- Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00619 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 36–37. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,686,871 - Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00617 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 6–8, 10–13, and 15 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 39. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here. 2 Congress amended § 103 when it passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). Petitioner asserts that the version amended by the AIA applies here. Pet. 23. 3 We use Petitioner’s nomenclature in which Petitioner collectively refers to the Vasell patent (Ex. 1004) and its corresponding provisional applications (Exs. 1015, 1016) as “Vasell.” 4 Erez Zadok, Ph.D. submitted a declaration on behalf of Petitioner. See Ex. 1003.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,893,095 - Falkbuilt Ltd. v. Dirtt Environmental Solutions, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00654 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–7, 10–16, and 19–20 were obvious over Scranton and Maciocci.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Because Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Scranton’s virtual objects are “associated with an independently executable software object that comprises independent variables and functions that are specific to a particular architectural element that is represented by the at least one virtual object,” Petitioner has not shown a likelihood that it will prove independent claim 1 obvious. And, because all of the other challenged claims include corresponding language, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prove the other challenged claims obvious either.6 III. CONCLUSION Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claims 1–7, 10–16, and 19–20 of the ’814 patent are unpatentable. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 15
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner fails to establish that Scranton’s “information components” could correspond to the claimed “independently executable software object” for several reasons. First, Petitioner does not show how the information components are “objects,” where, as Petitioner acknowledges, the ’814 patent is using “object” in the object-oriented programming sense. See, e.g., Pet. 27–28; Ex. 1001, 5:28–67. Second, Petitioner fails to explain how or why the components are “associated” with the virtual objects, where the patent contemplates an association akin to that of objects in object-oriented programming. See id. Third, although Petitioner asserts that the components are “executable,” it fails to explain why they would be considered to be “independently” executable. Finally, Petitioner fails to explain how or why the components would “comprise[] independent variables and functions that are specific to a particular architectural element,” where Scranton’s components are software that obtains and processes the 3D information, but do not appear to include the information themselves. See Ex. 1001, 10:27–12:3.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“technologies, including augmented reality technologies, and also three-dimensional design software such as architectural design software,” and that such a person “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design and application of electrical, computer, or software technologies, in combination with training or at least one to two years of related work experience with three-dimensional computer models and virtual or augmented reality devices.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 41– 48). “Alternatively,” argues Petitioner, “the person could have also had a Master of Science degree in a relevant academic discipline with approximately one year of related work experience in the same discipline.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner does not address this issue. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal in part, finding the skilled artisan to be a person with (a) “a Bachelor of Science degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design and application of electrical, computer, or software technologies,” and (b) “training or at least one to two years of related work experience with three-dimensional computer models and virtual or augmented reality devices.” That description is generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’814 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We conclude that we need not engage in any formal claim construction to resolve the issues addressed in this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
Claim constructioncites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,467,814 - Falkbuilt Ltd. v. Dirtt Environmental Solutions Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2021 · PGR2021-00067 · APJ Stacy B Margolies · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that claims 1–5, 8–12, and 15–17 were more likely than not unpatentable as indefinite or obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 324 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). We may not institute a post-grant review unless “the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner’s Certificate of Correction Brief, and Petitioner’s Certificate of Correction Response Brief, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of post-grant review.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteNot shown unpatentable
