- Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. H2 Intellect LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00480 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Elliott/Jacob grounds did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–15 were unpatentable, and Musk did not cure the deficiencies.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“c) Summary We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We have determined that, at this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, the information presented in the Petition does not show that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to its challenge to claim 1 based on the combination of Elliott and Jacob. Specifically, the Petition does not demonstrate that the proposed Elliott/Jacob combination would teach or suggest either limitation [1.e] or limitation [1.a] of independent claim 1. For the same reasons, the Elliott/Jacob combination does not teach or suggest the commensurate limitations in independent claims 6 and 11. Compare Ex. 1001, 13:42–14:5, 14:31–15:5, 15:38–16:21.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“a Bachelors’ degree in electrical or computer science or a comparable field of study, plus at least three years of professional experience in advertisement delivery systems or other relevant industry experience. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 79. Patent Owner does not offer a competing formulation, stating that “[f]or purposes of this preliminary response only, Patent Owner applies the same skill level proposed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 12. We find Petitioner’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’296 Patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that no express constructions of the terms identified by Petitioner are needed 6 For the term “recording a request identifier associated with the request,” Petitioner asserts that it is unclear which “request” is at issue, Pet. 7–8, while Patent Owner argues that “the ‘request’ refers to the ‘request for content to be used within the registered application program’ as described in claim element 1.h.” Prelim. Resp. 13. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that it is not necessary for us to construe this term for purposes of this Decision. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). C.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“as obvious over the combination of Elliott and Jacob. Pet. 9–60. Patent Owner contests Petitioner’s mapping of the cited prior art to four limitations in independent claim 1 (and the commensurate limitations in independent claims 6 and 11): limitations [1.a], [1.b], [1.d], and [1.e]. Prelim. Resp. 14– 39. Patent Owner also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Elliott with the teachings of Jacob. Id. at 39– 46. We agree with Patent Owner that the proposed combination does not teach or suggest elements [1.a] and [1.e], for the reasons discussed below. Because the absence of these two elements from the cited prior art is a sufficient basis for denying institution, we do not address Patent Owner’s remaining arguments.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,433,296 - Exactech, Inc. v. Zimmer, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 9, 2022 · IPR2022-00840 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 18–21 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that DeOrio and Stulberg rendered the claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“press-fit or screwed to the tibia. Pet. 33. Petitioner and its declarant, Mr. Drewry, rely on column six, lines 28–33 and Figure 4 to support the contention that “DeOrio discloses an intramedullary rod 28 that is secured to the tibia by being press-fit or screwed into a bore drilled into the intramedullary canal of the tibia.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1004, 6:28–33, Fig. 4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50, 73); Ex. 1003 ¶ 73 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:28–33, Fig. 4). However, DeOrio makes no such disclosure of a press-fit or screwed connection between the intermedullary rod and the tibia. The relevant portion of column six discloses only that “a bore is drilled into the intramedullary canal of a patient’s tibia.” Ex. 1004, 6:30–31. Figure 4 illustrates shaft 30 of intermedullary rod 28 extending into the tibia, presumably in the bore drilled therein. DeOrio does not provide details regarding how the intermedullary rod is positioned within the bore, and certainly makes no disclosure of a press-fit or screwed connection as asserted by Petitioner. Thus, DeOrio does not support Petitioner’s contentions.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“For at least the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that DeOrio discloses or teaches a fastener as recited in claim 18. Petitioner’s reliance on Stulberg to teach a computer-assisted tracking system does not correct this deficiency. See Pet. 38–41. Therefore, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claim 18 or its dependent claims 19–21 would have been obvious in view of DeOrio and Stulberg.” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,029,477 - PTAB · Jul 14, 2022 · IPR2022-00411 · APJ Paul J Korniczky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11, or 13 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and other evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11, and 13 of the ’690 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“2 The substantive discussion in Petitioner’s three declarations are essentially identical to each other and to the Petition. For example, pages 40–74 of the Petition are essentially identical to a single paragraph in each of the declarations –– Hopkins Decl. ¶ 88 on pages 54–92, Keough Decl. ¶ 88 on pages 63–97, and Denton Decl. ¶ 65 on pages 46–81. Thus, we question whether the declarations provide independent analysis and we give the declarations little, if any, weight. See Intex Recreation Corp. et al. v. Team Worldwide Corp., IPR2018-00875, Paper 129 at 40, n. 15 (PTAB Sept. 11, 2019) (“We further note that Dr. Stevick’s testimony is nearly identical to the language appearing in the Patent Owner Response, down to the case citation. This identity in language causes us to attribute less weight to a declarant’s testimony.” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s definition is unclear. Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition includes unclear and subjective requirements such as that the person of ordinary skill in the art have (a) worked “long enough to be aware of” certain items, including unexplained “primary existing RV features,” (b) familiarity with unexplained “common terminology,” (c) “good mechanical aptitude,” (d) “good spatial perception,” (e) “significant experience” with a wide variety of roles, and (f) “sufficient awareness of the various governmental regulations applicable to RVs.” Id. (citing Pet. 18–20). Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’690 patent. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“While we generally agree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a truss and beam, as used in the ’690 patent, are two different structures, serve different purposes, and provide different benefits to the overall design of a chassis, Patent Owner identifies the function, but not the structure, of a truss and beam. After considering the extrinsic and intrinsic evidence, we construe: (1) a beam to be a “body, with one dimension large compared with the other dimensions, configured to carry lateral loads (perpendicular to the large and bending dimension) and bending movements;” and (2) a truss to be a “frame built from members in tension and compression.” These definitions are consistent with the support structures shown in Figures 7 and 9 and discussed in column 3, lines 21–48 of the Specification. Referring to Figures 7 and 9, for example, truss 93C is a frame built from members in tension and compression and beam 93D has one large dimension and supports loads applied to its perpendicular axis. In addition, third section 93 of chassis 90 has beams, not trusses. Ex. 1001, 3:26–28.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,046,690 - Helen Of Troy Limited v. Tomy International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 7, 2022 · IPR2021-01208 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–21 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on anticipation by Song or obviousness over Song alone, with Kilion, or with Kassai.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we determine the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’176 patent “would be someone with a Bachelor’s degree in industrial design or furniture design with a focus on designing adjustable or reconfigurable furniture, or with one to two years of experience designing adjustable furniture or other products for infants or children.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 10). Patent Owner indicates that it “does not submit a different level of ordinary skill than the Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that it “does not believe any special claim constructions are required for the Board to conclude that the asserted prior art renders the challenged claims unpatentable.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner generally agrees, stating that “the Board does not need to construe the claims to deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 11. We determine that for the purposes of this Decision, it is unnecessary to expressly construe these claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Only terms in controversy must be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that Patent Owner has the better position. With respect to Petitioner’s annotated versions of Song’s Figures 2 and 3, we agree that Petitioner’s arguments are not supported. To be sure, drawings may be relied upon for the purposes of anticipation. In re Bager, 47 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA 1931) (“Description for the purposes of anticipation can be by drawings alone as well as by words.” (citation omitted)). Nonetheless, an ambiguous reference cannot anticipate a claim. Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017). With respect to Figure 3, Song does not expressly teach that the bottom portion of water tank 3 is rigid. Rather, Song teaches that water tank 3 is made with foldable wall 2 that can be folded inward. Ex. 1005, 3. The support legs are also foldable to the inside of support levers 4 and each part can be joined and affixed in a small volume. Id. In other words, the walls, legs, and levers are folded together into a small volume to make the bathtub “convenient to carry.” Id. As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Figure 3 may very well depict the folded bathtub with a taut or folded wall (including the tank bottom) rather than a rigid material. The point, here, though is that we cannot tell from Figure 3 why the tank bottom is depicted as it is shown. Moreover, Song’s express description of the folded bathtub shown in Figure 3 does not support Petitioner’s position that the straight tank bottom must be rigid. Similarly, it is ambiguous as to whether Figure 2 uses cross-hatching to depict a rigid material for any illustrated structural components. Indeed, the left-side leg attachment of Figure 2 shows white dots against black. Id. at Fig. 2. But at the opposite side, the companion leg attachment near “6” does not show the same pattern. Id. Moreover, lid body 9, which is made from a synthetic resin, has no cross-hatching. Id. Further, the pattern presented in the magnified version (provided by Patent Owner) of Figure 2 shows uneven and inconsistent markings at the bottom of water tank 3. Thus, it is unclear whether the identified portion at the tank bottom contains any cross-hatching or intentional markings. Likewise, even if we were to apply purported drafting conventions (e.g., MPEP § 608.02) to a Japanese patent application, the relied upon markings shown in Figure 2 still do not show cross-hatching “with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.” Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,545,176 - PTAB · Mar 4, 2021 · IPR2020-00344 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and upheld denial of institution because Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12 lacked particularity, justifying denial of the entire petition.