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  • PTAB · Jun 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00343 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 based on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim and declining discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “The Petition, to justify institution of review, must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine that the Petition has met this standard. Further, we decline to discretionarily deny inter partes review. Therefore, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–7 of the ’052 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

      “The Board has set forth a two-part framework for this determination under § 325(d): (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 45

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

      “B. Analysis The Interim Procedure instructs that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.”” slip op. at 52

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In this proceeding, Patent Owner has not challenged Petitioner’s definition for an ordinarily skilled artisan. See generally Prelim. Resp. In the Qualcomm litigation, however, Patent Owner described a person of ordinary skill in the art as having: a Bachelor of Science (or equivalent) degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and 2–3 years of work experience in very large-scale integrated (“VLSI”) systems, such as application-specific integrated circuits (“ASICs”), application-specific standard parts (“ASSPs”), system-on-chip (“SoC”), or field programmable gate arrays (“FPGAs”), and has an understanding of on-chip interconnection networks. Ex. 1017, 11. In this proceeding, Petitioner’s definition is uncontested and appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’052 patent (“Specification”) and in the asserted prior-art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions in this Decision if we were to adopt the definition that Patent Owner set forth in the Qualcomm litigation. To the extent the parties dispute the definition of an ordinarily skilled artisan during” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,594,052
  • PTAB · Jun 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00338 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–6 and 9–16 on all asserted challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES “Whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication under § 102 is a legal conclusion based on underlying fact findings.” Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In an inter partes review, a petitioner has “the burden to prove” that a reference “is a printed publication.” Id.” slip op. at 24

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “combined throughput and latency guarantee (GT), or be best effort (BE), with an unspecified finite latency upper bound,” an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that one channel is “independently configurable” for “a combined throughput and latency guarantee (GT)” and that another channel is “independently configurable” for “best effort (BE), with an unspecified finite latency upper bound.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 103; Ex. 1005, 3. Petitioner quotes that disclosure in Goossens2002 when explaining what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood. Pet. 28 (quoting Ex. 1005, 3). Accordingly, we disagree with Patent Owner that Petitioner provides “no explanation” why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have” slip op. at 44

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,373,449
  • PTAB · Dec 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01046 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and 16–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the obviousness grounds based on Chalom and Aslan, with Grau or Pace for certain claims.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). We have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Based on the current record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review. slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but offers a definition of its own. Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s or master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, electrical and computer engineering, computer science, or similar educational background; or equivalent on-the-job training, including approximately two to three years of experience in machine learning and/or pattern recognition.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 21). Patent Owner asserts that the “level of skill is approximate and more experience would compensate for less formal education and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 21). We note that the differences between the parties’ descriptions are immaterial and find Petitioner’s description to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’985 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision, albeit without the two instances of “at least,” which introduce ambiguity. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that it “applied plain and ordinary meanings of all terms and no express constructions are required here.” Pet. 5. Patent Owner “agrees with Petitioner that there are no claim terms that require construction for purposes of the Board’s decision on institution.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage in the proceeding, and without further argument from the parties, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review). We note that this determination does not preclude the parties from arguing their proposed constructions of the claims during trial, as permitted by our rules and binding precedent. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that claim construction, in general, is an issue to be addressed at trial. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “related fields, in that they disclose similar techniques of using machine learning for image processing (e.g., using image data to train MLAs to correct the gaze of a video-conferencing user). Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:21–32; Ex. 1007 ¶ 24). Petitioner also contends both “Chalom and Aslan are at least reasonably pertinent to a problem identified in the ’985 Patent of high accuracy MLAs often consuming more computational resources and being slower to run, as compared to efficient MLAs tending to provide less accurate predictions.” Id. at 42 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:24–30; Ex. 1007 ¶ 45). Thus, “Chalom and Aslan are at least reasonably pertinent to this efficiency- 4 It has been held that where the claimed subject matter involves more than the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement, a holding of obviousness must be based on “an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18. That is, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Such reasoning can be based on interrelated teachings of multiple patents, the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace, and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 417–18. versus accuracy problem. Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 1:16–25, 9:48–55, 10:40–60, Fig. 3; Ex. 1007 ¶ 45; Ex. 1001, 16:24–44, 17:14–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 212). Petitioner shows sufficiently for institution that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate Aslan’s teacher-student architecture into Chalom’s image editing and training of its RFC to enhance the overall gains in efficiency and accuracy of the ensuing system. Id. at 42–44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 213–222; Ex. 1007 ¶ 44). For purposes of institution, we find that Petitioner’s rationale, which is supported by the testimony of Dr. Karam, is a sufficient demonstration, at this stage, of a motivation to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18. However, we note that Patent Owner’s arguments may have some merit, and encourage the parties to further develop this issue at trial.” slip op. at 37

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,740,985
  • PTAB · Sep 5, 2023 · IPR2023-00154 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the IMU–Okabe and IMU–Okabe–Li obviousness grounds and rejecting the § 315(b) time-bar argument.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

