- Biocon Biologics, Inc. / Biocon Biologics Limited v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2026 · PGR2026-00039 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director denied the petition and instituted no trial because it was filed more than nine months after the patent issued, contrary to § 321(c).
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“I agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is barred by § 321(c). Section 321(c) provides that “[a] petition for a post-grant review may only be filed not later than the date that is 9 months after the date of the grant of the patent or of the issuance of a reissue patent (as the case may be).” Joinder is authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 325(c), which provides that “[i]f more than 1 petition for a post-grant review under this chapter is properly filed against the same patent and the Director determines that more than 1 of these petitions warrants the institution of a post-grant review under section 324, the Director may consolidate such reviews into a single post-grant review.” Notably, the statutory authorization for joinder under § 325(c) does not provide an exception to the nine-month statutory bar, as it requires any petition considered for joinder to be “properly filed,” i.e., to meet the statutory filing requirements including the nine-month filing deadline recited in § 321(c). Petitioner argues that I have broad discretion to promulgate rules and permit exceptions, such as here where institution would increase efficiency. See Reply 2–3. I agree that my institution discretion is broad. But § 325(c) provides no exception to the time period in which a petition for post-grant review may be filed.1 The board rule on which Petitioner relies cannot override a clear statutory requirement, and Petitioner does not point” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Section 321(c) provides that “[a] petition for a post-grant review may only be filed not later than the date that is 9 months after the date of the grant of the patent or of the issuance of a reissue patent (as the case may be).” Joinder is authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 325(c), which provides that “[i]f more than 1 petition for a post-grant review under this chapter is properly filed against the same patent and the Director determines that more than 1 of these petitions warrants the institution of a post-grant review under section 324, the Director may consolidate such reviews into a single post-grant review.” Notably, the statutory authorization for joinder under § 325(c) does not provide an exception to the nine-month statutory bar, as it requires any petition considered for joinder to be “properly filed,” i.e., to meet the statutory filing requirements including the nine-month filing deadline recited in § 321(c). Petitioner argues that I have broad discretion to promulgate rules and permit exceptions, such as here where institution would increase efficiency. See Reply 2–3. I agree that my institution discretion is broad. But § 325(c) provides no exception to the time period in which a petition for post-grant review may be filed.1 The board rule on which Petitioner relies cannot override a clear statutory requirement, and Petitioner does not point 1 Although the Office continues to encourage joinder and early challenges to increase efficiency and resolve patentability challenges early in the life of the patent, these considerations must follow the statute.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,168,036 - Viance, LLC v. Koppers Performance Chemicals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2026-00023 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director denied the PGR petition and instituted no trial because Petitioner failed to identify Venator as a real party in interest within the statutory filing period.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDecided for patent owner
“However, as I previously explained, RPIs are not limited to entities that are actually funding and controlling the proceeding but include entities that have the ability to control the proceeding. See Tianma, IPR2025-01579, Paper 12 at 9–10. Petitioner argues that its two owners do not have unilateral control of Petitioner. However, unilateral control is not the standard, and control of Petitioner is vested solely in its two owners as members of the Board of Directors. See Moyes Decl. ¶ 7. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that Venator and Lanxess do not have the ability to control” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner cannot correct its RPI listing because adding an RPI would require a new filing date that places the Petition outside the 9-month window for filing a PGR. DD Opp. 11–12 (citing Corning, IPR20214-00440, Paper 68 at 24). Patent Owner is correct. See Sun Pharm. Indus., Inc. v. Biofrontera, Inc., PGR2026-00021, Paper 12 at 4 (Director May 26, 2026) (denying PGR petition because Petitioner did not meet the requirement to name all RPI within the statutory timeframe for filing a PGR petition). Accordingly, this Petition is denied, and Petitioner may file an IPR petition listing the appropriate real parties in interest.3” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“listing because adding an RPI would require a new filing date that places the Petition outside the 9-month window for filing a PGR. DD Opp. 11–12 (citing Corning, IPR20214-00440, Paper 68 at 24). Patent Owner is correct. See Sun Pharm. Indus., Inc. v. Biofrontera, Inc., PGR2026-00021, Paper 12 at 4 (Director May 26, 2026) (denying PGR petition because Petitioner did not meet the requirement to name all RPI within the statutory timeframe for filing a PGR petition). Accordingly, this Petition is denied, and Petitioner may file an IPR petition listing the appropriate real parties in interest.3 In consideration of the foregoing, it is: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,370,716 - Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc. v. Biofrontera Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 26, 2026 · PGR2026-00021 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director denied Sun Pharmaceutical Industries’ PGR petition because it failed to show that it had identified all real parties in interest.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDecided for patent owner
“As I previously explained, RPIs are not limited to entities that are actually funding and controlling the proceeding, but include entities that have the ability to control the proceeding. See Tianma Microelectronics (Director Mar. 18, 2026) (precedential) (“With its identification of RPIs in dispute, it is Petitioner’s burden to bring forth evidence or arguments demonstrating that it had named all RPIs—and that none were foreign governments or entities a foreign government had the ability to control.”); see also Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding to the Board to further consider RPI where the patent owner identified an unnamed party with the “opportunity to control” the proceeding). Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence that SPI Ltd., the corporate parent and 100% owner of SPI Inc., does not have the ability to control the proceeding. Rather, Petitioner’s declaration evidence is focused on whether SPI Inc. is actually funding or controlling the proceeding. See Ex. 1021 ¶ 4 (“SPI Inc. is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.”). On this record, Petitioner fails to carry its burden to establish that it has identified all RPIs.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“(Director Mar. 18, 2026) (precedential) (“With its identification of RPIs in dispute, it is Petitioner’s burden to bring forth evidence or arguments demonstrating that it had named all RPIs—and that none were foreign governments or entities a foreign government had the ability to control.”); see also Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding to the Board to further consider RPI where the patent owner identified an unnamed party with the “opportunity to control” the proceeding). Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence that SPI Ltd., the corporate parent and 100% owner of SPI Inc., does not have the ability to control the proceeding. Rather, Petitioner’s declaration evidence is focused on whether SPI Inc. is actually funding or controlling the proceeding. See Ex. 1021 ¶ 4 (“SPI Inc. is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.”). On this record, Petitioner fails to carry its burden to establish that it has identified all RPIs.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,280,146 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Omni Medsci, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 14, 2026 · IPR2025-01253 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director vacated institution and denied the IPR petition because the patent was determined eligible for PGR and therefore not eligible for IPR.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedDecided for patent owner
