- Viance, LLC v. Koppers Performance Chemicals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2026-00023 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director denied the PGR petition and instituted no trial because Petitioner failed to identify Venator as a real party in interest within the statutory filing period.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDecided for patent owner
“However, as I previously explained, RPIs are not limited to entities that are actually funding and controlling the proceeding but include entities that have the ability to control the proceeding. See Tianma, IPR2025-01579, Paper 12 at 9–10. Petitioner argues that its two owners do not have unilateral control of Petitioner. However, unilateral control is not the standard, and control of Petitioner is vested solely in its two owners as members of the Board of Directors. See Moyes Decl. ¶ 7. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that Venator and Lanxess do not have the ability to control” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner cannot correct its RPI listing because adding an RPI would require a new filing date that places the Petition outside the 9-month window for filing a PGR. DD Opp. 11–12 (citing Corning, IPR20214-00440, Paper 68 at 24). Patent Owner is correct. See Sun Pharm. Indus., Inc. v. Biofrontera, Inc., PGR2026-00021, Paper 12 at 4 (Director May 26, 2026) (denying PGR petition because Petitioner did not meet the requirement to name all RPI within the statutory timeframe for filing a PGR petition). Accordingly, this Petition is denied, and Petitioner may file an IPR petition listing the appropriate real parties in interest.3” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“listing because adding an RPI would require a new filing date that places the Petition outside the 9-month window for filing a PGR. DD Opp. 11–12 (citing Corning, IPR20214-00440, Paper 68 at 24). Patent Owner is correct. See Sun Pharm. Indus., Inc. v. Biofrontera, Inc., PGR2026-00021, Paper 12 at 4 (Director May 26, 2026) (denying PGR petition because Petitioner did not meet the requirement to name all RPI within the statutory timeframe for filing a PGR petition). Accordingly, this Petition is denied, and Petitioner may file an IPR petition listing the appropriate real parties in interest.3 In consideration of the foregoing, it is: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,370,716 - Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc. v. Biofrontera Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 26, 2026 · PGR2026-00021 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director denied Sun Pharmaceutical Industries’ PGR petition because it failed to show that it had identified all real parties in interest.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDecided for patent owner
“As I previously explained, RPIs are not limited to entities that are actually funding and controlling the proceeding, but include entities that have the ability to control the proceeding. See Tianma Microelectronics (Director Mar. 18, 2026) (precedential) (“With its identification of RPIs in dispute, it is Petitioner’s burden to bring forth evidence or arguments demonstrating that it had named all RPIs—and that none were foreign governments or entities a foreign government had the ability to control.”); see also Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding to the Board to further consider RPI where the patent owner identified an unnamed party with the “opportunity to control” the proceeding). Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence that SPI Ltd., the corporate parent and 100% owner of SPI Inc., does not have the ability to control the proceeding. Rather, Petitioner’s declaration evidence is focused on whether SPI Inc. is actually funding or controlling the proceeding. See Ex. 1021 ¶ 4 (“SPI Inc. is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.”). On this record, Petitioner fails to carry its burden to establish that it has identified all RPIs.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“(Director Mar. 18, 2026) (precedential) (“With its identification of RPIs in dispute, it is Petitioner’s burden to bring forth evidence or arguments demonstrating that it had named all RPIs—and that none were foreign governments or entities a foreign government had the ability to control.”); see also Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding to the Board to further consider RPI where the patent owner identified an unnamed party with the “opportunity to control” the proceeding). Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence that SPI Ltd., the corporate parent and 100% owner of SPI Inc., does not have the ability to control the proceeding. Rather, Petitioner’s declaration evidence is focused on whether SPI Inc. is actually funding or controlling the proceeding. See Ex. 1021 ¶ 4 (“SPI Inc. is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.”). On this record, Petitioner fails to carry its burden to establish that it has identified all RPIs.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,280,146 - Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd. v. LG Display Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 18, 2026 · IPR2025-01579 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution because Petitioner failed to establish that a foreign government was not an RPI, making Petitioner ineligible to file the IPR.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“Patent Owner’s evidence is sufficient to put into dispute whether the Petition identified all RPIs and whether there is an RPI who is not a “person” eligible to file an IPR. See Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A] patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.”); Yangtze Memory Techs. Co. v. Micron Tech., Inc., IPR2025- 00098, Paper 38 at 7 (Director Jan. 15, 2026) (informative) (explaining that the Office’s “mandate to protect the public interest is especially compelling” where a petitioner does not identify all RPIs). Patent Owner’s evidence that Petitioner is owned by AVIC Innovation and AVIC, AVIC is owned by a foreign government, and AVIC is included on the entity list is particularly persuasive. DD Req. 7–8 (citing Exs. 2013–19).” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Today’s decision is consistent with Return Mail and—even if Return Mail reached the opposite conclusion—would be comfortably within the Office’s settled broad discretion in deciding whether to use its limited resources to institute IPR in any given case. Apple Inc. v. Squires, No. 2024- 1864, 2026 WL 406495, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (“[T]he Director has broad and protected discretion not to launch an IPR, even when the statutory pre-conditions are met.”). Indeed, as to the exercise of discretion, as I stated in the Memorandum, “the integrity of PTAB proceedings depends on knowing who is behind a petition—who funds it, directs it, and/or benefits from it. Any opacity in that chain of control invites exploitation, may facilitate technology transfer contrary to U.S. law, regulation, and interests, and serves only to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the patent system.” Memorandum 4. Notions of fundamental fairness dictate no other result.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,251,394 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00726 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not adequately explain which of its three alternative constructions of “risk indices” applied to the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least 1 claim of the ’141 patent is unpatentable. 1” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“risk index” differ in several “particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. The Board does not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied. For example, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus-function term. However, Petitioner does not provide any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Rather, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term(s), and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,894,141 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00725 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition failed to explain how the challenged claims should be construed or how the prior art rendered them unpatentable under the proposed constructions.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the Petition fails to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) to set forth how the challenged claims are to be construed. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review. IV.ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition for an inter partes review is denied and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenDenied
“particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which claim construction the Board is being asked to apply, and under what circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. To be sure, we do not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied or an explanation of how the prior art renders the claims unpatentable under alternative constructions. For instance, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a meansplus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus- any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Instead, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term, and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,424,035 - Analog Devices, Inc. v. Number 14 B.V.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00550 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial requests and denied the petitions under § 314(a), so no trial was instituted.
RulingsDirector review decision- Settled expectationsInstitution denied settled expectationsInstitution denied
“In particular, the challenged patents have been in force for more than 13 years, creating strong settled expectations, and Petitioner does not provide any persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an appropriate use of Board resources. Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2–3 (Director June 18, 2025).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“Furthermore, Patent Owner presents evidence that Petitioner’s real party in interest (and now wholly owned subsidiary2) controlled prosecution of and maintained the involved patents, and paid “millions of dollars in royalties.” DD Req. 18–19; Ex. 2002 ¶ 88; Ex. 2001 § 2.2; Paper 1, iv (identifying Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. as a real party in interest). It is not an appropriate use of Office resources where a party or its real party in interest applied for and was issued a patent, but, as is the case here, now advocates for its unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,973,596 - MPL Brands NV, Inc. v. Buzzballz, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 18, 2024 · IPR2024-01000 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the IPR petition was premature while the patent remained within its nine-month post-grant review window and the parallel PGR was instituted.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“For AIA patents like the ’441 patent, a petition for inter partes review “shall be filed after the later of either (1) the date that is 9 months after the grant of a patent; or (2) if a post-grant review is instituted . . . , the date of the termination of such post-grant review.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(c); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a). Here, the ’441 patent issued on March 19, 2024 (see Ex. 1001, code (45)), and PGR2024-00035 is instituted. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on June 7, 2024. As such, the instant Petition is premature because it was filed within nine months of the grant of the ’441 patent and before termination of PGR2024-00035. For this reason, we deny institution of this inter partes review.