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  • PTAB · Apr 6, 2022 · DER2017-00031 · APJ Jameson Lee · DER · Institution

    The Board instituted a derivation proceeding as to Respondent’s claims 24–36, finding sufficient evidence that claims 24–30 and 32–35 matched the disclosed invention.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “The threshold showing for institution of a derivation proceeding is whether the petition demonstrates substantial evidence, which if unrebutted, would support the assertion of derivation.5 35 U.S.C. § 135(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.405(c). For establishing derivation, a petitioner must show that the respondent, without authorization, filed an application claiming a derived invention. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.405(b)(2). The party asserting derivation must establish prior conception of an invention and communication of that conception to an inventor of the other party. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hedgewick v. Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 908 (CCPA 1974).” slip op. at 4

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “Exhibits 1026, 1028, 1041, and 1042, constitute sufficient evidence, under the substantial evidence standard, to support Petitioner’s assertion of conception, except for the requirement of independent corroboration. For instance, there is no declaration testimony from any of the recipients of the email communications or people who were copied on those email communications to corroborate those email communications. There is no testimony from anyone at Pro-Tech to corroborate the nature and existence of the signed manufacturing outline that is Exhibit 1042.” slip op. at 9

    None
  • PTAB · Oct 31, 2017 · IPR2017-00807 · APJ Kristi L R Sawert · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in declining to construe the terms or in reserving disputed motivation and reasonable-expectation issues for trial.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “We are not persuaded that the Board abused its discretion by declining to expressly interpret “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” in the Institution Decision. As the Board explained in the Institution Decision, Petitioner showed sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the prior art teaches pharmaceutical compositions in the form of nasal sprays. Instit. Dec. 14. Specifically, the Board found that the prior-art references explicitly teach nasal sprays that are administered nasally. See id. (citing Ex. 1007 (Hettche), 1:28–30, 2:12–17, 41–43), 15 (citing Ex. 1009 (Phillips), 32:57– 60, 33:12–14). Patent Owner does not allege its proposed construction of “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” is different from the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms to an ordinarily skilled artisan. Id. at 4–6; see also Prelim. Resp. 9–11. As a consequence, we are not persuaded that the Board overlooked or misapprehended this matter or that the Board would have declined institution on the obviousness grounds had it explicitly adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation.” slip op. at 4

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “osmolality, poor spray quality, and unacceptable settling and caking” resulting from the attempted formulation of Cramer’s Example III. Id. at 8– 10; see also Prelim. Resp. 25. The Board, however, addressed those issues in the Institution Decision and determined that “Patent Owner’s arguments and expert testimony highlight disputed issues of fact about whether the skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hettche, Phillipps, and Segal to arrive at the claimed subject matter, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success.” Instit. Dec. at 20 (citing Ex. 1002, 268–87; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 40–47; Ex. 2111, 1; Ex. 2044, 1–2). The Board concluded that those “issues are best resolved following trial with the benefit of a full record.” Id. We are still of that view. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Board misapprehended or overlooked the issue of reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 5

    • BurdenOther

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on petition, we review 1 Helmut Hettche, U.S. Patent No. 5,164,194 (Nov. 17, 1992) (“Hettche”). Ex. 1007. 2 Gordon H. Phillipps, et al., U.S. Patent No. 4,335,121 (Jun. 15, 1982) (“Phillipps”). Ex. 1009. 3 Catherine A. Segal, Int’l Publication No. WO 98/48839 (Nov. 5, 1998) (“Segal”). Ex. 1012. 4 FLONASE® (fluticasone propionate) Nasal Spray, 50 mcg Product Information (Dec. 1998) (“Flonase Label”). Ex. 1010. the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “In the Institution Decision, the Board determined that “no claim term requires express interpretation for purposes of this Decision.” Instit. Dec. 7. In its Rehearing Request, Patent Owner argues that the Board “misapprehended or overlooked the importance of construing the terms ‘nasal spray’ and ‘suitable for nasal administration’” found in all the challenged claims. Reh’g Req. 2. In particular, Patent Owner asserts that those terms mean “pharmaceutical formulations that are tolerable to patients, homogeneous, and can be suitably deposited onto the nasal mucosa.” Id. (citing Paper 7, Preliminary Response (“Prelim. Resp.”), 9). Patent Owner alleges that, had the Board construed “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration,” then the Board would have denied the obviousness grounds because “none of the combinations of cited art teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make the claimed fixed-dose combination ‘nasal spray’ or formulation ‘suitable for nasal administration’ with a reasonable expectation of success.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Prelim. Resp. 9). We are not persuaded that the Board abused its discretion by declining to expressly interpret “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” in the Institution Decision. As the Board explained in the Institution Decision, Petitioner showed sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the prior art teaches pharmaceutical compositions in the form of nasal sprays. Instit. Dec. 14. Specifically, the Board found that the prior-art references explicitly teach nasal sprays that are administered nasally. See id. (citing Ex. 1007 (Hettche), 1:28–30, 2:12–17, 41–43), 15 (citing Ex. 1009 (Phillips), 32:57– 60, 33:12–14). Patent Owner does not allege its proposed construction of “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” is different from the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms to an ordinarily skilled artisan. Id. at 4–6; see also Prelim. Resp. 9–11. As a consequence, we are not persuaded that the Board overlooked or misapprehended this matter or that the Board would have declined institution on the obviousness grounds had it explicitly adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation.” slip op. at 3

