- PTAB · Sep 27, 2022 · IPR2022-00666 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–4 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Mazzoni and VDSL1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, a decision to institute may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on the arguments and evidence of record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’048 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’048 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We consider several factors when determining whether to deny institution under § 314(a) based on a parallel district court proceeding. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). Nonetheless, “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” USPTO Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, 4–5 (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_m emo_20220621_.pdf. “Compelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4. Based on the evidence of record, Petitioner’s assertion that claims 1–4 would have been obvious over Mazzoni and VDSL1 presents a compelling unpatentability challenge. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner disputes that the Mazzoni and VDSL1 combination teaches a “shared memory” and “a message during initialization specifying a maximum number of bytes of memory that are available to be allocated to an interleaver.” Prelim. Resp. 44–46, 52–55. Patent Owner also disputes that it would have been obvious to combine the cited teachings of Mazzoni and VDSL1. Id. at 55–59. As discussed in detail below, the evidence of record plainly shows that the Mazzoni and VDSL1 combination teaches the disputed limitations and that it would have been obvious to combine the cited teachings of Mazzoni and VDSL1. See Sections II.E.1, II.E.3. Because the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“§ 315(b). Prelim. Resp. 23. Section 315(b) provides that an inter partes review “may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner served 2Wire, Inc. (“2Wire”) with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’048 patent in February 2014. Prelim. Resp. 12; Ex. 2001, 34–35; Ex. 2002. Petitioner filed the Petition in this case more than one year later on March 4, 2022. Pet. 79. Patent Owner contends that the Petition is barred under § 315(b) because 2Wire and its successor-in-interest CommScope Holding Company, Inc. (“CommScope”) are real parties in interest and privies of Petitioner.1 Prelim. Resp. 23–28; Sur-reply 2–7.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner filed the Petition at the behest of 2Wire and CommScope. The evidence of record indicates that Patent Owner sent claim charts to Petitioner alleging infringement of the ’048 patent based on compliance with Very High Speed Digital Subscriber Line (“VDSL”) standards.2 Reply 2; Ex. 1037, 39; Ex. 1038, 1–8; Ex. 1039, 1–8; Ex. 1040 ¶ 3. Although Patent Owner has not filed a complaint against Petitioner for infringement of the ’048 patent, Patent Owner did file a complaint against Petitioner for infringement of another patent that includes similar claims. Ex. 1026, 5 (“asserts infringement of . . . United States Patent Nos. . . . 7,844,882”); Ex. 2031, 5 (“Family 3 Patents”); compare Ex. 1001, 10:41–65, with IPR2022-00664, Ex. 1001, 11:39–12:12. Further, 2 Petitioner argued in a related district court case that Patent Owner’s communications do not provide a specific charge of infringement by a specific product that constitute actual notice under 35 U.S.C. § 287. Sur-reply 3; Ex. 2032, 11. Here, we rely on Patent Owner’s communications only as evidence that Petitioner had its own interest in filing the Petition, not that those communications provided sufficient notice under § 287. there is evidence that Patent Owner continues to demand that Petitioner “take a license to its entire portfolio,” including the ’048 patent. Reply 2–3 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1040 ¶ 3. Thus, at this stage of the proceeding, the evidence of record indicates that Petitioner filed the Petition for itself, not at the behest of 2Wire and CommScope.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,276,048 - PTAB · Sep 27, 2022 · IPR2022-00664 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 9–16 on both asserted obviousness grounds; the Mazzoni and VDSL1 combination presented a compelling challenge, and the second ground was also instituted.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“A. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) Patent Owner argues that we should deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Prelim. Resp. 23. Section 315(b) provides that an inter partes review “may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner served 2Wire, Inc. (“2Wire”) with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’882 patent in February 2014. Prelim. Resp. 11–12; Ex. 2001, 33–34; Ex. 2002. Petitioner filed the Petition in this case more than one year later on March 4, 2022. Pet. 83. Patent Owner contends that the Petition is barred under § 315(b) because 2Wire and its successor-in-interest CommScope Holding Company, Inc. (“CommScope”) are real parties in interest and privies of Petitioner.5 Prelim. Resp. 23–28; Sur-reply 2–7.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Petitioner filed the Petition at the behest of 2Wire and CommScope. Prelim. Resp. 26. