PTAB
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137 decisions · 564msnewest first
  • PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-01116 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Sudre, Lee, and Penven.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). In other words, a decision to institute under § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). In addition, if the Board institutes trial, it will “institute . . . on all grounds in the petition.” PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 5–6 (Nov. 2019)1 (“CTPG”); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “had at least (1) a Bachelor’s Degree (or higher) in material science, materials engineering, mechanical engineering, textile engineering, or a related field, and (2) a minimum of two years of working experience in textiles engineering, fibers and textiles manufacturing, or a related field.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21–22). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. On the present record, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 25–26. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’566 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Both parties argue that no claim terms require express construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 26. On the present record, we agree. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent the parties’ arguments regarding unpatentability do address claim construction issues, we address these issues below.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “articulated a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Sudre, Lee, and Penven. Prelim. Resp. 60–63. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would not have been motivated to look into Penven to modify the teachings of Lee because Lee and Penven disclose substantially different structures.” Id. at 60–61. This argument does not address Petitioner’s proposed reason to combine, which looks to Lee and Penven each to modify Sudre, not to Penven to modify Lee. See Pet. 79–81. In addition, “[c]ombining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). In other words, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425–26 (CCPA 1981). Petitioner provides “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” to combine the teachings of Sudre with those of Lee and Penven. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). In particular, Petitioner directs us to Sudre’s teaching of “a method for manufacturing PMC,” to Sudre’s lack of teaching of “specific parameters, such as warp thread size and spacing” to satisfy the “particular requirements” of its fabric. Pet. 79 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 248–250; Ex. 1004, 1:2–5, 6:14–17). As Petitioner points out, id. at 79–80, Lee and Penven provided yarn diameters and loop diameters that were conventional, and there is evidence of record that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used these conventional diameters in constructing Sudre’s paper machine clothing. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 258–261, 263–266; Ex. 1006, 3:64–66.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,261,566
  • PTAB · Dec 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00897 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 combination renders claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’527 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “invention of the ’527 patent “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology,” and that “[a]dditional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–43). Patent Owner at this stage of the proceeding does not provide an alternative definition for a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’527 patent or identify any shortcoming in Petitioner’s formulation. See Prelim. Resp. 3–4. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. We view the definition for the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the ’527 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner argues that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. At this stage, Patent Owner agrees that no terms need construction. Prelim. Resp. 3. We determine that no express constructions are needed for us to render our Decision on Institution. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). Rather, at this stage of the proceeding, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms.” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “discloses the preamble and the remaining limitations of claim 1. Pet. 38–64. Petitioner identifies where the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 teaches these limitations, supported with testimony from Dr. Mandayam, which Patent Owner does not specifically rebut at this stage. We determine, on this record, that the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 teaches the preamble (whether or not limiting) and the remaining undisputed limitations of claim 1. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., 759 F. App’x 917, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (“The Board is ‘not required to address undisputed matters’ or arguments about limitations with which it was never presented.”) (quoting In re NuVasive, Inc., 841 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We also find that Petitioner has provided sufficiently articulated reasoning, which Patent Owner does not specifically address at this stage, to support combining Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966’s teachings in the manner Petitioner does. Pet. 21–38. 3. Summary In summary, based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 renders claim 1 obvious.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,944,527
  • PTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00903 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Kim, Dahlman, and Kim-966 combination renders the claims obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’110 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “966 renders obvious this limitation. See Pet. 50–53. With respect to the “first signaling,” Petitioner argues that the combination teaches “the UE [user equipment] receiving a ‘system information block (‘SIB’) (a first signaling) which can include various types of information such as ‘information about the allocation of subframes to uplink/downlink and configuration of the special subframe in the case of TDD [time division duplexing].” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1007, 358–62; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 21, 65; Ex. 1003 ¶ 100). Petitioner argues that “[b]ecause the SIB assigns time resources or an ‘allocation of subframes for uplink/downlink,’ an SIB would be understood to function as and render obvious as assigning the UE a collection of time intervals (e.g., subframes) or ‘time resource pools.’” Id. at 51 (citing Ex. 1007, 358–62; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 60–61, 64–78, 84; Ex. 1003 ¶ 113). Petitioner contends that “a POSITA would have understood and found obvious that the first signaling (SIB) is used to determine an ‘allocation of subframes to uplink/downlink’ (a first time resource pool) through an assignment of a Time Division Duplexing (TDD) configuration.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 113). Petitioner submits that “[t]he TDD configuration would identify a series of subframes available for uplink and downlink (a first time” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner agrees “that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” Prelim. Resp. 2. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Mandayam, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’110 patent “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology.” Pet. 12. Petitioner additionally contends “[a]dditional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Id. Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’110 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art). We note that our decision would be the same applying either party’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,546,110
  • PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00905 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–5, 7–11, 13–17, and 19–23 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Yeo and TS36 render at least claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art stating that “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’581 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction Neither party proposes any claim constructions at this stage. Pet. 19– 20; Prelim. Resp. 2. Where there is no dispute we conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “c) Conclusion as to Independent Claim 1 We have considered and find persuasive, at this stage, Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence as set forth at pages 31–45 of the Petition with respect to the remaining limitations [1pre]–[1f] and [1i]. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s arguments as to these remaining limitations. Also, Dr. Ding’s testimony is currently unrebutted. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that Yeo alone, or the combined teachings of Yeo and TS36 render independent claim 1 obvious.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,917,581
  • PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00894 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Yeo and TS36 render at least claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims. slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art stating that “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’767 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

      “under 112(f) pointing out the respective functions and structure disclosed in the ’767 patent specification. Pet. 18–20. Patent Owner does not dispute the construction of these terms, stating only “that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Pet. 18–20). Where there is no dispute and our Decision does not turn on any particular construction of these terms, we need not decide at this point whether “receiver module” and “transmitter module” invoke means-plus-function under 112(f). Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. And, because there is no dispute, we conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the” slip op. at 10

    • BurdenInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1889, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,462,767
  • PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 11 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Cleveland or obvious over Nakagawa.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “contentions, the cited portions of Cleveland, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Cleveland discloses each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland.” slip op. at 6

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “5 Clearwater argues that Cleveland qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Pet. 17. In support, Clearwater asserts that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (id. at 18) and submits claim charts to demonstrate that the Cleveland provisional provides written support for: (1) at least claim 1 of Cleveland (id. at 18–21); and (2) the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland (id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006 throughout)). Based on our review of the Cleveland provisional, as well as Clearwater’s claim charts, we are persuaded that the current record demonstrates that Cleveland is prior art to the challenged patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “satisfies each claim element as identified above in Section I.D, i.e., elements [1.pre]–[1.6]. See id. at 22–40. Clearwater also submits annotated Figure 3 of Cleveland, reproduced below, to further illustrate the specific laminate structure of Cleveland’s coffee cup. See id. at 39.” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “protective layers have “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2,” Clearwater submits the declaration of its expert, who explains that, because Nakagawa identifies the specific polymers and the thickness of the coat used for the plastic layers and one skilled in the art “would recognize that the disclosed polymers have a given density,” then “[w]ith these known parameters, the coat weight is easily calculated to be 23.04 lbs./ 3000 ft2 — falling squarely within the claimed range.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–133; Ex. 1008 ¶ 24; Ex. 1024, at 4). At this stage, we find that testimony credible and supported by the evidence presently of record. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. We need not decide Clearwater’s challenge of the dependent claims based on Nakagawa alone nor its challenge of claims 1–3 based on Nakagawa and Tanner. Our analysis of these challenges, in our view, is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 8,637,126
  • PTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00895 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted challenges after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had at least [a bachelor’s degree in] electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks. Additional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background. . . . A POSITA would also have familiarity with the 3GPP LTE standards, and would have understood how to search through the available Technical Specifications for implementing RAN technologies. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–53). Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage, with a proposed modification to insert “a bachelor’s degree in” to Petitioner’s statement. Prelim. Resp. 12–13; id. at 12, n.1. We have inserted this proposed modification in brackets in the above block quotation. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal, as modified by Patent Owner, is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’113 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s skill definition at this stage.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “The parties do not propose any claim constructions. See Pet. 11–12; Prelim. Resp. 8. As no terms are in dispute, we determine that no terms require construction at this stage.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “IV. CONCLUSION At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges as to at least one challenged claim. At this preliminary stage, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of the challenged claims or any underlying factual and legal issues. V. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’113 patent is instituted with respect to all challenges of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial commencing on the entry date of this Decision.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “measurement value, as Jover teaches.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 39–40; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Among other reasons, Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine “to improve the accuracy and reliability of the beam failure determination.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Petitioner further contends that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success because “it would have been straightforward for a POSITA to implement Jover’s triggering condition in Xia’s method.” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). After considering Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below, we agree with Petitioner at this stage that the combination of Xia and Jover renders obvious limitation [1e]. Patent Owner first argues that Jover “does not cure the deficiencies of Xia because Jover’s threshold condition for an increase in BER is not used for triggering a transmission of the first and second radio signal.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Just like Xia, Patent Owner contends, Jover discloses no “causality between the threshold being exceeded and transmitting the first and second radio signal.” Id. at 21. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s showing at this stage because Petitioner relies on Xia, not Jover, for the claimed “triggering the transmission,” or “causality,” as Patent Owner calls it. See Pet. 36–38. That is, Petitioner relies on Jover for the triggering condition and on Xia for the actual triggering. See id. Patent Owner’s argument attacking the references individually is unpersuasive. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of refences.”). Patent Owner next contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Xia and Jover “since Jover is directed to the opposite objective of the ’113 Patent or Xia.” Prelim. Resp. 21. That is, Patent Owner asserts, Jover teaches away from the disclosed methods. Id. at 22. Patent Owner explains, “Jover provides no attempt to improve the beam strength, but rather ignores it through beam sweeping or nullif[ies] it, in contrast to the purpose of the ’113 Patent.” Id. at 22–23. At this stage, Patent Owner’s argument is insufficient to undermine” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 10,568,113
  • PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00898 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6, 11, and 16 would have been obvious over Kim and Chen.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’271 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review with respect to all challenged claims and challenges asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 10, 16, 29–32). Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 6. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’271 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill at this stage.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “The parties do not propose any explicit claim constructions. See Pet. 4–6; Prelim. Resp. 6. As no terms are in dispute, we do not construe any terms. Petitioner discusses constructions proposed by Patent Owner in the Samsung IPR, but Patent Owner does not rely on those constructions here. Pet. 4–6 (citing IPR2023-00747, Paper 14 at 11–13). We therefore do not address them at this stage.” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “discloses the claimed “proportional sequence.” Prelim. Resp. 9. First, Patent Owner contends that “indexes of antenna port groups with RSRP measurement values higher than a certain threshold are not a sequence of ratios,” but rather, just an identification of antenna port groups. Id. (emphasis added). We disagree, on this record. The flaw in this reasoning is that the claim does not require the first proportional sequence to be a sequence of ratios. Rather, the claimed “first proportional sequence” merely “corresponds to . . . ratios.” Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that the indexes “are not a sequence of ratios” is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Petitioner persuades us, at this stage, that the indexes correspond to ratios (e.g., RSRP_n/max(RSRP_i)). See Pet. 32–33.” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,951,271
  • PTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the patentability of at least one claim of the ’562 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–17 of the ’562 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “(“POSITA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Neither party proposes any explicit construction of any term. See Pet. 7 (“For the purposes of this IPR, the plain meaning of each term can be applied.”). We do not expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that Usui discloses all of the limitations of claim 1. Usui discloses that aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15 is in electrical contact with titanium underlayer 13, and titanium nitride layer 14 is located “intermediate the [titanium underlayer] 13 and the aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15” to prevent “reaction between the aluminum layer 15 and underlayer 13.” Ex. 1004, 3:27–29, 3:38–41, 3:58–63. Usui further discloses that “a capping layer is provided above layer 15,” and that “[p]referred capping layers are titanium nitride and combinations of as layer 18 of a group IVA metal, preferably titanium with a titanium nitride layer 19.” Id. at 3:67–4:6. Usui teaches that titanium nitride layer 19 is about 150 to 800 Å thick, and that the thickness of titanium underlayer 13 is between about 90 to 110 Å. Id. at 3:31–33, 4:6–8. Usui also teaches that the interconnect metallurgy structures described therein “exhibit[] enhanced electromigration characteristics” and “are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.” Id. at 1:8–14. Usui’s description of a plurality of metal layers (layers 13–18) and a capping layer formed over the plurality of metal layers (layer 19), along with its description of the structure’s usefulness for forming electrical connections in an integrated circuit structure, is sufficient, on this record, to establish that Usui discloses “an electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. Usui’s teaching that the capping layer is a refractory metal nitride (titanium nitride) that has a thickness (150–800 Å) greater than the bottommost layer of the plurality of metal layers (layer 13, 90–110 Å), sufficiently establishes, on this record, that Usui discloses the “said capping layer consisting only of a refractory metal nitride, said refractory metal nitride forming a top of said electrical contact and having a thickness greater than that of a bottommost layer of said plurality of metal layers” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 8,686,562
  • PTAB · Jul 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00094 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Bonn and Mizuta.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–69). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. On the present record, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 1–52. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’003 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We apply the same claim-construction standard used in the federal courts—in other words, the claim-construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is articulated in Phillips. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the Phillips standard, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” which “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes construing any claim terms. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 1–52. On the present record, we agree. As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute inter partes review of the ’003 patent without expressly construing any terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not show sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to modify Bonn to remove local oscillator 55. Prelim. Resp. 13–15. We disagree. Petitioner argues that, “[i]n addition to using Figure 7’s ‘dual gate FET structure in high frequency signal mixing’ applications . . . , Bonn discloses using this dual gate FET in ‘other applications such as high frequency signal amplification.’” Pet. 22 (quoting Ex. 1006, 11:26–37). Indeed, Bonn does suggest using its structure for signal amplification. Ex. 1006, 11:26–37 (“the dual gate FET structure of the present invention can be tailored to provide superior performance . . . in . . . other applications such as high frequency signal amplification”). On the present record, this appears to have provided the motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to use Bonn for amplification instead of for signal mixing. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Bernstein to show the modifications that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered necessary in order to convert Bonn’s structure for signal-amplification use. Pet. 23–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 98–109). In particular, Petitioner cites Dr. Bernstein’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to remove Figure 1’s LO (local oscillator) port 55 and its associated impedance matching components because the LO signal is no longer being mixed.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 98; see Pet. 23. Dr. Bernstein supports this testimony with citations to Bonn and with reasoning regarding why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have made this modification. Ex. 1003 ¶ 98 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:20–23, 3:19–21, 3:30–41). Accordingly, on the present record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to modify Bonn’s structure to remove the connection between a local oscillator and the gate of the second transistor. Finally, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s proposed modification would have rendered Bonn inoperable for its intended purpose because the modification would eliminate the ability of Bonn’s structure to conduct high frequency signal mixing. Prelim. Resp. 26–27. As Patent Owner notes, one purpose of Bonn is to mix high-frequency signals. Ex. 1006, 11:33–36. But Bonn itself teaches using its structure for “other applications,” including “high frequency signal amplification.” Id. at 11:33–37. Thus, on the present record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposed modification does not render Bonn inoperable for its intended purpose so much as it acknowledges the modifications necessary to convert Bonn from one of its intended purposes to another. Thus, Petitioner has shown sufficiently for the purpose of the present Decision that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Bonn and Mizuta and that the combination of Bonn and Mizuta teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of claim 1. We encourage the parties to develop the arguments and the record surrounding this issue further during the trial.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,264,003
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