- Google LLC v. DH International Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01322 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10–12, and 19 are obvious over Mooney and over Mooney in view of Lee.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Pre-Institution Reply, Pre-Institution Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’294 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’294 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“the claims nor the specification of the ’294 Patent require such a narrow reading of the term ‘activation cue’” as that proposed by Patent Owner. Reply 1 (citing Prelim. Resp. 9–10). Operative claim language—“a cue receiver operatively linked to said electronic circuit for receiving an activation cue from a source external to said cellular phone”—does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator as argued by Patent Owner. Claim 1 further recites the “data conveyance switching element . . . being assigned a first state upon an activation cue having been received by said cue receiver,” which also does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator. Both parties, moreover, cite the same description of the structure and function of the “activation cue” in the ’294 patent: “This activation cue is in the form of a data communication of a specific type which will be recognized by electronic device 10 as an activation cue, for example a predetermined bit sequence.” Prelim. Resp. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Sur-Reply 1 (citing same). The recited “activation cue,” when read in context and in view of the” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“for the recited “data conveyance switching element” pursuant to §112, sixth Petition characterizes the corresponding structure as “a physical structure, a virtual program, or both because the ’294 patent explains that a switching element ‘can be any type of device allowing data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations,’ such as ‘a series of instructions programmed onto [a] microchip’ or a ‘decisional logical circuit,’ and ‘can be a physical structure, a virtual program, or both.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 9:28– 31, 9:40–41; Lipoff Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). The Petition identifies the claimed function as switching between inactive and activated states based on whether or not the cellular phone receives an activation cue. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:4–9, 4:18–23, 5:48–53; Ex. 1003 ¶ 64).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“construction of an “external data exchange device” as a data transceiver coupled to a circuit that carries out the function of exchanging data. Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:4–6, 12:62, 13:28, Figs. 1, 3, 4; Ex. 2001 ¶ 48); see Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:14–17, 4:7–14, 9:3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–68). Patent Owner states that “[a]n external data exchange device is not a transceiver but a device with a transceiver.” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 48). On this preliminary record, we need not construe “external data exchange device” to decide whether or not to institute. To the extent there is a dispute over the plain meaning of “external data exchange device,” the parties are invited to address it in detail in their briefs following institution. On the present record, we determine that no further construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute a trial in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties are free to address any further claim construction issues bearing on this inter partes review following institution.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,022,294 - PTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01230 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 for all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“discretionary denial under § 325(d). The Notice Regarding Amendment Options explains that the Board may deny institution under § 325(d) of a requested AIA trial proceeding if a parallel Office proceeding, for example, is in a more advanced stage and involves overlapping issues with the proposed AIA trial proceeding. 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,657 (emphasis added). We find that the EPR is not in a more advanced stage as compared to this proceeding, and therefore does not weigh in favor of the Board exercising discretion to deny institution, despite its overlapping issues with those in the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–5 of the ’336 patent, based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“the art.7 On consideration of the record, specifically the patent and cited prior art, we find Petitioner’s proposed educational levels and subject matter (bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering) more appropriate. Specifically, Patent Owner’s reference to a degree in computer science does not appear relevant to the claimed electro-mechanical device. We find Patent Owner’s proposed hands-on experience more persuasive as Petitioner’s definition is too vague (“generally familiar”) to assist our determination. On this record and for the purposes of institution, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the challenged claims, as of the earliest claimed priority date, would have a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering or mechanical engineering, and would have two years of experience in designing and/or implementing hardware components for computers, servers, and/or other electronic devices. We further determine that more experience could compensate for the absence of a bachelor’s degree. The level of skill is reflected by the testimony of the parties’ declarants and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We determine that the plain meaning of claim 1 supports Patent Owner’s interpretation. Claim 1 recites a body, provided with a fan in center of the body, an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at top of the body, a power socket and a first connector on one