• Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00278 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company and PacifiCorp’s petition because it had instituted the earlier-filed IPR2025-00274 challenging the same patent.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “request from Patent Owner for Director Review, finding that Patent Owner introduced “evidence sufficient to put RPI and privity at issue” and remanding with instructions to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues” including “at least materials sufficient to clarify the evidence the Board found to be ‘ambiguous’ and to avoid the need for the Board to ‘speculate as to the nature of the redacted material.’” Paper 57 (Decision on Request for Director Review). The Director instructed that after allowing such discovery, we “should then determine on the full record whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that the Petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b), applying the framework set forth in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Concurrently herewith, we issue a decision in IPR2025- 00278 finding that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that its Petition is not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 2

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00274, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00274, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 . . . before IPR2025-00278.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00274. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00274, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00274. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’114 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 before IPR2025-00278, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,343,114
• Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00281 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because it had instituted IPR2025-00280 challenging the same patent, consistent with the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00280, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00281, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 . . . before IPR2025-00281.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00280. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00280, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00280. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’517 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 before IPR2025-00281, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,596,517
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-01055 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’326 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’326 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, which is supported with testimony of Dr. Easttom (Ex. 1004 ¶ 22–23), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Claim 1 explicitly recites “partially,” not “fully” or “completely.” On its face, “partially” appears to have its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., not completely. The use of “partially” in the subject limitation shows or at least strongly suggests that the claimed invention contemplates at least some frequency gap to remain between the first channel and the second channel. In addition, as argued persuasively by Patent Owner, this interpretation is further supported by claim 1’s requirement of “transmitting data subcarriers occupying the first channel, the second channel, and the frequency gap in parallel to a receiver”: [T]he “transmitting” step in claim 1 requires that the frequency gap be included in the transmitted signal. Inclusion of the frequency gap in the transmitted signal necessarily requires that the frequency gap be only partially filled -- but not fully filled -- with added data subcarriers at the time of transmission, because if the frequency gap were fully filled it would no longer exist at the time of signal transmission. Prelim. Resp. 23. Petitioner offers no explanation for how the language of claim 1 itself would allow for “partially” to encompass “completely.”” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For all but one sentence of Petitioner’s arguments for how each of the subject combinations allegedly would have taught the Partially Filling Limitation as variously recited in claims 1, 16, and 18, Petitioner relies (implicitly) on a construction of “partially” that allows for completely filling the frequency gap between the first channel and the second channel, and alleges that the asserted combinations teach completely filling such gap. See Pet. 26–28 (Gardner and Mori), 64–67 (Mori, Lu, and Williams); Prelim. Resp. 25–29, 38–40 (Patent Owner agreeing that the asserted combinations teach only completely or fully filling the frequency gap.). We reject such a construction of “partially” as discussed above in Section III.C.2, and thus find Petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,027,326
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00931 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–27 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would be unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’844 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “critical time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Newman, states that for his analysis he uses the definition provided by Dr. Zadok. Ex. 2014 ¶ 13. We discern no meaningful difference between the definitions proffered by Petitioner or its Declarant. Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’844 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Dr. Zadok’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan (Ex. 1003 ¶ 35), which is adopted by Dr. Newman (Ex. 2014 ¶ 13) and is consistent with the asserted prior art references, we apply the level of skill set forth by Dr. Zadok.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner contends “that the challenged claims are obvious under any reasonable interpretation under the Phillips standard, and thus Petitioners submit that the Board need not resolve any express constructions.” Pet. 11 Patent Owner asserts “the Board should resolve this IPR under the plain-and ordinary-meaning standard without adopting any special constructions beyond what is necessary to address a concrete dispute.