• Sterlite Technologies Inc. v. Afl Telecommunications, LLC.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00127 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 8, or 13 were unpatentable over either proposed obviousness ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art As noted above, resolving the question of obviousness requires determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Here, however, as Patent Owner observes (Prelim. Resp. 10), 8 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of secondary considerations in its Preliminary Response. Therefore, secondary considerations do not constitute part of our analysis herein. Petitioner has provided no assessment as to the level of ordinary skill to be considered in evaluating the grounds of obviousness that are advanced by Petitioner. The absence of such assessment calls into question the fundamental adequacy of Petitioner in carrying its burden to show a reasonable likelihood of success of unpatentability of the challenged claims that necessarily must take into account the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In any event, we do not discern that there is any apparent dispute between the parties as to the meaning of any claim term. In considering the record at hand, we determine that it is unnecessary to make explicit, or further address, any claim term in deciding whether or not to institute trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the 9 Throughout their briefings, the parties refer to the limitations designated [1.1] through [1.7] using the term “element,” e.g., “element [1.7]” (see, e.g., Pet. 23; Prelim. Resp. 23). For consistency with the parties’ chosen nomenclature, we do the same in this Decision. controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “A POSITA would have been motivated to modify Summers’ fiber optic cable 50 to include Kaji’s intermittently-fixed optical fiber tape 2A to obtain the predictable result of enabling a higher density of optical fibers to be packed in Summers’ fiber optic cable 50, as contemplated by Kaji. *** a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success because such modification would amount to nothing more than a simple substitution of Summers’ four-fiber ribbons 52 with Kaji’s intermittently-fixed optical fiber tape 2A by known methods of cable manufacturing. ***” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,287,591
• Ecto World, LLC / Sv3, LLC v. Rai Strategic Holdings, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 10, 2025 · PGR2024-00049 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show the patent was eligible for PGR; the challenged claims were supported by the 2006 priority application.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the challenged claims lack written support in the Specification (and the ’634 application). That is, on this record, it appears that the challenged claims properly claim priority to the ’634 application and, accordingly, have an effective filing date in October 2006. 2. Conclusion: PGR Eligibility For the foregoing reasons, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the ’202 patent has, or had, at least one claim having an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. Accordingly, we determine that the ’202 patent is entitled to the filing date of the ’634 application (October 18, 2006), and, thus, the ’202 patent is not eligible for post-grant review.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, the ’202 patent consistently and repeatedly characterizes the invention as incorporating tobacco in some form and ties the stated benefits of the invention to the inclusion of tobacco. Moreover, the Specification is directed to smoking articles containing tobacco, all of the embodiments include tobacco, and “the present invention” is described as a smoking article, where the smoking article includes tobacco. Consequently, we determine that “smoking article” as it is used in the challenged claims is limited to devices that include tobacco. See Mosaic Brands, Inc. v. Ridge Wallet LLC, 55 F.4th 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (finding claimed “lip” is limited to “extrudable plastic materials” where specification states that “the device of the present invention is constructed of extrudable plastic materials” and “emphasizes the benefits of using extrudable plastics and describes them as benefits of the invention as a whole”); Poly-Am., L.P. v. described in the specification has inwardly extended short seals and every section of the specification indicates the importance of inwardly extended short seals. These two facts provide together a proper reason to limit the claims in this way.”); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he specification may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor. In that instance as well, the inventor has dictated the correct claim scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is regarded as dispositive.”).” slip op. at 13

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument is dependent on accepting Petitioner’s assertion that the claims include a smoking article that does not contain tobacco, which we have not done. Instead, as set forth above, we construe “smoking article” as being limited to devices that include tobacco. See § II.B.2, supra. Based on our construction of “smoking article” and the evidence of record in this proceeding, we determine that the challenged claims are supported by the specification of the ’202 patent, which is identical to the specification of all of the continuations in the chain leading back to the October 18, 2006 that the specification of the ’202 patent and every patent in its priority chain “have identical specifications”); Prelim. Resp. 13 (noting that Petitioner does not identify other limitations in the challenged claims “allegedly lacking support in the ’202 patent family’s applications dating back to U.S. App. No. 11/550,634, filed on October 18, 2006”). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the challenged claims lack written support in the Specification (and the ’634 application). That is, on this record, it appears that the challenged claims properly claim priority to the ’634 application and, accordingly, have an effective filing date in October 2006.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,925,202
