PTAB
Advanced fields
112 decisions · 1186msnewest first
  • PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01463 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “predict how the district court in the related district court litigation will proceed because the court may determine whether or not to stay any individual case . . . based on a variety of circumstances and facts beyond our control and to which the Board is not privy.” Sand Revolution II LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp., IPR2019-01393, Paper 24, 7 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative). We decline to speculate on how the court may rule on the pending motion to stay. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.” slip op. at 13

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. We decline to deny the Petition on a discretionary basis as requested by Patent Owner. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–10 of the ’706 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra are result effective variables and that copper foils having ΔPD, TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra values that meet the values recited in claim 1 have advantageous properties. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 45 (Kim ’761, disclosing that preferably the “difference in peak count roughness Rpc between the shiny surface . . . and the matte surface . . . of the electrolytic copper foil . . . is preferably 60 or less” because “when the difference in the peak count roughness Rpc exceeds 60 capacity maintenance of the secondary battery is deteriorated.”);15 Ex. 1007, 3:16–23, 4:14–23 (Cheng, disclosing that the foils of Cheng’s invention have (220) and (311) surfaces that provide increased elongation and that solve a high roughness problem that rendered traditional products unsuitable for use in a lithium ion secondary battery), 10:27–34 (Cheng, disclosing that in the foils of Cheng’s invention “the roughness difference between both sides was extremely small” and thus “it was . . . not easy for the electrolytic copper foil to break or fracture during the charging-discharging cycles and the life of a battery is thus increased”), Tables 3 & 4 (Cheng, disclosing embodiments and comparative examples with TC(220) values meeting the requirements of claim 1); Ex. 1008, 6:36–44 (Wolski, disclosing that “the surface roughness Rz at the matte side of the untreated copper foil of the present invention is the same or smaller than the surface roughness Rz at the shiny side . . . so that the surface treated copper foil . . . becomes more low-profiled . . . whereby it becomes a foil having a large etching factor”), 9:1–29 & Table 2 (Wolski, disclosing 15 Dr. Randall testifies that “Kim ’761’s peak count roughness Rpc corresponds to the peak density PD of the ’706 patent.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 52. At this stage in the proceeding, this testimony is unrebutted. 38 embodiments meeting the ΔRz/Ra of claim 1, describing them as having “matte side roughnesses” that are “sufficiently small,” and as having “excellent” “high temperature elongation characteristics”), 11:37–41 (Wolski, describing comparative examples as having “large” matte side roughnesses “whereby etching factors are not good”), 12:12–27 (Wolski, teaching that “as compared with a conventional untreated copper foil, both surfaces of the untreated copper foil obtained by [Wolski’s] invention are flat” resulting in a low profile foil that has “excellent elongations at room temperature and high temperature and also high tensile strength”). The teachings in the prior art support the presently unrebutted testimony of Dr. Randall explaining why the POSA would have been motivated to modify Kim ’761’s copper foil to have the claimed TC(220) and ΔRz/Ra. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–68, 71–74; Pfizer Inc., v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 94 F.4th 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Where [a gap in prior art] includes a parameter not necessarily disclosed in the prior art, it is not improper to consider whether or not it would have been recognized as result-effective. If so, then the optimization of that parameter is ‘normally obvious.’”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner failed to articulate a sufficient motivation to combine the references. To the contrary, the preliminary record presents a strong showing that the POSA would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner described in the Petition.” slip op. at 38

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the field of the invention reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’706 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,591,706
  • PTAB · Mar 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01458 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 7, 8, and 11 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the record at this stage, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we grant institution of an inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Patent Owner’s construction of the claims as informed by its allegations of infringement in co-pending litigation, as best Petitioner is able to understand such allegations.” Pet. 18 (citing Exs. 1016–1017). Petitioner does not propose construction of any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Upon review of the record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would possess at least a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, industrial design or product design or product design engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and at least three to four years of industry experience, or a Master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, industrial design or product design or product design engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and at least one to two years of industry experience. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Petitioner further argues a “POSA would have been familiar with electrically powered cigarettes and their components and underlying technologies or similar components and technologies.” Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’788 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “second chamber. Pet 55 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20, Fig. 1a). Petitioner concedes Lee does not disclose a bulb containing a heating wire, but contends this would have been obvious at least in view of Gilbert. Id. at 56 (referring to Pet. 41–42, citing Ex. 1004, 2:45–46, 2:50, 2:71–3:2, Fig. 2). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to explore other types of heating elements than the nichrome wire described in Lee due to issues with e-cigarettes at the time, such as metallic taste or inhalation risks associated with the use of a metal wire heating element. Id. at 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 117). Petitioner contends it was known to use bulb heaters for vaporizing fluids for almost 100 years (id. ¶¶ 117–118), and therefore a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to implement a heating element within a glass bulb in Lee’s device to address the metal taste and inhalation risk issues. Pet. 57. Petitioner further contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement a heating element within a glass bulb to increase the life of the heating element and prevent failure of the device, because Levin teaches that directly contacting the heating element was known to reduce the life of the heating element, and discloses a heater bulb for vaporizing an active ingredient for inhalation by the user. Id. at 58–59 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 4, 49, 56). In view of the foregoing, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently for purposes of institution that the combination of Lee, Gilbert, and Levin teaches or suggests limitation [1d], and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to use Gilbert’s or Levin’s bulb heater in Lee’s electronic cigarette, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,538,788
  • PTAB · Feb 26, 2025 · IPR2024-01199 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim based on the preliminary record.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-reply, and evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