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner and CommScope are “‘featured partner[s]’ in business” who agreed to a “joint strategy.” Id. at 27; Sur-reply 3–4. According to Patent Owner, Petitioner filed petitions challenging certain patents that 2Wire and CommScope are “unquestionably time barred from challenging,” even though Petitioner is not accused of infringing them. Prelim. Resp. 25–27; Sur-reply 2–3. And, in “exchange,” CommScope filed petitions challenging certain other patents that Petitioner is accused of infringing. Prelim. Resp. 26–27; Sur-reply 3. Patent Owner also contends that Petitioner and CommScope used the same declarants to support their respective petitions. Prelim. Resp. 27; Sur-reply 4. On this record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner filed the Petition at the behest of 2Wire and CommScope. The evidence of record indicates that Patent Owner sent claim charts to Petitioner alleging infringement of the ’882 patent based on compliance with Very High Speed Digital Subscriber Line (“VDSL”) standards. Reply 2; Ex. 1034, 38–39; Ex. 1035, 1–8; Ex. 1036, 1–8; Ex. 1037 ¶ 3. Thereafter, on August 13, 2021, Patent Owner filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Texas accusing Petitioner of infringing several patents, including the ’882 patent. Ex. 1026, 5; see Reply 2–3. Further, there is evidence that Patent Owner “continues to “take a license to its entire portfolio,” including the ’882 patent. Reply 3 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1037 ¶ 3. Thus, at this stage of the proceeding, the evidence of record indicates that Petitioner filed the Petition for itself, not at the behest of 2Wire and CommScope.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“to deny institution in light of parallel district court litigation. Prelim. Resp. 28–39; Sur-reply 7–8. We consider several factors when determining whether to deny institution under § 314(a) based on a parallel district court proceeding. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). Nonetheless, “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” USPTO Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, 4–5 (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. “Compelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 4. Based on the evidence of record, Petitioner’s assertion that claims 9–16 would have been obvious over Mazzoni and VDSL1 presents a compelling unpatentability challenge. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner disputes that the Mazzoni and VDSL1 combination teaches a “shared memory” and “a message during initialization specifying a maximum number of bytes of memory that are available to be allocated to an interleaver.” Prelim. Resp. 43–45, 51–54. Patent Owner also disputes that it would have been obvious to combine the cited teachings of Mazzoni and VDSL1. Id. at 55–59. As discussed in detail below, the evidence of record plainly shows that the Mazzoni and VDSL1 combination teaches the disputed limitations and that it would have been obvious to combine the cited teachings of Mazzoni and VDSL1. See Section III.F. Because the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Summary For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner makes a sufficient showing that the combination of Mazzoni and VDSL1 teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 9–16 and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references in the manner asserted. Accordingly, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that claims 9–16 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Mazzoni and VDSL1.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,844,882 - PTAB · Aug 18, 2022 · IPR2022-00471 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 8–10, 15, 24–26, and 31 over four asserted grounds: anticipation by G.992.1 and obviousness over SC-060, G.992.1 with SC-060, and G.992.1 with Wunsch.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner “bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b) based on a complaint served on an alleged real party in interest more than a year earlier.” Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 3. RPI Analysis” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum8 titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“the Memorandum” or “Memo”), which states, among other things, that “to benefit the patent system and the public good, the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memo, 2. The Memorandum explains that “compelling, meritorious challenges will be allowed to proceed at the PTAB even where district court litigation is proceeding in parallel.” Id. at 4. “Compelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “[W]here the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage 8 Available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf 19 presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Id. at 4−5. “This clarification strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Id. at 5. In addition, “[t]he compelling evidence test affirms the PTAB’s current approach of declining to deny institution under Fintiv where the evidence of record so far in the case would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable.” Id. at 5 n.6 (citing, e.g., Illumina Inc. v. Trs. Of Columbia Univ., IPR2020-00988, Paper 20 (PTAB Dec. 8, 2020) (declining to deny under Fintiv in light of strong evidence on the merits even though four factors weighed in favor of denial and remining factor was neutral)).” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“agreed[] that a flag signal does not include information indicating when the FIP settings are going to be used.” Prelim. Resp. 8. In its Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion, the District Court in the Delaware case, after considering both parties’ arguments and evidence, rejected Patent Owner’s proposed construction and adopted Defendants’ compromise construction, which does not import the negative limitation advanced by Patent Owner into the claims. Ex. 2027, 7−8; see also Ex. 1024, 2. The District Court in the Delaware case noted that “the patent does not provide lexicography for ‘flag signal,’” and “[Patent Owner] does not argue that a disclaimer supports it[s] construction.” Ex. 2027, 7−8. The ’835 patent discloses that “synchronization can be based on, for example, a synchronization using FEC codeword counters or a flag signal.” Ex. 1001, 11:7−9. The “flag signal” embodiment does not limit a flag signal to “an inverted sync symbol, or sync FLAG, as used in the ADSL2 G.992.3 OLR protocol,” as Patent Owner alleges. The portions of the Specification relied upon by Patent Owner and Dr. Madisetti use permissive language in explaining that “[f]or example, the flag signal could be an inverted sync symbol, or sync FLAG, as used in the ADSL2 G.992.3 OLR protocol.” Ex. 1001, 12:29−31. Moreover, Patent Owner conceded at the Markman hearing in the Delaware case that a flag signal may contain information that indicates when updated FIP settings are to be used, as long as the” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, this proposal appears to be consistent with the ’835 patent, prior art of record, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Jacobsen, except that we do not accept the qualifier “at least,” which would expand the required amount of experience indefinitely.” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,462,835 - Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingenioshare, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jun 7, 2022 · IPR2022-00295 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 7–12, 22–24, and 33–67 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the § 103(a) combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”), Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution in light of the Texas case where Patent Owner has asserted the ’038 patent and other patents against Petitioner. See Prelim. Resp. 7–12; supra § II.B.” slip op. at 16
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Under the circumstances here, two petitions challenging claims in the ’038 patent will not place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board or Patent Owner. In IPR2022-00202, the Board will consider challenges to related U.S. Patent No. 10,142,810 B2 based on Diacakis and alternatively the Tanigawa-Hullfish combination. See Epic Games, Inc. v. IngenioShare, LLC, IPR2022-00202, Paper 9 (PTAB May 23, 2022) (granting institution of inter partes review); supra § II.B. In IPR2022-00291, the Board will similarly consider challenges to related U.S. Patent No. 10,708,727 B2 based on Diacakis and alternatively the Tanigawa-Hullfish combination. See Epic Games, Inc. v. IngenioShare, LLC, IPR2022-00291, Paper 10 (PTAB May 24, 2022) (granting institution of inter partes review); supra § II.B. Thus, in other proceedings the Board will consider and become familiar with Diacakis, Tanigawa, and Hullfish and the relevance of those references to claims in related patents.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with Internet communication systems.” Pet. 25. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education might 5 The record does not include evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–97. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not address the educational level or work experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1–7, 12–16. Based on the current record and for purposes of institution, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’038 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,492,038 - Epic Games, Inc. v. Ingenioshare, LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 24, 2022 · IPR2022-00291 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9 and 15–17 on all asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Epic would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, or an equivalent field, and three to five years of experience working with Internet communication systems.” Pet. 25. According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Dr. Almeroth supports this articulation, and Patent Owner does not, at this time, propose any different articulation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–97. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Although “Petitioner does not believe that any terms need to be construed to assess the arguments presented” in its Petition, Patent Owner raises an issue with respect to the challenged claims’ recitation of a “network-based portal.” See Pet. 25; Prelim. Resp. 15–16. In particular, Patent Owner contends that “[t]he specification of the ’727 Patent uses the term ‘network-based portal’ consistently as being at the server-side of a network.” Prelim. Resp. 15. Patent Owner supports its contention by identifying examples where the specification of the ’727 patent describes a “portal” as separate from a “mobile phone” or from a person’s “wireless device.” Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:12–13, 6:32–33, 6:55–63, 16:1–3). But the specification also includes numerous examples where the portal functionality is implemented in a “mobile phone,” i.e., a client-side device. See Ex. 1001, 3:10–19, 9:3– 10:2, 10:17–13:27, 14:64–15:54, Figs. 7–11. For example, the specification explains that a “mobile communication device,” such as a “mobile telephone,” may perform steps depicted in Figures 7 through 11. See id. at 9:4–8, 10:17–28, 11:60–12:5, 13:1–9, 14:7–13, 14:66–67, 15:44–46; see also id. at 14:36–38 (identifying a “mobile telephone” as an example of a “mobile communication device), 17:53–55 (same). And Patent Owner categorizes a “mobile phone” as a client-side device. See Prelim. Resp. 16– 22. To adopt Patent Owner’s exclusion of client-side functionality from the scope of the recited “network-based portal” would thus exclude preferred embodiments. See PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we decline to adopt such an exclusion. The parties will have an opportunity to elaborate on their positions for proper construction of “network-based portal” during the trial. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any other term for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Among such reasons, Petitioner identifies both references’ teachings regarding prioritization of communications from certain individuals, as well as the similarity of Diacakis’s “presence and availability” information with Loveland’s “current circumstance” information. Id. at 53–56 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 8, 24; Ex. 1008, 3:45–5:24, Figs. 1–2). Petitioner supports this identification with testimony by Dr. Almeroth, who also supports Petitioner’s contention that the combination would both yield predictable results and be reasonably expected to succeed. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 152–161; Pet. 54–57. At this time, Patent Owner disputes neither Petitioner’s reasoning to effect the combination nor Petitioner’s specific analysis of the individual limitations of claims 7–9. On the current record, and mindful of the standard that applies during this preliminary phase of the proceeding, we find that Petitioner’s reasoning is sufficiently supported by rational underpinning.” slip op. at 25
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDecided for petitioner
“discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny the Petition in light of the state of the related litigation. Prelim. Resp. 9–14 (citing, inter alia, NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential)). But on the same date Patent Owner filed its Preliminary Response, the district court granted Petitioner’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, thereby terminating the related litigation. See Ex. 3001, 9. We agree with Petitioner that “this dismissal moots Patent Owner’s arguments based on Fintiv” and that “[b]ecause there is no longer any parallel proceeding, there is no basis for a discretionary denial under § 314(a).”4 Reply 1. We accordingly decline to exercise our discretionary authority to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 33
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,708,727 - Allstate Insurance Company v. Atos, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 8, 2022 · IPR2021-01449 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–5 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, and 5 are unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“invention “would have been someone with a bachelor’s or master’s degree in the field of mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or physics or with a bachelor’s or master’s degree in a related field and at least three years of experience in designing or developing portable device systems.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). Petitioner further argues the “Skilled Artisan would have been aware of the types of portable devices discussed below and would have known how to utilize the portable devices and their accelerometers to detect motion while inside a vehicle,” and “would have known how to model the forces on moving objects in line with Newtonian Mechanics.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’174 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“appear only in claim 5. Claim 5 is at issue in Grounds 4 and 5, but no issue in Ground 4 turns on construction of either claim term. As to Ground 5, for the reasons discussed below, we need not decide at this stage of the proceeding whether Kim discloses an “operation indicator” under either party’s proposed construction, because we determine that Petitioner has met the threshold for institution based on other claims and grounds asserted in the Petition. See SAS Guidance. Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, no issue turns on our construction of “operation indicator” or “on-board component,” and we determine we need not construe either term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). This does not constitute a determination regarding the persuasiveness of either party’s arguments; we leave claim construction as an open question for the parties to address during trial. In that regard, we remind Patent Owner that any argument not raised in its Patent Owner response pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.120 may be deemed waived.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“analogous art. Under In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004), we determine analogous art based on (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. According to Patent Owner, the ’174 patent is directed to using the sensors of a portable device to accurately determine changes in operational state of a vehicle, such as vehicle cornering, using the relationship between vectors derived from the sensors’ output. Prelim. Resp. 3. On this preliminary record, Johnson describes monitoring driver behavior using sensors on a mobile phone (Ex. 1010, 1609), and Kleppner describes inter alia using vector operations to determine the direction of rotation of a moving object. See supra II.D.1. Thus, both references appear reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventors of the ’174 patent were involved.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,846,174 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2022 · IPR2021-01406 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 6–14, and 16, finding a reasonable likelihood they are obvious over Hellman and Chou, or Hellman, Chou, and Schneck.