- ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · IPR2020-00952 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b), and denied Roku’s motion for joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“III. ANALYSIS “An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). The parties agree that the Petition was filed more than one year after the date on which Petitioner was served in the related litigation with a complaint” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s argument is nevertheless foreclosed by the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In that decision, the Federal Circuit expressly considered the impact of Thryv, determining that the Board’s joinder decisions are “unlike” the challenges it is precluded from reviewing and “more like” those that it may review. Windy City, 973 F.3d at 1332. the Board’s joinder decisions.” Id. And after reviewing such a joinder decision, the court further concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) “does not authorize same-party joinder, and does not authorize the joinder of new issues.” Id. at 1333–38. In accordance with the Federal Circuit’s decision, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Consequently, we conclude that the Petition is time-barred and that no exception applies under the facts before us. We therefore deny the Petition.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,716,853 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 27, 2020 · IPR2019-01403 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Juniper’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS The applicable standard for granting a request for rehearing of a petition decision is abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party seeking rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDecided for patent owner
“district court and the June 13, 2018 vacatur of that grant, we determined that “service occurred at a time authorized by the district court.” Dec. 6. In its Request, Petitioner contends that, because the district court originally granted leave to serve the complaint in “error,” “Patent Owner’s June 8, 2018 filing was not properly served and cannot start the clock on Petitioner’s one-year deadline.” Req. Reh’g 1. But in advancing this contention, Petitioner misconstrues the meaning of “properly served” in the context of the Board’s precedential decision in GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., IPR2018-01754, Paper 38 (PTAB Aug. 23, 2019) (precedential). In recognizing that a complaint “improperly served” does not trigger the § 315(b) time bar, the Precedential Opinion Panel in GoPro cites IpDatatel, LLC v. ICN Acquisition, LLC, IPR2018-01823, Paper 17 at 10–18 (PTAB Apr. 17, 2019) for the interpretation of “served” in § 315(b) as “requir[ing] compliance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” GoPro at 14. Although we alerted the parties in our Decision that “we discern no evidence on this record that service failed to comply with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Petitioner offers no evidence or argument in its Request that prompts us to reconsider that finding. See Dec. 6.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aOther
“In this case, the Chief Judge has considered Petitioner’s suggestion for an expanded panel, but has determined that an expanded panel is not warranted.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,418,731 - Microsoft Corporation v. Science Applications International CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2020 · IPR2019-01361 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the government was Microsoft's privy and the petitions were time-barred under § 315(b); it also independently denied review under § 314(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Rather, “privity” has a common-law meaning. Id. “Privity is essentially a shorthand statement that collateral estoppel is to be applied in a given case.” Id. at 1318 (quoting Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759). The privity “analysis seeks to determine whether the relationship between the purported ‘privy’ and the relevant other party is sufficiently close such that both should be bound by the trial outcome and related estoppels.” TPG 14–15. “[T]he standards for the privity inquiry must be grounded in due process.” WesternGeco, 889 F.3d. at 1319. For example, it is important whether the petitioner and a prior litigant’s relationship is sufficiently close that it can be fairly said that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the patent’s validity in the corresponding lawsuit. See id. “Due process also prohibits a litigant from taking a second bite at the apple by relitigating the same case through the persona of another, its privy.” AIT, 897 F.3d at 1359 (Reyna, J., concurring).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for patent owner
“WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Rather, “privity” has a common-law meaning. Id. “Privity is essentially a shorthand statement that collateral estoppel is to be applied in a given case.” Id. at 1318 (quoting Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759). The privity “analysis seeks to determine whether the relationship between the purported ‘privy’ and the relevant other party is sufficiently close such that both should be bound by the trial outcome and related estoppels.” TPG 14–15. “[T]he standards for the privity inquiry must be grounded in due process.” WesternGeco, 889 F.3d. at 1319. For example, it is important whether the petitioner and a prior litigant’s relationship is sufficiently close that it can be fairly said that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the patent’s validity in the corresponding lawsuit. See id. “Due process also prohibits a litigant from taking a second bite at the apple by relitigating the same case through the persona of another, its privy.” AIT, 897 F.3d at 1359 (Reyna, J., concurring). In Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), the Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive list of six considerations under which nonparty preclusion would be justified: (1) an agreement between the parties to be bound; (2) pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the parties; (3) adequate representation by the named party; (4) the nonparty’s control of the prior litigation; (5) where the nonparty acts as a proxy for the named party to re-litigate the same issues; and (6) where special statutory schemes foreclose successive litigation by the nonparty (e.g., bankruptcy or probate). WesternGeco, 889 F.3d. at 1319−20 (citing Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894–95). The presence of one of these is sufficient to establish privity. See id.” slip op. at 6
