• Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2022 · IPR2021-01290 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–19 under § 314(a), applying the General Plastic factors, and denied Apple’s conditional motion for joinder.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied

    “patent and the Petition here involves claims 1–19. Thus, more claims are challenged here than in the 471 IPR. Nonetheless, Petitioner provides no explanation why it is again challenging claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12, 14–17, and 19 here or why Petitioner needs two instituted inter partes reviews on the common claims. Pet. 73–74. In none of its briefs does Petitioner explain “why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions if it [the Board] identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner’s burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a),” short of saying that “Gundlach (471 IPR) and Kim (this Petition) offer very different disclosures.” Explanation 3; TPG 60.8 However, Petitioner does not identify any circumstances identified in the Trial Practice Guide supporting a need for a second petition, such as a large number of claims in litigation or a potential dispute about priority date. TPG 59. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 6) that this General Plastic factor weighs in favor of denying institution of the proceeding.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “IV. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JOINDER As stated above, the Director may join a party to an ongoing IPR only if the filed petition warrants institution under § 314. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Because we exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314, we deny Petitioner’s Conditional Motion for Joinder. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Petition is denied; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Conditional Motion for Joinder is denied.” slip op. at 11

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,259,021
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01270 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review of claims 2–5, 11–14, 22, 23, and 26–28 under § 325(d) because substantially the same prior art was previously presented and material Office error was not shown.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

    “applicant, such as on an [IDS].” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8. Because it was submitted in an IDS during prosecution of the ’380 patent, Sourcefire qualifies as art that was “previously presented” to the Office.” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied

    “Bionics framework, and based on the particular circumstances here, we conclude that the same or substantially the same prior art as in the Petition was presented previously to the Office, and Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we determine that discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is appropriate. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 18

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,735,380
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01156 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1, 6–10, 15–21, 24, 25, 29, and 30, because the same prior art was previously presented and no material Office error was shown.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

    “presented to the Office. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 9

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,735,380
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01154 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–27 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that either asserted Jungck-based obviousness combination rendered the claims unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “c. Summary of Claim 1 In sum, Petitioner does not explain how the edge cache devices contribute or detract from Jungck’s ability to teach or suggest the “entire boundary” and “all traffic” limitations of the challenged claims. The evidence of device 900 and claims of collateral estoppel do not remedy this deficiency. In the absence of such evidence, Petitioner has failed to “identif[y], in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge.” See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). For the reasons above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the combination of Jungck and Wood meets the limitation of “[a] method of filtering packets at a packet security gateway, of a plurality of packet security gateways that collectively provide an entire interface across a boundary of a network protected by the packet security gateway . . . comprising: a first set of packet filtering rules to be applied to all network traffic traversing the boundary.”” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition’s avoidance of the operation of edge caches when edge caches are important in the processing of traffic flowing across the boundary undermines this ground of the Petition. If Petitioner wished to rely on an embodiment or configuration in which the edge caches were irrelevant, the edge caches were redundant to the edge server, or the edge caches were unnecessary, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to explain sufficiently how and why that was the case. Petitioner was aware of the edge caches because it appears to have omitted all references to them in the Petition yet did not explain why this was done. Additionally, although Petitioner’s declarant does include references to edge caches, its declarant also does not explain sufficiently the relevance of those edge caches. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 148, 212, 214, 215, 227, 323. Additionally, Petitioner’s references to collateral estoppel do not relieve Petitioner from the burden to describe its contentions regarding obviousness in the Petition.” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “Our reviewing court has held that “[c]ollateral estoppel protects a party from having to litigate issues that have been fully and fairly tried in a previous action and adversely resolved against a party-opponent.” Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., 884 F.3d 1350, 1351–1352 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). “It is well established that collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, applies in the administrative context.” MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citations omitted); Webpower, Inc. v. WAG ACQUISITION, LLC, Case IPR2016- 01239, Paper 21 at 26–28 (PTAB Dec. 26, 2017). “Issue preclusion [i.e., collateral estoppel] is appropriate only if: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.” In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also MaxLinear, Inc., 880 F.3d at 1377 (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 91 S. Ct. 1501, 28 L.Ed. 2d 788 (1971) (finding collateral estoppel applies to a patentee who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of a patent in a prior federal case.)). Patent Owner points out that the claims at issue in IPR2018-01443, 1444, 1513 (“prior IPRs”) did not include the “entire boundary” or “all traffic” limitations. Prelim. Resp. 26–27, 32, 44. We agree. Collateral estoppel does not apply because there are differences between the claim limitation at issue here and the adjudicated claim limitations at issue in the prior IPRs. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1465; accord MaxLinear, Inc., 880 F.3d at 1377–1378; cf. In re Arunachalam, 709 F. App’x 699, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (finding collateral estoppel applies to an adjudicated claim that is not “materially different” than the adjudicated claims).” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner requests that the preamble of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 be treated as limiting. Prelim. Resp. 16–17. These preambles provide antecedent basis for “packet security gateway,” “boundary,” “network,” and “one or more other networks.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:64–21:2, 22:13–18, 23:35–42). The preambles also recite the “plurality of packet security gateways that collectively provide an entire interface across a boundary of a [protected] network,” which is “essential to understand” the “all traffic” limitation in the body of these claims and thus ‘“give life, meaning, and vitality”’ to the claims. Id. (citing Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The preambles provide the context for the body of the independent claims by defining the arrangement of the “plurality of packet security gateways” relative to the “boundary” of the protected network and thus the basis for applying “packet filtering rules . . . to all network traffic traversing the boundary.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 20:64–21:8). The “entire interface” limitation also was relied on during prosecution of the parent ’437 Patent’s claims to distinguish them from the prior art. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 2008, 254–61; Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808–09). Petitioner does not dispute the preambles are limiting. Pet. 18–21, 37. For, the reasons above, we construe the preambles of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 as limiting. After review of the current record, we conclude that, other than determining the preambles are limiting, no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether to institute review of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,785,266
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01153 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution

