• Ecto World, LLC / Sv3, LLC v. Rai Strategic Holdings, Inc.Other
  PTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01280 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial despite declining to deny under § 325(d).

  RulingsRemand decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

    “Other than initials on a lengthy IDS, nothing in the record indicates that the Examiner substantively considered Takeuchi, Kim, Pienemann, or among over 1,000 other references listed on the IDS, which, as noted in the Director Review Decision, “is over 40 times the size of a typical IDS.” Pet. Remand Br. 5–6; DR Dec. 7 n.3 (citing Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees During Fiscal Year 2025, 89 FR 91898 at 91924 (Nov. 20, 2024)); Ex. 1002, 228–284. Petitioner also shows that the applicant did not respond to the Examiner’s request that the applicant specifically point out “any particular reference or portion of a reference in the [IDS] which the examiner should take [sic] pay particular attention to.” Ex. 1002, 174, 295– 302.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “Patent Owner is likely correct that the ITC would not have been inclined to grant a stay if one had been requested at the time the Institution Decision issued. Moreover, the ITC conducted a full evidentiary hearing a month after the Institution Decision issued, and the target date for the ITC’s final determination is several months before the projected statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision. PO Remand Br. 7. Accordingly, we determine that Fintiv factor 1 weighs in favor of discretionary denial. See also Klein Tools, Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., IPR2024-01400, Paper 22 at 2 (PTAB June 9, 2025) (Acting Director Stewart determining that Fintiv factor 1 weighs in favor of discretionary denial when the ITC investigation is unlikely to be stayed, the ITC already conducted a full evidentiary hearing, and the ITC final determination is expected to issue six months before the statutory deadline for the Board’s final written decision).” slip op. at 19

  Discretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,925,202
• Microsoft Corporation / HP Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Sep 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00457 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any claim was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agreed that resolution of this time bar issue would be resolved in the same manner as in IPR2024-00456. In particular, the parties stipulated: The parties stipulate with respect to the privity time bar issue that the facts and issues in IPR2024-00457 are the same as in IPR2024-00456, so that any decision the Board reaches resolving the privity time bar issue in IPR2024-00456 will apply and resolve the privity time bar issue in IPR2024-00457 in the same manner. Notice of Stipulation, Paper 14, 1. In the decision on institution for IPR2024-00456, the Board determined that “Lenovo is not a privity of Microsoft [in this context] and the Petition is not time-barred under § 315(b).” IPR2024-00456, Paper 22, 10 (July 31, 2024). Thus, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the instant petition is also not time-barred.” slip op. at 16

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For this decision, we again construe “plurality of views of a plurality of visual representations of computer content” as “referring to a plurality of ways of organizing visual representations of computer content.” We again note that this limitation is distinct from merely providing a plurality of ways of displaying content (by, for example, changing display orientation, color, resolution, etc.). Petitioner assumes this construction for the Petition, and Patent Owner assumes this construction for Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. Moreover, the construction is well supported by the ’715 patent’s claims and specification for reasons similar to those stated in the prior decision cited by Petitioner. IPR2021-00786, Paper 6, 13–16 (construing this term for the ’715 patent). For this decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analysis below and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties.7 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “Below, we explain that we deny institution based on the merits: Petitioner has not shown, with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial. In the interest of judicial efficiency, we therefore do not need to consider discretionary denial. Cf. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that the Board is not required to reach issues unnecessary to “resolve the controversy”); see also, e.g., Aylo Freesites Ltd. v. Dish Techs. LLC, IPR 2024-00512, Paper 12, 12, n. 3 (declining to reach the 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) issues when denying based on 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA), would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus two years of work experience in designing GUIs for computing devices. Ex-1003, ¶ 21. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa. Id. Pet. 15. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and the ’715 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,880,715
• Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc. / Sony Group Corporation v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00570 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8, 11, 15–17, and 20 were obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’830 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have an engineering-related undergraduate degree such as electrical, mechanical, or computer engineering, with at least two years of experience with computer-controlled electrical or electronic systems, or equivalent academic experience (e.g., a master’s degree with a similar focus). The POSITA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through a combination of education and experience in the above. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’830 patent specification.