“indefinite. “[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014); see also id. at 910 (The definiteness requirement “require[s] that a patent’s claims, when viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of invention with reasonable certainty.”). Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that, when viewed in light of the specification and the prosecution history, claims 2 and 3 fail to inform a skilled artisan about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. Petitioner fails to address the amendment of claim 2 leading up to the issuance of the patent.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner fails to sufficiently explain how the references are combined to teach this limitation or the reason one of ordinary skill in the art would have made such a combination. For example, Petitioner fails to explain how one would have “[a]ppli[ed] the teachings of Shingu to Scranton.” Id. Such a combination is not readily apparent from the references themselves because Shingu relates to moving a camera so that it can take a repeat photograph and does not describe determining the architectural space surrounding the user. Petitioner also does not provide a reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the cited teachings of Shingu and Scranton to arrive at the claimed features. See id. at 41–42. Nor does Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Welch, provide testimony explaining how the teachings would have been combined or a reason to make the combination. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 79–81. Indeed, as Patent Owner notes, Dr. Welch does not even reference Scranton in his analysis of this claim limitation. See id.; Prelim. Resp. 19–20. Petitioner therefore fails to sufficiently show that the combination of Shingu and Scranton teaches “the particular physical location and the virtual predetermined position comprising the same relative view position within the architectural design file and an architectural space surrounding the user.”” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“and Scranton teaches the “receive a communication” limitation. Petitioner relies on Dr. Welch’s testimony to fill in gaps for what is not expressly disclosed in Shingu. As explained above, Shingu discloses an augmented reality system “that helps users take pictures from the same position and camera angle as a previous photo.” Ex. 1003, 272. Shingu discloses “us[ing] an existing method to estimate camera position as implemented in ARToolKit.” Id. at 271 (emphasis added). Shingu—which describes aiming a camera on an object at a certain angle—does not disclose having a user located within a particular physical space. Petitioner therefore relies on Dr. Welch to assert that it was known ARToolKit could provide the claimed functionality—indicating a relative direction that the virtual reality module (the camera in Shingu) is facing, and a location of a user with respect to the one or more position tracking sensors, wherein the user is located within the particular physical space. Pet. 34–35 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 69, 72). Dr. Welch’s testimony, in turn, is based on Wagner (Exhibit 1018), which appears to have been downloaded in February 2021. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 69 (citing Ex. 1018), 72; Ex. 1018 (footer). Although Dr. Welch gives a date of 2002 for Wagner (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 69), that date does not appear in Exhibit 1018. See Ex. 1018. Petitioner fails to explain in its Petition what evidence supports its assertion that Wagner shows that ARToolKit had been applied to the creation of a floor of a building “more than a decade before the time of the alleged invention” or that the techniques described in Welch were “well known by the time of the alleged invention.” See Pet. 34–35. Nor does the cited testimony from Dr. Welch identify evidence or otherwise provide support for the 2002 date or that the functionality described in Wagner was “well known.” See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 69, 72. Thus, Petitioner’s assertions and Dr. Welch’s testimony regarding what was known to a person of ordinary skill in the art about the functionality of ARToolKit goes well beyond the express disclosures of Shingu—using “an existing method to estimate camera position” (Ex. 1003, 271)—and, on the current record, are not sufficiently supported by contemporaneous evidence. Petitioner therefore does not sufficiently show that the combination of Shingu and Scranton teaches “receiv[ing] a communication from the one or more position tracking sensors, wherein the communication comprises an indication of a relative direction that the virtual reality module is facing, and a location of the user with respect to the one or more position tracking sensors, wherein the user is located within the particular physical space.”” slip op. at 22
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,783,284 - Impinj, Inc. v. NXP B.V.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 2, 2021 · IPR2020-01422 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Impinj’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied on all challenged claims because the Petition did not sufficiently explain how MacLellan or Gallagher teaches “specific useful data.”
