- Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc. v. Spruce Biosciences, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 3, 2025 · PGR2025-00032 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“Section 42.207(e) states that “[n]o post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e). Because the Patent Owner has disclaimed all claims challenged by the grounds in this Petition, we determine that no trial will be instituted.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,115,166 - Tesla, Inc. v. The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy (Intellectual Ventures II LLC)Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00341 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Tesla had not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Having considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply, as well as the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’743 patent. We accordingly do not institute inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the areas of networking and distributed computing that are pertinent to the ’743 patent,” would “have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately 2-3 years of professional experience relating to distributed computing,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex.1003, ¶¶ 32-34). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. B.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“of “event,” in which Petitioner argued that the term should be broad enough to include “processing radar sensor data, performing radar tracking initialization and refinement, and distributing radar tracking information to other modules,” and Patent Owner argued that the specification uses the term as “as an umbrella term to cover various types of ‘internal event and performance data’ such as ‘application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.’” Reply 1; Sur-reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that that claimed “events” must concern “application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.” See Ex. 1001, 7:44–45. The patent explains that function group 2 collects that type of information from applications using an API and then “correlate[es], combin[es], and reformat[s] [the] application data into higherlevel metrics (composite events) for use by displays or other Resource Management components.” Id. at 7:52–54. The middleware described and claimed in the ’743 is concerned with how applications are performing, not what they doing.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“This claim limitation, however, also requires “event correlation capabilities.” For that, Petitioner asserts that “Welch’s metrics calculation component (part of the ‘second function group’) provides ‘event correlation capabilities’ because the QoS management software “implementation includes the following capabilities: . . . (2) track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1003, 4). This, we find, mischaracterizes Welch’s disclosure, because Welch’s metrics calculation component does not perform the identified “correlation.” The language quoted by Petitioner comes from the experimental results section of Welch, which describes how the implementation of the NSWC HiPer-D testbed, the system that was used test Welch’s QoS middleware, included “track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Ex. 1005, 4. Welch is not explaining that the middleware correlates the QoS system level events that Petitioner has identified as the claimed “events,” but, instead, that the NSWC HiPer-D system that was used to test the middleware included the ability to correlate radar data in a shipboard anti-air-warfare system.6 The correlating mentioned in Welch occurs at the application level, not in the middleware.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,181,743 - Formycon AG v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00233 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 314(a) based on the Fintiv factors and denied joinder; it did not reach the merits of the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“B. The Fintiv Factors and Related Guidance The Board’s precedential decision in Fintiv outlines factors that balance considerations of system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality when a patent owner raises an argument for discretionary denial due to the advanced state of a parallel proceeding, such as the MDL proceeding here. Fintiv 5–6. These factors are: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. “[I]n evaluating the factors, the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III. DISCRETION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 314(A) We begin by addressing Patent Owner’s arguments for discretionary denial. As explained below, we find those arguments persuasive. Thus, we exercise discretion to deny institution of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of the Petition and deny the Joinder Motion.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,084,865 - Samsung Bioepis Co., Ltd. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00176 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on all challenged claims under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors—particularly investment, overlap, and merits—weighed against review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“raised by this overlap, but given the circumstances, it does not effectively mitigate them. First, the disputed issues for Petitioner’s ODP defense are the same or substantially similar to those for the obviousness grounds in the Petition, but the Sotera stipulation does not prevent Petitioner from litigating those issues before both the district court (as part of its ODP defense) and here in the event an IPR is instituted.19 Second, the MDL proceeding 19 ODP or nonstatutory double patenting is, as the name implies, not premised on any statute. See, e.g., Ostuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Nonstatutory double patenting is a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy.”). Accordingly, it is not a ground Petitioner reasonably could have raised in this IPR. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (inter partes review may be requested “only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103”). includes other biosimilar applicant defendants who are similarly motivated to try to invalidate the ’865 patent claims, but who are not subject to any Sotera stipulation. Even if we institute review on Petitioner’s grounds here, those other defendants remain free to litigate the same grounds in the consolidated MDL proceeding. For these reasons and given the particular circumstances of this case, Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation does not sufficiently mitigate the risks of duplicated efforts or inconsistent decisions by making this IPR a “true alternative” to resolution of these issues by the district court. See Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLC, IPR2024-01205, Paper 19, 3–4 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2005) (determining on Director Review that a Sotera stipulation did not ensure IPR would be a “true alternative” because Petitioner’s invalidity arguments “include combinations of the prior art asserted in these proceedings with unpublished system prior art, which Petitioner’s stipulation is not likely to moot” and thus the same or similar issues would remain in the parallel proceeding); SAP America, Inc. v. Cyandia, Inc., IPR2024-01496, Paper 13, 8–9 (PTAB Apr. 7, 2025) (similar).” slip op. at 19