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “As Patent Owner shows, the specification reveals that in step 762, “the routine ‘control’ computes an output value p corresponding to the currently selected strength, stored in the variable strength, and outputs the value p to the power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current to the coil.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added) (quoting Ex. 1001, 8:20–30). Step 762 corresponds to, for example, control input 624 transmitted from CPU 602 to power supply 612 of Figure 6 to control the current from power supply 612 to coil 626. See supra Section II.C (describing Fig. 6); Ex. 1001, 6:41–44 (“The power supply 612 receives a control input 624 from the CPU to control the current supplied to the H-bridge switch 618 for transfer to the coil 626.”). The specification, therefore, supports Patent Owner. The specification clearly links this algorithmic structure to the recited function, “controlling supply of power from the power supply.” As Patent Owner shows, Petitioner agreed in the Sony litigation that the corresponding structure includes “provide a corresponding output to the power supply so that the power supply provides a corresponding output to the driving component and equivalents thereof.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (quoting Ex. 2001, 12–14).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The record supports Patent Owner. Under a means plus function analysis, which the parties agree applies, Petitioner relies on Houston’s microprocessor as the structure that corresponds to the recited “control component.” Pet. 36 (“Houston teaches that vibration controller 623 is a microprocessor thereby satisfying the structural requirement of this means plus-function limitation.”). microprocessor, limitation 1.f further requires algorithmic structure (processed by the microprocessor of the recited “control component”) to include “1) computing a digital output value corresponding to user-selected amplitude of oscillation and outputting the value to the claimed power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current amplitude to the coil.” Supra Section III.C (emphasis added). In other words, as Patent Owner argues, to satisfy limitation 1.f, the “prior art [at least] would need to have this microprocessor perform the algorithmic step of ‘provid[ing] a corresponding ‘output to the power supply.’” Prelim. Resp. 18. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he Petition fails to show that this [algorithmic step] is disclosed or rendered obvious by the combination of Houston and Goldenberg.” Prelim. Resp. 18. The record supports Patent Owner. Petitioner does not contend, let alone show, that the combination of Houston and Goldenberg teaches outputting any value to a power supply as limitation 1.f requires according to the claim construction Patent Owner argues and we adopt. See Pet. 35–42; supra Section III.C. It follows that the Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,941,830
• Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc. / Sony Group Corporation v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00569 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 2 or 3 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of claims 2 and 3, the remaining “challenged claims” per the disclaimer. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’337 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have an engineering-related undergraduate degree such as electrical, mechanical, or computer engineering, with at least two years of experience with computer-controlled electrical or electronic systems, or equivalent academic experience (e.g., a master’s degree with a similar focus). The POSITA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through a combination of education and experience in the above. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129). Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’337 patent specification.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “called in step 716 in FIG. 7A” (Ex. 1001, 8:10–11), where Figures 7A–7C “illustrate the control program, executed by the CPU, that controls operation of an LRVM” (id. at 6:43–45). Essentially, Figures 7A–7C represent a disclosed algorithm used with a CPU of a microprocessor with memory for implementing the algorithm to control the supply of current from a power supply to a coil surrounding a moveable magnet. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Fig. 6; supra Section. II.C. “the routine ‘control’ computes an output value p corresponding to the currently selected strength, stored in the variable strength, and outputs the value p to the power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current to the coil.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Ex. 1001, 8:10–20). Step 762 corresponds to, for example, control input 624 transmitted from CPU 602 to power supply 612 of Figure 6 to control the current from power supply 612 to coil 626. See supra Section II.C (describing Fig. 6); Ex. 1001, 6:33–35 (“The power supply 612 receives a control input 624 from the CPU to control the current supplied to the H-bridge switch 618 for transfer to the coil 626.”). The specification, therefore, supports Patent Owner. The specification clearly links this algorithmic structure to the recited function, “controlling supply of power from the power supply.” As Patent Owner shows, Petitioner agreed in the Sony litigation that the corresponding structure includes “provide a corresponding output to the power supply so that the power supply provides a corresponding output to the driving component and equivalents thereof.” Prelim. Resp. 14–15 (quoting Ex. 2002, 4–5). In summary, limitation 2.f recites “a control component that controls supply of power from the power supply to the driving component to cause the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency and an amplitude specified by user input received from the user input features.” Step 762, which corresponds to control input 624 transmitted from CPU 602 to power supply 612 in the block diagram of Figure 6, is a clear link of algorithmic structure to the recited function of “control[ling] supply of power from the” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The record supports Patent Owner. Under a means plus function analysis, which the parties agree applies, Petitioner relies on Houston’s