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“preliminary record, we find that it is necessary to address only the claim terms identified below expressly for purposes of this Institution Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Here, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the ’941 patent “would have had been at least a B.S. degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering (or equivalent experience)” and “would have had at least two years of experience with computer science and computer engineering, including information encryption, computer architecture, and firmware programming,” citing to the declaration of Andrew Wolfe, Ph.D., for support. Pet. 21−22” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner argues that Chou discloses that “embedding sensitive information in the BIOS memory reduced the risk of tampering with that information” because Chou explains that, “by storing sensitive information (passwords in Chou) in the BIOS memory, any attempt to delete or disable the sensitive information would also disable the BIOS program.” Id. at 31−32 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:63−2:1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 115). Indeed, Chou discloses that “EEPROM flash devices may be programmed with BIOS routines which permit the user to enter data without requiring the computer to be returned to the manufacture,” and that “[t]he present invention makes use of these new BIOS memory devices for effecting security measures which discourage theft.” Ex. 1005, 1:63−2:7. Petitioner asserts that, in light of Chou, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to store value M (the claimed “license record”) in the BIOS EEPROM memory “in order to achieve Hellman’s purpose of discouraging tampering with the license information.” Id. at 28−33 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:22−26; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 112−116). Petitioner explains that it was well-known at the time of the invention that “a computer would have BIOS and that it would be common to store it in EEPROM memory.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 1:54−62, 2:2−7, 3:21−35; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105−111). Indeed, during prosecution of the ’941 patent, Patent Owner admitted that “all computers must have a BIOS.” Ex. 1002, 51 (Prosecution History of the ’941 patent—Office Action Response, dated February 5, 2002). Dr. Wolfe testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated 16 to store BIOS together with the values M in the non-volatile memory 37, in order to discourage users from tampering with the values M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 115 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:63−2:7). Based on the evidence in this current record, we determine that Petitioner has articulated a sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Hellman and Chou for purposes of this Decision. b. Motivation to combine Schneck’s teachings with Hellman and Chou” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s theory of teaching away is unavailing. Nothing in Chou discourages an ordinarily skilled artisan from storing sensitive information, such as Hellman’s license information, in the BIOS memory. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.”). As Petitioner points out, Chou discloses that, “by storing sensitive information (passwords in Chou) in the BIOS memory, any attempt to delete or disable the sensitive information would also disable the BIOS program.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:63−2:1). Chou also discloses that “EEPROM flash devices may be programmed with BIOS routines which permit the user to enter data without requiring the computer to be returned 28 to the manufacture,” and that “[t]he present invention makes use of these new BIOS memory devices for effecting security measures which discourage theft.” Ex. 1005, 1:63−2:1 (emphasis added). Therefore, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that: (1) Chou teaches away from using a software agent to set up a verification structure in BIOS memory; or (2) “Chou discloses that ‘configuration of the BIOS EEPROM’ is done at manufacture, such that altering it in order to write Hellman’s value ‘M’ to Chou’s ‘BIOS Memory’ would require de-coupling the EEPROM memory module from the chip, returning it to the manufacturer, and reconfiguring the ‘BIOS EEPROM.’” Prelim. Resp. 61−63. In addition, Patent Owner’s argument that Chou’s description of Figure 7 reflects that “the ‘configuration of the BIOS EEPROM’ provides for no spare memory space for functions and routines other than those already prescribed by Chou” is misplaced. Id. “It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that the criterion for obviousness is not whether the references can be combined physically, but whether the claimed invention is rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole). In that regard, one with ordinary skill in the art is not compelled to follow blindly the teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the exercise of independent judgment. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21 (stating that a person with ordinary skill in the art is “a person of ordinary creativity, 29 not an automaton,” and “in many cases . . . will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”).” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,411,941 - PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · IPR2021-01338 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 6–14, and 16 based on reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Hellman and Chou, and over Hellman, Chou, and Schneck.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’941 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“equivalent experience)” and “would have had at least two years of experience with computer science and computer engineering, including information encryption, computer architecture, and firmware programming,” citing to the declaration of Andrew Wolfe, Ph.D., for support. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21−25). At this juncture, Patent Owner does not dispute that assessment. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, this proposal appears to be consistent with the ’941 patent, the asserted prior art, and supported by the testimony of Dr. Wolfe.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached
“erasable, non-volatile memory area of a BIOS of the computer, and a volatile memory area.” Ex. 1001, 6:60−62. Patent Owner argues that this portion of the preamble is a claim limitation because it provides antecedent basis for the following terms recited in the body of claim 1: (1) “the volatile memory,” (2) “the erasable, non-volatile memory of the BIOS,” and (3) “the erasable non-volatile memory of the BIOS.” Prelim. Resp. 17−18. Petitioner argues that, even if the preamble is considered limiting, the combination of Hellman and Chou would have rendered the preamble of claim 1 obvious. Pet. 35, 49. Regardless of whether the preamble is limiting, as discussed below, we find that Petitioner shows sufficiently for purposes of institution that the recitation in the preamble is satisfied by the prior art. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to determine whether the aforementioned portion of the preamble is limiting.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededDecided for petitioner
“‘an OS-level software program or routine running on the recited conventional computer to write and/or erase data’ (i.e., performing the task of writing and/or erasing data without the need for additional or specialized hardware).” Prelim. Resp. 20−31. Patent Owner argues that “the Federal Circuit and other courts uniformly recognize [that] this ‘agent’ is an OS-level software program or routine running on the recited conventional computer to write and/or erase data (i.e., it executes without the need for additional or specialized hardware).” Id. However, the cases cited by Patent Owner do not support Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction. Only the District Court in the LG case construed the claim term “agent.” The District Court in the LG case determined that “a plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate” and that “the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘agent’ is ‘a software program or routine’” because, “[a]s demonstrated by [Patent Owner] through its references to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, agent has a well-established meaning of ‘a software program or routine.’” Ex. 1012, 3; Ex. 1013, 36−37 (emphasis added). slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,411,941 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2021 · IPR2021-00920 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–31 on all four §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“Taking the facts as presented by Patent Owner and not contested by Petitioner, we agree that Petitioner and Unified have a relationship. Further, even if Unified was under no obligation to file an inter partes review of the ’431 patent, such as based on the litigation between Patent Owner and Petitioner, Unified chose to involve itself in a manner that is presumably for the benefit of its members including Petitioner. At the same time, there is no evidence that Unified and Petitioner are the same, have the same interests, or are working jointly in their inter partes review cases. See e.g., Pet. 62; Reply 1. Thus, based on the current record, these facts are neutral.” slip op. at 25
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that the preambles should be limiting because they recite essential structure or steps and are “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claims. Prelim. Resp. 5–6 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 770 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2018)). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that each claim includes one or more limitations that refer back to the preamble’s “handheld computing device” or “handheld computer apparatus” for antecedent basis. Id. at 6–8. Patent Owner further argues that the ’413 patent discloses different embodiments, with some embodiments being in the form of a computer and some embodiments being in the form of a handheld device. Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:59–13:7, Fig. 1A). Patent Owner contends that the claims are directed to the latter embodiments related to a handheld device and, therefore, “the preamble is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to claims 1, 7, and 14, consistent with the embodiments that the inventor chose to claim.” Id. at 8. We agree that the preambles of claims 1, 7, and 14 are limiting. This is primarily because in the body of each claim includes “said device” or “said apparatus” which refers back to the preamble and is understood with reference thereto. For example, the last clause of claim 7 states: “means for controlling a function of said apparatus using said information.” Ex. 1001, 26:4–5 (emphasis added). “Said apparatus” derives antecedent basis from the “[h]andheld computer apparatus” recited in the preamble. Moreover, the of this reference to the handheld computer apparatus. The limitations of claims 1 and 14 are similar and so this logic applies equally to these claims as well. Thus, we agree that the preamble recites essential structure and is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to claims 1, 7, and 14.