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. REQUEST FOR REHEARING When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of 1 The PTAB E2E docket system correctly identifies the denial of POP review as Paper “11,” dated “October 26, 2020.” This document itself, however, incorrectly states that it is “Paper 10.” In fact, “Paper 10” in the PTAB E2E docket system for this IPR proceeding is Patent Owner’s “RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING,” filed on August 21, 2020 See Paper 10. We note that Patent Owner was not authorized to file this response. See Consolidated Office Patent Trial Practice Guide (“Consolidated Practice Guide”), November 2019, 90 (“The opposing party should not file a response to a request for rehearing absent a request from the Board.”). No such request was made by the Board. Accordingly, Paper 10 will be expunged from this record and will not be considered in deciding Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing. discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burdens and requirements of a request for rehearing are stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): (d) Rehearing. . . . The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If an inter partes review is instituted, a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) must decide the patentability of all claims, and all grounds, asserted in the petition. SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Petition fails to identify with particularity what disclosure is relied on from each of the references in Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12, how it would be combined with the other disclosures, and why the proposed combination would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technology. Without any explanation as to what, how, and why the references would have been combined in Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12, we, and the Patent Owner, are left to speculate as to the specific details of asserted unpatentability based on combining the references to arrive at the claimed invention. See Paper 7 (“Decision” or “Dec.”), 14 (citation omitted). We determined that “[t]he lack of particularity [in Grounds 7, 8, 11, and 12] infects the proceeding sufficiently that we do not institute an inter partes review.” Id. at 16–17.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“asserted unpatentability of the claims challenged in Grounds 7 and 8, and why it would have been obvious to combine selected disclosures from each of the three references. We have not been directed to any persuasive evidence that the Petition met this burden.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Petition, “the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11, 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (Precedential). Apple v. Fintiv was decided in the context of evaluating the factors related to a co-pending parallel district court proceeding. The same holistic view applies equally to situations where some claims meet the requirements for instituting a trial and some do not. While we consider the number of claims that fail to meet the statutory and other requirements to institute an inter partes review, as well as the number of claims that meet these requirements, there is no fixed threshold or ratio of claims that meet the requirements compared to those that do not meet the requirements that controls our determination, as suggested by Petitioner (see Req. Reh’g 2. The Patent and Trademark Office addressed this issue in its “SAS Q&As”, which stated: D3. Q: Will the Board institute a petition based on the percentage of claims and grounds that meet the reasonable likelihood standard, e.g., 50%? A: No. The Board does not contemplate a fixed threshold for a sufficient number of challenges for which it will institute. Instead, the panel will evaluate the challenges and determine whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system (see 35 USC § 316(b)), the entire petition should be denied under 35 USC § 314(a). Ex. 3003, 8. As explained in our TPG, If a panel determines that a petition meets the standards for institution in relation to fewer than all the challenges presented, or where deficiencies in the petition (such as a failure to provide a construction under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)) affect only a portion of the challenges presented, the panel will evaluate all the challenges and determine whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied. TPG, 64. Where no trial is instituted, a decision to that effect will be provided, as was done in this proceeding. “The Board expects that the decision will contain a short statement as to why the standards were not met, although this may not be necessary in all cases.” Id. at 64–65.” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,918,801 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com LLC et al. v. VB Assets, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 24, 2021 · IPR2020-01388 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–23 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute only when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). We have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the parties’ briefs and evidence of record, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would have at least a Bachelor-level degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field in computing technology, and two years of experience with automatic speech recognition and natural language understanding, or equivalent education, research experience, or knowledge.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–29). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition or proffer an alternate definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art often is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner appears to be consistent with that of the references, and we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner also argues that the Petition does not set forth adequate rationale for modifying Cohen to include Yonebayashi’s alleged recognition of pronouns because Cohen’s system presents a “yes-no question” to the user and the “yes” answer is enough for Cohen’s system to reserve a rental car. Prelim. Resp. 18–19. We agree. Petitioner relies on Cohen’s disclosure of presenting to the user questions the answers to which are one word. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1012, 19:1–10, 19:24–31), 25 (citing Ex. 1012, 19:8–13, 19:24–34). In each of these examples cited by Petitioner, the user responds by saying “yes.” Ex. 1012, 19:11, 19:32. Petitioner does not explain persuasively why it would be obvious to change this one-word response to include additional words, including pronouns, or why this modification would be of any benefit. Furthermore, even if a user’s utterance were to include the other words as suggested by Petitioner, Petitioner does not explain persuasively why it would be obvious to modify Cohen’s system to look to those additional words instead of the uttered “yes” to which Cohen’s system already responds and which remains in Petitioner’s modified utterances. See Pet. 27 (suggesting that the user respond by saying “Yes, I need that” or “Yes, reserve it” (emphases omitted)).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,269,097 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com LLC et al. v. VB Assets, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 4, 2021 · IPR2020-01380 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 7–15, 21–24, and 30–33 obvious over Cohen, Hao, and Kennewick-II.