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“For AIA patents like the ’441 patent, a petition for inter partes review “shall be filed after the later of either (1) the date that is 9 months after the grant of a patent; or (2) if a post-grant review is instituted . . . , the date of the termination of such post-grant review.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(c); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a). Here, the ’441 patent issued on March 19, 2024 (see Ex. 1001, code (45)), and PGR2024-00035 is instituted. Petitioner filed the instant Petition on June 7, 2024. As such, the instant Petition is premature because it was filed within nine months of the grant of the ’441 patent and before termination of PGR2024-00035. For this reason, we deny institution of this inter partes review.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,932,441 - Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00966 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not explain whether the component limitations invoke § 112(f) or identify corresponding structure, as required by Rule 42.104(b)(3).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“The Consolidated Trial Practice Guide[1,2](“CTPG”) . . . instructs that “[w]here claim language may be construed according to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), a petitioner must provide a construction.” CTPG 45 (emphases added) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)). The CTPG advises that a party “may choose to elaborate why § 112(f) should or should not apply to the limitation at issue.” Id. Notably, the CTPG warns that “[a] petitioner who chooses not to address construction under § 112(f) risks failing to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDenied
“Given these facts, we determine that rule 104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition either identify “the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function” recited in the “component” term limitations or explain why the “component” term limitations are not subject to a means-plus-function construction. This, it fails to do. To be clear, we note that our rules do not prohibit a petitioner from taking inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and a district court. See 10x Genomics, Inc. v. Bio-Rad Labs, Inc., IPR2020- 00086, Paper 8 at 18 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2020). However, where, as here, a petitioner has proposed a claim term be construed solely as a means-plus-function limitation in a district court proceeding and emphasized that the issue is not only “most significant” but potentially “case . . . dispositive,” we determine the petition is obliged to either apply that construction in this proceeding or explain why that construction is not applicable. Accordingly, we find the Petition to be deficient under rule 104(b)(3).4” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other
“connote a definite structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (identifying words such as “mechanism,” “element,” “device,” and others as verbal constructs that do not connote sufficiently definite structures). Indeed, the Specification discloses all of the “components” recited in claims 1, 8, and 15, including the “comparing component,” can be “implemented as a computer having tangible computer-readable media for carrying or having computer-executable instructions or data structures stored thereon.” Ex. 1001, 5:35–43. Thus, like the word “module,” a recognized nonce word, each of the recited “components” is nothing more than “a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified function” and their recitation “operate[s] as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, we construe the “comparing component” limitation recited in claims 1, 8, and 15 as a meansplus-function limitation whose function is “generating a comparison signal.”2” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelNot reached
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 9,333,946 - Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00952 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–18 because the Petition failed to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) by omitting required claim-construction analysis.
RulingsInstitution decision- BurdenDenied
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 8,989,952 - College Products, Inc. v. Intirion CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-01043 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petitioner’s earlier Iowa declaratory judgment action challenging the patents triggered the § 315(a)(1) bar.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards Section 315(a)(1) of 35 U.S.C. states that “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” Section 315(a)(3) states that “[a] counterclaim challenging the validity of a claim of a patent does not constitute a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent for purposes of this subsection [section 315(a)].”” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“their declaratory judgment action included counterclaims to infringement allegations under § 315(a)(3) because the declaratory judgment complaint was filed after and in response to infringement allegations. Avigilon, Paper 11, 10. The Board determined that “a counterclaim typically is asserted in an existing civil action, in contrast to a complaint, the filing of which begins a civil action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (defining counterclaims as distinct from pleadings, including a complaint, set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”)). The Board also noted the definition of “counterclaim” as “a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 11 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,495,374
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.