• Triller, Inc. v. Tiktok Pte. Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 16, 2022 · IPR2022-00181 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 19, 23, 24, or 28 unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner contends that the PCT application does not include “anything that could reasonably be characterized” as disclosing the metadata limitation. Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1025 ¶ 81). Petitioner, however, does not elaborate or address any aspect of the PCT application’s disclosure. See id. Patent Owner argues that the PCT application discloses the metadata limitation. Prelim. Resp. 6–12. According to Patent Owner, the PCT application describes a mobile device receiving and displaying “descriptive information” about a track (such as the song title, artist, and duration) without downloading the track itself, and this “descriptive information” discloses the “track meta-data” recited in the claim. Id. at 8–11 (citing Ex. 1008, 4:27–5:9, 11:6–16, 13:14–21, 51:7–13, 91:7–10, 105:16–18, 116:1–10, 133:2–3, 134:10–15, 149:21–23, 149:25–150:3, 150:12–26, 152:1–9, 153, 156). In support, Patent Owner notes that the PCT application describes “[m]etadata” as “[i]ndividual items of data or collections of data, of,” among other things, mobile content such as “full music downloads.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1008, 13:14–21) (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner further explains by asserting that “[t]he fact that the track metadata is provided as a search result, but not the music file itself, demonstrates” disclosure of the metadata limitation. Id. at 9. In addition, Patent Owner submits that the PCT application discloses “sharing” track information because users can send their playlists and recommendations to other users. Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1008, 5:21–22, 7:2–4, 59:10–14, 61:15–28, 65:1–17, 66:18–9, 67:7–9, 101:17–102:13, 130:8–17, Figs. 84, 97, 106). On this record, we are persuaded that the PCT application discloses the metadata limitation, which (for purposes of this Decision) requires a software application that uses “track meta-data” that (1) exists separately from the music track, (2) exists separately in any way from other forms of metadata, and/or (3) is stored in a separate database. See supra § II.B (claim construction). In particular, Patent Owner persuasively shows that the PCT application discloses a mobile device application that uses “track meta-data” (e.g., attributes of music tracks, such as the song’s title, artist, and duration) stored on the mobile device while the corresponding track and its metadata remain separately stored on a remote server.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “2. Law on Written Description Support “It is elementary patent law that a patent application is entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier filed application only if the disclosure of the earlier application provides support for the claims of the later application, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “To satisfy the written description requirement [in § 112,] the disclosure of the prior application must ‘convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, [the inventor] was in possession of the invention.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “[T]he hallmark of written description is disclosure.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The sufficiency of written description support is based on “an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Id. “The level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement” necessarily “varies predictability of the relevant technology.” Id. The invention need not be described in haec verba, but a disclosure that merely renders obvious the claims does not provide adequate written description support. Id. at 1352.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “connect these dots. For example, it is unclear whether Petitioner proposes a combination of Abrams’s web browser and Khedouri’s music application, or whether it instead proposes that one be replaced with the other. See id. at 53–54. Petitioner also does not address whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining a web browser and a music application. See id. Rather, Petitioner simply refers to combining “Khedouri’s music sharing functions” with “Abrams’ social networking functions” (id. at 54), which does not address the requirement that “a software application” meet these limitations. Moreover, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the functionality of Abrams and Khedouri. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (obviousness requires analysis of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”). Liberally interpreting the relevant portion of the Petition, Petitioner contends that a motivation to combine is established because: (1) the references themselves provide the motivation to combine, (2) the proposed combination was desirable and predictable, (3) an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to add music to Abrams, and/or (4) an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to add Abrams’s social networking functions to Khedouri. See Pet. 53–54; see also supra § II.E.1 (reproducing relevant portion of Petition with corresponding reference numbers). We are not persuaded. themselves provide the requisite motivation. See Pet. 53. Abrams is directed to “connecting users in an online computer system based on their relationships within social networks.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 1; see also id. ¶ 36 (“What is needed is a system that allows individuals to replicate the process of developing personal relationships through social networks, using a computer system and database.”). Khedouri, on the other hand, is directed to “selecting, requesting, downloading, and playing audio” files on a user’s portable audio player device from a content delivery service. Ex. 1011, Abst., ¶ 3. Petitioner identifies (and we perceive) no disclosure in either reference that suggests their combination. See Pet. 53–54. Petitioner incorrectly implies that Khedouri “expands on [Abrams’s] ‘music theme.’” Id. at 53. Abrams states that a user can identify the user’s interests as well as favorite music, books, tv, and movies (Ex. 1009 ¶ 91, Fig. 2), and each of these are stored as a text field in Abrams’s database (id. ¶¶ 89, 91, Fig. 2). This is a passing reference to music, not a music theme. Petitioner also contends that both Abrams and Khedouri teach most limitations of the claim (Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1025, 120–123)), but even if that were true, it does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined them. Second, Petitioner’s assertions that the proposed combination would have been “desirable” and “predictable” are conclusory and entitled to little weight. See Pet. 54. Petitioner relies on Dr. Shamos’s testimony in support, but it similarly fails to provide analysis or evidence to support his conclusions. See Ex. 1025 ¶ 170. Accordingly, we assign little weight to that testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also TQ Delta, 942 F.3d at 1358. a desirable feature” and the combination would provide users “the ability to not only identify and publicize information about their favorite music on their profiles (and learn about others’ favorite music from others’ profiles) but to actually search for that music and be able to listen to it.” Pet. 54 (citing Ex. 1025 ¶ 170). Although this identifies vague benefits of a combination (i.e., sharing information and facilitating access to music), it fails to explain why an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to incorporate these benefits in Abrams’s social network. Petitioner also provides no evidence that an ordinary artisan would have had reasonable expectation of success in making this proposed combination. See id. at 53– 54. Given the specific facts and circumstances of this case, we are concerned that this rationale suffers from improper hindsight bias. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.”); Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We have observed that the prejudice of hindsight bias often overlooks that the genius of invention is often a combination of known elements which in hindsight seems preordained.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).” slip op. at 24

