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  • PTAB · Dec 17, 2025 · IPR2025-01280 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Laut, Kincaid, and Bongiovi.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons given below we determine the information presented in the Petition demonstrates there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’925 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther

      “The Board’s Preliminary Analysis — Rationale to Combine Kincaid with Laut At this stage of the proceeding, based on the express disclosures of Kincaid and Laut, we are persuaded Petitioner’s rationale is sufficient to show that a “POSITA would seek to ensure consistent loudness across tracks to maximize customer satisfaction and would thus be motivated to combine Kincaid with Laut in order to correct these problems.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65). Moreover, we credit Mr. Rosenblatt’s testimony that the “POSITA’s motivation would have been at least partially financial: improving the listeners’ experiences could increase demand for the jukebox, leading to” slip op. at 19

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’925 patent “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree and a Masters [sic] degree in Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as one to two years of academic or industry experience in computer-based systems for digital audio distribution and playback, or comparable industry experience.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 28). Petitioner further asserts that the ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been knowledgeable about audio signal processing techniques, such as gain normalization and dynamic range compression, and software engineering.” Id. At this stage, Patent Owner does not specifically address the level of skill of the ordinary artisan. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’925 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Patent Owner incorrectly interprets the issued ’925 patent claim terms under BRI. Prelim. Resp. 2. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, we decline to consider Patent Owner’s proposed constructions for claim 1 under the legally incorrect broadest reasonable interpretation standard, which is only applicable during prosecution before a patent examiner. As emphasized above, in interpreting the claims of the ’925 patent, we “us[e] the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2023). We further emphasize that we construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on our review of the current record, we determine that no express construction of any term is necessary to resolve this case for purposes of institution. We leave it to the parties to further develop during under the proper Phillips standard applied to IPR proceedings. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,146,925
  • PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01046 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 2–15, finding a reasonable likelihood that the 1946 Cyclopedia, Lindström, and Wong render at least claim 2 obvious; claim 1 was disclaimed.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is incorrect, “because design or analysis experience with other industrial wheeled vehicles would not necessarily be applicable to the art of the ’892 Patent.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶¶ 38–39). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars.” Id. (citing Ex. 2035 ¶¶ 34, 38). The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years 5 Because Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed claim 1, this ground is moot. Patent Owner, however, disagrees that the experience should include designing or analyzing “similar vehicles.” Prelim. Resp. 12. At this stage, for the reasons below, limiting the ordinary skill in the art to “at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars” does not affect our analysis of the parties’ dispute or our determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to determine whether review should be instituted.” slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge would not.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 39). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “At this stage, we need not construe expressly any claim term to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “been obvious over the 1946 Cyclopedia and Wong. Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner provides sufficient rational underpinning for its assertion that it would have been obvious in view of Wong to implement a cross-wise extending beam to reinforce the 1946 Cyclopedia’s NSC ore car’s end slope sheet. Pet. 52–53; Prelim. Resp. 28– 30. In response to Petitioner’s assertion that “[t]he upper, outboard end of [Wong’s slope sheet 26] is reinforced by a cross-wise, L-shaped beam positioned under the slope sheet,” Patent Owner argues that “Wong does not provide reinforcement, but simply shows two sheets being connected for lading containment and load transfer.” Pet. 52; Prelim. Resp. 29. At this stage, we find Petitioner has the better position. Although we agree with Patent Owner that Wong shows two sheets connected to one another, that does not negate Petitioner’s correct observation that Wong shows an upper end of its end slope sheet 26 resting on an L-shaped structure, which apparently would reinforce end slope sheet. Pet. 52; Ex. 1003 ¶ 56. reason to look to Wong in the first place,” we again find that Petitioner has the better position at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 29. For example, Wong’s disclosure of “hopper railcar 10” (Ex. 1006, 3:6–9) and the 1946 Cyclopedia’s disclosure of “Freight Cars: Hopper Ore” (Ex. 1004, 27–28; Ex. 1054, 27–28) support Petitioner’s position that “Wong and the 1946 Cyclopedia are in the same field.” Pet. 52; see also id. at 76 (“Wong discloses a rail road hopper car (‘hopper railcar’ 10)”), 18–19 (“The ore-car section of the 1946 Cyclopedia—entitled ‘Freight Cars: Hopper Ore’— contains drawings and a photograph of an ore car manufactured by Patent Owner NSC.”); Ex. 1003 ¶ 56 (“Wong and the 1946 Cyclopedia are in the same field of hopper railcars”) (citing Ex. 1004, 27–28; Ex. 1006, code [57]). This position is not persuasively rebutted by Patent Owner’s argument that Wong’s hopper railcar 10 uses aluminum and steel together for certain reasons. Prelim. Resp. 28–29.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,166,892
  • PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01047 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–44 on all presented challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that FreightCar would prevail on at least one claim based on Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–44 of the ’515 patent on all presented challenges. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2024) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars.” Pet. 29; Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner, however, disagrees that the experience should include designing or analyzing “similar vehicles.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage, for the reasons below, limiting the ordinary skill in the art to “at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars” does not affect our analysis of the parties’ dispute or our determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to determine whether review should be instituted. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “to further support the upper, outboard end of the slope sheet with a crosswise, L-shaped beam as in Wong,” and one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so, because of “the benefits of reinforcing the slope sheet at its upper end, where its connection with another structure creates a stress concentration.” Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108). Petitioner points to Hart’s transverse beam b3 and argues that it suggests using a transverse beam like Wong if Hart is modified so that upper beam b3 no longer supports the slope sheet. Id. (citing Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Petitioner also argues that the references are in the same field and that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 63–64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108; Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Based on the preliminary record, Petitioner shows that its proposed combination of Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong teaches or suggests the above-quoted limitations of claim 24 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 19