side of the body, and a second connector on another side of the body . . . such that when the power socket on the one side of the body is supplied with power, the fan and the illumination area of the body are respectively driven into rotation and illumination . . . Ex. 1001, 4:5–9 (emphasis added). Claim 1 expressly recites three body locations: “the top of the body,” “one side of the body,” and “another side of the body.” Id. “A power socket and a first connector” are listed together in the same clause “on one side of the body.” Id. The plain language of the claim further supports that “one side of the body” includes both power socket and first connector, as the limitation is repeated later in the claim: “the power socket on the one side of the body.” See id. at 4:12 (emphasis added). The location of the second connector is defined in relation to the one side with the first connector. See id. at 4:5–9. Accordingly, the plain meaning of claim 1 defines three sides of the claimed body, a top of the body (with an illumination area on two sides of the fan), one side of the body with a power socket and a first connector, and another side of the body with a second connector. See id. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no other claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,690,336 - PTAB · Feb 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01214 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–22 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Thurler anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a trial, the Board will institute on all challenges raised in the petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had a relevant technical degree in 5 At this stage of the proceeding, the parties have not directed us to any such objective evidence. Mechanical Engineering, Fluid Engineering, or the like, and 2-3 years of experience researching, designing, manufacturing, or assessing [energy suppression devices (“ESD”)], though less education may be sufficient with additional experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 1. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for petitioner
“Thus, both the ’750 patent and its prosecution history support Petitioner’s contention that a “radially serpentine” fluid flow is one in which the fluid flows back and forth around a radius of the off axis chamber. We see no support, however, for Petitioner’s assertion that a serpentine flow requires two or more changes of direction. See Pet. 17. Petitioner states that “‘back and forth’ movement requires at least two changes in direction. Specifically, to come ‘back,’ an object must have first gone ‘forth.’” Pet. 17; see also Ex. 1013 ¶ 130 (presenting essentially identical assertions). However, both Petitioner and its witness, Mr. Nixon, identify only a single change in direction – from “forth” to “back.” Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Nixon provide any support for their assertions that two changes of direction are required, and we decline to adopt this aspect of Petitioner’s interpretation of “radially serpentine.” Instead, we interpret “back and forth,” as used in the ’750 patent, to be satisfied by only a single change in direction.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s interpretation of Superguide. There, the Federal Circuit “conclude[d] that the plain and ordinary meaning of . . . the phrase ‘at least one of’ means ‘one or more.’” Superguide, 358 F.3d at 886 (citing Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The court then considered what the phrase modified and determined that, because “[t]he phrase ‘at least one of’ precedes a series of categories of criteria, and the patentee used the term ‘and’ to separate the categories of criteria,” the phrase “connotes a conjunctive list” and required selecting at least one value for each category. Id. (emphasis added). For example, in SuperGuide, the claim phrase “storing at least one of a desired program start time, a desired program end time, a desired program service, and a desired program type” was interpreted as requiring storing at least one desired program start time, at least one desired program end time, and so forth. Id. at 884, 886. Neither courts nor the Board has interpreted SuperGuide as setting forth a per se rule that the use of “at least one of” followed by “and” necessarily connotes a conjunctive list, and both courts and the Board have found SuperGuide inapplicable when the listed items following “at least one of” are not categories containing many possible values. See Apple Inc. v. CPC Patent Techs. PTY, Ltd., IPR2022-00601, Paper 31 at 28 (PTAB Sept. 27, 2023) (collecting cases). Here, Petitioner does not persuade us that “axially serpentine” and “radially serpentine” are categories. Notably, for each of these terms, both Petitioner and Mr. Nixon provide only a single example of such a fluid pathway. See Pet. 18; Ex. 1013 ¶ 134. Such identification of only a single instance does not persuade us that these terms identify categories of criteria. See Superguide, 358 F.3d at 886 (“Each category is further comprised of many possible values.”). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and on this preliminary record, we interpret “at least one of” as recited in the claims of the ’750 patent to have its plain and ordinary meaning of one or more.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,286,750 - PTAB · Jan 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01067 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 5–7, 9, and 10 for all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Board may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 5–7, 9, and 10 of the ’644 patent, based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition. We do not institute review of disclaimed claim 13. Infra Section III.A; 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“(citing Ex. 2004). Our rules explain: “The patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer,” and “[n]o inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e). Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer on October 24, 2024. Ex. 2004. A disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) is “considered as part of the original patent” as of the date on which it is “recorded” in the Office. 35 U.S.C. § 253(a). For a disclaimer to be “recorded” in the Office, the disclaimer must: (1) Be signed by the patentee, or an attorney or agent of record; (2) Identify the patent and complete claim or claims, or term being disclaimed. . . .; 3) State the present extent of patentee’s ownership interest in the patent; and (4) Be accompanied by the fee set forth in [37 C.F.R.] § 1.20(d). 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a); see also Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding § 253 disclaimer is immediately “recorded” on date the USPTO receives a disclaimer meeting the requirements of § 1.321(a), and no further action is required in the USPTO). Patent Owner’s filing of Exhibit 2004 appears to meet these requirements.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) as of the claimed priority date would have “had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related or equivalent field, and three or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating 4 In the present record, neither party presents arguments or evidence relating to secondary considerations. (emphasis added). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s characterization at this time. See Prelim. Resp. 29 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 19– 20). On this record and for the purposes of institution, we determine this level of skill, with the exception of the open-ended phrases “at least” and “or more,” which we remove from Petitioner’s proposal, comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’644 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), i.e., as construed in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Id. at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. Neither party seeks a specific claim construction or definition for any claim term. See Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 29. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,231,644 - PTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00896 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 25–29 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims would have been obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 25–29 of the ’120 patent, based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 12. Petitioner stipulates that “[i]f the PTAB institutes the pending IPR in IPR2024-00896 challenging the patentability of claims 25–29 of the ’120 Patent, then Samsung will not pursue as to the challenged claims any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in the IPR” in the co-pending district court litigation. Ex. 1046 (citing Sotera, Paper 12, 16–19) (emphasis added). Petitioner’s stipulation is not identical to that in Sotera and we decline to expand the categorical resolution of Fintiv outside the Director’s clear language. See Fintiv Guidance. Nevertheless, Petitioner’s stipulation here mitigates certain concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions. Thus, factor 4 weighs strongly in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“For this reason, we find there is a material difference between the asserted art (Li) and the prior art involved during examination (Xu). See Becton, Dickinson, 17–18. Additionally, we do not agree with Patent Owner that substantially the same argument—that Li teaches the “idle power consumption” limitation—was considered by the Examiner. Rather, the Examiner’s finding that the prior art did not teach the “idle power consumption” limitation in the reasons for allowance (Ex. 1004, 189) indicates the absence of overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art. See Becton, Dickinson, 17–18. Because there is a material difference between Li and Xu, and Li raises an issue not previously identified by the Examiner, we are not persuaded that the same or substantially the same art or the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“On this record and for the purposes of institution, we preliminarily adopt Petitioner’s interpretation of the plain and ordinary meaning of the claims as consistent with the intrinsic evidence. Specifically, we preliminarily interpret “idle power consumption” as including power consumption during which the transceiver may be waiting to send data, whether the transceiver is on or off. The ’120 patent Specification refers to idle time as time during which the transceiver may be waiting to send data, whereby “[e]ven if the idling transceivers turn off their transmission chains, some idle power may be consumed due to leakage current or other effects.” Ex. 1001, 2:60–66, 3:5–7. The ’120 patent does not appear to define “idle power consumption” as requiring the circuitry to be powered on while “waiting to send data” nor exclude circuitry that is powered off while claims. We invite the parties to further address this issue at trial.13” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,798,120 - PTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00885 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4 and 15–25 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Board “may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply and Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–4 and 15–25 of the ’515 patent, based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) as of the claimed priority date would have “had at least a bachelor’s degree in animal science, biological engineering, electrical engineering, or computer science, or a related or equivalent field, and three or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating RFID tracking and sensor systems for livestock management.” Pet. 5–6 (citing” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“c) Analysis At this preliminary stage, we agree with Patent Owner’s arguments as to the plain and ordinary meaning of “implanted in an animal,” meaning implanted within the animal rather than on the animal. Although we agree encompassing RFIDs attached or implanted “on or within” an animal, the plain language of the claim expressly recites “in,” which, on the present record, we determine corresponds to “within” as described by the ’515 patent Specification. We apply that understanding to our discussion of Petitioner’s challenges below.