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,294,430
• PNC Bank, N.A. v. United Services Automobile AssociationInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 11, 2022 · IPR2022-00050 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–30 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted references qualified as prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Technology, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356,1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). slip op. at 15

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “But, even accepting these premises, we disagree with the conclusion Petitioner asks us to draw from them. In particular, Petitioner appears to contend that we should find that the ’974 application does not provide written description support for the claims of the ’638 patent merely because the scope of the claims includes a configuration that is not expressly described in that document. See Pet. 15–16, 22. But this reflects a misunderstanding of the law—a claim can be broader than the embodiments disclosed. See, e.g., Rexnord, 274 F.3d at 1344 (“An applicant is not required to describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.”); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1582 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that a claim may be “literally infringed by undisclosed embodiments” and yet sufficiently supported); Application of Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“We cannot agree with the broad proposition . . . that in every case where the description of the invention in the specification is narrower than that in the claim there has been a failure to fulfill the description requirement in section 112.”).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “D. Obviousness Grounds Petitioner contends that the subject matter of claims 1–30 of the ’638 patent would have been obvious over various combinations of Oakes-I, Oakes-II, Medina, and Roach (collectively, “the asserted references”). Pet. 5, 32–100. Petitioner argues that the asserted references are prior art because the claims of the ’638 patent are not entitled to a priority date earlier than July 28, 2017. Id. at 4–5, 11–29. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of success because Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that the asserted references qualify as prior art. Prelim. Resp. 18–59. Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that the asserted references are prior art,8 and as a result, Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that any claim would have been unpatentable based on the asserted references.” slip op. at 16

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

    “In the first Joint Motion to Seal, the parties request entry of a Protective Order that is substantially the same as the Board’s Default Protective Order (see Consolidated Trial Practice Guide16 at 107–122 (App. B, Protective Order Guidelines and Default Protective Order)). Paper 9, 2.17 The parties also request sealing of Exhibit 2006 and sealing of portions of the Preliminary Response relating to that exhibit. Id. at 2–3. The portions of the Preliminary Response (Paper 11) requested to be sealed can be identified from the redacted version of the Preliminary Response filed as Paper 12. Based on the representations in the Joint Motion to Seal (Paper 9), the parties have shown good cause for entering the Protective Order and for sealing Exhibit 2006 and the identified portions of the Preliminary Response.” slip op. at 37

