- MPL Brands NV, Inc. v. Buzzballz, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 18, 2024 · IPR2024-01000 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the IPR petition was premature while the patent remained within its nine-month post-grant review window and the parallel PGR was instituted.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“For AIA patents like the ’441 patent, a petition for inter partes review “shall be filed after the later of either (1) the date that is 9 months after the grant of a patent; or (2) if a post-grant review is instituted . . . , the date of the termination of such post-grant review.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(c); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a). Here, the ’441 patent issued on March 19, 2024 (see Ex. 1001, code (45)), and PGR2024-00035 is instituted. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on June 7, 2024. As such, the instant Petition is premature because it was filed within nine months of the grant of the ’441 patent and before termination of PGR2024-00035. For this reason, we deny institution of this inter partes review.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“For AIA patents like the ’441 patent, a petition for inter partes review “shall be filed after the later of either (1) the date that is 9 months after the grant of a patent; or (2) if a post-grant review is instituted . . . , the date of the termination of such post-grant review.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(c); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a). Here, the ’441 patent issued on March 19, 2024 (see Ex. 1001, code (45)), and PGR2024-00035 is instituted. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on June 7, 2024. As such, the instant Petition is premature because it was filed within nine months of the grant of the ’441 patent and before termination of PGR2024-00035. For this reason, we deny institution of this inter partes review.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,932,441 - Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00966 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not explain whether the component limitations invoke § 112(f) or identify corresponding structure, as required by Rule 42.104(b)(3).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“The Consolidated Trial Practice Guide[1,2](“CTPG”) . . . instructs that “[w]here claim language may be construed according to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), a petitioner must provide a construction.” CTPG 45 (emphases added) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)). The CTPG advises that a party “may choose to elaborate why § 112(f) should or should not apply to the limitation at issue.” Id. Notably, the CTPG warns that “[a] petitioner who chooses not to address construction under § 112(f) risks failing to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDenied
“Given these facts, we determine that rule 104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition either identify “the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function” recited in the “component” term limitations or explain why the “component” term limitations are not subject to a means-plus-function construction. This, it fails to do. To be clear, we note that our rules do not prohibit a petitioner from taking inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and a district court. See 10x Genomics, Inc. v. Bio-Rad Labs, Inc., IPR2020- 00086, Paper 8 at 18 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2020). However, where, as here, a petitioner has proposed a claim term be construed solely as a means-plus-function limitation in a district court proceeding and emphasized that the issue is not only “most significant” but potentially “case . . . dispositive,” we determine the petition is obliged to either apply that construction in this proceeding or explain why that construction is not applicable. Accordingly, we find the Petition to be deficient under rule 104(b)(3).4” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other
“connote a definite structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (identifying words such as “mechanism,” “element,” “device,” and others as verbal constructs that do not connote sufficiently definite structures). Indeed, the Specification discloses all of the “components” recited in claims 1, 8, and 15, including the “comparing component,” can be “implemented as a computer having tangible computer-readable media for carrying or having computer-executable instructions or data structures stored thereon.” Ex. 1001, 5:35–43. Thus, like the word “module,” a recognized nonce word, each of the recited “components” is nothing more than “a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified function” and their recitation “operate[s] as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, we construe the “comparing component” limitation recited in claims 1, 8, and 15 as a meansplus-function limitation whose function is “generating a comparison signal.”2” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelNot reached
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 9,333,946 - Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00952 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–18 because the Petition failed to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) by omitting required claim-construction analysis.
RulingsInstitution decision- BurdenDenied
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 8,989,952 - Zimvie, Inc. / Zimmer Biomet Spine, Inc. v. Roger P. JacksonInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01430 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed all challenged claims 1–22.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“Patent Owner has disclaimed all claims of the ’479 patent and paid the requisite fees. See Ex. 2001; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (setting forth requirements for statutory disclaimer). Accordingly, we deny institution of the requested inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); see also General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution of inter partes review under rule 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) based on disclaimer) (“General Electric”). In the present instance, and consistent with Rule 42.107(e) and the Board’s precedential General Electric decision, we determine that a denial of 1 Petitioner has filed three additional inter partes review petitions against three related patents assigned to Patent Owner: IPR2023-01431 (U.S. Patent No. 10,548,641 B2), IPR2023-01432 (U.S. Patent No. 10,898,233 B2), and IPR2023-01433 (U.S. Patent No. 11,129,646 B2). Pet. 1. Petitioner additionally acknowledges that the’479 patent is subject to a pending lawsuit entitled Jackson v. ZimVie Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00891-RGA (D. Del. Filed June 30, 2022). Pet. 1. institution is sufficient to dispose of this case. Because the Board cannot institute trial on disclaimed claims and all the challenged claims have been disclaimed here, no inter partes review will be instituted.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,911,479
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.