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,168,620
  • Merial Limited v. VirbacRehearing denied
    PTAB · May 4, 2015 · IPR2014-01279 · APJ Fred E Mckelvey · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request without prejudice to presenting its patentability arguments in the Patent Owner’s Response on the merits.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Upon consideration of a Petition for Rehearing filed by the Patent Owner on 29 April 2015 (Paper 20), it is ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is denied without prejudice to Patent Owner presenting patentability arguments made in the Petition for Rehearing as part of its Patent Owner’s Response on the merits.” slip op. at 1

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,501,799
  • Merial Limited v. VirbacRehearing granted
    PTAB · Apr 15, 2015 · IPR2014-01279 · APJ Fred E Mckelvey · IPR · Rehearing

    Rehearing was granted and review instituted on claims 1–15 under § 103 over Huet ’333 combined with Saito and over Huet ’333 combined with Sirinyan.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “We agree with Petitioner that we overlooked the significance of that portion of Huet ʼ333 indicating that use of a cosolvent is optional. Upon consideration of the Petition for Rehearing1 and the Response, we grant the Petition for Rehearing and order institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “solvent must include any C1-C4 alcohol. The cosolvent, which can be absolute ethanol, isopropanol, or methanol (Ex. 1005, 6:19–20), is optional (Ex. 1005, 10:45).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “We recognize in circumstances similar to those present in this case that it often is questioned why one skilled in the art would “pick and choose” particular ingredients (solvents and crystallization inhibitors in this case) where a reference describes several alternatives. There is an answer. First, the entire disclosure of Huet ʼ333 is in the public domain. One skilled in the art should be free to use any combination described by Huet ʼ333 in proportions that Huet ʼ333 characterizes as being within the skill of the art. Claim 1 of the ’799 patent presumptively removes from that public domain a portion of what is described by Huet ʼ333. Absent some unexpected result obtained by the subgenus of claim 1 of the ʼ799 patent vis-à-vis the broader genus described by Huet ʼ333, it is likely that the subject matter of claim 1 of the ʼ799 patent would have been obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Patent Owner, in responding on the merits, is free to present evidence of unexpected results.” slip op. at 11

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,501,799
  • PTAB · Mar 10, 2015 · IPR2014-00903 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place on all challenged claims and five grounds while three grounds remained denied.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In a request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Upon a request for rehearing, the decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

    • Other 314aDecided for patent owner

      “discretion in the conduct of its proceedings. We, however, direct Petitioner’s attention to 35 U.S.C. § 316(b), which provides our rules are to take into account the “regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings.” Board trial rule 108 provides that the Board may “deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). Petitioner’s position does not consider that the Board is charged with securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Trials are no exception; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) requires us to administer proceedings such that the final written determination in an inter partes review be issued one year after the date of institution, except that the review may be extended by not more than six months for good cause shown. Our decision to proceed on a streamlined grouping of grounds, as opposed to all eight, yet encompassing all claims, is a meaningful exercise of that discretion in administering the proceeding. That our decision referenced a related portion of our enabling statute as well as the precise Board rule on point, is not error or an abuse of discretion.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached

      “The question of estoppel is premature at this point. Petitioner has not established the underlying conditions precedent with any persuasive evidence or argument that the Petitioner will be estopped ultimately. Presently, the trial is moving forward on all claims with the Petitioner having carried the initial burden on institution. Moreover, estoppel is but one of the many issues to be considered in litigation strategy, and we do not presume to make one factor so heavily weighted so as intrude into the province of counsel in making decisions as to how to proceed.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for patent owner