  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,402,638
• CTC Global Corporation v. TS Conductor Corp.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 4, 2022 · PGR2022-00002 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show it was more likely than not that any challenged claim 1–6 was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness or § 112 grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “A post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has not established that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’036 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “a. Reason to Combine A successful obviousness challenge requires articulated reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“An obviousness determination requires finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine or modify the teachings in the prior art . . . .”); KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “a. Reason to Combine A successful obviousness challenge requires articulated reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“An obviousness determination requires finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine or modify the teachings in the prior art . . . .”); KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)).” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,886,036
• Ideavillage Products Corp. v. Koninklijke Philips N.VInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2022 · PGR2021-00116 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because eight grounds failed the threshold showing and the remaining lack-of-ornamentality ground was marginal, making trial inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Here, Petitioner advances nine challenges against the claim of the ’346 patent. Pet. 8. As discussed above, we determine that, on this record, Petitioner has not met its burden for institution under eight grounds—an on-sale bar ground, six obviousness grounds, and an indefiniteness ground. Additionally, we determine that the ninth ground— the challenge based on the alleged lack of ornamentality—is marginal, at 5 We acknowledge that SAS and Harmonic address inter partes reviews, but see no reason to interpret differently § 324(a), the statute governing post-grant reviews. 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf best. Based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds based on evidence and arguments directed only to the one ornamentality ground would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 26

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Under the Office Guidance, “if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.” Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018).6 When a petition fails to satisfy the “more likely than not” institution standard as to some challenges, the Board evaluates “all the challenges and determine[s] whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide7 64 (Nov. 2019) (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 316(b), 326(b)). Here, Petitioner advances nine challenges against the claim of the ’346 patent. Pet. 8. As discussed above, we determine that, on this record, Petitioner has not met its burden for institution under eight grounds—an on-sale bar ground, six obviousness grounds, and an indefiniteness ground. Additionally, we determine that the ninth ground— the challenge based on the alleged lack of ornamentality—is marginal, at 5 We acknowledge that SAS and Harmonic address inter partes reviews, but see no reason to interpret differently § 324(a), the statute governing post-grant reviews. 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial. 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf best. Based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all grounds based on evidence and arguments directed only to the one ornamentality ground would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources. Cf. Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9, 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative); Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative). Thus, we do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 26

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The POSITA relating to the subject matter of the D’346 patent would possess [a] Bachelor’s degree in industrial design (or a related or equivalent field) and at least ten (10) years of research or work experience related to designing, developing, specifying, testing or analyzing multi-component consumer products (or supervising the same), with experience related to handheld consumer electronic products. Pet. 14. For purposes of this decision, we assume Petitioner is referring to the designer of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216 (CCPA 1981) (“In design cases we will consider the fictitious person identified in § 103 as ‘one of ordinary skill in the art’ to be the designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of the type presented in the application.”). Patent Owner has not filed a preliminary response and therefore, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the designer of ordinary skill in the art. Based on the limited record in front of us, we determine that Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the designer of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “incorrect standard, but also lacks credibility because it is internally inconsistent with other parts of his testimony. Mr. Fletcher testifies that it is his understanding that indefiniteness is viewed through the perspective of the ordinary observer, stating the following: I understand that an ordinary observer must be able to understand the scope of an invention with reasonable certainty. If not, a design is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. It is my understanding that errors and inconsistencies between drawings of a design patent can be indefinite, and thus invalid, if an ordinary observer cannot discern the overall appearance of the claimed design without resorting to conjecture or speculation. Ex. 1003 ¶ 27 (emphasis added). However, his opinions regarding indefiniteness all are in terms of the “POSITA.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–58; see, e.g., id. ¶ 32 (“The D’346 Patent is indefinite due to the inclusion of conflicting views, which would prevent a POSITA from understanding the claimed design as drawn. . . . A POSITA cannot discern from the D’346 Patent figures what design is actually being claimed.”). Casting further doubt on the reliability of his testimony, Mr. Fletcher does not articulate any definition for the POSITA, which is a necessary foundation for his opinions.4 Mr. Fletcher does not refer to the perspective of the ordinary observer (or even one skilled in the art, viewing the design as would an ordinary observer) in his opinions regarding indefiniteness (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32– 58), and we decline to assume his references to the unadorned “POSITA” implicitly encompass the perspective of the ordinary observer. Thus, Mr. Fletcher’s testimony regarding indefiniteness is unhelpful because it utilizes the incorrect perspective.” slip op. at 20