  Institution denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of establishing claims 1–20 unpatentable as obvious over Jungck, alone or with RFC2003.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “c. Summary of Claim 1 In sum, Petitioner does not explain how the edge cache devices contribute or detract from Jungck’s ability to teach or suggest the “entire boundary” and “all traffic” limitations of the challenged claims. The evidence of device 900 and claims of collateral estoppel do not remedy this deficiency. In the absence of such evidence, Petitioner has failed to “identif[y], in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge.” See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). For the reasons above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Jungck meets the limitation of “[a] method of filtering packets at a packet security gateway, of a plurality of packet security gateways that collectively provide an entire interface across a boundary of a network protected by the packet security gateway . . . comprising: a first set of packet filtering rules to be applied to all network traffic traversing the boundary.”” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “c. Summary of Claim 1 In sum, Petitioner does not explain how the edge cache devices contribute or detract from Jungck’s ability to teach or suggest the “entire boundary” and “all traffic” limitations of the challenged claims. The evidence of device 900 and claims of collateral estoppel do not remedy this deficiency. In the absence of such evidence, Petitioner has failed to “identif[y], in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge.” See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). For the reasons above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Jungck meets the limitation of “[a] method of filtering packets at a packet security gateway, of a plurality of packet security gateways that collectively provide an entire interface across a boundary of a network protected by the packet security gateway . . . comprising: a first set of packet filtering rules to be applied to all network traffic traversing the boundary.”” slip op. at 22