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability, by a preponderance of the evidence, of the claims challenged in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an inter partes review if we determine that the information presented in the Petition and Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would have at least a Bachelor-level degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field in computing technology, and two years of experience with automatic speech recognition and natural language understanding, or equivalent education, research experience, or knowledge.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition or proffer an alternate definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner appears to be consistent with that of the references, and we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not established that the combination of Cohen, Hao, and Kennewick-II teaches two limitations required by each of claims 1, 15, and 30. Our analysis below focuses on these two limitations.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the record before us, Petitioner has not persuasively established a rational basis for this combination, nor does Petitioner show a reasonable expectation of success. Petitioner’s underlying premise is that Kennewick-II could “enhance how context is determined” in Cohen and Hao, but as explained above, Cohen and Hao do not disclose any determination of context based on the words “Yes” and “need.” Dr. Smyth testifies that “Hao and Cohen could implement Kennewick’s scoring algorithm to determine the most likely context of the user’s utterance where a word may have multiple possible interpretations.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 104. This logic fails for similar reasons. As noted, the relied-on portion of Hao is not even a spoken utterance. Further, we are not persuaded that the words “Yes” and “need” could have multiple interpretations such that applying Kennewick’s scoring algorithm to Cohen and/or Hao makes sense. We are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to incorporate Kennewick-II to “enhance how context is determined,” as there is nothing to enhance. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner never suggests that Cohen and Hao be modified to include context determination in the first instance. See Prelim. Resp. 21. Similarly, Petitioner does not explain persuasively how Kennewick’s scoring algorithm would improve the alleged context determinations based on the single words “Yes” and “need.” Id. Petitioner does not persuade us that Cohen or Hao’s ability to recognize “Yes” and “need” and act upon those words needs context determination. Petitioner has not shown how Kennewick-II would improve the interaction.” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,626,703 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com LLC et al. v. VB Assets, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 4, 2021 · IPR2020-01381 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Cohen, Hao, and Kennewick-II, with or without Partovi, taught required limitations of the challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability, by a preponderance of the evidence, of the claims challenged in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an inter partes review if we determine that the information presented in the Petition and Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, any objective evidence of non-obviousness.1 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would have at least a Bachelor-level degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field in computing technology, and two years of experience with automatic speech recognition and natural language understanding, or equivalent education, research experience, or knowledge.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition or proffer an alternate definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner appears to be consistent with that of the references, and we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner does not identify any claim term that requires construction. Pet. 7–8. Likewise, Patent Owner does not identify any specific term requiring construction to reach a resolution. Prelim. Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that no express construction of any term is necessary.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the record before us, Petitioner has not persuasively established a rational basis for this combination, nor does Petitioner show a reasonable expectation of success. Petitioner’s underlying premise is that Kennewick-II could “enhance how context is determined” in Cohen and Hao, but as explained above, Cohen and Hao do not disclose any determination of context based on the words “Yes” and “need.” Dr. Smyth testifies that “Hao and Cohen could implement Kennewick’s scoring algorithm to determine the most likely context of the user’s utterance where a word may have multiple possible interpretations.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 112. This logic fails for similar reasons. As noted, the relied-on portion of Hao is not even a spoken utterance. Further, we are not persuaded that the words “Yes” and “need” could have multiple interpretations such that applying Kennewick’s scoring algorithm to Cohen and/or Hao makes sense. We are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to incorporate Kennewick-II to “enhance how context is determined,” as there is nothing to enhance. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner never suggests that Cohen and Hao be modified to include context determination in the first instance. See Prelim. Resp. 22. Similarly, Petitioner does not explain persuasively how Kennewick’s scoring algorithm would improve the alleged context determinations based on the single words “Yes” and “need.” Id. Petitioner does not persuade us that Cohen or Hao’s ability to recognize “Yes” and “need” and act upon those words requires context determination. Petitioner has not shown how Kennewick-II would improve the interaction.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,626,703 - Blackberry Corp. v. Facebook, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 5, 2020 · IPR2019-01596 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 3-6 were anticipated by Peinado or obvious over Peinado and McKelvey.