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
• ROKU, Inc. v. Flexiworld Technologies, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 14, 2022 · PGR2021-00111 · APJ Bryan F Moore · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the challenged patent was not eligible for post-grant review; it found the priority applications supported claims 6 and 19 and did not reach the § 101 ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “For the above reasons, we are persuaded that the ’031 patent’s priority applications (pre-AIA applications) provide written description support for the claim limitation that “that the “output system” (claim 6) or “output device” (claim 19) can be an “Internet appliance.” Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner that claims 6 and 19 have an effective filing date after March 16, 2013. Accordingly, claims 6 and 19 do not render the ’031 patent eligible for post-grant review under AIA § 6(f)(2)(A). Accordingly, the information presented in the Petition does not establish that the ’031 patent is eligible for post-grant review.” slip op. at 16

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner

    “Finally, the definition of output device in the priority ’765 Application (as in the Specification of the ’031 patent) is that an “[o]utput device [] is an electronic system capable of outputting digital content … Any device capable of playing or reading digital content in voice (e.g., music, speech) or data (e.g., text, document) is also a possible output device.” Prelim. Resp. 15 (alterations in original) (quoting Ex. 1011 (’765 application) ¶ 89, Ex. 1001, 16:29–41). An Internet appliance does fall within that definition. The ’765 Application also contemplates that an output device is a network device accessible through an IP address. See Ex. 1011, 14 (referring to “[i]dentification of an output device” by “IP address”). Put another way, the priority application adequately describes a device fitting the description of” slip op. at 14

  § 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 10,846,031
• PNC Bank N.A. v. United Services Automobile AssociationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 7, 2022 · IPR2021-01399 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Oakes I, Oakes II, Medina, and Roach qualify as prior art to claims 1–29.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “transmitted copy of the electronic images is a modified version of the electronic images captured with the digital camera, the modified version having a different electronic format than the images captured with the digital camera” recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claim 25. As explained above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments regarding these limitations. As a result, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would establish that Oakes I, Oakes II, Medina, and Roach qualify as prior art to the challenged claims of the ’605 Patent. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on its following assertions: (1) claims 12–23 and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I and Oakes II; (2) claims 12–23 and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, and Medina; (3) claims 1–11, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, and Roach; and (4) claims 1–11, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, Roach, and Medina. IV. CONCLUSION In view of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging any one of claims 1–29 of the ’605 Patent as unpatentable.” slip op. at 28

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner

    “important to the invention is that the image capture device and general purpose computer are communicatively coupled, not their locations relative to one another. See, e.g., id. ¶ 33; accord Prelim. Resp. 32–33. In addition, the ’974 Application does not limit its invention to only those remote deposits performed using a general purpose computer that is separate from an image capture device.10 The ’974 Application broadly describes the image capture device, noting it can be “a scanner or digital camera.” Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 21, 33. The ’974 Application also indicates that the general purpose computer and image capture device are “customer-controlled” and “electronics that today’s consumers actually own or can easily acquire.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 29, 33; see also id. ¶ 19. In light of these disclosures, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’974 Application to reasonably convey possession of both integrated and non-integrated configurations. See In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1215 (CCPA 1981) (explaining that claims with the generic step of “adheringly applying” one layer to an adjacent layer satisfied the written description requirement because “one skilled in the art who read [the] specification would understand that it is unimportant how the layers are adhered, so long as they are adhered”).” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedNot shown unpatentable