microprocessor as the structure that corresponds to the recited “control component.” Pet. 34 (“Houston teaches that vibration controller 623 is a microprocessor thereby satisfying the structural requirement of this means plus-function limitation.”). As indicated in Section III.C, if the corresponding structure is a microprocessor, limitation 2.f further requires algorithmic structure (processed by the microprocessor of the recited “control component”) to include “1) computing a digital output value corresponding to user-selected amplitude of oscillation and outputting the value to the claimed power supply so that the power supply outputs an appropriate current amplitude to the coil.” Supra Section III.C (emphasis added). In other words, as Patent Owner argues, to satisfy limitation 2.f, the “prior art [at least] would need to have this microprocessor perform the algorithmic step of ‘provid[ing] a corresponding ‘output to the power supply.’” Prelim. Resp. 19. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he Petition fails to show that this [algorithmic Goldenberg,” and Tierling. Id. at 19, 23.14 The record supports Patent Owner. Petitioner does not contend, let alone show, that the combination of Houston, Goldenberg, and Tierling teaches outputting any value to a power supply as limitation 2.f requires according to the claim construction Patent Owner argues and we adopt. See Pet. 35–44; supra Section III.C. It follows that the Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood of success of prevailing with respect to claim 1. In addition, although not necessary to our decision based on the dispositive claim construction issue discussed above, the Petition fails to show that the combination of Houston, Goldenberg, and Tierling teaches the “control component” algorithmic structure corresponding to the function of “caus[ing] the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency” as recited in limitation 2.f. Specifically, the Petition fails to show that the combination of Houston, Goldenberg, and Tierling teaches the following corresponding structure of the control component according to our claim construction: “at least one timer or equivalent to control a periodic change in direction of the current supplied to the coil . . . by providing a control value . . . such that the value flips according to the timer or its equivalent.” See supra Section II.C; Pet. 35–44.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,860,337
• Microsoft Corporation / HP Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Aug 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00458 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on both §103 grounds because neither combination showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4 and 11–14 were unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA): would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus two years of work experience in designing [graphical user interfaces (GUIs)] for computing devices. [Ex. 1003] ¶ 20–22. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa. Id. Pet. 14; see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 21 (Dr. Houh testifying that this level of skill is appropriate). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that in IPR2021-00786, the Board construed “plurality of views of a plurality of visual representations of computer content” as “referring to a plurality of ways of organizing visual representations of computer content.” Pet. 14–15 (citing IPR2021-00786, Paper 6, 13–16). IPR2021-00786 involved U.S. Patent No. 9,880,715 B2 (“the ’715 patent”). Petitioner further notes that “the Board found [this] limitation ‘is distinct from merely providing a plurality of ways of displaying content (by, for example, changing display orientation, color, resolution, etc.).” Id. Petitioner further argues that during a reexamination proceeding of the ’715 patent, “the Examiner also clarified that the ‘plurality of views’ limitation does not encompass merely changing to entirely different content.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 (90/014,958 Ex Parte Reexamination)). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Houh, applied this construction when forming opinions and Petitioner proposes that we adopt this construction in this proceeding. Ex. 1003 ¶ 53; Pet. 15.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Here, claim 1 requires the functionality of, for example, “selecting one of the plurality of views for display on the computer system in response to the detected current computer system configuration.” Ex. 1001, 71:34–36. As in Arendi and DSS, this functionality plays a major role in the subject matter claimed; this selection as at the heart of the ’818 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:49–62 (explaining that patent is directed to providing different views). We also determine that the limitation is not “unusually simple.” The cited art understood that display orientation could be modified based on a change in configuration (Pröll) and understood that a view could be selected based on a user’s active choice (the user shaking the device as in Martinez6), but the cited art did not recognize selecting a view based on a change of configuration. Prelim. Resp. 41. The evidence of record does not indicate that recognition of this function would be “unusually simple.”” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,564,818