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Whether or not this was known as a general proposition does not address reasons why Jungck’s traffic appears to bypass the edge servers upon which Petitioner relies and why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Jungck’s operation to apply its rules to all traffic or why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Jungck’s operation to use device 900 instead of the edge servers and what effect that would have on the rest of the operation of Jungck. Petitioner also appears to rely on its declarant who testifies it was well-known to block all incoming traffic. Fintiv Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1004 [Declaration of Dr. Vijay Madisetti] ¶¶ 72–73). Nevertheless, this section of the Declaration was not cited in the Petition but rather is referred to indirectly in a portion of the Declaration which is cited in the Petition. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 241). Paragraph 211 of the Declaration states “[a]s also discussed in Section IV, the use of block lists (e.g., blacklists) to perform packet filtering, including both ingress and egress filtering, was well-known,” but does not refer to paragraphs 72 and 73. Ex. 1004 ¶ 211 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained, “[a] brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.” DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). Additionally, paragraph 72 of the Declaration contains new argument regarding “firewall” and “standard networking practice” based on references (Bharali and Wood) not cited for that proposition in the Petition. Ex. 1004 ¶ 72. We find the Petition improperly incorporates this section of the Declaration by reference because the basis of the “firewall” argument is not explained sufficiently in the Petition. Cisco Systems, Inc., v. C-Cation Technologies, LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 at 8 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative opinion) (describing the proper course of action as “to not consider arguments that are not made in the Petition, but are instead incorporated by reference”).” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “other, Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art on October 22, 2012 (the filing date of the application that matured in the ’437 patent), would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, four years of professional experience, and a working knowledge of packet-switched networking, firewalls, security policies, communication protocols and layers, and the use of customized rules to address cyber-attack. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1004 [Declaration of Dr. Vijay Madisetti] ¶¶ 34–36). Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill, which Patent Owner does not dispute at this stage, appears appropriate for the technology addressed by this proceeding.” slip op. at 6

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,567,437
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jan 20, 2022 · IPR2021-01155 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–20 under § 325(d), finding the asserted art and arguments were previously presented and Petitioner failed to show material Office error.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

    “Examiner during prosecution of the ’343 patent and that Mantripragada is cumulative to Buck, which was considered during prosecution of the ’343 patent. We further find that Patent Owner’s argument during prosecution that the packet transformation function is configured “to prevent an exfiltration operation” resulted in allowance of the claims of the ’343 patent, which overlaps with the argument that Patent Owner makes in this case against Petitioner’s challenges. Prelim. Resp. 35–36. Petitioner has not shown that the two-stage filtering process was a basis for the Examiner’s allowance of the claims of the ’343 patent over the cited prior art. We, therefore, find that the same or substantially the same prior art, and the same or substantially the same arguments, previously were presented to the Office under the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework.” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Petitioner’s declarant testifies regarding the prosecution history of the ’343 patent. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–90. He concludes that “the ’343 Patent claims were apparently allowed because the Examiner concluded that the prior art of record failed to disclose a two-stage packet filtering process,” mirroring Petitioner’s argument. Id. ¶ 90. Petitioner’s declarant does not indicate how the facts support this conclusion. As mentioned, Patent Owner’s argument during prosecution leading to allowance was that the ’343 patent’s claims recite applying the packet transformation function configured to prevent an exfiltration operation. Ex. 1002, 1614–1615, 1639. Petitioner’s declarant does not explain sufficiently where in the prosecution history Patent Owner argued that a two-stage packet filtering process distinguished the ’343 patent’s claims over the prior art, or where the Examiner allowed the claims because of two-stage packet filtering. Accordingly, lacking evidentiary support, the declarant’s testimony is entitled to little or no weight on this point. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Thus, we see no additional evidence or facts in the Petition that warrant reconsideration of the prior art. Therefore, we find that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims under the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework.” slip op. at 18

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,567,343
• Guangdong Mic-Power New Energy Co. Ltd. / Peag LLC D/B/A Jlab Audio et al. v. Varta Microbattery GmbHInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2022 · IPR2021-01207 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to modify the battery of Comparative Example 1 to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1. See Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that the Board must “be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of the references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.”) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to modify the battery of Comparative Example 1 to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1. See Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that the Board must “be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of the references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.”) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).” slip op. at 15