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“f) “electro-optically sensing light reflected from said at least one finger using a sensing means associated with said device” Patent Owner argues that the Petition should have construed “sensing means” in claim 1 and that the Petition should be denied because of this failure. Id. at 24–25. Patent Owner argues that “[t]he Petition must identify how each challenged claim is to be construed” and that there are specific requirements “[f]or means-plus-function terms” that are not satisfied by the Petition for the term “sensing means.” Id. at 24 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)). Patent Owner further argues that “term includes the word ‘means,’ but Petitioner fails to identify whether the term requires construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).” Id. at 24–25. However, at the same time, Patent Owner states that it “does not contend that the term “sensing means” requires construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)” (id. at 25 n.2) and that the Petition implies that ‘“camera units’ . . .” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,933,431 - PTAB · Nov 29, 2021 · IPR2021-00922 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–30 on all petitioned grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“1. Legal Standards for Unpatentability Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A claim is unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). We resolve the question of obviousness based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the prior art and the claims; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We apply these principles to the Petition’s challenges.” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) at the time of the ’079 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 29–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 5. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s declarant’s statement is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’079 patent and prior art of record. We adopt this definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“performed in the work volume, the camera being fixed relative to the light source.” Ex. 1001, 13:5–7. As noted above, Petitioner relies on Numazaki’s portable computer with an information input generation device of Figure 74 with its photo-detection sensor unit (702) for the providing a camera method step of claim 1. Pet. 12–13. We determine that Petitioner’s showing is sufficient at this stage. Patent Owner argues that “Numazaki does not teach or suggest one camera oriented to observe a gesture performed in the work volume” (Prelim. Resp. 6 (emphasis added)), but then immediately thereafter explains why this understanding of the claim (that only one camera is required) appears to be incorrect (id. (discussing the meaning of “comprising” when used in claims)). Patent Owner concludes that claim 1 “uses the [open-ended] transitional phrase ‘comprising,’ so the term ‘a camera’ means one or more cameras.” Id. Based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim is not limited to only a single camera. Rather, “a camera” means one or more cameras. Thus, we determine that one or both of Numazaki’s cameras read on the claimed “providing a camera” as outlined in the Petition. See Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner further argues that “[t]he Petition concedes Numazaki requires two photo-detection units [i.e. cameras]. See Pet., p. 14. There is no teaching or suggestion of one or more cameras oriented to observe a gesture performed in the work volume.” Prelim. Resp. 7. However, again it is unclear on this record why Numazaki’s two cameras are not “one or more cameras” or why this teaching of Numazaki does not read on the claim. unclear why a PHOSITA would not understand the cameras at the photo-detection sensor unit (702) as oriented to observe a [hand] gesture performed in the work volume represented by the dotted circle.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner acknowledges, however, that Numazaki “cautions that requiring users to wear or mount some external component may negatively impact the user’s convenience and may bring with it durability issues.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 3:32–38). Petitioner relies on the testimony of its declarant to support its position that “users would accept” the tradeoff “of improved accuracy in exchange for the minor inconvenience of wearing a small ring or other hand-based target when using gesture recognition while typing.” Id. (citing 1010 ¶¶ 48–49). Further, Petitioner argues that “the durability concerns are implicated by a ring target, and many adults wear rings routinely while typing with no ill effect, which suggests that such a tradeoff would be acceptable to many users.” Id. at 23–24 (citing 1010 ¶¶ 48–49). Patent Owner argues10 that the portions of Numazaki that Petitioner discusses, identifying the user’s inconvenience and durability issues (Ex. 1004, 3:32–38), teach away from using a ring as a target. Prelim. Resp. 11 (“Numazaki explicitly criticizes, discredits, and discourages investigation into the use of targets (i.e., Numazaki’s markers or elements)). Patent Owner further argues that “a P[H]OSITA would be led in a path (i.e., an anti-target path) that is divergent from the path in claim 7.” Id. At this stage, Patent Owner’s statement about the actions of a PHOSITA amount to unsupported attorney argument. Further, Patent Owner” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,553,079
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.