• Microsoft Corporation / HP Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Sep 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00457 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any claim was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agreed that resolution of this time bar issue would be resolved in the same manner as in IPR2024-00456. In particular, the parties stipulated: The parties stipulate with respect to the privity time bar issue that the facts and issues in IPR2024-00457 are the same as in IPR2024-00456, so that any decision the Board reaches resolving the privity time bar issue in IPR2024-00456 will apply and resolve the privity time bar issue in IPR2024-00457 in the same manner. Notice of Stipulation, Paper 14, 1. In the decision on institution for IPR2024-00456, the Board determined that “Lenovo is not a privity of Microsoft [in this context] and the Petition is not time-barred under § 315(b).” IPR2024-00456, Paper 22, 10 (July 31, 2024). Thus, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the instant petition is also not time-barred.” slip op. at 16

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For this decision, we again construe “plurality of views of a plurality of visual representations of computer content” as “referring to a plurality of ways of organizing visual representations of computer content.” We again note that this limitation is distinct from merely providing a plurality of ways of displaying content (by, for example, changing display orientation, color, resolution, etc.). Petitioner assumes this construction for the Petition, and Patent Owner assumes this construction for Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. Moreover, the construction is well supported by the ’715 patent’s claims and specification for reasons similar to those stated in the prior decision cited by Petitioner. IPR2021-00786, Paper 6, 13–16 (construing this term for the ’715 patent). For this decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analysis below and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties.7 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “Below, we explain that we deny institution based on the merits: Petitioner has not shown, with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial. In the interest of judicial efficiency, we therefore do not need to consider discretionary denial. Cf. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that the Board is not required to reach issues unnecessary to “resolve the controversy”); see also, e.g., Aylo Freesites Ltd. v. Dish Techs. LLC, IPR 2024-00512, Paper 12, 12, n. 3 (declining to reach the 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) issues when denying based on 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA), would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus two years of work experience in designing GUIs for computing devices. Ex-1003, ¶ 21. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa. Id. Pet. 15. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and the ’715 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,880,715
• Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc. / Sony Group Corporation v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00570 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8, 11, 15–17, and 20 were obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’830 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have an engineering-related undergraduate degree such as electrical, mechanical, or computer engineering, with at least two years of experience with computer-controlled electrical or electronic systems, or equivalent academic experience (e.g., a master’s degree with a similar focus). The POSITA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through a combination of education and experience in the above. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’830 patent specification.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “As Patent Owner shows, the specification reveals that in step 762, “the routine ‘control’ computes an output value p corresponding to the currently selected strength, stored in the variable strength, and outputs the value p to the power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current to the coil.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting Ex. 1001, 8:20–30). Step 762 corresponds to, for example, control input 624 transmitted from CPU 602 to power supply 612 of Figure 6 to control the current from power supply 612 to coil 626. See supra Section II.C (describing Fig. 6); Ex. 1001, 6:41–44 (“The power supply 612 receives a control input 624 from the CPU to control the current supplied to the H-bridge switch 618 for transfer to the coil 626.”). The specification, therefore, supports Patent Owner. The specification clearly links this algorithmic structure to the recited function, “controlling supply of power from the power supply.” As Patent Owner shows, Petitioner agreed in the Sony litigation that the corresponding structure includes “provide a corresponding output to the power supply so that the power supply provides a corresponding output to the driving component and equivalents thereof.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (quoting Ex. 2001, 12–14).