests are redirected to an origin server for lower popularity content and to a parent server for medium popularity content at steps 522 and 524 as shown in Figure 5, respectively, wherein the edge server receives a redirect from the popularity service without a “followme” flag. See Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 43, 44. The Provisional Application also discloses that, by comparison, if there is a “follow-me” redirect sent to the edge server, it obtains and caches a resource as shown at step 528 for higher popularity content. Id. ¶ 44. On this record, as Patent Owner asserts, these disclosures are consistent with technical reasons provided in the Provisional Application for instructing the edge server not to cache unpopular resources. See Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 68–69. In light of these disclosures, we preliminarily find support for Dr. Shenoy’s testimony that, even with the words “instruction to not cache” are not literally recited in the Provisional Application, caching and not caching are alternative options that indicate the instruction to the edge server that will be implemented for each option. See Ex. 2014 ¶ 56. Further, these disclosures provide support for Dr. Shenoy’s testimony that the disclosures “reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the edge server receiving an instruction to not cache the resource (and instead simply forward the redirect).” Id. In re Johnson states that “it is not true that the factual context out of which the question under § 112 arises is immaterial. Quite the contrary. Here, . . . the ‘written description’ in the [] specification supported the claims in the absence of the limitation, and that specification, having described the whole, necessarily described the part remaining.” See Johnson, 558 F.2d at 1019. This is consistent with M.P.E.P. § 2173.05(i) which states, “[i]f alternative elements are positively recited in the specification, they may be explicitly excluded in the claims.” M.P.E.P. § 2173.05(i). Further, “the failure of the specification to specifically mention a limitation that later appears in the claims is not a fatal one when one skilled in the art would recognize upon reading the specification that the new language reflects what the specification shows has been invented.” All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prod., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Even though we do not discern that the Provisional Application explicitly discloses an “instruction to not cache,” at least on this preliminary record, and for the purposes of this Decision, there is positive recital of instructions to cache in the Provisional Application and Petitioner has provided sufficient supporting evidence that caching and not caching are alternative options. Further, there is sufficient evidence, in the context of the disclosures of written description support in the Provisional Application, providing support for Dr. Shenoy’s testimony that Patent Owner had possession of an edge server receiving an instruction to not cache the resource. Nonetheless, we invite additional briefing on these issues, including issues relating to alternative options of caching and not caching. On this preliminary record, we find that the ’573 patent has a priority date of April 2, 2008, which predates the earliest possible date on which Newton-471 could be effective as prior art, September 30, 2014 (the date on which the earliest application in the priority chain of Newton-471 was filed). Accordingly, we preliminarily find that Newton-471 is not prior art to the challenged claims. Thus, on the present record, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claims 1–20 are anticipated by Newton-471.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,924,573
  • PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00806 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the § 103 challenges.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’517 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “application must comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.” Zenon Envtl., Inc. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 506 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 609 (CCPA 1977). To comply with the “written description” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, an applicant must “convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted). The invention claimed does not have to be described in ipsis verbis to satisfy the written description requirement. Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The question of written description support should not be confused, however, with the question of what would have been obvious to the artisan. Whether one skilled in the art would find the claimed invention obvious in view of the disclosure is not an issue in the “written description” inquiry. In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 (CCPA 1977). “A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “motivated to combine Beaumont and Hasan. Pet. 13–14. Petitioner argues that “Beaumont does not describe a specific interface for manually entering [policy and rules] preferences, Hasan discloses a GUI for exactly this type of policy specification.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). Petitioner asserts that Hasan discloses that its Java-based, “platform independent” GUI takes the form of a “familiar tree structure” and allows administrators to “configure device and service configuration data and policy information.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, code (57), 7:7–26, 8:19–29, 18:9–20). Petitioner asserts that the combination of Beaumont and Hasan would have been straightforward, and a person of skill “would have been motivated to incorporate Hasan’s GUI so that administrators could conveniently configure preferences for Beaumont’s DNS servers through an intuitive interface.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–71; Ex. 1007 ¶ 23). Patent Owner does not present any arguments on the rationale to combine. See generally Prelim. Resp. We find that at this juncture Petitioner has presented sufficient rationale to combine Beaumont and Hasan.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “We agree with Patent Owner that its understanding of a policy as a rule is consistent with the disclosure in the ’517 patent that “a policy may be created by generating a decision tree representing the ATC rules.” See Ex. 1001, 9:1–3. We do not agree with Patent Owner, however, that Beaumont in combination with Hasan does not disclose the claimed policy features as claimed. As discussed above, Petitioner relies upon Beaumont in combination with Hasan with its teachings on the use of Java-based GUIs in the form of a tree structure that allows administrators to configure device and service configuration data, as well as policy information. See Ex. 1006, code (57), 7:7–26, 8:19–29. For the policy teachings, Petitioner relies upon Beaumont’s “content provider DNS server that directs requests (traffic) according to a preference table (policy).” Pet. 15–16 (citing Fig. 1, ¶¶ 6, 17, 23). Petitioner also asserts that the Beaumont-Hasan GUI would enable an administrator to set policies for a selected content delivery server to allow setting server preferences and rules. Id. at 17–18 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 76–77). In support, Dr. Lin testifies that: The Beaumont-Hasan GUI would enable an administrator to select a content delivery server (e.g., in Japan) and set policies for that server. Hasan, 8:30–36, 10:25–34, 10:53–67; Beaumont, [0031]. For example, given the description in Hasan, selecting a server would bring up a menu enabling an administrator to assign the preferences shown in Fig. 3 of Beaumont. Hasan, 10:25–34; Beaumont, Figs. 2, 3, [0029]–[0031]. A POSITA would thus have recognized the combined GUI to “support[] the setting of said at least one policy using a decision tree representing rules” because it is presented in a “familiar tree structure” and would allow users to set server preferences and rules. Ex. 1003 ¶ 77 (emphasis added). Beaumont provides support for Dr. Lin’s testimony. Beaumont discloses that “rules such as selecting one [a server] based on user preferences can be used . . . [f]or example, a preference number can be assigned to each content delivery server and a destination domain.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 31. Beaumont further states that “FIG. 3 shows an illustrative example of incorporating preference numbers in a column.” Id. Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Beaumont discloses that rules or policies, represented by the preference number, are represented in the table shown in Figure 3 of Beaumont. Dr. Lin also testifies that in the Beaumont-Hasan combination “the GUI supports the setting of” policy is taught. Ex. 1003 ¶ 77. Hasan provides support that service policies can be modified by the use of a GUI. See Ex. 1006, 8:30–36, 10:25–34, 10:53–67. Accordingly, in the combination of Beaumont and Hasan, wherein the preference database is replaced by the GUI decision tree, Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence at this juncture that the combination of Beaumont and Hasan teaches that the GUI obtains a policy, the preference number, for the direction of network traffic, where the GUI supports the setting of the policy using a decision tree representing rules.” slip op. at 19