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“2. Additional Claim Terms For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no other claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,823,515 - PTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00875 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6, and 17–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim would have been obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Board “may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply and Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, and 17–20 of the ’206 patent, based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) as of the claimed priority date would have “had at least a bachelor’s degree in animal science, biological engineering, electrical engineering, or computer science, or a related or equivalent field, and three or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating RFID tracking and sensor systems for livestock management.” Pet. 6 (citing 4 In the present record, neither party presents arguments or evidence relating to secondary considerations. characterization. See Prelim. Resp. 13. On this record and for the purposes of institution, we determine this level of skill, with the exception of the open-ended phrases “at least” and “or more,” which we remove from Petitioner’s proposal, comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’206 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 18
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“regarding alternative constructions of limitation 1[E].6 See Prelim. Resp. 13– 15. Instead, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner’s presentation of arguments relating to alternative constructions is an independent reason to deny the Petition under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). Id. at 14–15 (citing 37 C.F.R. §42.104(b)(3)–(4) (“[E]very petition must identify ‘[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed’ and ‘[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.’”)). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does “not inform the Board which of the two constructions they believe to be correct, nor do they provide any substantive argument as to how the Board should proceed with construing the terms.” Id. at 14. c) Analysis We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument to deny the Petition under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). Rule 42.104(b) requires identifying how the challenged claims are to be construed and how the construed claims are unpatentable. Petitioner presents arguments and evidence alleging claims 1 and 17 are unpatentable under either of the constructions it discusses.7 Accordingly, on this record and for the purposes of institution, Petitioner has met the requirements of Rule 42.104(b).” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent, the ‘sensed animal information’ must be retrieved from an ‘RFID device’ that is ‘implanted in an animal’ or ‘implanted in a plurality of animals.’” Prelim. Resp. 51; see e.g., Ex. 1001, 18:45 (claim 2), 20:29 (claim 17). Patent Owner asserts that “implanted in an animal” requires “implantation inside of an animal.” Prelim. Sur-Reply 2. Patent Owner argues that this interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the claims and the ’206 patent Specification. See id. at 2–3. For example, Patent Owner argues that the ’206 patent Specification “distinguishes between implanted ‘on’” and “implanted ‘within’ (i.e., ‘in,’ as recited in the claims).” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:8–13).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,844,206 - PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00617 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–18, and 20 on all asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, when instituting an inter partes review, we “will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Here, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all the grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“’142 patent’s earliest claimed priority date “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a healthcare field as well as 1–2 years of experience with health information technology, including specific experience with computer-based systems for recording, tracking, and analyzing patient health information.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 36). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bryan Bergeron. Ex. 1012 ¶ 36. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 2. We adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim is construed using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 7; Prelim. Resp. 10. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Douglas’s system includes Wager’s workforce management interface. Pet. 50–52 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 138–141). Petitioner presents evidence that doing so would have been obvious because “Douglas’s system is used to treat patients with a variety of needs,” and Wager’s interface “would have helped ensure that the assigned physician was equipped, in terms of skill set, to treat the patient.” Id. at 50–51 (citing Ex. 1002, 6:36–7:4; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 138, 140). Petitioner also presents evidence that combining the cited teachings of Douglas and Wager “would have . . . helped ensure that the assigned physician had the capacity to effectively treat the patient.” Id. at 51 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 141). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not show sufficiently that it would have been obvious to combine the cited teachings of Douglas and Wager for several reasons. Prelim. Resp. 29–37. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that combining Douglas’s system with Wager’s interface is redundant because Douglas’s “patients are only subscribed to the system because they are already assigned to a physician.” Id. at 29–30. On this record, Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. Even if a patient already saw a physician, the evidence of record indicates that Wager’s interface would have improved Douglas’s system by allowing the case administrator to assign a physician that has the appropriate skills and capacity to treat the patient. Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 140–141.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,151,142 - PTAB · Sep 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00616 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). We may institute inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20 of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the challenged claims, as of the earliest claimed priority date, “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a healthcare field as well as 1–2 years of experience with health information technology, including specific 3 In the present record, neither party presents arguments or evidence relating to secondary considerations. experience with computer-based systems for recording, tracking, and analyzing patient health information.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 36). At this time, Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 2. On this record and for the purposes of institution, we determine Petitioner’s proposed level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’554 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “[n]one of the claim terms of the Challenged Claims require an explicit construction to resolve the current grounds.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner “agrees with Petitioner[] that, for purposes of this Preliminary Response only, all terms of the ’554 patent have their plain and ordinary meaning.” Prelim. Resp. 10. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because no such construction is necessary to determine whether to institute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent the parties’ arguments implicate claim construction, these are discussed below with reference to limitation 1[b].4” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Fifth, Patent Owner argues that “Douglas teaches away from Wager by teaching against accomplishing its goals in an in-person [clinical] setting like the one to which Wager is directed.” Id. at 27–28 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4, 5, 11, 13). Patent Owner argues that Douglas’s system is designed for remote monitoring of patients to avoid the costs and inconvenience of in-person programs. Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 1:29–35, 2:5–7). On this record, we do not agree that Douglas teaches away from a combination with Wager’s interface simply because the interfaces may be used in different environments. Moreover, Douglas teaches alternatives to remote monitoring, including in-person visits. See Ex. 1002, 11:1–2 (“The system also accepts additional patient data obtained during office visits.”); see In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”).” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,144,554 - PTAB · Jun 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00367 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–4 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Horie.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Other
“corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the claimed invention, either expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.” Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “A single prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if such feature is necessarily present, or inherent, in that reference.” Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Moreover, the reference must also “disclose[] within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’310 patent has an application filing date of March 11, 2005, we apply the pre-AIA version of the statutory basis for unpatentability. See Ex. 1001, code (22). 2 Japanese Patent Application 2002-133100, published May 10, 2002 (Ex. 1009). All citations are to the Petitioner-provided English translation. Ex. 1006. claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’310 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue this ground. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.10 10 As guidance to the parties, we note that it is unclear that the Petition, unlike Dr. Akl’s testimony, argues how a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified Horie. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 98 (arguing that the differences between the first and second transmission channels in Horie “would have suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art that separate and independent lines of communication could be employed in Horie’s system for the sending/receiving of requests and notifications.”), with Pet. 32–33 (not making the argument in Dr. Akl’s testimony). The parties should address in the Response and Reply (1) whether the Petition argues how and why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified Horie and (2), if not, whether we can rely on the argument in Dr. Akl’s testimony that is not made in the Petition.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “no claim terms require an express construction.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). 3 If Patent Owner disagrees with this formulation of the level of skill in the art, it must raise that disagreement in its Response. If a different level of skill would affect the outcome in this case, the parties must brief that issue as well. The failure of Patent Owner to describe how a different level of skill in the art is determinative will be a forfeiture of that argument. If there is a dispute regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, then the parties are also encouraged to submit evidence, other than conclusory expert testimony, that supports their position. See 37 C.F.R § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.4, 5 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,357,310
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.