• Microsoft Corporation / HP Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2024 · IPR2024-00454 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds because Petitioners did not show a reasonable likelihood that the Reavey–Chandhri combination met limitation 1h.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “view of the evidence of record, we are not persuaded Petitioners have shown with sufficient particularity why the combined teachings of Reavey and Chandhri disclose or suggest the recited elements of Limitation [1h]. For our purposes here, we accept Petitioners’ contention that, in light of the Reavey and Chandhri disclosures, a skilled artisan would have been led to configure Reavey’s device to display in laptop mode a first set of visual representations using a menu-based view and transition when in flat mode to an image-based scrolling view to display a second set of visual representations. Still, we remain unpersuaded Petitioners have established sufficiently that the Reavey and Chandhri combination discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a configuration in which the device filters the first set of visual representations by identifying and removing content therefrom to be used with the image-based scrolling view to generate a second set of visual representations that are based on the filtered version of the first set of visual representations.” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioners assert, with the support of its expert, that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would have had a “bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus two years of work experience in designing GUIs for computing devices.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22). Patent Owner does not dispute or address this characterization of the skill level of an artisan in the relevant field. See generally Prelim. Resp. On this record, Petitioners’ proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’315 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. For purposes of this Decision, therefore, we rely on Petitioners’ proposed level of ordinary skill in the art to focus the lens through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The Petition offers explicit claim constructions for a number of claim terms, including “plurality of views,” “display component,” “execution component,” “storage component,” and “first/second user interface component.” Pet. 11–15. And Patent Owner states that it “does not challenge Petitioners’ explicit claim constructions because the Petition fails even if these constructions are adopted.” Prelim. Resp. 18. Nevertheless, we do not reach Petitioners’ proposed constructions because a resolution in this matter does not turn on the precise meaning of any of those terms; in fact, none of the proposed constructions are for terms that are used in Limitation [1h]. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For the language used in Limitation [1h], which is critical to our decision, both parties rely on the plain and ordinary meaning and neither party suggests that any term used has a particular meaning beyond what is clearly conveyed within the context of the ’315 patent. Therefore, no term in this proceeding needs to be construed expressly.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “view of the evidence of record, we are not persuaded Petitioners have shown with sufficient particularity why the combined teachings of Reavey and Chandhri disclose or suggest the recited elements of Limitation [1h]. For our purposes here, we accept Petitioners’ contention that, in light of the Reavey and Chandhri disclosures, a skilled artisan would have been led to configure Reavey’s device to display in laptop mode a first set of visual representations using a menu-based view and transition when in flat mode to an image-based scrolling view to display a second set of visual representations. Still, we remain unpersuaded Petitioners have established sufficiently that the Reavey and Chandhri combination discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a configuration in which the device filters the first set of visual representations by identifying and removing content therefrom to be used with the image-based scrolling view to generate a second set of visual representations that are based on the filtered version of the first set of visual representations.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,003,315
• Microsoft Corporation / HP Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2024 · IPR2024-00455 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds because Petitioners did not show a reasonable likelihood that Reavey and Chandhri disclose or suggest limitation 1[h].

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “shown with sufficient particularity why the combined teachings of Reavey and Chandhri disclose or suggest the recited elements of Limitation [1h]. And as a result, we find Petitioners have not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that the Reavey/Chandhri combination render independent claims 1 and 28 unpatentable, which is a deficiency that necessarily extends therethrough to all of the dependent claims challenged in all three grounds.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioners assert, with the support of its expert, that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would have had a “bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus two years of work experience in designing GUIs for computing devices.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22). Patent Owner does not dispute or address this characterization of the skill level of an artisan in the relevant field. See generally Prelim. Resp. On this record, Petitioners’ proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’315 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. For purposes of this Decision, therefore, we rely on Petitioners’ proposed level of ordinary skill in the art to focus the lens through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The Petition offers explicit claim constructions for a number of claim terms, including “plurality of views,” “display component,” “execution component,” “storage component,” and “first/second user interface component.” Pet. 12–16. And Patent Owner states that it “does not challenge Petitioners’ explicit claim constructions because the Petition fails even if these constructions are adopted.” Prelim. Resp. 18. Nevertheless, we do not reach Petitioners’ proposed constructions because a resolution in this matter does not turn on the precise meaning of any of those terms; in fact, none of the proposed constructions are for terms that are used in Limitation [1h]. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For the language used in Limitation [1h], which is critical to our decision, both parties rely on the plain and ordinary meaning and neither party suggests that any term used has a particular meaning beyond what is clearly conveyed within the context of the ’315 patent. Therefore, no term in this proceeding needs to be construed expressly.” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “view of the evidence of record, we are not persuaded Petitioners have shown with sufficient particularity why the combined teachings of Reavey and Chandhri disclose or suggest the recited elements of Limitation [1h]. For our purposes here, we accept Petitioners’ contention that, in light of the Reavey and Chandhri disclosures, a skilled artisan would have been led to configure Reavey’s device to display in laptop mode a first set of visual representations using a menu-based view and transition when in flat mode to an image-based scrolling view to display a second set of visual representations. Still, we remain unpersuaded Petitioners have established sufficiently that the Reavey and Chandhri combination discloses or suggests to a skilled artisan a configuration in which the device filters the first set of visual representations by identifying and removing content therefrom to be used with the image-based scrolling view to generate a second set of visual representations that are based on the filtered version of the first set of visual representations.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,003,315
• US Conec Ltd. v. Senko Advanced Components, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00122 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6–16, 19, and 20 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. We may institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s proposal is undisputed. Prelim. Resp. 38. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we find that Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’190 patent and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “consistent with or supported by Nakagawa’s teachings. Dr. Brennan modifies Nakagawa Figure 4B by adding yellow highlighting in the form of a cylinder and opines that the added highlighting represents an inner round surface extending along a longitudinal axis within tubular main body portion 41. Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 164–165. Dr. Brennan’s testimony does not take into account that the circular shape highlighted yellow in his annotation of Figure 4E is recessed within boot 40 and does not extend to the proximal end of the boot.5 Nakagawa does not support Dr. Brennan’s addition of a yellow-highlighted cylindrical surface extending to the proximal end of the boot, as depicted in his annotation of Figure 4B.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Nakagawa’s deficiency is apparent from Figure 2. As noted above, claim limitation 1.3.3 recites an “inner round surface defining a proximal end portion of the boot passageway.” Dr. Brennan testifies “As shown in Figures 4B and 2 of Nakagawa, reproduced above and below, respectively, a POSITA would have understood that Nakagawa’s inner round surface defines the proximal end at the center of the rotatable boot assembly.” Ex. 1016 ¶ 166. Annotated version of Figure 2 of Nakagawa, above, is a cross-sectional view of optical connector 1 having, among other things, boot 40 (Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 46) and includes red highlighting of boot 40 and yellow highlighting of a 5 Like Petitioner and Dr. Brennan, we use the term “proximal end” consistent with the definition in the ’190 patent. Ex. 1016 ¶ 166 n.2. surface within tubular main body portion 41 of boot 40. Id. ¶ 56; Ex. 1016 ¶ 166. Relying on the testimony of Mr. Pearson, Patent Owner argues that the “inner round surface” of Nakagawa relied on by Petitioner “defines an intermediate portion of a boot passageway, that is distal of the proximal end portion of the boot passageway.” Prelim. Resp. 57 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶ 120). Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence and Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence, we agree with Patent Owner. As shown in Figure 2, the highlighted yellow surface relied on by Petitioner is recessed and does not define “a proximal end portion of the boot passageway” as recited in limitation 1.3.3. Dr. Brennan identifies the “boot passageway” as extending the entire length of Nakagawa’s boot 40. Ex. 1016 ¶ 164 (annotation of Nakagawa Figure 4B identifying boot passageway with dotted blue line). Dr. Brennan does not, however, identify an inner round surface that defines a proximal end of the boot passageway. We find that Dr. Brennan’s testimony (id. ¶ 166) is not supported by the teachings of Nakagawa and, therefore, we give little to no weight to Dr. Brennan’s testimony concerning an inner round surface. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown” slip op. at 15

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,061,190
• Dell Technologies Inc. / Dell Inc. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00480 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–11, 19–21, and 23–25 were obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had (i) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and two to three years of experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices, or (ii) an advanced degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and one year of post-graduate research or work experience in the field. Ex. 1003, ¶102. A POSITA would have been familiar with the structural hardware aspects of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices as well as designs of user interfaces employed and displayed by computer operating systems and their organization of content and functionality. Id. Pet. 9–10. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 17. For this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’229 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For this decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analysis below and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Lane’s accelerometer provides information only on the “spatial orientation” of the first module (keyboard) or second module (screen). Ex. 1005, 5:23–6:6. “Spatial orientation,” as used in Lane, refers to the orientation of the first or second module relative to the earth’s gravity because Lane teaches that its accelerometer uses a “movable conductor” that “responds via gravitational forces” to reorientation. Id. at 5:25–31. Lane does not teach using an accelerometer to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other, and Petitioner does not suggest that Lane could be modified to determine the orientation of the first and second modules relative to each other. Rather, Petitioner argues that, for example, a determination that the keyboard is “facing upward but at a diagonal angle” (relative to the earth’s gravity) would be indicative of “easel mode.” Pet. 30. The spatial orientation of Lane’s keyboard or screen relative to the earth’s gravity, however, does not reliably9 indicate the device’s current display mode because, at any given moment, the Lane device could be held at different angles such that orientation relative to gravity does not correlate with the display mode. For example, Lane Figure 13 teaches that its keyboard could be at an angle (relative to earth’s gravity) while in laptop mode. Ex. 1005, Fig. 5; Prelim. Resp. 41–42. We reproduce Lane Figure 13 as annotated by Patent Owner below.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,563,229
• Asustek Computer Inc. / Asus Global Pte. Ltd. et al. v. Litl LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00532 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–10 and 23 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that a skilled artisan would replace Lane’s hinge with Misawa’s single-pivot hinge.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “defines a single longitudinal axis running along an interface between the display component and the base” where “the display component and the base are rotatable about the single longitudinal axis.” Ex. 1001, 17:15–21 (the “single axis limitation”). In each of its seven grounds, Petitioner asserts that this claim limitation would have been obvious because “a POSA would have been motivated and able to adapt the portable computer 10 of Lane to use a single-pivot hinge like the hinge 20 taught in Misawa.” Pet. 29; see also id. at 32 (“In the portable computer 10 of Lane modified to implement a singlepivot hinge like the hinge 20 of Misawa, the hinge would define a ‘single longitudinal axis.’”). Our decision turns on whether Petitioner has carried its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the POSA would have been motivated to use a single-pivot hinge, like that disclosed in Misawa, in Lane’s computer, as proposed in the Petition. For the reasons discussed below, we find that Petitioner has not carried its burden. slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Having determined that Petitioner’s proposed modification provides a modest benefit, we now consider whether such modification has any drawbacks. Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that, in an obviousness inquiry, “[t]he benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Here, by Petitioner’s own admission, modifying Lane’s hinge in the manner Petitioner proposes comes at the expense of the hinge’s ability to rotate through a full 360°, which allows Lane’s computer to function as a tablet. Pet. 17 (explaining that Misawa’s single axis hinge “can open beyond the stated 300° (but less than 360°)”), 29 (explaining that a dual-pivot hinge is “unnecessary except to allow the display component to rotate far enough to fold flat against the bottom of the base to deploy the portable computer in tablet mode”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 110 (testimony of Dr. Wolfe echoing statement in the Petition that Misawa’s hinge cannot rotate through the full 360°), 114 (testimony of Dr. Wolf explaining that “the use of a dualpivot hinge would make it easier to design a portable computer having a display that can rotate far enough to fold flat against the bottom of the base to deploy the portable computer in a tablet mode”); Ex. 1017, 3:5–14 (Lane, teaching that allowing 360° of rotation allows a laptop computer to function as a “pen-based computing tablet”).” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “motivated to replace Lane’s hinge with a single axis hinge because a single axis hinge is less expensive and more reliable than Lane’s biaxial decouplable hinge. Pet 29; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 113, 114, 131 (testimony of Dr. Wolfe to the same effect). Patent Owner argues this proffered motivation is supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Wolfe. Prelim. Resp. 21. Patent Owner also argues that neither Petitioner nor Dr. Wolfe attempts to explain or quantify just how much of a benefit using a simpler hinge provides. Id. We agree that Dr. Wolfe’s testimony on this point is somewhat conclusory. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 113, 114, 131 (citing only limited supporting evidence). Nonetheless, we give Dr. Wolfe’s testimony some weight because it is consistent with the notion that a simpler device with fewer moving parts is likely to be somewhat less expensive and more reliable than a more complicated device. See Ex. 1016 ¶ 9 (prior art reference cited by Dr. Wolfe (Misawa), teaching that the mechanism of a hinge having a biaxial structure is “likely to be biaxial decouplable hinge with Misawa’s single axial hinge would provide a modest benefit.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’688 Patent (“POSA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject, and two to three years of experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices. Alternatively, a POSA would have had an advanced degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable subject and one year of post-graduate research or work experience in the design and architecture of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices. A POSA would have been familiar with the structural hardware aspects of laptop computers and other portable electronic devices, as well as designs of user interfaces employed and displayed by computer operating POSA could have acquired similar skills and knowledge by other means. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s identification of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s description of the person of ordinary skill is consistent with the subject matter of the ’688 patent and with the prior art of record, we apply it for purposes of this decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,289,688

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.