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. We, therefore, do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“of invention of the ’432 patent “would have had a Bachelors of Science degree in computer or electrical engineering, or equivalent, and 2–3 years of relevant experience working with computer security technology.” Pet. 89. Patent Owner states that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had approximately the level of education and experience identif[ied] by Petitioner, or a similar level of education and/or experience, with somewhat more education substituting for somewhat less work experience and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Storer Decl. ¶ 16). Given the lack of dispute, and for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the level of skill in 5 the art reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“using the same standard used in federal district court, including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner proposes that the term “dedicated security processor” means “a processor dedicated to providing security functions.” Pet. 910. Patent Owner states that in the copending litigation, the parties have agreed to this construction, and, therefore, Patent Owner does not dispute the proposed construction. Prelim. Resp. 45. For purposes of this decision, we adopt the construction of “dedicated security processor” proposed by Petitioner, as stated above, and agreed to by Patent Owner in the co-pending litigation. The remainder of the claim we interpret in accord with the claim’s ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art at the time of invention, in light of the teachings of the specification and the prosecution history, and do not find it necessary to provide any express claim constructions. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“correctly notes, Peinado’s DRM system and the rendering application are both implemented on a computing device with a single processor. Prelim. Resp. 13. As stated above in the summary of Peinado, security processor 64 runs DRM system 32p in the portable device to authenticate the digital content downloaded from another computer. Ex. 1004, 37:6266. The same DRM system 32p renders the digital content on the portable device. Id. at 36:5362. The claim requires that the “dedicated security processor” validate the file and user access. The claim also requires that the “dedicated security processor” provide the file to “an other processor” that continues processing the file after the user has been validated. There is no “providing” step in Peinado’s security processor 64 embodiment. The same processor performs both the validating and the processing of the file after validation. Petitioner also points to the disclosure of the decrypted content being provided to the rendering application. See Pet. 19. But that “providing” is (1) not shown occur in the embodiment of security processor 64 and (2) not shown to involve “an other processor.” Pointing to another application receiving the content in a completely different embodiment in Peinado is not sufficient to show that Peinado discloses the limitation. Accordingly, we find that the Petition does not show adequately that Peinado anticipates claim 1 of the ’432 patent.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,228,432 - Eis GmbH v. Novoluto GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 10, 2020 · IPR2019-01444 · APJ John E Schneider · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomechanical engineering, or the equivalent, and three or more years of experience in fluid mechanics and pump-based medical devices.” Pet. 4; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18–22. Petitioner also contends that “practical experience could qualify one not art], while a higher level of education could offset lesser experience.” Pet. 4; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18–22. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree or equivalent practical experience in mechanical engineering, biomechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, sexual health or human sexuality, or the equivalent, and three or more years of experience in research, development, or design of devices that interact with the human female body (and specifically the vulva).” Prelim. Resp. 1–2. Patent Owner also contends “[e]xperience in fluid mechanics and pump-based medical devices, though helpful, is not necessary. More practical experience could offset less education and vice versa.” Id. at 2. We have considered the contentions of the parties, and for purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Although the invention generally relates to a device for stimulating female erogenous zones, as seen from the discussion below, the design and operation of the device largely relate to issues of mechanical engineering and fluid flow. Thus, we conclude that experience in developing devices that interact with the female body is not needed to define a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore, at this stage in the proceeding, we need only construe the claims to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Both the Petitioner and Patent Owner contend that no claim construction is needed at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 7. As both parties appear to agree as to the meaning of “reference pressure” that is at the heart of the controversy here, we need not expressly construe the claim term here. See Ex. 1002, ¶ 28; Ex. 2001 ¶ 34.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Guan’s bag would result in a negative pressure is based on unsupported assumptions as to how the device of Guan works. For example, Dr. Pisco opines that the rubber mouth described in Guan forms a largely air-tight seal. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 92. Dr. Prisco based this opinion on Guan’s teaching that the rubber mouth comes into contact with the body. Id. As Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Jansen, points out, merely bringing the mouth into contact with a body does not teach or imply that an air-tight seal is formed. Ex. 2001 ¶ 109. Other than the reference to the mouth contacting a body, nothing in Guan teaches or suggests an air-tight seal. See Ex. 1004, 3. Similarly, Dr. Prisco opines in detail as to how the device in Guan operates based on a supposition that appears to be guided by the disclosure in the ’851 patent. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–92; see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 97–108. Guan, however, only describes the different elements present in the disclosed device and provides no explicit discussion as to how those elements operate. opinions that the elements operate in the manner he describes. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–92. Based on the foregoing, we afford Dr. Prisco’s opinions little weight. Perreira v. Secretary of the Dept. of HHS, 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1994). (“An expert opinion is no better than the soundness of the reasons supporting it.”).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,763,851
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.