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“D. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL UNDER SECTION 314(A) Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). “[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if Petitioner and the government were not in privity, we would exercise our discretion to deny review to avoid any concerns that the government is obtaining a benefit to which it is not permitted under Return Mail.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“All papers are available for public access by default. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1). A party may file a concurrent motion to seal, and the information at issue is sealed pending the motion’s outcome. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. The standard for granting a motion to seal is “for good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a). For instance, we consider whether the movant has adequately shown that (1) the information sought to be sealed is truly confidential, (2) a concrete harm would result upon public disclosure, (3) there exists a genuine need to rely in the trial on the specific information sought to be sealed, and (4) on balance, an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record. Argentum Pharms. LLC v. Alcon Research, Ltd., IPR2017-01053, Paper 27 at 4 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2018) (Denying Motion to Seal) (informative). Confidential information includes, but is not limited to, commercial information. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(7). Here, the information to be sealed includes a discussion of and direct quotations from the contract filed as Exhibit 2006. See Pet. Mot. to Seal 3–5; PO Mot. to Seal 1–2. The contract is not publicly available, it has been sealed in this proceeding, and it contains the details and financial terms of an agreement between Petitioner and the government. We are persuaded that the Motions demonstrate that the information sought to be sealed reflects Petitioner’s confidential business information and that “an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record” here. See Argentum, Paper 27 at 4. Also, Patent Owner asserts that the United States is a real party in interest and privy in this proceeding. The information to be sealed is the basis for Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Pet. Mot. to Seal 3–5; PO Mot. to Seal 1–2. Because Patent Owner’s argument and Petitioner’s rebuttal depend on the information to be sealed, the parties have adequately shown that there exists a genuine need to rely on that information. See Argentum, Paper 27 at 4. For these reasons, we determine that good cause exists for sealing part of Petitioner’s Reply, part of Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply, and the concurrently filed exhibits (Exs. 1027, 2006). Thus, we grant the Motions to Seal in each case.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,618,752 - Microsoft Corporation v. Science Applications International CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2020 · IPR2019-01360 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied the petitions because the government was Microsoft’s privy, making the petitions time-barred under § 315(b); it also exercised § 314(a) discretion to deny review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the parties” Under the second Taylor factor, the evidence shows a “pre-existing substantive legal relationship between” the government and Petitioner. “Qualifying relationships include, but are not limited to, preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor.” See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894. “A common character of these relationships is that the two parties share a high degree of commonality of proprietary or financial interest.” AIT, 897 F.3d at 1352 (Reyna, J., concurring). The evidence here shows that the government and Petitioner share such interests. Before requesting inter partes review, the government had a preexisting, established relationship with Petitioner. In particular, Patent Owner has an ongoing infringement lawsuit against the government in the Court of Federal Claims. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1025, (“the Complaint”)). Petitioner entered into the Contract with the government to develop a system incorporating the allegedly infringing feature. Id. slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDenied
“C. SECTION 315(B) BARS INSTITUTION We have found that the government, a nonparty to the instant proceedings, is a privy of Petitioner. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” The government was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patents-at-issue in 2017. The instant Petitions were filed in July 2019, more than 1 year from the service of the complaint on the government. Accordingly, inter partes review may not be instituted under § 315(b).” slip op. at 13
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“D. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL UNDER SECTION 314(A) Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). “[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if Petitioner and the government were not in privity, we would exercise our discretion to deny review to avoid any concerns that the government is obtaining a benefit to which it is not permitted under Return Mail.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“All papers are available for public access by default. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1). A party may file a concurrent motion to seal, and the information at issue is sealed pending the motion’s outcome. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. The standard for granting a motion to seal is “for good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a). For instance, we consider whether the movant has adequately shown that (1) the information sought to be sealed is truly confidential, (2) a concrete harm would result upon public disclosure, (3) there exists a genuine need to rely in the trial on the specific information sought to be sealed, and (4) on balance, an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record. Argentum Pharms. LLC v. Alcon Research, Ltd., IPR2017-01053, Paper 27 at 4 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2018) (Denying Motion to Seal) (informative). Confidential information includes, but is not limited to, commercial information. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(7). Here, the information to be sealed includes a discussion of and direct quotations from the contract filed as Exhibit 2006. See Pet. Mot. to Seal 3–5; PO Mot. to Seal 1–2. The contract is not publicly available, it has been sealed in this proceeding, and it contains the details and financial terms of an agreement between Petitioner and the government. We are persuaded that the Motions demonstrate that the information sought to be sealed reflects Petitioner’s confidential business information and that “an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record” here. See Argentum, Paper 27 at 4.