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions. In sum, Petitioner argues in its Request for Rehearing that “specific useful data” could be comprised of all the “useful data.” Even if we were persuaded that “specific useful data” could be comprised of all the “useful data,” however, Petitioner did not make this argument in its Petition. As discussed in our Institution Decision, Petitioner instead argued that “MacLellan discloses that a specific set of ‘optional data’ is stored on a tag.” Pet. 23 (emphasis added) (cited by Inst. Dec. 12–13). The wording of this argument suggests that the “specific set” is comprised of a portion of all the optional data. Petitioner, however, relied on the same passage describing optional data 603 in MacLellan to support its contentions that MacLellan teaches both the recited “useful data” and the recited “specific useful data.” For instance, with respect to “useful data,” Petitioner asserted that MacLellan “discloses that optional data sent by the tag can be ‘any data stored on the Tag 102 that is always transmitted to the Interrogator 101 together with the Tag ID 602.’” Id. at 18–19 (quoting Ex. 1003, 8:30–32). As to “specific useful data,” Petitioner asserted that “MacLellan discloses that a specific set of ‘optional data’ is stored on a tag,” and cited again to MacLellan’s teaching that “Optional Data 603 . . . contain[s] any data stored on the Tag 102 that is always transmitted to the Interrogator 101.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:30–31). In our Institution Decision, we stated that Petitioner did not sufficiently explain how MacLellan teaches specific useful data. Inst. Dec. 12–13. In particular, we noted that Petitioner did not sufficiently explain how optional data 603 on a tag is a “specific set” of the same optional data 603. See id. Because Petitioner’s arguments and evidence focused on MacLellan’s optional data as satisfying both “useful data” and “specific useful data” limitations, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to explain its claim scope position regarding these two terms. Alternatively, it was Petitioner’s burden to explain how MacLellan’s optional data would satisfy both limitations despite the claim utilizing different terms. In other words, if Petitioner considers a “specific set” of optional data to be all the optional data, Petitioner needed to state that position in the Petition and provide sufficient explanation with supporting evidence in light of the ’092 patent’s teachings that distinguish useful data from specific useful data.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 7,257,092 - Amazon.Com, Inc. v. M2m Solutions LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 8, 2018 · IPR2017-01894 · APJ Stacy B Margolies · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–30 unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Having reviewed the record, we determine that the information presented does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Saylor and Loughran. As explained below, Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the following limitation would have been obvious: “a plurality of consumer device assets . . . , each asset having . . . nonvolatile memory for storing files of data content for display . . . and a display apparatus for displaying the stored data content.”” slip op. at 16
- BurdenDenied
“Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Saylor discloses that control panel 220—which Petitioner contends is a “consumer device asset”—has “nonvolatile memory for storing files of data content for display to a consumer user of the device” and “a display apparatus for displaying the stored data content.” Even though control panel 220 shown in Figure 2 of Saylor appears to include a display, Saylor does not describe the display or describe what, if anything, is displayed on the portion identified by Petitioner as the display. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 5:50–57. Saylor also does not describe any memory components of the control panel. The only components of control panel 220 that Saylor describes are in connection with communication, not data storage or display. Id. at 5:20–22 (“Each of the sensors (or group of sensors) may be equipped with a transmitter and the control panel may be equipped with a receiver.”), 10:20–21 (“The control panel may have a built-in modem or other communication device.”). Petitioner’s one sentence in its Petition regarding inherency is conclusory and lacks any explanation. Dr. Kesidis’s testimony is likewise conclusory, without sufficient evidentiary support or explanation. Dr. Kesidis’s use of present tense makes it unclear as to whether all control panels at the time of the invention necessarily displayed the information he describes or that that information necessarily persisted after termination of power of the control panel such that it would have been stored in nonvolatile memory. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 415 (“Security system control panels display information to users, for example, during initial setup, when the security system’s settings are being modified, and in the course of normal day-to-day operation of the security system.”) (emphasis added). Dr. Kesidis also fails to cite support in Saylor that set-up options and settings were necessarily displayed on control panel 220. Nor does Dr. Kesidis cite to other contemporaneous evidence to support his opinion. Given the minimal disclosure in Saylor regarding the components of control panel 220 and what information was stored in nonvolatile memory or displayed on the control panel, Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that Saylor inherently discloses that control panel 220 includes the claimed display and nonvolatile memory.” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Patent Owner does not address Dr. Kesidis’s opinion regarding the level of ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 4. Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Brian Berg, likewise does not challenge Dr. Kesidis’s opinion and instead proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art in May 2002 would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, electrical engineering, mathematics, computer science or a closely related field; and (2) a minimum of 2–3 years of industry experience with consumer electronics and related software and firmware, and networked electronic devices.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 27; see Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 27). Mr. Berg also opines that an individual with an advanced degree in a relevant field, such as computer or electrical engineering, would require less industry experience (e.g., 1–2 years). Ex. 2001 ¶ 27; see Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 27). We do not ascertain a meaningful difference between the parties’ competing proposals and the parties do not argue that any issue in the case turns on such a difference. We find that both proposals are essentially the same and that both reflect the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“control panel may be equipped with a receiver.”), 10:20–21 (“The control panel may have a built-in modem or other communication device.”). Petitioner’s one sentence in its Petition regarding inherency is conclusory and lacks any explanation. Dr. Kesidis’s testimony is likewise conclusory, without sufficient evidentiary support or explanation. Dr. Kesidis’s use of present tense makes it unclear as to whether all control panels at the time of the invention necessarily displayed the information he describes or that that information necessarily persisted after termination of power of the control panel such that it would have been stored in nonvolatile memory. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 415 (“Security system control panels display information to users, for example, during initial setup, when the security system’s settings are being modified, and in the course of normal day-to-day operation of the security system.”) (emphasis added). Dr. Kesidis also fails to cite support in Saylor that set-up options and settings were necessarily displayed on control panel 220. Nor does Dr. Kesidis cite to other contemporaneous evidence to support his opinion. Given the minimal disclosure in Saylor regarding the components of control panel 220 and what information was stored in nonvolatile memory or displayed on the control panel, Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that Saylor inherently discloses that control panel 220 includes the claimed display and nonvolatile memory.” slip op. at 19
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,504,007 - PTAB · Sep 5, 2017 · IPR2017-00072 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its discretionary denial of institution because the petition presented the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Sabbaghian, disclosing an adjustable socket wrench, and Baker, disclosing a tube pointer, were not considered during prosecution. See Pet. 37, 41. Petitioner relies on Sabbaghian and Baker as disclosing dies arranged to form a variable-sized polygonal aperture, the only claimed feature Petitioner argues is missing from the alleged Applicant Admitted Prior Art. Pet. 3– 4, 37–43. According to Petitioner, “the polygonal-shaped die configuration is nothing new,” and “[f]or more than a century, skilled artisans have used such a configuration.” Id. at 4. Petitioner concedes that “[t]he die configuration disclosed in Sabbaghian and Baker is not unique. Such a die configuration is common in the prior art.” Id. at 93 (under the heading “The Claimed Die Configuration Was Ubiquitous In The Prior Art”). Although Sabbaghian and Baker were not considered, Petitioner notes that during examination Whitesell was applied as disclosing a crimper with a “substantially regular polygonal shape.” Pet. 22. Similarly, Tuberman was considered during prosecution as teaching a device with “an aperture of a substantially regular polygonal shape.” See Prelim. Resp. 19 (quoting Ex. 1002, 45). For the foregoing reasons we determine that the alleged Applicant Admitted Prior Art and Morales were previously presented to the Office. Additionally, the Petition further presents information from Sabbaghian and Baker, generally described by Petitioner as “ubiquitous” in the prior art, which we find to be the same or substantially the same as information considered during prosecution in the context of other references, including Whitesell and Tuberman. Id. at 10–11. According to Petitioner, “[t]he only distinction between the AAPA and the challenged claims is the shape and arrangement of the blades that form the claimed ‘polygonal aperture.’” Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 94). Petitioner argues that Whitesell can be distinguished from the asserted prior art in this proceeding because it does not teach “the straight-sided die/polygonal aperture limitation.” Req. Reh’g. 7. However, Petitioner does not dispute that Tuberman discloses this feature. See id. at 7–8. Thus, Petitioner has not shown a substantial difference between the art previously considered by the Office and the alleged prior art asserted in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner argues that the Examiner did not apply Tuberman in combination with the alleged Applicant Admitted Prior Art. According to Petitioner, “the Examiner applied Tuberman individually as an anticipatory reference,” and “[i]t is irrelevant to speculate why the Examiner did not make a combination that is so readily apparent.” Req. Reh’g. 8, 11.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,915,560
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.