      “We disagree with the conclusion that Petitioner is being deprived of due process rights. Placing reasonable limits upon the trial in order to have the proceedings move forward less expensively and more efficiently does not equate to a denial of a due process right. Indeed, in its current posture, Petitioner could obtain the complete relief it seeks.” slip op. at 5

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 5,986,701
  • PTAB · Mar 10, 2015 · IPR2014-00902 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied HTC’s rehearing request, leaving institution on all challenged claims on five grounds and denial of eight other grounds in place.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In a request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Upon a request for rehearing, the decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

    • Other 314aDecided for patent owner

      “Board trial rule 108 provides that the Board may “deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). Petitioner’s position does not consider that the Board is charged with securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Trials are no exception; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) requires us to administer proceedings such that the final written determination in an inter partes review be issued one year after the date of institution, except that the review may be extended by not more than six months for good cause shown. Our decision to proceed on a streamlined grouping of grounds, as opposed to all thirteen, yet encompassing all claims, is a meaningful exercise of that discretion in administering the proceeding. That our decision referenced a related portion of our enabling statute as well as the precise Board rule on point, is not error or an abuse of discretion.” slip op. at 4

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyNot reached

      “The question of estoppel is premature at this point. Petitioner has not established the underlying conditions precedent with any persuasive evidence or argument that the Petitioner will be estopped ultimately. Presently, the trial is moving forward on all claims with the Petitioner having carried the initial burden on institution. Moreover, estoppel is but one of the many issues to be considered in litigation strategy, and we do not presume to make one factor so heavily weighted so as intrude into the province of counsel in making decisions as to how to proceed.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for patent owner

      “We disagree with the conclusion that Petitioner is being deprived of due process rights. Placing reasonable limits upon the trial in order to have the proceedings move forward less expensively and more efficiently does not equate to a denial of a due process right. Indeed, in its current posture, Petitioner could obtain the complete relief it seeks.” slip op. at 6

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 5,943,093
  • PTAB · Mar 10, 2015 · IPR2014-01249 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution in place on the previously instituted claims and grounds; it rejected the challenges to denying claims 8–14 on Grounds 1 and 3 and other proposed grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In a request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Upon a request for rehearing, the decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

      “We disagree with Petitioner’s assertion, and reading of the rules and statute. The appropriate rule, 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), is not to be read in isolation, but also in conjunction with other Board rules, including 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b), which requires the rules to be interpreted for securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. Requiring identification of the means, and sufficient means, avoids institution of a trial where the scope of the means-plus-function claims cannot be determined with precision. The trial potentially would be delayed and ultimately potentially incapable of decision on the merits of the grounds. Consequently, the panel has the discretion to determine if the trial might stray into grounds outside of the statutory authority provided for inter partes review proceedings.” slip op. at 3

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDecided for patent owner

      “First, it is a long-standing part of jurisprudence that the tribunal has discretion in the conduct of its proceedings. The language of § 314 provides us with discretion in that it expressly states that review “may not” be authorized in certain situations, but it does not require that a review “shall” be instituted in any situation. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In addition, we direct Petitioner’s attention to 35 U.S.C. § 316(b), which provides our rules are to take into account the “regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings.” Board trial rule 108 provides that the Board may “deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). Petitioner’s position does not consider that the Board is charged with securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Trials are no exception; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) requires us to administer proceedings such that the final written determination in an inter partes review be issued one year after the date of institution, except that the review may be extended by not more than six months for good cause shown. Our decision to proceed on a streamlined grouping of grounds, as opposed to all eleven, yet encompassing all claims, is a meaningful exercise of that discretion in administering the proceeding. Thus, we are not persuaded of error or an abuse of discretion in our decision not to institute those additional grounds.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached

      “The question of estoppel is premature at this point. Petitioner has not established the underlying conditions precedent with any persuasive evidence or argument that the Petitioner will be estopped ultimately. Presently, the trial is moving forward on all claims with the Petitioner having carried the initial burden on institution. Moreover, estoppel is but one of the many issues to be considered in litigation strategy, and we do not presume to make one factor so heavily weighted so as intrude into the province of counsel in making decisions as to how to proceed.” slip op. at 6

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 6,362,850

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.