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The record supports Patent Owner. Under a means plus function analysis, which the parties agree applies, Petitioner relies on Houston’s microprocessor as the structure that corresponds to the recited “control component.” Pet. 36 (“Houston teaches that vibration controller 623 is a microprocessor thereby satisfying the structural requirement of this means plus-function limitation.”). microprocessor, limitation 1.f further requires algorithmic structure (processed by the microprocessor of the recited “control component”) to include “1) computing a digital output value corresponding to user-selected amplitude of oscillation and outputting the value to the claimed power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current amplitude to the coil.” Supra Section III.C (emphasis added). In other words, as Patent Owner argues, to satisfy limitation 1.f, the “prior art [at least] would need to have this microprocessor perform the algorithmic step of ‘provid[ing] a corresponding ‘output to the power supply.’” Prelim. Resp. 18. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he Petition fails to show that this [algorithmic step] is disclosed or rendered obvious by the combination of Houston and Goldenberg.” Prelim. Resp. 18. The record supports Patent Owner. Petitioner does not contend, let alone show, that the combination of Houston and Goldenberg teaches outputting any value to a power supply as limitation 1.f requires according to the claim construction Patent Owner argues and we adopt. See Pet. 35–42; supra Section III.C. It follows that the Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,941,830
• Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc. / Sony Group Corporation v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00569 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 2 or 3 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of claims 2 and 3, the remaining “challenged claims” per the disclaimer. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’337 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have an engineering-related undergraduate degree such as electrical, mechanical, or computer engineering, with at least two years of experience with computer-controlled electrical or electronic systems, or equivalent academic experience (e.g., a master’s degree with a similar focus). The POSITA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through a combination of education and experience in the above. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129). Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’337 patent specification.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “called in step 716 in FIG. 7A” (Ex. 1001, 8:10–11), where Figures 7A–7C “illustrate the control program, executed by the CPU, that controls operation of an LRVM” (id. at 6:43–45). Essentially, Figures 7A–7C represent a disclosed algorithm used with a CPU of a microprocessor with memory for implementing the algorithm to control the supply of current from a power supply to a coil surrounding a moveable magnet. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Fig. 6; supra Section. II.C. “the routine ‘control’ computes an output value p corresponding to the currently selected strength, stored in the variable strength, and outputs the value p to the power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current to the coil.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Ex. 1001, 8:10–20). Step 762 corresponds to, for example, control input 624 transmitted from CPU 602 to power supply 612 of Figure 6 to control the current from power supply 612 to coil 626. See supra Section II.C (describing Fig. 6); Ex. 1001, 6:33–35 (“The power supply 612 receives a control input 624 from the CPU to control the current supplied to the H-bridge switch 618 for transfer to the coil 626.”). The specification, therefore, supports Patent Owner. The specification clearly links this algorithmic structure to the recited function, “controlling supply of power from the power supply.” As Patent Owner shows, Petitioner agreed in the Sony litigation that the corresponding structure includes “provide a corresponding output to the power supply so that the power supply provides a corresponding output to the driving component and equivalents thereof.” Prelim. Resp. 14–15 (quoting Ex. 2002, 4–5). In summary, limitation 2.f recites “a control component that controls supply of power from the power supply to the driving component to cause the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency and an amplitude specified by user input received from the user input features.” Step 762, which corresponds to control input 624 transmitted from CPU 602 to power supply 612 in the block diagram of Figure 6, is a clear link of algorithmic structure to the recited function of “control[ling] supply of power from the” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The record supports Patent Owner. Under a means plus function analysis, which the parties agree applies, Petitioner relies on Houston’s microprocessor as the structure that corresponds to the recited “control component.” Pet. 34 (“Houston teaches that vibration controller 623 is a microprocessor thereby satisfying the structural requirement of this means plus-function limitation.”). As indicated in Section III.C, if the corresponding structure is a microprocessor, limitation 2.f further requires algorithmic structure (processed by the microprocessor of the recited “control component”) to include “1) computing a digital output value corresponding to user-selected amplitude of oscillation and outputting the value to the claimed power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current amplitude to the coil.” Supra Section III.C (emphasis added). In other words, as Patent Owner argues, to satisfy limitation 2.f, the “prior art [at least] would need to have this microprocessor perform the algorithmic step of ‘provid[ing] a corresponding ‘output to the power supply.’” Prelim. Resp. 19. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he Petition fails to show that this [algorithmic Goldenberg,” and Tierling. Id. at 19, 23.14 The record supports Patent Owner. Petitioner does not contend, let alone show, that the combination of Houston, Goldenberg, and Tierling teaches outputting any value to a power supply as limitation 2.f requires according to the claim construction Patent Owner argues and we adopt. See Pet. 35–44; supra Section III.C. It follows that the Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success of prevailing with respect to claim 1. In addition, although not necessary to our decision based on the dispositive claim construction issue discussed above, the Petition fails to show that the combination of Houston, Goldenberg, and Tierling teaches the “control component” algorithmic structure corresponding to the function of “caus[ing] the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency” as recited in limitation 2.f. Specifically, the Petition fails to show that the combination of Houston, Goldenberg, and Tierling teaches the following corresponding structure of the control component according to our claim construction: “at least one timer or equivalent to control a periodic change in direction of the current supplied to the coil . . . by providing a control value . . . such that the value flips according to the timer or its equivalent.” See supra Section II.C; Pet. 35–44.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,860,337
• US Conec Ltd. v. Senko Advanced Components, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00122 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6–16, 19, and 20 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. We may institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s proposal is undisputed. Prelim. Resp. 38. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we find that Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’190 patent and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “consistent with or supported by Nakagawa’s teachings. Dr. Brennan modifies Nakagawa Figure 4B by adding yellow highlighting in the form of a cylinder and opines that the added highlighting represents an inner round surface extending along a longitudinal axis within tubular main body portion 41. Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 164–165. Dr. Brennan’s testimony does not take into account that the circular shape highlighted yellow in his annotation of Figure 4E is recessed within boot 40 and does not extend to the proximal end of the boot.5 Nakagawa does not support Dr. Brennan’s addition of a yellow-highlighted cylindrical surface extending to the proximal end of the boot, as depicted in his annotation of Figure 4B.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Nakagawa’s deficiency is apparent from Figure 2. As noted above, claim limitation 1.3.3 recites an “inner round surface defining a proximal end portion of the boot passageway.” Dr. Brennan testifies “As shown in Figures 4B and 2 of Nakagawa, reproduced above and below, respectively, a POSITA would have understood that Nakagawa’s inner round surface defines the proximal end at the center of the rotatable boot assembly.” Ex. 1016 ¶ 166. Annotated version of Figure 2 of Nakagawa, above, is a cross-sectional view of optical connector 1 having, among other things, boot 40 (Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 46) and includes red highlighting of boot 40 and yellow highlighting of a 5 Like Petitioner and Dr. Brennan, we use the term “proximal end” consistent with the definition in the ’190 patent. Ex. 1016 ¶ 166 n.2. surface within tubular main body portion 41 of boot 40. Id. ¶ 56; Ex. 1016 ¶ 166. Relying on the testimony of Mr. Pearson, Patent Owner argues that the “inner round surface” of Nakagawa relied on by Petitioner “defines an intermediate portion of a boot passageway, that is distal of the proximal end portion of the boot passageway.” Prelim. Resp. 57 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶ 120). Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence and Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence, we agree with Patent Owner. As shown in Figure 2, the highlighted yellow surface relied on by Petitioner is recessed and does not define “a proximal end portion of the boot passageway” as recited in limitation 1.3.3. Dr. Brennan identifies the “boot passageway” as extending the entire length of Nakagawa’s boot 40. Ex. 1016 ¶ 164 (annotation of Nakagawa Figure 4B identifying boot passageway with dotted blue line). Dr. Brennan does not, however, identify an inner round surface that defines a proximal end of the boot passageway. We find that Dr. Brennan’s testimony (id. ¶ 166) is not supported by the teachings of Nakagawa and, therefore, we give little to no weight to Dr. Brennan’s testimony concerning an inner round surface. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown” slip op. at 15

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,061,190