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,645,517
  • PTAB · Feb 8, 2023 · IPR2022-01335 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 19, 20, and 37–52 based on the §103 combination of Hardin and Salmre, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the Petition, the arguments presented in the Preliminary Response, as well as all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge of at least one claim of the ’447 patent as unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all Challenged Claims of the ’447 patent on the ground stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 3

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther

      “(1) Petitioner asserts that substantially the same two claim limitations lack written description support in the ’094 application and U.S. Patent Application No. 13/856,392 (“the ’392 application”) (compare Pet. 23–29, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 (petition) at 23–28); (2) Petitioner asserts that because these limitations lack written description support in the ’094 and ’392 applications, the Challenged Claims are not entitled to the priority date of either of these applications and, therefore, Hardin ’665 (the pre-issuance publication of the ’094 application) is available as prior art to the Challenged Claims (compare Pet. 1, 2, 28–29, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 at 1, 2, 28–29);” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “(3) Petitioner asserts that the same combination of references— Hardin ’665 and Salmre—would have rendered the subject matter of the claims challenged in each petition obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (compare Pet. 29–64, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 at 29–66); (4) Petitioner asserts the same reasons with rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre as proposed with a reasonable expectation of success (compare Pet. 65–71, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 at 66–71);” slip op. at 15