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Based on our review of the current record, we agree with parties that no express construction of any term is necessary to resolve this case.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to offer sufficient explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Sapuntzakis and Holzmann. Rather, Petitioner appears to argue that, based on the advantages described by Holzmann (Ex. 1007 ¶ 33), and using well-known techniques with unspecified predictable results, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to combine these disparate elements taught in the prior art references to render the challenged claims obvious. Pet. 23–24, 33. Yet, other than Petitioner’s cursory assertion of advantageously incorporating the memory module from Holzmann to provide a caching mechanism (Pet. 33), which cites equally cursory and unsupported testimony by Dr. Zadok (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 329, 333, 336–355), Petitioner fails to identify what particular advantages or efficiencies would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Holzmann’s memory module with Sapuntzakis’s system.” slip op. at 29

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,332,844
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00782 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’469 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that: [A] POSITA would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, business information systems, software engineering, or systems engineering and at least two years of experience in computer networking or telecommunications. Ex.1002 ¶21; see also Ex.1001 (1:14-31). Additional education could substitute for professional experience. Ex.1002 ¶21. Significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Ex.1002 ¶21. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner states that it “do[es] not believe explicit construction is required to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner proposes constructions for “Internet,” “access the Internet,” “subscriber access website.” Prelim. Resp. 12–15. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 10, 11, and 24–28 by Bruner and” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “We find Patent Owner’s argument to be persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately how Bruner discloses the positional requirement of a subscriber access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and the router. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently for purposes of institution that Bruner anticipates independent claim 24. Although, for the obviousness challenge, Petitioner contends that Clark discloses a wireless router (for limitation 24c), Petitioner relies solely on Bruner for the “between” limitation. See Pet. 17 (“Bruner and/or Bruner in view of Clark both disclose each limitation of claim 24c, including a router (e.g., Bruner’s ‘ADS’ and Clark’s ‘wireless router’)”); id. at 18–19 (the discussion of the “between” limitation 24d asserting that “Bruner discloses claim 24d,” with no mention of Clark). Furthermore, Petitioner merely asserts that both Bruner and Clark disclose a router. See id. at 17–18. Petitioner, however, does not indicate clearly which is used in the proposed combination, does not describe the configuration of a proposed combination or a proposed modification of Bruner’s system, and fails to set forth an adequate and persuasive reason with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bruner’s system to arrive at the positional requirement of the subscription access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and a router. See id. at 13–14 (motivation section for this ground); id. at 18–19 (addressing the “between” limitation 24d). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to independent claim 24 as obvious over Bruner in view of Clark.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,324,469
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00786 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was obvious over either asserted combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’785 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) relevant to this patent at the time of its invention would’ve had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related technical field, combined with approximately two years of practical experience in fields of networking such as network virtualization, security, or management. Additional professional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 33–35). Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. However, Patent Owner’s proffered declarant, Dr. Noubir, opines that “a person of ordinary skill in the art in March 2003 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering, and would have one or two years of experience in computer networking or equivalent educational and professional experience.” Ex. 2008 ¶ 53. We discern no material difference between the two definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to apply Patent Owner’s witness’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “name.” See Pet. 11–16 (claim construction section). Patent Owner asserts that “a person of ordinary skill would read ‘a domain name’ in its ordinary networking sense: an ASCII string label used with the Domain Name System (DNS) to resolve to an IP address.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:47–48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 37). This is consistent with the Specification, which explains: Users and software applications do not always refer to hosts or other resources by their numerical IP address. Instead of using numbers, they use ASCII strings called domain names. The Internet uses a Domain Name System (DNS) to convert a domain name to an IP address. Ex. 1001, 1:45–50. According to the Patent Owner, the network in the Specification of the ’785 patent is defined by the domain name X.VCN. Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:18–19, 9:28–31). Patent Owner further contends that “[t]he use of a domain name to define the virtual network in the ‘785 Patent’s claims provides more than an identifier of the virtual network or even a plain language identification of an IP address – it signifies a hierarchical structure for the virtual network that enables [certain functions].” Prelim. Resp. 33–34 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 83–84; Ex. 1001, 14:29–38).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner, however, that Petitioner has not explained adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have further modified the Caronni-I/Caronni-II combination to have DNS capability or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the three references to have a system that returned the three specific addresses recited in the challenged independent claims. Rather than explaining the “why,” the Petition’s motivation argument focuses on the purported capabilities of the resulting combination and implying, but not explicitly stating, that the combination results in the claimed subject matter; this indicates impermissible hindsight. See, e.g., id. at 29 (“This integration would leverage Hipp’s DNS capability for virtual hostnames to return multiple address records from a single query, aligning with the dual addressing requirements of hybrid virtual/physical networks. The combination creates a cohesive system where DNS resolution triggers context-aware routing decisions—using virtual addresses for internal Supernet traffic and NAT-translated addresses for cross-boundary communication.”). We determine that Petitioner has failed to set forth an adequate and persuasive reason with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the three references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter where the three recited addresses are returned in response to a DNS request.” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,949,785
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00785 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–14 were unpatentable over either asserted § 103 combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenDenied

    “Petitioner’s single-reference allegations do not align with its two “combination” challenges identified above. As for its “combination” allegations, Petitioner does not identify, for example: (1) which limitations in claim 1 are missing in any of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski; (2) which aspects of any of these references requires modification to achieve the invention of claim 1; (3) which specific reference Petitioner posits to teach any such missing limitation in another reference or as the basis to modify a specific feature in a given reference; or (4) a rational reason as to why the skilled artisan would have combined particular teachings from one of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski with particular teachings of another such reference to achieve the invention of claim 1 as a whole.5 Instead, Petitioner improperly punts its burden to define its obviousness challenges to the Board (and Patent Owner). See, e.g., Pet. 38 (“To the extent the Board disagrees that [any particular] limitation is disclosed by the Chow/Reiffin combination 4 See, e.g., Pet. 16, 19 (“Thus, Chow and Reiffin both disclose or suggest claim [1b].” “Therefore, claim 1 was obvious over Chow and Reiffin separately and over their combination.”); see also id. at 12–19, 37–42. 5 Petitioner argues that the skilled artisan would have combined Reiffin with Chow for “increased computational power and the ability to solve larger problems.” Pet. 11. These generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Chow and Reiffin (and Kurowski) lack rational underpinning, particularly because Petitioner does not even identify which teachings of which references are being combined to achieve any particular limitation in claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 40 (“[Petitioner’s] ‘spaghetti on the wall’ approach fails [to] explain how Petitioners’ purported motivation for combining Chow and Reiffin fits with each of the at least 64 different possibilities for combining Chow and Reiffin.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “and quotes various passages in Chow. Pet. 13–14. For example, Petitioner identifies that, under “Description of the Related Art,” Chow states: “Typically, workload is apportioned by somehow logically dividing the data to be processed. For example, a block of data might be divided evenly into a number of parts equal to the number of available threads, so that each thread can independently process a separate portion of the data. This is called ‘static’ or ‘a priori’ partitioning.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:38–42; Ex. 1022 ¶ 144). Petitioner also identifies that Chow describes “aggregate tasks” divisible into “multiple sub-tasks,” and “multiple task execution units are independently operated on-demand to sequentially self-allocate and execute sub-tasks of the aggregate task.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:66–2:15). After presenting such quoted passages from Chow, Petitioner proffers the conclusion that Chow discloses the Partitioning Limitation, but does so without sufficiently explaining why such passages allegedly teach or suggest the features of the Partitioning Limitation not only within the context of claim 1 as a whole, but given that Chow itself disparages such “static” or “a priori” partitioning as posing “a significant problem” (Ex. 1003, 1:52–58). Patent Owner persuasively responds (and we agree for the same” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “combination” challenges identified above. As for its “combination” allegations, Petitioner does not identify, for example: (1) which limitations in claim 1 are missing in any of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski; (2) which aspects of any of these references requires modification to achieve the invention of claim 1; (3) which specific reference Petitioner posits to teach any such missing limitation in another reference or as the basis to modify a specific feature in a given reference; or (4) a rational reason as to why the skilled artisan would have combined particular teachings from one of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski with particular teachings of another such reference to achieve the invention of claim 1 as a whole.5 Instead, Petitioner improperly punts its burden to define its obviousness challenges to the Board (and Patent Owner). See, e.g., Pet. 38 (“To the extent the Board disagrees that [any particular] limitation is disclosed by the Chow/Reiffin combination 4 See, e.g., Pet. 16, 19 (“Thus, Chow and Reiffin both disclose or suggest claim [1b].” “Therefore, claim 1 was obvious over Chow and Reiffin separately and over their combination.”); see also id. at 12–19, 37–42. 