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,132,515
  • PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01026 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because the Baliarda-543 challenges met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we 1 Petitioner filed a confidential version of the Petition as Paper 3 and a public version of the Petition as Paper 4. We cite to the public version of the Petition. institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 in the ’677 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill as of the ’677 patent’s effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 40. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 17. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’677 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:26–6:47, 42:47–44:61, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2.” slip op. at 23

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term, phrase, or limitation requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Although “Dou does not require its ‘diversity antenna architecture’ to provide spatial diversity,” Dou nevertheless requires a wireless device with some type of diversity antenna architecture. See, e.g., Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 14, 17–18, 22–24, 30, 32–34, codes (54), (57), claims 1 and 16. As an example, Dou’s independent claim 1 covering a “wireless device” requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 1. As another example, Dou’s independent claim 16 covering a “wireless device” also requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 16. As yet another example, Dou’s Abstract describes a “wireless device” including a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at code (57). Petitioner does not explain how the proposed combination provides anything other than spatial diversity. See Pet. 33–35; Prelim. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118–124. Based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that with Ciais-Quadband’s antenna used for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208, the two identical quadband antennas would have:” slip op. at 46

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,031,677
  • PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01027 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Baliarda-543 anticipates or renders obvious those claims.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Regarding spatial diversity, Dou explains that a first internal antenna and a second internal antenna “may be separated by a distance (D) that is no less than the quarter wavelength (>=λ/4) of the lowest frequency.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 24; see Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 35, 44. Consistent with Dou’s preference for at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas at the lowest frequency, “a commonly accepted rule of thumb is that at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas is necessary to provide effective spatial diversity.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 33, 35, 47. Effective spatial diversity requires sufficient spacing between antennas because that technique “uses multiple antennas to improve signal reliability and performance by mitigating the effects of multipath fading and other interference.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 33. “Multipath fading occurs when a wireless signal propagates along multiple different paths of differing lengths because of interactions with obstacles, resulting in portions of the signal energy arriving at a receiver with different phases slightly offset in time.” Id. Locations insufficiently separated in terms of wavelength “tend to experience similar fading and interference characteristics.” Id. Thus, closely spaced antennas “cannot provide effective spatial diversity.” Id. By providing sufficient spacing between antennas, however, “the likelihood increases that at least one of the antennas will be positioned at a location where the multipath or other interference is relatively low, thereby improving overall signal quality and reliability.” Id. As Patent Owner contends, the proposed combination modifies Dou’s ground plane 310 to replicate Jing’s ground plane with dimensions of 36 mm × 60 mm and limits “the extent of Dou’s ground plane 310 so that it [does] not extend behind Jing’s antenna at 306, just like Dou does not extend it behind antenna 308.” See Pet. 35–36; Prelim. Resp. 20 (quoting Pet. 35); Prelim. Sur-reply 1; Ex. 1007 ¶ 120; Ex. 2010 ¶ 45. The lowest frequency of Jing’s antenna is 900 MHz. Ex. 1011, 2657–58; see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118, 154; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 37, 44. The wavelength (λ) corresponding to a frequency of 900 MHz is 333.3 mm, and a quarter wavelength (λ/4) is 83.3 mm. Ex. 2010 ¶ 44. In the proposed combination, a distance of 60 mm separates the” slip op. at 49