• Dell Technologies Inc. / Dell Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00481 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 12, 14, or 16–18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and two to three years of experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices, or (ii) an advanced degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and one year of post-graduate research or work experience in the field. Ex. 1003, ¶102. A POSITA would have been familiar with the structural hardware aspects of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices as well as designs of user interfaces employed and displayed by computer operating systems and their organization of content and functionality. Id. Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 18. For this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’229 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For this decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analysis below and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Lane’s orientation information would generate information indicative of a current mode of operation as claim 18 requires. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not carried its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have, based on the teachings of Lane or other cited art, used an accelerometer that generates orientation information indicative of the current mode of operation. See Prelim. Resp. 35–42. Lane’s accelerometer provides information only on the “spatial orientation” of the first module (keyboard) or second module (screen). Ex. 1005, 5:23–6. “Spatial orientation,” as used in Lane, refers to the orientation of the first or second module relative to the earth’s gravity because Lane teaches that its accelerometer uses a “movable conductor” that “responds via gravitational forces” to reorientation. Id. Lane does not teach using the accelerometer to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other, and Petitioner does not suggest that Lane could be modified to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other. Rather, Petitioner argues that, for example, a determination that the keyboard is “facing upward but at a diagonal angle” (relative to the earth’s gravity) would be indicative of “easel mode.” Pet. 29.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,563,229
• Dell Technologies Inc. / Dell Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00480 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–11, 19–21, and 23–25 were obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and two to three years of experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices, or (ii) an advanced degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and one year of post-graduate research or work experience in the field. Ex. 1003, ¶102. A POSITA would have been familiar with the structural hardware aspects of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices as well as designs of user interfaces employed and displayed by computer operating systems and their organization of content and functionality. Id. Pet. 9–10. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 17. For this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’229 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For this decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analysis below and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Lane’s accelerometer provides information only on the “spatial orientation” of the first module (keyboard) or second module (screen). Ex. 1005, 5:23–6:6. “Spatial orientation,” as used in Lane, refers to the orientation of the first or second module relative to the earth’s gravity because Lane teaches that its accelerometer uses a “movable conductor” that “responds via gravitational forces” to reorientation. Id. at 5:25–31. Lane does not teach using an accelerometer to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other, and Petitioner does not suggest that Lane could be modified to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other. Rather, Petitioner argues that, for example, a determination that the keyboard is “facing upward but at a diagonal angle” (relative to the earth’s gravity) would be indicative of “easel mode.” Pet. 30. The spatial orientation of Lane’s keyboard or screen relative to the earth’s gravity, however, does not reliably9 indicate the device’s current display mode because, at any given moment, the Lane device could be held at different angles such that orientation relative to gravity does not correlate with the display mode. For example, Lane Figure 13 teaches that its keyboard could be at an angle (relative to earth’s gravity) while in laptop mode. Ex. 1005, Fig. 5; Prelim. Resp. 41–42. We reproduce Lane Figure 13 as annotated by Patent Owner below.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,563,229
• Asustek Computer Inc. / Asus Global Pte. Ltd. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00532 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–10 and 23 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that a skilled artisan would replace Lane’s hinge with Misawa’s single-pivot hinge.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “defines a single longitudinal axis running along an interface between the display component and the base” where “the display component and the base are rotatable about the single longitudinal axis.” Ex. 1001, 17:15–21 (the “single axis limitation”). In each of its seven grounds, Petitioner asserts that this claim limitation would have been obvious because “a POSA would have been motivated and able to adapt the portable computer 10 of Lane to use a single-pivot hinge like the hinge 20 taught in Misawa.” Pet. 29; see also id. at 32 (“In the portable computer 10 of Lane modified to implement a singlepivot hinge like the hinge 20 of Misawa, the hinge would define a ‘single longitudinal axis.’”). Our decision turns on whether Petitioner has carried its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the POSA would have been motivated to use a single-pivot hinge, like that disclosed in Misawa, in Lane’s computer, as proposed in the Petition. For the reasons discussed below, we find that Petitioner has not carried its burden. slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Having determined that Petitioner’s proposed modification provides a modest benefit, we now consider whether such modification has any drawbacks. Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that, in an obviousness inquiry, “[t]he benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Here, by Petitioner’s own admission, modifying Lane’s hinge in the manner Petitioner proposes comes at the expense of the hinge’s ability to rotate through a full 360°, which allows Lane’s computer to function as a tablet. Pet. 17 (explaining that Misawa’s single axis hinge “can open beyond the stated 300° (but less than 360°)”), 29 (explaining that a dual-pivot hinge is “unnecessary except to allow the display component to rotate far enough to fold flat against the bottom of the base to deploy the portable computer in tablet mode”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 110 (testimony of Dr. Wolfe echoing statement in the Petition that Misawa’s hinge cannot rotate through the full 360°), 114 (testimony of Dr. Wolf explaining that “the use of a dualpivot hinge would make it easier to design a portable computer having a display that can rotate far enough to fold flat against the bottom of the base to deploy the portable computer in a tablet mode”); Ex. 1017, 3:5–14 (Lane, teaching that allowing 360° of rotation allows a laptop computer to function as a “pen-based computing tablet”).” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “motivated to replace Lane’s hinge with a single axis hinge because a single axis hinge is less expensive and more reliable than Lane’s biaxial decouplable hinge. Pet 29; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 113, 114, 131 (testimony of Dr. Wolfe to the same effect). Patent Owner argues this proffered motivation is supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Wolfe. Prelim. Resp. 21. Patent Owner also argues that neither Petitioner nor Dr. Wolfe attempts to explain or quantify just how much of a benefit using a simpler hinge provides. Id. We agree that Dr. Wolfe’s testimony on this point is somewhat conclusory. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 113, 114, 131 (citing only limited supporting evidence). Nonetheless, we give Dr. Wolfe’s testimony some weight because it is consistent with the notion that a simpler device with fewer moving parts is likely to be somewhat less expensive and more reliable than a more complicated device. See Ex. 1016 ¶ 9 (prior art reference cited by Dr. Wolfe (Misawa), teaching that the mechanism of a hinge having a biaxial structure is “likely to be biaxial decouplable hinge with Misawa’s single axial hinge would provide a modest benefit.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’688 Patent (“POSA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject, and two to three years of experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices. Alternatively, a POSA would have had an advanced degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and one year of post-graduate research or work experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices. A POSA would have been familiar with the structural hardware aspects of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices, as well as designs of user interfaces employed and displayed by computer operating POSA could have acquired similar skills and knowledge by other means. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s identification of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s description of the person of ordinary skill is consistent with the subject matter of the ’688 patent and with the prior art of record, we apply it for purposes of this decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,289,688
• NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00142 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent “would have had at least the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and one to two years of experience in the field of circuit design, particularly the design of circuits operating at high frequencies.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not identify a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent or identify any specific shortcoming in Petitioner’s definition. See Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 4. This definition is consistent with the ’330 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

    “Petitioner argues that “no express constructions of the claims are necessary to assess whether the prior art reads on the challenged claims.” Pet. 8. However, Petitioner also cites to a Special Master Report and Recommendation on Claim Construction where “node” was construed to mean “a point of connection or intersection in an electrical circuit.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ex. 1015, 29). Patent Owner adopts this construction for purposes of this Decision on Institution. Prelim. Resp. 8. We find that this construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “node.” We thus apply the construction as such to our analysis below, and we determine that we need not provide an express construction of any other claim term for purposes of this institution decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “[claim] limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “A claim limitation is inherent in the prior art if it is necessarily present in the prior art, not merely probably or possibly present.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite, Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “[t]o anticipate, the reference must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F. 3d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, it is not enough to be able to find all of the pieces of the claimed invention somewhere in a prior art reference; rather, those elements must be set out in the prior art reference in the same way they are in the claimed invention. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,535,330

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.