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,804,506
• Guangdong Mic-Power New Energy Co. Ltd. / Peag LLC et al. v. Varta Microbattery GmbHInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2022 · IPR2021-01206 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–30 were obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any challenged claim of the ’776 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to adequately explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use the welding technique of Martin when assembling the battery of Comparative Example 1. Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that the Board must “be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of the references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.”) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated sufficiently that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Kannou and Martin to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1. See Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that a petitioner must demonstrate that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the identified references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention).” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party asserts that any terms of the ’776 require construction for purposes of this Decision. Pet. 24; Prelim. Resp. 12. And, upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we agree that no terms of the ’776 patent require construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,971,776
• Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Correct Transmission, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2021 · IPR2021-00814 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Juniper’s rehearing request, leaving intact its denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “because the Board was not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for purposes of institution does not mean that we overlooked or misapprehended Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and importantly, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to reargue one’s case or to express disagreement with the Board’s decision.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “But Bruckman’s “trunk link” (or LAG as argued by Petitioner) is explicitly disclosed as a link to a core network, not as the links (or traces 34 on backplane 26) to subsidiary modules 24, as argued by Petitioner: “In network access systems, for example, a backplane may be used to connect a main module, having a trunk link to a core network, to a number of subsidiary modules, such as line cards, with ports serving network users. Ex. 1007, 1:25–30 (emphasis added); see id. at 1:61–2:4 (“The master module comprises a switch, which is typically used for linking the subsidiary modules via the connection lines to a network trunk.” (emphases added)); Dec. 25. Bruckman also explicitly discloses that “[a]t any given time, a number of the connection lines [between main module 22 and subsidiary modules 24, i.e., traces 34] are likely to be idle” (Ex. 1007, 2:2–4), which is contrary to a purpose of a LAG (see Ex. 1001, 2:10–16 (“The [LAG] forwarding entity usually attempts to distribute the load evenly over each physical output port of the aggregated logical link.” (emphasis added))). See Dec. 25–28. Thus, in the Decision, we found neither Petitioner nor its declarant had explained sufficiently, let alone with particularity, why the skilled artisan, but for hindsight, would have understood Bruckman to teach the Physical/Logical Link Limitations, of which the physical links are subject to the Designating Limitations, as recited, for example, in claim 1. Indeed, we were not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments in its Petition as to the Physical/Logical Link Limitations, and having reviewed the Request, remain unpersuaded. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 4

  Nonecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,768,928
• Bright Data Ltd. v. Metacluster LT, UabInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2021 · IPR2021-00983 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted anticipation or obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “(a) THRESHOLD.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion (see generally Prelim. Resp.). The prior art itself demonstrates the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). in light of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan is: an individual who had (1) a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering as a topic of study (hereinafter, “technical study”), plus at least one year of industry technical experience in the computer network field, such as serving as an engineer for an Internet service provider performing network design, development, or configuration tasks, or as a software developer for network communications software or related utility software, or (2) three years of full-time technical experience in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science or in an equivalent field that includes network engineering or network communications software (hereinafter, “technical fields”), or (3) an equivalent combination of academic study in technical study and work experience in the technical fields.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Proxy Rotator’ as ‘a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting’” (Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:4–7)). of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting” (id. at 5:4–7). In accordance with the Specification’s “general terminology description,” we construe the term “Smart Proxy Rotator” as a system coupled of separate components implementing a specific method and responsible for collecting statistical data, proxy control, rotation, maintenance, and reporting.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “construed as “‘the portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider,’ which may be equal to the weight assigned to that particular proxy provider divided by the sum of weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period” (Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 56)). Patent Owner’s definition requiring a “utilization threshold” to be a “portion of all proxy requests received by the SPR during a time period that the SPR will refer to a particular proxy provider” is too narrow. The ’948 Patent does not expressly define the term “utilization threshold,” and, instead, describes utilization thresholds using an example (id. at 8:1–8). The ’948 Patent states [o]ne of the usage examples can be the following: if one provider has a weight equal to 10, and the other provider has a weight equal to 20, the proxy rotator should use the second provider 66.6% of the time and the first provider 33.3% of the time, when no changes to the default providers’ weights have been introduced. These percentages are the utilization thresholds of each provider. threshold is a goal amount of use, not an actual amount of use. A utilization threshold may represent a desired maximum percentage (i.e., proportion), of proxy requests to be referred to a particular proxy provider. Based on the Specification’s use of a “utilization threshold,” we construe the term to mean “a maximum percentage of use assigned to a particular proxy provider that is equal to a weight for the particular proxy provider divided by the sum of respective weights assigned to all proxy providers during the same time period.”” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,601,948

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