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “To satisfy the written-description requirement, the inventor must have possession of the claimed invention as interpreted to encompass an allegedly infringing product. See Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1319–22; ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1372–73, 1377–79. For purposes of the written-description requirement, the “invention” is “whatever is now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis omitted). Based on the current record, and as Petitioner asserts, LTE band 12 was not available for “use with mobile communications” or “use in any cellular communication, let alone LTE or 4G communication,” as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 229, 231; Pet. 76–77. For instance, a Federal Communications Commission report adopted on July 31, 2007, notes that the 698-806 MHz spectrum “currently is occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” Ex. 1045, 1, 3; see Ex. 1007 ¶ 231. The 698-806 MHz spectrum includes LTE band 12 with 698-716 MHz for uplink and 728-746 MHz for downlink. See Ex. 1026, 11 (Table 1); Ex. 1039, 498 (Table 20.1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute that as of July 31, 2007, the 698-806 MHz spectrum was “occupied by television broadcasters in TV Channels 52-69.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–3, 23–30; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Thus, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that as of the ’429 application’s December 21, 2006, filing date, the ’429 application did not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of “an antenna configured to send or receive signals in the 698-806 MHz spectrum,” including LTE band 12 that Patent Owner relies on in the Geotab litigation, for “communication with any ‘4G communication standard’ because those frequencies were not usable for any mobile device communications at the time of filing.” See Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 231, 233–234, 236–237; Ex. 1045, 1, 3; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, based on the current record, Petitioner demonstrates a” slip op. at 63

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,349,200
  • PTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00404 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, 19, 26, 28–41, and 43–46 on both obviousness grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have been someone with at least (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related scientific field, and (2) either (a) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related field, or (b) two or more years of work or research experience in wireless networking and/or computing.” Pet. 13” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Petitioner identifies the term “client side modem functionality” in claim 5 for construction. Pet. 14. Patent Owner does not address the construction of this term. See Prelim. Resp. 4–6. We determine that we do not need to construe the term “client side modem functionality” for purposes of this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Patent Owner argues that the terms “first communication technology,” “second communication technology,” and “third communication technology” should “be understood to have their plain meaning wherein each of these recited communication technologies is a different communication technology.” Prelim. Resp. 5. For purposes of this decision, we will apply Patent Owner’s understanding of these terms. However, we note that Patent Owner does not explain what it means by a “different” communication technology, or how to determine whether two communication technologies qualify as “different.” Id. at 5–6. The parties may wish to explore the meaning of this term further during the trial.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,413,502
  • PTAB · Jul 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00308 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claim 1, finding a reasonable likelihood it would be shown obvious over Darnell and Kim; it did not reach the Dasgupta and Kim ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner describes a person of ordinary skill in the art as a person having “a bachelor’s degree in computer science and two years’ experience in cloud computing or a similar field, or a master’s degree in computer science or similar field.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 1–55, 119–122). Patent Owner describes a person of ordinary skill in the art as a person having “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and approximately 3 years of experience working with content management systems and graphical user interfaces; or a more advanced degree such a master’s or doctorate with proportionally less work experience.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner and Patent Owner’s descriptions of a person of ordinary skill are similar, although Patent Owner’s proposal is slightly more experienced. Both appear to be reasonably consistent with the subject matter of the ’068 patent. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description, which is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 121; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). C.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the current record, we credit Dr. Martin’s testimony and preliminarily determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “real time” as it is used in the context of the ’068 patent means to provide or transmit content when it is available without significant delay. This, however, does not resolve the issue of whether, as Petitioner contends, the claims require that content must be streamed in “real time” to just a “master server,” or as Patent Owner contends, content must also be streamed in “real time” to a “master webpage.”” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of aggregating and presenting multiple feed sources to a user.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 390–391). Petitioner notes, for example, that “Darnell addresses ‘[l]ooking through a dense list of content items to locate items of interest,’ which is cumbersome for a user,” and Kim “similarly addresses the problem of viewing multiple pieces of fragmented content from news sources, blog entries, email, and the like in a ‘consuming experience having significant drawbacks.’” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 391; Ex. 1004 ¶ 9; Ex. 1005 ¶ 1). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kim’s teachings for aggregating news, blog entries, and email in a network computer and sending the feeds to a remote computer for display in a UI to be suitable for use with Darnell’s feed reader architecture, in which content feed sources are aggregated on a remote server instead of at the user device. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–24; Ex. 1002 ¶ 391). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have also been motivated to implement Kim’s identification of “traits” and the organization of the user interface based on those traits in Darnell’s feed aggregation system. Id., ¶ 392. A POSITA would have been further motivated to implement Kim’s feed application, email application, media application, and photo application using Darnell’s server system 104 rather than on user devices, because doing so would allow users to access personalized content feeds on any user device (e.g., phone, computer, tablet, etc.) instead of only on a single user device. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 392–395). Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have further understood Darnell and Kim to be compatible because they disclose content feed aggregators with a similar user experience—aggregating multiple content feeds from different sources into a unified user interface displayed on a user device. Darnell, Abstract, ¶¶ 8, 11–14, 30–32, 37–38, Fig. 1; Kim, Abstract, ¶¶ 20–23, 37, Fig. 1; Martin, ¶¶ 396-397. Thus, a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Kim’s additional feed types and feed processing on a server instead of the user device based on Darnell’s teachings.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,334,068
  • PTAB · Jul 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00307 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 on all four § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Darnell and Kim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Settled expectationsDecided for patent owner