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (compare Prelim. Resp. 61–66, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 9 at 61–66);” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,984,447
  • PTAB · Feb 8, 2023 · IPR2022-01334 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 18 and 21–36 on the Hardin and Salmre obviousness ground, finding a reasonable likelihood of success.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the Petition, the arguments presented in the Preliminary Response, as well as all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge of at least one claim of the ’447 patent as unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all Challenged Claims of the ’447 patent on the ground stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 3

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “lack written description support in the ’094 application and U.S. Patent Application No. 13/856,392 (“the ’392 application”) (compare Pet. 23–28, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 (petition) at 23–28); (2) Petitioner asserts that because these limitations lack written description support in the ’094 and ’392 applications, the Challenged Claims are not entitled to the priority date of either of these applications and, therefore, Hardin ’665 (the pre-issuance publication of the ’094 application) is available as prior art to the Challenged Claims (compare Pet. 1, 2, 28–29, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 at 1, 2, 28–29);” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Hardin ’665 and Salmre—would have rendered the subject matter of the claims challenged in each petition obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (compare Pet. 29–62, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 at 29–66); (4) Petitioner asserts the same reasons with rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre as proposed with a reasonable expectation of success (compare Pet. 59–65, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 4 at 66–71);” slip op. at 15

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (compare Prelim. Resp. 61–66, with IPR2022-01333, Paper 9 at 61–66);” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,984,447
  • PTAB · Feb 8, 2023 · IPR2022-01329 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 19–28, 33, and 34, finding a reasonable likelihood that Hardin ’665 and Salmre render them obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable 1 Petitioner’s Preliminary Reply is limited to the issue of discretionary denial pursuant to Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), and, particularly, the effect of Samsung’s stipulation in related litigation, in accordance with Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther

      “(1) Petitioner asserts that substantially the same two claim limitations lack written description support in the ’094 application and U.S. Patent Application No. 13/856,392 (“the ’392 application”) (compare Pet. 23–27, with IPR2022-01327, Paper 4 (petition) at 23–27); (2) Petitioner asserts that because these limitations lack written description support in the ’094 and ’392 applications, the Challenged Claims are not entitled to the priority date of either of these applications and, therefore, Hardin ’665 (the pre-issuance publication of the ’094 application) is available as prior art to the Challenged Claims (compare Pet. 1, 2, 27–28, with IPR2022-01327, Paper 4 at 1, 2, 27–28);” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “(3) Petitioner asserts that the same combination of references— Hardin ’665 and Salmre—would have rendered the subject matter of the claims challenged in each petition obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (compare Pet. 28–62, with IPR2022-01327, Paper 4 at 28–63); (4) Petitioner asserts the same reasons with rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre as proposed with a reasonable expectation of success (compare Pet. 62–68, with IPR2022-01327, Paper 4 at 63–69);” slip op. at 16

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “(6) Patent Owner relies on the same argument and evidence to assert that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (compare Prelim. Resp. 61–66, with IPR2022-01327, Paper 9 at 61–66);” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,049,387
  • PTAB · Feb 8, 2023 · IPR2022-01328 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 under § 103 over Hardin ’665 and Salmre, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable 1 Petitioner’s Preliminary Reply is limited to the issue of discretionary denial pursuant to Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), and, particularly, the effect of Samsung’s stipulation in related litigation, in accordance with Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther

      “Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in IPR2022-01327, Paper 13, we: (1) determine, based on the present record, that the Challenged Claims of the ’387 patent are not entitled to the priority date of the ’094 application, and, therefore, Hardin ’665 is available as prior art to the ’387 patent; (2) determine that, on balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Hardin ’665 and Salmre would have rendered the subject matter of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 of the ’387 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; (3) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Fintiv; and (4) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedOther

      “Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in IPR2022-01327, Paper 13, we: (1) determine, based on the present record, that the Challenged Claims of the ’387 patent are not entitled to the priority date of the ’094 application, and, therefore, Hardin ’665 is available as prior art to the ’387 patent; (2) determine that, on balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Hardin ’665 and Salmre would have rendered the subject matter of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 of the ’387 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; (3) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Fintiv; and (4) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in IPR2022-01327, Paper 13, we: (1) determine, based on the present record, that the Challenged Claims of the ’387 patent are not entitled to the priority date of the ’094 application, and, therefore, Hardin ’665 is available as prior art to the ’387 patent; (2) determine that, on balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Hardin ’665 and Salmre would have rendered the subject matter of claims 10–18, 31, and 32 of the ’387 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; (3) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Fintiv; and (4) decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 17

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,049,387
  • PTAB · Feb 8, 2023 · IPR2022-01330 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 based on the obviousness ground using Hardin ’665 and Salmre.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’418 patent, namely, claims 1–10, based on the sole ground presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “lack written description support in U.S. Application No. 12/434,094 (“the ’094 application”) and U.S. Patent Application No. 13/856,392 (“the ’392 application”) (compare Pet. 22–26, with IPR2022-01331, Paper 4 at 22–26 (petition)); (2) Petitioner asserts that because these limitations lack written description support in the ’094 and ’392 applications, the challenged claims are not entitled to the priority date of either of these applications, and, therefore, Hardin ’665 (the pre-issuance publication of the ’094 application) is available as prior art to the challenged claims (compare Pet. 1, 2, 26–27, with IPR2022-01331, Paper 4 at 1, 2, 26–27);” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “(3) Petitioner asserts that the same combination of references— Hardin ’665 and Salmre—would have rendered the subject matter of the claims challenged in each petition obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (compare Pet. 27–70, with IPR2022-01331, Paper 4 at 27–69); (4) Petitioner asserts the same reasons with rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre as proposed with a reasonable expectation of success (compare Pet. 64–70, with IPR2022-01331, Paper 4 at 64–69);” slip op. at 16

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (compare Prelim. Resp. 61–66, with IPR2022-01331, Paper 10 at 61–66);” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,779,418
  • PTAB · Feb 7, 2023 · IPR2022-01333 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim was obvious over Hardin ’665 and Salmre.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We reviewed Petitioner’s uncontested evidence and arguments and determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over Hardin and Salmre.” slip op. at 32

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a comparable field of study and at least five years of professional experience in mobile or location-based computing or other relevant academic experience. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38–41). Patent Owner, at this stage of the proceeding, does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 46. Mr. Denning, however, applies Mr. Williams’ level of ordinary skill in the art in Mr. Denning’s Declaration in support in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. Ex. 2001 ¶ 26.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that “no express claim constructions are necessary, and the claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding.” Pet. 22–23. Patent Owner submits that it “do[es] not believe the Board needs to construe any terms.” Prelim. Resp. 33. We determine that an express construction of any claim term is not necessary for purposes of this Decision because none are in dispute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 13

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “regarding the state of the art, the more predictable field of mechanical/electrical technologies, and the relatively high level of skill in the art, on the present record, there is a disconnect between what the ’094 application discloses and the specific limitation of the Challenged Claims at issue, which requires that the application program makes a request to reserve a geographic area of interest. In addition to the ’094 application’s failure to disclose this limitation expressly, the ’094 application fails to reasonably convey to one of ordinary skill in the art any hint, suggestion, or indication that Patent Owner possessed an invention in which an application program makes such a request. To the contrary, based on our review and the present record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’094 application consistently and repeatedly discloses that a sponsor makes such a request and does not attribute that action expressly, inherently, or otherwise to any other aspect of the invention. See, e.g., Pet. 13 (identifying several instances where the ’094 application attributes that action to a sponsor).” slip op. at 24