5 Petitioner argues that the skilled artisan would have combined Reiffin with Chow for “increased computational power and the ability to solve larger problems.” Pet. 11. These generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Chow and Reiffin (and Kurowski) lack rational underpinning, particularly because Petitioner does not even identify which teachings of which references are being combined to achieve any particular limitation in claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 40 (“[Petitioner’s] ‘spaghetti on the wall’ approach fails [to] explain how Petitioners’ purported motivation for combining Chow and Reiffin fits with each of the at least 64 different possibilities for combining Chow and Reiffin.”). slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,257,582
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00987 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any of claims 1–37 was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’722 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’722 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed definition of the skilled artisan, which is supported with testimony of Dr. Easttom (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner submits a proposed construction for the term “activation module” implicated in dependent claims 17–19, 23–25, 29–31, and 35–37. Pet. 10–12. Petitioner otherwise argues, “[n]o express construction of the other challenged claims is necessary in this IPR because the prior art renders these claims obvious under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner argues that “the Board should apply the plain and ordinary meaning to all challenged claim terms under the Phillips standard.” Prelim. Resp. 9. We find that no express construction of any term is necessary to resolve this case.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Lawson and Choquier lack rational underpinning, particularly for the specific and substantial modifications of Lawson necessary to reach the subject Mapping Limitation, and are beset with impermissible hindsight. The Board must “recognize that we cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.” Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to arrive at the claimed invention, we are left with only hindsight bias that KSR warns against.”); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (2007) (“A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.”). “Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1313–14 (CCPA 1971). In this case, Petitioner does not show sufficiently how or why an alleged desire to “increase efficiency, redundancy, and scalability of Lawson’s routing network” would have led the ordinarily skilled artisan specifically to the subject Mapping Limitation, but for using claim 1 as a roadmap. Indeed, as Patent Owner persuasively argues: The Petition fails to tie these generic design goals to the specific functionality that the Petition seeks to cherry-pick from Choquier and import into Lawson. Put another way, the Petition does not explain what about Choquier’s scalability, load balancing and redundancy techniques would have motivated [the skilled artisan] to have configured Lawson’s servers to “determine which server groups (node types) should receive an event update based on this server groups to event producer mapping.” Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Petitioner never identifies how Lawson’s registries of servers/consumers become the claimed gateway-kept category→node-type mapping (EX1005, 10:63–67; 12:36–43). Nor does Petitioner show that Choquier’s service map—not keyed by message category and used for CPU-based server selection—somehow supplies the missing category→node-type routing rule that controls update-message traffic through routing nodes (EX1007, 11:2–22; 12:33–36; 12:56–61). To the contrary, Choquier’s update path increases processing by replicating each update to every server in the service group (EX1007, 21:27–50), which is the opposite of the claim’s mapping-based control that limits which nodes must process a given update. Id. at 30–31. We find this context shows that Petitioner’s reasons for combining Lawson and Choquier (and Tsutsumitake) to achieve the subject Mapping Limitation lack rational underpinning, and that Petitioner’s proposed combination of teachings is based on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 27

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,407,722
• Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15

  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 12,119,463
• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00573 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7 or 11 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’772 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’772 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) pertaining to the ’772 patent “would have had an educational background of, engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’772 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In this inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We do not need to construe any terms expressly to determine whether or not to institute a trial. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,481,772

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.