    “transmitted copy of the electronic images is a modified version of the electronic images captured with the digital camera, the modified version having a different electronic format than the images captured with the digital camera” recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claim 25. As explained above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments regarding these limitations. As a result, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would establish that Oakes I, Oakes II, Medina, and Roach qualify as prior art to the challenged claims of the ’605 Patent. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on its following assertions: (1) claims 12–23 and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I and Oakes II; (2) claims 12–23 and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, and Medina; (3) claims 1–11, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, and Roach; and (4) claims 1–11, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, Roach, and Medina.” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

    “transmitted copy of the electronic images is a modified version of the electronic images captured with the digital camera, the modified version having a different electronic format than the images captured with the digital camera” recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claim 25. As explained above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments regarding these limitations. As a result, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would establish that Oakes I, Oakes II, Medina, and Roach qualify as prior art to the challenged claims of the ’605 Patent. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on its following assertions: (1) claims 12–23 and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I and Oakes II; (2) claims 12–23 and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, and Medina; (3) claims 1–11, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, and Roach; and (4) claims 1–11, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Oakes I, Oakes II, Roach, and Medina.” slip op. at 28

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,013,605
• PNC Bank N.A. v. United Services Automobile AssociationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 2, 2022 · IPR2021-01381 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because PNC did not show that Oakes, Medina, or Roach qualified as prior art, so it failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Although USAA takes issue with PNC’s approach to claim construction for purposes of this proceeding, it does not appear that USAA disputes PNC’s position that we should apply the constructions for the claim terms “mobile device,” “portable device,” and “digital camera” that USAA proposed in the district court and, eventually, the district court adopted. Compare Ex. 1028, 15, with Ex. 1054, 20. Because there is no dispute between the parties as to the construction of these three claim terms, we need not construe them for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “2. Level of Skill in the Art There is sufficient evidence in the current record that enables us to determine the knowledge level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Noble, PNC argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the relevant field of art . . . at the relevant time (2006–2017) of the ’681 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent field, and two years of experience in software development and programming in the area of image capturing/scanning technology involving transferring and processing of image data to and at a server. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 37, 38). In response, USAA states that, “[f]or the purposes of [its] Preliminary Response only, USAA applies the level of skill in the art proposed by [PNC].” Prelim. Resp. 21. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt PNC’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Noble and it is consistent with the ’681 patent.” slip op. at 17