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,984,447
  • PTAB · Feb 7, 2023 · IPR2022-01331 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 11–18 based on obviousness over Hardin ’665 and Salmre; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success, including because the claims likely lack the asserted priority date.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’418 patent, namely, claims 11–18, based on the sole ground presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “the time of the invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a comparable field of study and at least five years of professional experience in mobile or location-based computing or other relevant academic experience.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38–41).” slip op. at 15

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “regarding the state of the art, the more predictable field of mechanical/electrical technologies, and the relatively high level of skill in the art, on the present record, there is a disconnect between what the ’094 application discloses and the specific limitation of the challenged claims at issue, which recites that the application program makes a request to reserve a geographic area of interest. In addition to the ’094 application’s failure to disclose this limitation expressly, the ’094 application fails to reasonably convey to one of ordinary skill in the art any hint, suggestion, or indication that Patent Owner possessed an invention in which an application program makes such a request. To the contrary, based on our review of the present record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’094 application consistently and repeatedly discloses that a sponsor makes such a request and does not attribute that action expressly, inherently, or otherwise to any other aspect of the invention. See, e.g., Pet. 13 (identifying several instances where the ’094 application attributes that action to a sponsor).” slip op. at 27

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “c. Differences Between the Prior Art and the Claims Petitioner sets forth a detailed analysis showing how the combined teachings of the references meet the elements of claims 11–18. Pet. 27–69. In particular, Petitioner relies on Hardin ’665 as teaching most of the limitations of the claims, but relies on Salmre to meet the claim limitations reciting application programs on mobile devices that can reserve geographic areas and a content delivery platform that can be implemented on the same mobile device as the application program. Id. at 28. Additionally, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 64–69. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not raise an argument responding to Petitioner’s challenge based on Hardin ’665 and Salmre aside from whether the ’418 patent claims are entitled to the priority date of the ’094 application, an issue we addressed above (see supra Part III.C.). We have reviewed Petitioner’s uncontested argument and evidence regarding the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre, and we find, for the reasons provided by Petitioner and on the preliminary record before us, that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combined teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre satisfy the limitations of the claims, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason with rational underpinning to combine the teachings as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 36

    § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,779,418
  • PTAB · Feb 7, 2023 · IPR2022-01327 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–9, 29, and 30 on the § 103 ground over Hardin ’665 and Salmre.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s uncontested argument and evidence regarding the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre, and we find, for the reasons provided by Petitioner and on the preliminary record before us, that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combined teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre satisfy the elements of the claims, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason with rational underpinning to combine the teachings as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Analogous artInstituted

      “Differences Between the Prior Art and the Claims; Motivation to Modify Petitioner sets forth a detailed analysis showing how the combined teachings of the references meet the elements of claims 1–9, 29, and 30. Pet. 28–63. In particular, Petitioner relies on Hardin ’665 as teaching most of the elements of the claims, but relies, on Salmre to meet the claim elements reciting application programs on mobile devices that can reserve geographic areas and a content delivery platform that can be implemented on the same mobile device as the application program. Id. at 29. Additionally, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 63–69.” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Differences Between the Prior Art and the Claims; Motivation to Modify Petitioner sets forth a detailed analysis showing how the combined teachings of the references meet the elements of claims 1–9, 29, and 30. Pet. 28–63. In particular, Petitioner relies on Hardin ’665 as teaching most of the elements of the claims, but relies, on Salmre to meet the claim elements reciting application programs on mobile devices that can reserve geographic areas and a content delivery platform that can be implemented on the same mobile device as the application program. Id. at 29. Additionally, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hardin ’665 and Salmre with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 63–69.” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

      “Objective Considerations of Nonobviousness Neither party presents evidence of objective considerations of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding.” slip op. at 34

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,049,387
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