      “Director review) (precedential). Here, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral, factors 2 through 4 all weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution, and factor 5 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Accordingly, when considered in combination, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, and we do not consider the question of compelling merits. 7. summary We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6; Guidance Memorandum. On this record, after weighing all of the factors and taking a holistic view, we determine that the facts presented weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 20

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’053 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’053 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,878,053
  • PTAB · Feb 26, 2025 · IPR2024-01198 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 10–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability and no basis for discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’315 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 10–20 of the ’315 patent. A. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “Gilstrap may rule on Petitioner’s motion for a stay. Accordingly, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral.” slip op. at 30

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “an advanced degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related discipline” and “at least one year of experience in designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies.” Pet. 23. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have had “a bachelor’s degree in one of the aforementioned disciplines” and “at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching the design and/or manufacture of solar cells or related technologies.” Id. Petitioner also states that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated for by a higher level of education, and vice versa.” Id. at 23– 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–41). Patent Owner responds that, for purposes of the Preliminary Response, it “applies [Petitioner’s] level of ordinary skill.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On this record, we preliminarily adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’315 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We construe each claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. C. Asserted Obviousness over Choi, Granek or Marvin, and Istratov” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,251,315
  • PTAB · Feb 26, 2025 · IPR2024-01203 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–12 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-reply, and evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “compelling merits if they first determined that Fintiv factors 1–5 favored a discretionary denial.” CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (decision on Director review) (precedential). Here, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral, factors 2 through 4 all weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution, and factor 5 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Accordingly, when considered in combination, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, and we do not consider the question of compelling merits. 7. summary We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6; Guidance Memorandum. On this record, after weighing all of the factors and taking a holistic view, we determine that the facts presented weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “On this record, we disagree and determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that the skilled artisan would have modified Froitzheim in view of Gan’s teachings. Petitioner may rely on Gan 14 Jon-Yiew Gan, Polysilicon Emitters for Silicon Concentrator Solar Cells (July, 1990) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (Ex. 2003, “the Gan Thesis”). for all that it teaches to show obviousness, which is “consistent with the longstanding principle that the prior art must be considered for all its teachings, not selectively.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d. 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, Gan appears to broadly suggest that replacing a diffused-emitter with a polysilicon emitter improves solar cell performance. For example, Gan states that “[t]he cell performance can be improved if the diffused-emitter is replaced with the polysilicon emitter, of which the Jo is less than 4.5 x 10-13 A/cm2 and the pc is low enough.” Ex. 1005, 1. Patent Owner does not direct us to anything in Gan that suggests its teachings are inapplicable to conventional solar cells. See generally Prelim. Resp. In contrast, Gan’s introduction states that “[p]olysilicon emitters, because of their important applications in high speed bipolar transistors, have been widely studied,” which indicates broad applicability. Ex. 1005, 245. Further, Dr. Holman testifies that “although Gan references a concentrator solar cell—a category of solar cells that uses lenses, mirrors, and other components to focus (i.e., concentrate) sunlight on a cell (Ex.1016-Komp, 56–58)—a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Gan’s teachings are equally applicable to non-concentrator solar cells.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 131. Dr. Holman declares that Gan’s “polysilicon emitter and oxide layer structure is ‘useful for silicon solar cells’” and “[p]ersons of ordinary skill in the art frequently looked at various solar cell designs and related technologies when evaluating how to improve a solar cell’s efficiency, which is exactly what Gan did when evaluating how to improve a cell’s design.” Id.” slip op. at 28