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,084,865 - Cipla Limited v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00033 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–13 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“We determine that this factor weighs heavily in favor of exercising discretion to deny the Petition. The trial date in the district court litigation is scheduled for October 6, 2025. See Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2010). This date is at least six months before our projected statutory deadline should we go forward in this case. Patent Owner points out that this trial date is nine months later than the median time to trial in the District of Delaware, and in Patent Owner’s view, the parties are on track to satisfy the current schedule. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2011).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“1 Patent Owner also asserts that the Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), but we need not reach this issue because we are exercising discretion under Section 314(a) to deny the Petition. See Prelim. Resp. 2–3.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,744,802 - Aardevo North America, LLC v. Agventure B.V.Institution deniedPTAB · May 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00136 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Institution
Institution of inter partes review was denied for claims 1–10 because Petitioner did not establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, we find that on the current record Petitioner has not shown that it has a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on these obviousness grounds. XII. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL – 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) In view of our determination that the Petitioner does not meet the threshold for instituting review on the merits, we need not address the parties’ dispute about whether the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Pet. 74–75; Prelim. Resp. 38–54; Pet. Reply 1–5; PO Sur-Reply 1–5. XIII. CONCLUSION After reviewing the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that, based on the evidence of record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–10 of the ’841 patent are unpatentable. XIV. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds presented in the Petition is denied.” slip op. at 35
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“However, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Jansky provide specific data on the record before us showing the actual measured homozygosity of either of the inbred lines, US-W 5309 and US-W 5315. And Phumichai experimentally demonstrates that Dr. Jansky’s assumption that theoretical heterozygosity reduction of 50% per generation is not necessarily accurate, stating the “observed average percentage of reduction of heterozygosity per generation (38.4% or 38.5%) was lower than the theoretically expected value of 50%.” Ex. 1005, 982. Indeed, Phumichai disclosed that the “SOPH [Section-based observed percentage of heterozygosity] decreased steadily from the original 100% in 99H2–1 (S0) to the family means of 62.4% in 3H2 (S1), 37.9% in 3H3 (S2).” Id. at 981. That is, Phumichai experimentally shows that in an S2 generation of a potato line, the heterozygosity was 37.9%, resulting in homozygosity of about 62.1%, below the 75% theoretically expected and the 75% required by claim 1 of the ’841 patent. Therefore, the evidence of record does not show that the S2 generation of potato lines in Jong necessarily satisfies the homozygosity recitation in claim 1 of the ’841 patent, and so cannot establish on the record before us that Jong inherently teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Owner is telling. Petitioner does not refute Patent Owner’s evidence of objective indicia. On the current record, the objective indicia evidence is compelling. As to long felt need, Patent Owner cited evidence on record before the Examiner that showed a persistent need recognized by ordinarily skilled artisans. In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538 (CCPA 1967). For example, Dr. Huang states “This research is the breakthrough we have been waiting for since nearly a century . . . This is crucial for the potato breeding worldwide.” Ex. 2009, 687. There is no evidence that this long-felt need was satisfied by another before Appellant’s invention. See Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[O]nce another supplied the key element, there was no long-felt need or, indeed, a problem to be solved . . . .”). Lastly, Dr. Lindhout explains that this invention satisfies the long-felt need, stating “I have discovered, and disclosed in the present application for patent, how a fertile homozygote in” slip op. at 33
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“XII. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL – 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) In view of our determination that the Petitioner does not meet the threshold for instituting review on the merits, we need not address the parties’ dispute about whether the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Pet. 74–75; Prelim. Resp. 38–54; Pet. Reply 1–5; PO Sur-Reply 1–5.” slip op. at 35
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,140,841 - Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00082 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the district court had already held all challenged claims invalid under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“recent Director Review decision (i.e. in the above-noted related cases, IPR2024-01252 and IPR2024-01253) reached the opposite conclusion to that of AviaGames in holding that a district court’s § 101 invalidity judgment precludes instituting challenges to the invalid claims even though an appeal of that judgment is pending. Specifically, in Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLC, IPR2024-01252, -01253, Paper 27 (PTAB April 17, 2025) (Director Review decision) (“Hulu”), the Acting Director held that “[b]ecause the patent claims already stand invalid [due to the District Court’s § 101 invalidity judgment], it is unnecessary to institute another proceeding to review them for patentability under other grounds.” Hulu at 2, 3 (reasoning that “[i]n the event the Federal Circuit reverses the district court’s decision, Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand”) (remanding the panel’s institution decisions and denying institution). Accordingly, under clear guidance from Hulu, because the District Court held all the ’403 patent claims invalid under § 101, we deny institution. See Hulu at 3 (holding that “where a district court already has found the challenged claims invalid, the efficiency and integrity of the patent system is best served by denying institution” (citing Fintiv at 16)).” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,986,403 - Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00081 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the district court had already held those claims invalid under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“IPR2024-01252 and IPR2024-01253) reached the opposite conclusion to that of AviaGames in holding that a district court’s § 101 invalidity judgment precludes instituting challenges to the invalid claims even though an appeal of that judgment is pending. Specifically, in Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLC, IPR2024-01252, -01253, Paper 27 (PTAB April 17, 2025) (Director Review decision) (“Hulu”), the Acting Director held that “[b]ecause the patent claims already stand invalid [due to a district court’s § 101 invalidity judgment], it is unnecessary to institute another proceeding to review them for patentability under other grounds.” Hulu at 2, 3 (reasoning that “[i]n the event the Federal Circuit reverses the district court’s decision, Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand”) (remanding the panel’s institution decisions and denying institution). Accordingly, under clear guidance from Hulu, because the District Court held all the ’403 patent claims invalid under § 101, we deny institution. See Hulu at 3 (holding that “where a district court already has found the challenged claims invalid, the efficiency and integrity of the patent system is best served by denying institution” (citing Fintiv at 16)).” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,986,403 - Biofrontera Inc. / Biofrontera Bioscience GmbH et al. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00874 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, failing to show Bansal's claimed light intensity arrangement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An obviousness determination requires finding both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” CRFD Research, Inc. v. Matal, 876 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367– 68 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Obviousness grounds must be supported with “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” and not by “mere conclusory statements.” See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S at 418. slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown for institution that Bansal teaches or suggests arranging light sources “such that a higher intensity of light is emitted proximate the second edges compared to the intensity of light emitted not proximate the second edges,” as required by the challenged claims. Instead, Petitioner demonstrates how Bansal describes varying the density of light source distribution throughout the array to provide a higher density of light in the entire peripheral area of the array, which includes the areas proximal to both the first and second edges, as compared to the central area of the array. See Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1005 ¶ 25. In this regard, Petitioner relies on Bansal’s Figure 9b, asserting that it “shows one embodiment where more light sources are placed near the edges of the panel compared to the light sources in the center.” Pet. 36–37. The comparison of Bansal’s light density between the entire periphery and the central area of the array is insufficient. What is missing from Petitioner’s argument and discussion of Bansal is how Bansal teaches or suggests a configuration that provides a higher density of light proximate to the second shorter edges of the periphery in comparison to the remaining areas of the array, which includes the first longer edges of the periphery. Without that discussion, we find that Petitioner has not shown sufficient for institution that Bansal is persuasively relied upon for the light source arrangement limitation of the challenged claims. likelihood of prevailing in its obviousness challenge of independent claims 1, 5, 16, 20, or 21, or dependent claims 2, 4, 6–8, and 17–19 over Larsen, Bansal, and Jones.” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelOther
“would have had at least a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering, physics, biomedical engineering, computer engineering, chemical engineering, material science, or a related scientific or engineering field, and at least one year of work or research experience in optics, optoelectronics, radiometry, photometry, photodynamic diagnosis (PD), photodynamic therapy (PDT), phototherapy (PT), or a related field. Pet. 8. Petitioner asserts that, alternatively, a “POSITA in the relevant time frame would have had at least four years of industry or academic experience in optics, optoelectronics, radiometry, photometry, PD, PDT, PT, or a related field.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 37). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the application for the ’028 patent was filed, “would have had a M.D. and/or a Ph.D. in an electrical engineering, physics, optical sciences, optical engineering, or a related scientific or engineering field, and at least one to two years of work or research experience in optical engineering, optics, optoelectronics, phototherapy (‘PT’), PDT, or a related field.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner asserts that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA could have a Bachelor’s degree in one of the above areas and at least three to four years of work or research experience in that area.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 30–31). We note that the parties’ proposed definitions are largely similar. To the extent that the proposed definitions differ, we do not need to resolve those differences as our findings and conclusion in this Decision would be the same under any of the proposed definitions.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,697,028 - Cisco Systems, Inc. / Fortinet, Inc. v. Infoexpress Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00678 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that either Krantz alone or Krantz and Herrmann rendered them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. As noted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 27), claim 1 separately recites (1) “an authentication module” that seeks access based on “authentication information” and (2) a “gatekeeper” that “formulate[s] an audit request” and evaluates whether to approve access based on a response to the audit request. The fact that authentication can be a part of a security policy audit (see Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1301, 11:67–12:6)) does not change the fact that claim 1 recites separate sets of limitations for authentication and auditing that Petitioner must account for in its unpatentability contentions.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and at least three years of experience in networking operating systems and cybersecurity.” Prelim. Resp. 1. Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Id. at 2. Patent Owner does not cite any evidence supporting its assessment of the level of ordinary skill. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’645 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would find the challenged claims unpatentable under any interpretation consistent with their plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the [’645 patent],” so we “need not expressly construe the claim terms.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner also argues that we should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms. Prelim. Resp. 6. Nonetheless, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner deviates from the plain and ordinary meaning of certain limitations. Id. at 6– 7. Thus, Patent Owner puts forth its understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning for the following recitations: “configure an access point in response to approval of the device by the gatekeeper” and “device information received from the device in response to the audit request.” Id. at 7–13. Based on the present record, we need not expressly construe any claim terms in order to render the instant Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,117,645
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.