      “or “Petition”), to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,729,658 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’658 patent”). On March 28, 2025, the Board issued a notice extending the deadline for discretion briefing pursuant to the bifurcated discretionary denial review process that applies to proceedings with a patent owner preliminary response due after March 26, 2025.1 Paper 10. On May 1, 2025, RazDog Holdings LLC (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response, Paper 12 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Patent Owner filed a request for discretionary denial. Paper 11. Petitioner filed an opposition to Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial. Paper 13. On May 16, 2025, the Acting Director issued a decision denying Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial and referring the petition to the Board. Paper 18.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the current record, we credit Dr. Martin’s testimony and preliminarily determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “real time” as it is used in the context of the ’658 patent means to provide or transmit content when it is available without significant delay. This, however, does not resolve the issue of whether, as Petitioner contends, the claims require that content must be streamed in “real time” to just a “master server,” or as Patent Owner contends, content must also be streamed in “real time” to a “master webpage.”” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of aggregating and presenting multiple feed sources to users.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 146). Petitioner notes, for example, that “Darnell addresses ‘[l]ooking through a dense list of content items to locate items of interest,’ which is cumbersome for users,” and Kim “similarly addresses the problem of viewing multiple pieces of fragmented content from news sources, blog entries, email, and the like in a ‘consuming experience having significant drawbacks.’” Pat. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 146; Ex. 1004 ¶ 9; Ex. 1005 ¶ 1). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kim’s teachings for aggregating news, blog entries, and email in a network computer and sending the feeds to a remote computer for display in a UI to be suitable for use with Darnell’s feed reader architecture, in which content feed sources are aggregated on a remote server instead of at the user device. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–24; Ex. 1002 ¶ 146). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have also been motivated to implement Kim’s identification of “traits” and the organization of the UI based on those traits in Darnell’s feed aggregation system. Id., ¶147. POSITAs would have been further motivated to implement Kim’s feed application, email application, media application, and photo application using Darnell’s server system 104 rather than on user devices, because doing so would allow users to access personalized content feeds on any device (e.g., phone, computer, tablet, etc.) instead of only on a single device. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 147–150). Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have further understood Darnell’s and Kim’s compatibility because they disclose content feed aggregators with a similar user experience—aggregating multiple content feeds from different sources into a unified UI displayed on user devices. Darnell, Abstract, ¶¶ 8, 11–14, 30–32, 37–38, Fig. 1; Kim, Abstract, ¶¶ 20–23, 37, Fig. 1; Martin, ¶¶ 151–152. Thus, POSITAs would have been motivated to implement Kim’s additional feed types and feed processing on a server instead of user devices based on Darnell’s teachings.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,729,658
  • PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00188 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–10, finding a reasonable likelihood that Cisco would prevail on the §103 challenge based on EDC_525, EDC_892, and Hanif.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review. B. Real Party in Interest” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner’s reading and interpretation of the stipulation. Petitioner’s stipulation states that “Petitioner will not pursue in the co-pending district court litigation (WSOU Investments, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00332 (E.D. Tex.)) the specific grounds asserted in the IPR2025-00188 petition, or any other ground that could have been reasonably raised against Challenged Claims 1 through 10 of U.S. Patent No. 8982691 in an IPR.” Paper 7, 2 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s reservation of rights also states that “Petitioner does not relinquish any rights or opportunities to pursue in the co-pending district court litigation (WSOU Investments, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00332 (E.D. Tex.)) any ground on which the PTAB declines to institute an IPR trial. Id. (emphasis added). When read together, Petitioner’s stipulation limits Petitioner to pursue in district court a “ground on which the PTAB declines to institute an IPR trial.” This means that the Board must first have “decline[d] to institute” a “ground” in “an IPR trial” before the Petitioner would be allowed to pursue that “ground” in the “co-pending district court litigation.” In our view, Patent Owner misinterprets and overstates Petitioner’s limited reservation of rights in its Sotera stipulation. In Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corporation, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”), the Board considered a stipulation similar to the one Petitioner now offers in its “mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions,” and determined that “Petitioner’s broad stipulation ensures that an inter partes review is a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding.” Id. at 19. Following the analysis in Sotera, we find that Petitioner’s stipulation weighs strongly against exercising discretion to deny institution. See Sotera at 18– 19.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner provides sufficient evidence and argument for combining the teachings of the asserted art in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Patent Owner does not substantively dispute Petitioner’s evidence or arguments for combining the asserted references. Based on this preliminary record, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that at the time of the claimed invention a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of the asserted art in the manner described by the Petition.” slip op. at 32