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner also states that “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, [Patent Owner] applies [Petitioner’s] level of ordinary skill.” Prelim. Resp. 6. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’516 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’516 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,222,516
  • PTAB · Jan 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01194 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 16 and 19 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims would have been obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’315 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 16 and 19 of the ’315 patent. A. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “therefore, must show that metal impurities are necessarily present in Li’s Ntype region 308 and P-type region 310 formed over dielectric film 320 (the claimed “first emitter region” and “second emitter region” “formed over the dielectric region.”). On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that the natural result of the structures and processes described in Li is the gettering of metal impurities from substrate 304 to N-type region 308 and P-type region 310 in material layer 302, such that N-type region 308 and P-type region 310 contain metal impurities. In particular, Dr. Banerjee testifies, with objective evidentiary support, that “multicrystalline silicon substrates were known to contain substantial concentrations of metal impurities.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 90 (citing Ex. 1010, 283; Ex. 1021, 402; Ex. 1020 ¶ 6). Hu teaches that when a semiconductor body (substrate) and polycrystalline layer are subjected to processing steps at temperatures ranging from 870° C to 1000° C, “getterable impurities such as copper, lithium, sodium, potassium, iron, cobalt, nickel, chromium, and gold will diffuse to, and become trapped in,” the polycrystalline layer. Ex. 1017, 5:61–6:3. Ramappa and Liu–2 teach that a silicon dioxide layer placed between the substrate and the polycrystalline layer does not impede the gettering of metal impurities at increased diffusion temperatures. See Ex. 1025, 3775 (Ramappa stating “for a given SiO2 thickness, there exists a diffusion temperature beyond which the oxide fails to mask the silicon bulk from iron impurity incorporation”); Ex. 1029, 139 (Liu-2’s Figure 3(a) illustrating gettering effectiveness), 140 (“At lower diffusion temperatures, the samples with no oxide show the best gettering efficiency, but a similar efficiency can be achieved in the presence of a thin [approximately 1.3 nm] chemical oxide by increasing the diffusion” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner, with supporting testimony from Dr. Banerjee, provides adequate reasons why using the front portion doping concentration of 1x1018 cm-3 or less as disclosed in King, Swanson- 352, or Marvin with Li’s back contact solar cell would have been a “predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007); see Pet. 32–35 (and evidence cited therein). We acknowledge that Patent Owner disagrees, but find that Patent Owner’s disagreement raises issues of fact” slip op. at 21

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “We, however, decline to speculate on how Judge Gilstrap may rule on a future motion for a stay should one be filed. Accordingly, in view of the fact that no motion for a stay has been filed, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral.” slip op. at 29

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,251,315
  • PTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01044 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 4, 8–23, and 27 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Jones renders at least claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2024). Upon consideration of the papers, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’629 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 2–4 years of experience in the field of wireless communication,” and that “[e]quivalent education, work, or experience in this field could substitute for the foregoing qualifications.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 82). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 22. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 20. We view the” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

      “Here, neither party sets forth any term that we need to construe. Pet. 5–6; Prelim. Resp. 23. Thus, for purposes of our Decision on Institution, we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “52 subcarriers are used while “the DC subcarrier and 11 subcarriers near the edges of the 20 MHZ channel are not used for data transmission” (i.e., are set to zero). Ex. 1014, 2:14–30 (explaining the long training sequence for a conventional 802.11a preamble), 6:11–15. Notably, Jones also teaches that “packet formation block 314 may insert appropriate complex values at unused . . . subcarrier locations in each group of symbols D[k],” and that “any or all of the subcarriers k may be used to transmit data, thereby increasing the data rate.” Id. at 6:15–20 (emphasis added); see also id. at 8:22–24 (teaching that an extended long training sequence “can contain more than 52 non-zero subcarriers”). At this stage, we credit Dr. Buehrer’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “add[] four subcarriers to 802.11a data and training fields [to] increase[] data rate throughput as taught in . . . Jones,” as this testimony is consistent with Jones’s teachings. Ex. 1005 ¶ 107. In addition, we agree with Petitioner and find that one of ordinary skill in the art extending the long training sequence would want to use the same 52 center subcarriers to maintain backwards compatibility with 802.11a. Pet. 28–29. This is supported by Jones’s teaching of having a long training sequence that “is usable in a process for determining whether the packet is an 802.11a packet or an extended-mode packet.” Ex. 1014, 8:37– 40. Moreover, Jones’s L2 example of an extended long training sequence maintains the same 52 center subcarriers as 802.11a, which also supports this finding. Id. at Fig. 4; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 96, 113. Thus, up to 11 subcarriers unused in 802.11a could be used for an extended long training sequence. “more than 52 non-zero subcarriers” can be used for an extended long training sequence, which explicitly teaches that only a portion of the 11 subcarriers may be used. Ex. 1014, 6:15–20, 8:22–24. In light of the above teachings, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to use only the next 4 nearest to the center of these 11 unused subcarriers. Ex. 1005 ¶ 87. The remaining 7 subcarriers would remain at zero.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01040 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 9–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “Director review) (precedential). Here, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral, factors 2 through 4 all weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution, and factor 5 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Accordingly, when considered in combination, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, and we do not consider the question of compelling merits. 7. summary We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6; Guidance Memorandum. On this record, after weighing all of the factors and taking a holistic view, we determine that the facts presented weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 19