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “conclusion PNC asks us to draw from them. In particular, PNC appears to contend that we should find that the ’247 application does not provide sufficient written description support for the device limitations merely because the scope of the independent claims encompass a configuration that is not described expressly in that document. See Pet. 16, 18–19. But this reflects a misunderstanding of the law—a claim can be broader than the embodiments disclosed. See, e.g., Rexnord, 274 F.3d at 1344 (“[A]n applicant is not required to describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.”); see also Ethicon, 93 F.3d 1582 n.7 (noting that a claim may be “literally infringed by undisclosed embodiments” and yet sufficiently supported); In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“We cannot agree with the broad proposition . . . that in every case where the description of the invention in the specification is narrower than that in the claim there has been a failure to fulfill the [written] description requirement in section 112.”). We acknowledge that there are situations where a claim’s breadth results in a lack of written description support, but PNC fails to show that such a situation is present here. In its argument, PNC primarily relies on Reckitt, but this case is unavailing. See Pet. 13–15, 19, 32 (citing Reckitt Benckiser LLC v. Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC, IPR2017-00063, Paper 38 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2018)). First, Reckitt is a non-precedential Board decision that is not binding on this panel.5 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the case is readily distinguishable on its facts. See Prelim. Resp. 30–31 (distinguishing Reckitt from the circumstances presented here). In particular, in Reckitt, the Board panel found that claims lacking a pre-vulcanization requirement lacked written description support in the priority document, noting that “[p]re-vulcanization [was] not some ancillary feature but rather the very heart of the invention.” Reckitt, IPR2017-00063, Paper 38 at 12, 14–15 (emphasis added). However, “[PNC] identifies nothing whatsoever in the ’247 application suggesting that it is important— much less the ‘very heart of the invention’—that the described image capture device be in a housing entirely separate from the described general purpose computer.” Prelim. Resp. 31. In fact, the Petition identifies (and we perceive) no reason why the relative location of the general purpose computer (i.e., the portable/mobile device) and the image capture device” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We have considered Dr. Noble’s supporting testimony, but it suffers from the same deficiencies as PNC’s arguments. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–58. Moreover, in our view, Dr. Noble does not explain sufficiently his conclusions regarding what a person of ordinary skill would have understood the inventor of the ’247 application to possess (or not possess) and, accordingly, we assign little weight to his testimony on this particular issue. E.g., id. ¶¶ 46, 54–57; see TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Conclusory expert testimony does not qualify as substantial evidence.”).” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,013,681
• Human Power Of N Company v. Heartbeet LtdInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 25, 2022 · PGR2021-00110 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show the ’555 patent was eligible for post-grant review; the challenged claims were entitled to pre-AIA effective filing dates.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “The test for written description support is “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date” based on an “objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). If this test fails, the application is not entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing date. The written description requirement is satisfied when the specification “set[s] forth enough detail to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand what is claimed and to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed.” University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The specification does not have to provide exact or verbatim textual support for the claimed subject matter at issue. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Federal Circuit has clarified that [a]lthough [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, . . . the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed . . . . The test for sufficiency of support . . . is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon “reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter.” Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Moreover, “the written description requirement does not demand either examples or an actual reduction to practice.” Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “An applicant is not required to describe in the” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an M.D. degree or a Ph.D. degree in biochemistry, pharmacology, nutrition chemistry, exercise physiology, or kinesiology, and at least two years of post-doctoral research or clinical experience with physiology, biochemistry, exercise science, or dietary supplements and formulation.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner does not challenge this definition at this time. Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition as it is consistent with the level of skill presented in the ’555 patent and applied art. We also note that the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention may be reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We are unpersuaded that Dr. Volek’s reliance on Exhibit 1066 as the sole source of his conclusion that certain doses of inorganic nitrate would have been lethal in the context of the claimed methods is sufficient to establish undue experimentation under the Wands factors. As Patent Owner argues, the working example disclosed in PCT1 discloses administration of a dose Dr. Volek states would have been lethal, but was not. Rather, the result of that experiment was a demonstrated decrease in glucose consumption by the participants, a benefit of increased endurance. Ex. 1008 ¶ 106. We agree with Patent Owner that this case is distinguishable from those cited by Petitioner for the reasons explained by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 31–33), and also from the recent case by our reviewing court, Amgen, Inc. v. Sanofi, 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2021). In Amgen, the court found the claims lacked enablement because the claims recited dual functional limitations, and potentially millions of antibody candidates could be found to fall within those limitations. Id. at 1088. The court found the examples provided in the specification insufficient to enable the full scope of the claims given the high effort required to screen and identify all such antibodies. Id. Here, as Patent Owner has observed, the only effort required to practice claims within the range in light of the working example is to “simply administer a different dosage to the human for which increased exercise endurance is desired,” which would have been within the scope of the ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 31. Moreover, Patent Owner correctly notes that methaemoglobinaemia15, the source of the lethality cited in Exhibit 1066, does not result via the claimed method. Prelim. Resp. 30, citing Ex. 1066 at 14–15. As Patent Owner explains, Petitioner’s sole cited Exhibit, 1066, discloses a risk of development of methaemoglobinaemia, a condition where more than 10% of the haemoglobin is transformed into methaemoglobin.” Id. When the conversion to haemoglobin exceeds 70% the condition can be fatal.” Ex. 1066 at 14–15. Patent Owner explains that the inventors discussed the risk of development of methaemoglobinaemia, and explained in PCT1 that their methods do not cause a significant rise in the methemoglobin level in the test subjects. Prelim. Resp. 30. Moreover, PCT1 discloses a working example where three test subjects were given a dose in the range Petitioner alleges would be lethal, with no ill result. Id., citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 106. Dr. Volek’s failure to address this discrepancy, or to provide alternate sources to explain why his conclusion is nonetheless correct, merits his brief testimony on this issue be assigned little probative” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “G. Claim Construction In a post-grant review, we apply the same claim construction standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2020). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner does not propose a construction for “inorganic nitrate.” Prelim Resp. 8–9. For purposes of determining whether to institute trial of the challenged claims, we determine it is not necessary to construe “inorganic nitrate.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an AIA proceeding).” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,835,555
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2022 · PGR2021-00108 · APJ Aaron W Moore · PGR · Institution