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner describes a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) as a person having “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of network communications and would be knowledgeable regarding MPLS techniques.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). According to Petitioner, “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but “submits that the above POSITA at the time of the ’691 Patent may alternatively have additional years of practical and 2 The ’691 patent was filed before the March 16, 2013, effective date of the §103 provisions in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29. Ex. 1001, code (22). Accordingly, we cite to pre-AIA § 103(a). technical education, and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 28–29. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the subject matter of the ’691 patent. This is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Houh. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 8

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,982,691
  • PTAB · May 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00050 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR of claims 1–3 and 5 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Walker.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 5. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of those claims. We do not address claims 4 and 6–13 because Patent Owner disclaimed those claims. See Exs. 2001, 2008; Prelim. Resp. 30; Supp. Prelim. Resp. 3.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “Jury trial in the Related Litigation is currently scheduled to begin on June 22, 2026. Ex. 1008, 16. The statutory deadline for issuing a Final Written Decision predates the trial by approximately one month. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner was not diligent in filing the Petition, and this factor favors discretionary denial. Supp. Prelim. Resp. 2. Petitioner argues that Factor 2 favors institution because that Final Written Decision date precedes the scheduled trial date and also because based on the median time to trial for Judge Noreika, the judge presiding over the Related Litigation, the anticipated trial date would be in December 2026. Pet. Supp. Resp. 2. Petitioner also points out that even based on the median time to trial in the District of Delaware, the trial in the Related Litigation would occur in October 2026. Id.; Pet. 72. We agree with Petitioner that based on median time-to-trial statistics for the District of Delaware and for Judge Noreika, the Final Written Decision in this proceeding would issue a few months before the anticipated trial date and a month before the currently scheduled trial date. Exs. 1007, 1012. This factor therefore weighs against exercising our discretion to deny institution.5” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “Walker discloses that during normal television viewing, a broadcast program is provided to and displayed on an interactive television system and a streaming version of the broadcast program is provided to a television distribution facility in advance of the broadcast. Ex. 1005 ¶ 10. Walker explains that if a user requests a playback control function, the interactive television system may switch from displaying the broadcast television program to the streaming version of the program. Id. When switching, the system may switch to displaying the streaming version of the program at the same point in time in the program that the user was viewing in the broadcast program. Id.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner contends that “[b]ecause the asserted prior art discloses embodiments within the indisputable scope of the claims, the Board need not construe the outer bounds of the claims.” Pet. 3. Petitioner lists several terms and proffers its position on the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms. Id. at 4–6. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s claim construction positions. Prelim. Resp. 5. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no term requires express construction.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,880,592
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