      “district court complaint does not trigger the time bar under § 315(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 requires that “an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also Rodriguez v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 748 F.3d 1073, 1076–77 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Because the Civil Rules require service of all pleadings, it follows that the exhibits to the pleading must also be served, regardless of whether they were filed at the same time.”); Sixta v. Thaler, 615 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2010); Ringgold v. Burgett, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-00836, 2022 WL 8044117, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2022). Here, Exhibits A–D to the complaint filed in the district court are part of the complaint. See Ex. 1026.” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 47). Patent Owner does not propose any claim construction in its Preliminary Response. On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms. . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “given this laborious, non-graphical process for extracting a frame and creating a subsequent animation of the frame image in IMV6, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to modify IMV6 (as described in IMU) by at least enabling a user to animate an already-extracted frame image using simpler and more intuitive graphical user commands. Id. at 68–69 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 168). Petitioner contends that “Okabe teaches simple and graphical user commands that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have found well-suited for implementing a GUI for at least animating an image (e.g., a frame image) in IMV6.” Id. at 69–70 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 170). According to Petitioner, “Okabe’s simple and graphical user commands thus enable creating looping animations ‘with less effort than with previous methods’ and ‘markedly reduces the user burden.’” Id. at 70 (citing Ex. 1009, 1–2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 170). Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to modify IMV6 to include Okabe’s simple and graphical user commands to make the animation process easier, graphical, and less time consuming.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 171).” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,621,469
  • PTAB · Feb 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01374 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 6–11 on anticipation by Oh and obviousness over Oh, and claims 4, 5, and 12–17 as obvious over Oh, Forbes, and TS23.141.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Based on the information presented in the Petition and the supporting evidence, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or computer engineering (or equivalent experience) and two years of experience in monitoring or telecommunications systems. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 25). Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response and, therefore, does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal at this stage of the proceeding. We determine, on the current record, that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’739 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt that level in deciding whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner proposes constructions for “presentity,” “personal presentity,” “watcher,” and “aggregate presence service.” Pet. 7–10. In particular, Petitioner contends, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood ‘presentity’ to mean an entity that has presence information associated with it, such as information regarding whether a visitor is present at a resident’s door,” and “would have understood ‘personal presentity’ to mean a presentity that is associated with the presence of a person (e.g., a human visitor).” Id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 59–63). Petitioner also contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood ‘watcher’ to mean an entity (person or otherwise) that requests and/or receives presence information regarding a presentity.” Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 64–67). Petitioner further contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood ‘aggregate presence service’ to mean a service that receives, stores and provides presence-related information.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 68–71). Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response and, therefore, does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed constructions at this stage of the proceeding. We determine we need not explicitly construe any claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “As discussed above (supra Section III.E.1.c, III.E.1.e), we determine that, for the purposes of institution, Oh teaches or suggests “determining a current location of the watcher” and “storing data related to a current location of the watcher,” as recited in claim 1, and the related limitation in claim 8. We question, however, whether the evidence presented as to these limitations supports Petitioner’s assertion of anticipation of claims 1 and 8. See Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369–71. For example, Petitioner’s anticipation ground turns on the construction of “current location,” which has not been fully developed on the current record. Petitioner relies on the IP address of Oh’s wireless communication terminal as being indicative of the physical location of the watcher/user. See Pet. 18–20, 25. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that a person of skill in the art would have recognized that Oh’s home gateway could readily have been modified to store GPS location data associated with the wireless terminal. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 106). We are therefore not persuaded, on the current record, that Oh expressly or inherently discloses the claim limitations related to the watcher/user’s current location and location information. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding and without prejudging our ultimate determination with respect to this ground at the conclusion of this proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing that Oh anticipates independent claims 1 and 8, and dependent claims 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9–11 of the ’739 patent.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,956,739
  • PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2016-00159 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Finjan’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place for claims 1–6 and 10–15 on the Swimmer-based § 103 grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “III. DISCUSSION The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id. Upon a request for rehearing, the decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office” (emphasis added). As Patent Owner recognizes, § 325(d) provides the Board with the discretion to deny institution of a petition for inter partes review in the event that the same or similar prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. Req. Reh’g 2; see Apple, Inc. v. Aylus Networks, Inc., Case IPR2014-01566, slip op. at 8 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2015) (Paper 10) (exercising discretion under § 325(d) to deny a second petition filed by the same petitioner against a subset of the claims challenged in earlier petition over the same prior art). Section 325(d), however, does not compel any particular outcome. See, e.g., Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., Case IPR2014-01544, slip op. at 15 (PTAB Apr, 3, 2015) (Paper 9) (“Denial of a Petition under § 325(d) is discretionary, not mandatory.”). Indeed, by using the phrase “may take into account,” § 325(d) permits, but does not require, us to take into account whether the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, let alone require us to reject a petition on that basis. Given that the same panel issued the institution decision in Case IPR2015-01892 as in the instant case, we, of course, did take into account that Swimmer was previously presented in the former case and did not “overlook” Patent Owner’s argument regarding § 325(d). Cf. Req. Reh’g 4– 6. Although not expressly addressed, it is implicit in our Decision to Institute an inter partes review in the instant case that we declined to exercise our discretion under § 325(d) in this case.” slip op. at 6

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

      “we entered a decision denying institution of inter partes review of the challenged claims in Case IPR2015-01897, explaining that we were persuaded on the record before us in that case that claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, or 15 were entitled to a priority date of at least November 6, 1997, and that, based on that priority date, the references cited in that case did not constitute prior art to the challenged claims. Symantec Corp. v. Finjan, Inc., Case IPR2015-01897, slip op. 5–16 (PTAB Feb. 26, 2016) (Paper 7). We then entered a decision instituting an inter partes review in Case IPR2015-01892, concluding that Symantec had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of each of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, and 15 of the ’494 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Swimmer. Symantec Corp. v. Finjan, Inc., Case IPR2015-01892, slip op. 12–23 (PTAB Mar. 18, 2016) (Paper 9). Patent Owner requested reconsideration of our institution decision in the latter case on April 1, 2016. Case IPR2015-01892, Paper 13.” slip op. at 4

    § 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,677,494

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.