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,229,230 - Microsoft Corporation v. Science Applications International CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2020 · IPR2019-01359 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the government was Microsoft’s privy and was served with an infringement complaint more than one year before the petitions; it also denied review under § 314(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Rather, “privity” has a common-law meaning. Id. “Privity is essentially a shorthand statement that collateral estoppel is to be applied in a given case.” Id. at 1318 (quoting Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759). The privity “analysis seeks to determine whether the relationship between the purported ‘privy’ and the relevant other party is sufficiently close such that both should be bound by the trial outcome and related estoppels.” TPG 14–15. “[T]he standards for the privity inquiry must be grounded in due process.” WesternGeco, 889 F.3d. at 1319. For example, it is important whether the petitioner and a prior litigant’s relationship is sufficiently close that it can be fairly said that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the patent’s validity in the corresponding lawsuit. See id. “Due process also prohibits a litigant from taking a second bite at the apple by relitigating the same case through the persona of another, its privy.” AIT, 897 F.3d at 1359 (Reyna, J., concurring). In Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), the Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive list of six considerations under which nonparty preclusion would be justified: (1) an agreement between the parties to be bound; (2) pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the parties; (3) adequate representation by the named party; (4) the nonparty’s control of the prior litigation; (5) where the nonparty acts as a proxy for the named party to re-litigate the same issues; and (6) where special statutory schemes foreclose successive litigation by the nonparty (e.g., bankruptcy or probate). WesternGeco, 889 F.3d. at 1319−20 (citing Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894–95). The presence of one of these is sufficient to establish privity. See id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“nonparty” A special statutory scheme applies here under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), which bars institution of an IPR if a “privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent” more than one year before the petition was filed. Moreover, we note that the government, according to a recent Supreme Court case, is not a “person” that can file a Petition for inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 311. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019). Thus, Petitioner’s filings are the only filed Petitions from which the government could benefit, because the government could not file its own petition in light of the June 10, 2019, Return Mail decision.” slip op. at 11
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“D. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL UNDER SECTION 314(A) Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). “[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if Petitioner and the government were not in privity, we would exercise our discretion to deny review to avoid any concerns that the government is obtaining a benefit to which it is not permitted under Return Mail.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“All papers are available for public access by default. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1). A party may file a concurrent motion to seal, and the information at issue is sealed pending the motion’s outcome. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. The standard for granting a motion to seal is “for good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a). For instance, we consider whether the movant has adequately shown that (1) the information sought to be sealed is truly confidential, (2) a concrete harm would result upon public disclosure, (3) there exists a genuine need to rely in the trial on the specific information sought to be sealed, and (4) on balance, an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record. Argentum Pharms. LLC v. Alcon Research, Ltd., IPR2017-01053, Paper 27 at 4 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2018) (Denying Motion to Seal) (informative). Confidential information includes, but is not limited to, commercial information. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(7). Here, the information to be sealed includes a discussion of and direct quotations from the contract filed as Exhibit 2006. See Pet. Mot. to Seal 3–5; PO Mot. to Seal 1–2. The contract is not publicly available, it has been sealed in this proceeding, and it contains the details and financial terms of an agreement between Petitioner and the government. We are persuaded that the Motions demonstrate that the information sought to be sealed reflects Petitioner’s confidential business information and that “an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record” here. See Argentum, Paper 27 at 4. Also, Patent Owner asserts that the United States is a real party in interest and privy in this proceeding. The information to be sealed is the basis for Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Pet. Mot. to Seal 3–5; PO Mot. to Seal 1–2. Because Patent Owner’s argument and Petitioner’s rebuttal depend on the information to be sealed, the parties have adequately shown that there exists a genuine need to rely on that information. See Argentum, Paper 27 at 4. For these reasons, we determine that good cause exists for sealing part of Petitioner’s Reply, part of Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply, and the concurrently filed exhibits (Exs. 1027, 2006). Thus, we grant the Motions to Seal in each case.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,229,230 - Microsoft Corporation v. Science Applications International CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2020 · IPR2019-01311 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied the petitions because the government was Microsoft's privy and had been served with infringement complaints more than one year before filing; it also denied review under § 314(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“The evidence here shows that the government and Petitioner share such interests. Before requesting inter partes review, the government had a preexisting, established relationship with Petitioner. In particular, Patent Owner has an ongoing infringement lawsuit against the government in the Court of Federal Claims. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1025, (“the Complaint”)). Petitioner entered into the Contract with the government to develop a system incorporating the allegedly infringing feature. Id. Therefore, both Petitioner and the government share a common interest in canceling the allegedly infringed claims.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“existing substantive legal relationship. This provides at least one ground of nonparty preclusion under Taylor. We further determine, as discussed below, that two other Taylor factors support our privity determination. 2. “where special statutory schemes foreclose successive litigation by the nonparty” A special statutory scheme applies here under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), which bars institution of an IPR if a “privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent” more than one year before the petition was filed. Moreover, we note that the government, according to a recent Supreme Court case, is not a “person” that can file a Petition for inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 311. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019). Thus, Petitioner’s filings are the only filed Petitions from which the government could benefit, because the government could not file its own petition in light of the June 10, 2019, Return Mail decision.” slip op. at 11
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“D. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL UNDER SECTION 314(A) Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). “[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if Petitioner and the government were not in privity, we would exercise our discretion to deny review to avoid any concerns that the government is obtaining a benefit to which it is not permitted under Return Mail.” slip op. at 13
- ExcludeGranted
“All papers are available for public access by default. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1). A party may file a concurrent motion to seal, and the information at issue is sealed pending the motion’s outcome. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. The standard for granting a motion to seal is “for good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a). For instance, we consider whether the movant has adequately shown that (1) the information sought to be sealed is truly confidential, (2) a concrete harm would result upon public disclosure, (3) there exists a genuine need to rely in the trial on the specific information sought to be sealed, and (4) on balance, an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,787,012 - Microsoft Corporation v. Science Applications International CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2020 · IPR2019-01312 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the government was Microsoft’s privy, making the petitions time-barred under § 315(b); it also independently denied review under § 314(a) discretion.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“customer-manufacturer relationship” may not be sufficient to establish privity. WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1321. Petitioner and the government, however, have more than a standard relationship here. As discussed in detail above, Petitioner intervened in the infringement case against the government (Mot. to Intervene), the Petition and the infringement claims against the government are intertwined (Mot. to Stay, 6–7; Ex. 2009, 4), and the Thus, we determine that the government and Petitioner have a pre- existing substantive legal relationship. This provides at least one ground of nonparty preclusion under Taylor. We further determine, as discussed below, that two other Taylor factors support our privity determination. 2. “where special statutory schemes foreclose successive litigation by the” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“C. SECTION 315(B) BARS INSTITUTION We have found that the government, a nonparty to the instant proceedings, is a privy of Petitioner. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” The government was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patents-at-issue in 2017. The instant Petitions were filed in July 2019, more than 1 year from the service of the complaint on the government. Accordingly, inter partes review may not be instituted under § 315(b).” slip op. at 13
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“D. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL UNDER SECTION 314(A) Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). “[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even if Petitioner and the government were not in privity, we would exercise our discretion to deny review to avoid any concerns that the government is obtaining a benefit to which it is not permitted under Return Mail.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“§ 316(a)(1). A party may file a concurrent motion to seal, and the information at issue is sealed pending the motion’s outcome. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. The standard for granting a motion to seal is “for good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a). For instance, we consider whether the movant has adequately shown that (1) the information sought to be sealed is truly confidential, (2) a concrete harm would result upon public disclosure, (3) there exists a genuine need to rely in the trial on the specific information sought to be sealed, and (4) on balance, an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,817,103 - Blue Coat Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2016-00493 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b); the joinder motion was dismissed as moot.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“II. DISMISSAL OF MOTION FOR JOINDER Because the petition in IPR2016-02000 was denied and inter partes review was not instituted, Petitioner’s Joinder Motion is dismissed as moot. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“Petitioner admits that a complaint alleging infringement of the ʼ731 patent was served on Petitioner more than a year before the filing date of the Petition. Pet. 4. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), that is a bar to the institution of inter partes review unless Petitioner’s request for joinder is granted. See id., final sentence. Because we conclude supra that the joinder motion is dismissed, we conclude also that the Petition should be denied as time-barred under § 315(b). B. Denial on the Same Grounds as the ʼ2000 IPR” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,418,731 - Blue Coat Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2016-00492 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–18 as time-barred under § 315(b), after dismissing the joinder motion as moot because the related IPR was denied.