  Institution was denied because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable, including because the asserted combination did not link rule generation to the packet correlation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Obviousness Analysis A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, primarily: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.6 Petitioner asserts that claims 1–2, 7–8, 10, 12–13, and 17–18 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious in view of Paxton and Sutton. See Pet. 6, 18–64. For the reasons described below, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2-3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, and because we find it generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’797 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. C.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Patent Owner argues that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of the terms “determining . . . a first plurality of log entries” and “determining . . . a second plurality of log entries” is “identifying” or “ascertaining” log entries.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he terms “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the first plurality of packets received by the network device,” and “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the second plurality of packets transmitted by the network device” (“provisioning rules”) . . . should be given their plain and ordinary meaning—rules configured to identify packets.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Neither party, however, argues that the prior art arguments presented in the Petition turn on the construction of these terms. Instead, it appears that they are raised as claim construction issues only because Petitioner is challenging the language under Section 112. We will discuss the Section 112 arguments below, but do not see a dispute about the constructions offered by the parties above the makes a difference in the prior art analysis and, therefore, do not construe these terms at this time. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “respect to this limitation for several reasons, including that Petitioner’s “alleged rule generation and provisioning” is responsive to detecting malicious activity, not “based on the determined correlation.” Prelim. Resp. 38. On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. The claims require “generating, by the computing system and based on the determined correlation, one or more rules configured to identify packets received from the first host.” We do not have sufficient argument or evidence to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to generate these rules “based on” the determined correlation.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,931,797
• PNC Bank N.A. v. United Services Automobile AssociationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2022 · IPR2021-01076 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show Oakes was prior art, so it failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable over Oakes and Maloney.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner asks us to draw from them. In particular, Petitioner appears to contend that we should find that the ’247 application does not provide written description support for the device limitation merely because the scope of the claim includes a configuration that is not expressly described in that document. See Pet. 17–18, 21. But this reflects a misunderstanding of the law—a claim can be broader than the embodiments disclosed. See, e.g., Rexnord, 274 F.3d at 1344 (“An applicant is not required to describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.”); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1582 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that a claim may be “literally infringed by undisclosed embodiments” and yet sufficiently supported); Application of Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“We cannot agree with the broad proposition . . . that in every case where the description of the invention in the specification is narrower than that in the claim there has been a failure to fulfill the description requirement in section 112.”). There are situations where a claim’s breadth results in a lack of written description support, but Petitioner fails to show that such a situation is present here. In its argument, Petitioner primarily relies on Reckitt, but” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that Oakes is prior art,8 and as a result, Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that any claim would have been unpatentable over Oakes and Maloney.” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

    “Preliminary Response and Exhibit 2006); Paper 13 (relating to the Reply); and Paper 19 (relating to the Sur-reply). In each of these motions, the parties seek to protect as confidential certain information that relates to the issue of whether Petitioner has properly identified all the real parties in interest in its Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). As we deny the Petition on the merits and do not grant the request to institute an inter partes review, the issue of identification of the real parties in interest to this proceeding is moot. Accordingly, we do not reach the arguments and evidence of the parties relating to whether the Petitioner identified all the real parties in interest in its Petition and we make no reference in this decision to the documents and information that the parties seek to protect as confidential.” slip op. at 25

  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,621,559

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.