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the discipline of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Patent Owner contends that “[b]ecause this term is in a dependent claim, construction is not necessary to resolve the issues presented at institution.” Prelim. Resp. 4–8. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,878,053
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01039 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 9–12, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Froitzheim and Gan and declining discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “compelling merits if they first determined that Fintiv factors 1–5 favored a discretionary denial.” CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (decision on Director review) (precedential). Here, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral, factors 2 through 4 all weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution, and factor 5 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. Accordingly, when considered in combination, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, and we do not consider the question of compelling merits. 7. Conclusion – Fintiv Absent a compelling reason to the contrary, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating the Fintiv factors. Fintiv at 6; see Guidance Memorandum. Having evaluated all of the factors on this record, we determine that the circumstances presented do not support exercising our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of this inter partes review.” slip op. at 34

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

      “issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.’” Google, 54 F.4th at 1381 (quoting In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).” slip op. at 25

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner directs us to evidence in Gan and testimony from Dr. Banerjee that suggests Gan provided information regarding how to form an oxide layer and doped polysilicon layer on a silicon substrate. Pet. 47– 10 Jon-Yiew Gan, Polysilicon Emitters for Silicon Concentrator Solar Cells, A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Materials Science and Engineering and the Committee on Graduate Studies of Stanford University, July 1990 (Ex. 2003). 48; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 152–155; Ex. 1007, 246–247. On this record, this evidence provides sufficient support for Petitioner’s argument that the proposed combination involves the use of a known technique from Gan to improve Froitzheim’s solar cell, and could have been accomplished with a reasonable expectation of success. Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, Patent Owner’s argument regarding “no assurances” suggest that it is applying an incorrect standard on this issue. “Only a reasonable expectation of success, not absolute predictability, is necessary for a conclusion of obviousness.” In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 896 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Second, Patent Owner directs us to evidence from the Gan Thesis, not Gan itself. Prelim. Resp. 41–42 (citing Ex. 2003). Patent Owner, however, does not direct us to sufficient evidence demonstrating when this reference became available to the public. Absent such evidence, we are unable to agree with Patent Owner’s conclusion of what a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood based on the Gan Thesis. Accordingly, on this record, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and determine that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,222,516
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01038 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 10–15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim and no basis for discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’315 patent. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 10–15 of the ’315 patent. A. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“Skilled Artisan”) would have had “an advanced degree involving the discipline of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field,” or “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 47). Patent Owner states that, for purposes of the Preliminary Response, “Maxeon applies CSI’s level of ordinary skill.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On this record, we preliminary adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’315 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We construe each claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Based on the record before us, we determined that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. C. Asserted Obviousness over Li and King, Swanson-352, or Marvin” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “7. Motivation to Combine Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious “to combine Li’s back contact solar cell with the front portion doping concentration of 1x1018 cm-3 or less as disclosed in King, Swanson-352, or Marvin.” Pet. 30–31. Petitioner contends that Li, King, Swanson-352, and Marvin “all relate to solar cell design and in particular, back contact solar cells” and are analogous art. Id. at 30. Petitioner also contends that King teaches “that this concentration was the ‘optimum’ for back-contact solar cells,” and Swanson-352 teaches “to use it as the maximum concentration for this portion of a back contact solar cell.” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 124). Petitioner contends that Marvin likewise teaches “that for space applications, a ‘peak doping concentration of 1E18 [1 x 1018] cm-3’ or lower with a resulted in better efficiency metrics than higher doping concentrations.” Id. (citing Ex. 1035, 826–827). Petitioner contends: Given Li’s acknowledgement that “[e]fficiency is an important characteristic of a solar cell as it is directly related to the solar cell’s capability to generate power” and that “[a]ccordingly, techniques for increasing the efficiency of solar cells are generally desirable” (EX1005, ¶0005), the Skilled Artisan reviewing Li would further have been motivated to select the efficient front doping concentration disclosed by any of King, Swanson-352, or Marvin. EX1003, ¶126.” slip op. at 19

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,251,315
Page 1 of 12
← Previous12345…Next →

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.