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“Petitioner admits that a complaint alleging infringement of the ʼ780 patent was served on Petitioner more than a year before the filing date of the Petition. Pet. 5. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), that is a bar to the institution of inter partes review unless Petitioner’s request for joinder is granted. See id., final sentence. Because we conclude supra that the joinder motion is dismissed, we conclude also that the Petition should be denied as time-barred under § 315(b). B. Denial on the Same Grounds as the ʼ165 IPR” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“II. DISMISSAL OF MOTION FOR JOINDER Because the petition in IPR2016-00165 was denied and inter partes review was not instituted, Petitioner’s Joinder Motion is dismissed as moot. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In view of our determination that the Petition is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), however, we do not need to decide this separate ground for denial urged by Patent Owner. IV. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that the Motion for Joinder is dismissed as moot; FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,804,780 - Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., Ltd. / Broad Ocean Motor LLC et al. v. Nidec Motor CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00762 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied joinder and denied institution because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b), despite finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 19 were anticipated.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied
“Petitioners were served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’349 patent on September 25, 2013. The Petition was filed on February 20, 2015, more than a year later. Notwithstanding our determination that the Petition meets the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we conclude that institution of an inter partes review is barred by § 315(b).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Section 315(c) provides: If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. In our view, the phrase “join as a party” indicates that only a person who is not already a party to an instituted inter partes review can be joined to the proceeding. A person cannot be joined as a party to a proceeding in which it is already a party. That the statute uses the expansive term “any person” is of little moment because the overall language of the statute places unambiguous limits on the term. Specifically, the phrase “join as a party” excludes a person who is already a party.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstituted
“We conclude that Petitioners have established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on their contention that Hideji discloses performing sinewave commutation using independent values of Q and d axis currents in the manner recited in each of independent claims 1, 16, and 19. Thus, we conclude that Petitioners have established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on their challenge of claims 1–3, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 19 as anticipated by Hideji. B. Time Bar Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) Section 315(b) provides: An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c). Petitioners were served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’349 patent on September 25, 2013. The Petition was filed on February 20, 2015, more than a year later. Notwithstanding our determination that the Petition meets the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we conclude that institution of an inter partes review is barred by § 315(b).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“contention that Hideji discloses “performing sinewave commutation, using independent values of Q and d axis currents, in response to one or more control signals received from the system controller to produce continuous phase currents in the permanent magnet motor for driving the air-moving component,” recited in each of independent claims 1, 16, and 19. Pet. at 19– 26. Patent Owner contends that Hideji fails to disclose the use of independent values of Q and d axis currents: “In fact, Hideji discloses that it employs calculations in the rotating frame of reference in which Q and d axis currents depend on each other.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Petitioners observe that Figure 2 of Hideji illustrates that three-phase / two-phase coordinate conversion part 36 outputs separate values for Iq and Id, i.e. the Q and d axis currents.3 Pet. 23–24. Hideji discloses that 3 We note that the labels “Iq” and “Id” output from part 36 of Hideji are identified directly as such in the original Japanese reference. Ex. 1003, 8. [t]he three-phase/two-phase coordinate conversion part 36 converts the coordinates of the alternating current Iu and Iv introduced by the current input part 35 to a revolving coordination system (d-q coordination system) on the rotor of the brushless DC motor 30A, and calculates flux current Id (d-axis current) and torque current Iq (q-axis current). Ex. 1005 ¶ 35. Petitioners reason that such transformation results in separate, independent values of Q and d axis currents determined from control signals received from the system controller. Pet. 23. Petitioners support this reasoning with testimony by Dr. Ehsani. Ex. 1009 ¶ 38. Patent Owner responds that “the values coming from part 36 are at best a transform into the rotating frame of reference of actual measured currents” and that “[t]hey are not the demanded currents generated by the controller.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Notwithstanding the explicit identification of these values as “Iq” and “Id” in the original Japanese reference, Patent Owner also contends that they “are not values one of ordinary skill would refer to as Iq and Id.” Id. at 23. In addition, Patent Owner contends that “[i]t is the current control part 40 output that is used to create the continuous phase sine wave commutated currents for the motor after being transformed back out of the rotating frame of reference,” reasoning that “[i]f Iq and Id are not independent at this step, the ‘motor controller’ is not using ‘independent values of Q and d axis current’ to perform ‘sine wave commutation.’” Id. at 24. Patent Owner contends that such inputs are not independent, noting” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,626,349
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.