“Given my determination in PGR2026-00003 as to the ’790 patent’s PGR eligibility, and because a patent cannot be both PGR eligible and IPR eligible at the same time, it is appropriate to vacate institution of this IPR. See, e.g., Philip Morris Prods., S.A. v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc., IPR2020-01188, Paper 12 at 10–12 (PTAB Jan. 13, 2021); Paper 6, 3 n.2 (Samsung acknowledging that the ’790 patent is not eligible for simultaneous IPR and PGR). Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that the Notice granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 19) is vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,193,790 - Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd. v. LG Display Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 18, 2026 · IPR2025-01579 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution because Petitioner failed to establish that a foreign government was not an RPI, making Petitioner ineligible to file the IPR.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“Patent Owner’s evidence is sufficient to put into dispute whether the Petition identified all RPIs and whether there is an RPI who is not a “person” eligible to file an IPR. See Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A] patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest.”); Yangtze Memory Techs. Co. v. Micron Tech., Inc., IPR2025- 00098, Paper 38 at 7 (Director Jan. 15, 2026) (informative) (explaining that the Office’s “mandate to protect the public interest is especially compelling” where a petitioner does not identify all RPIs). Patent Owner’s evidence that Petitioner is owned by AVIC Innovation and AVIC, AVIC is owned by a foreign government, and AVIC is included on the entity list is particularly persuasive. DD Req. 7–8 (citing Exs. 2013–19).” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Today’s decision is consistent with Return Mail and—even if Return Mail reached the opposite conclusion—would be comfortably within the Office’s settled broad discretion in deciding whether to use its limited resources to institute IPR in any given case. Apple Inc. v. Squires, No. 2024- 1864, 2026 WL 406495, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (“[T]he Director has broad and protected discretion not to launch an IPR, even when the statutory pre-conditions are met.”). Indeed, as to the exercise of discretion, as I stated in the Memorandum, “the integrity of PTAB proceedings depends on knowing who is behind a petition—who funds it, directs it, and/or benefits from it. Any opacity in that chain of control invites exploitation, may facilitate technology transfer contrary to U.S. law, regulation, and interests, and serves only to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the patent system.” Memorandum 4. Notions of fundamental fairness dictate no other result.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,251,394 - Google LLC v. Soundclear Technologies LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 17, 2026 · IPR2025-01597 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Institution
The Director denied Google’s petition for IPR of claims 1–5 because Google filed it after the § 315(b) deadline and showed no exceptional circumstances.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“is acknowledged. Google’s statutory deadline to file a proceeding, however, expired on July 31, 2025, one year after service of the complaint in the parallel litigation between Google and SoundClear Technologies LLC. See Pet. 75. Accordingly, Google’s Petition was filed more than one year after the date on which it was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’337 patent and Google is time-barred from filing a petition under § 315(b). “Petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances.” Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 (June 25, 2025) (designated precedential January 9, 2026). Google does not present an exceptional circumstance here beyond its goal of judicial efficiency. Judicial efficiency, however, absent other considerations, does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance that would justify institution and joinder of a time-barred party. The better course in a situation like this would have been for Google to file the petition and motion for joinder before the statutory time bar. Here, the Amazon IPR was filed in January 2025, giving Google ample time to file the petition and joinder motion. Parties do not have to wait to request joinder until the case they are seeking to join is instituted. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,069,337 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00726 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not adequately explain which of its three alternative constructions of “risk indices” applied to the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least 1 claim of the ’141 patent is unpatentable. 1” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“risk index” differ in several “particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. The Board does not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied. For example, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus-function term. However, Petitioner does not provide any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Rather, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term(s), and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,894,141 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00725 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition failed to explain how the challenged claims should be construed or how the prior art rendered them unpatentable under the proposed constructions.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the Petition fails to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) to set forth how the challenged claims are to be construed. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review. IV.ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition for an inter partes review is denied and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenDenied
“particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which claim construction the Board is being asked to apply, and under what circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. To be sure, we do not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied or an explanation of how the prior art renders the claims unpatentable under alternative constructions. For instance, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a meansplus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus- any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Instead, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term, and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,424,035 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00630 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition failed to explain which of three alternative constructions of “risk map” applied or how the prior art met the claims under those constructions.
RulingsInstitution decision- BurdenDenied
“particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given that Petitioner acknowledges there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which claim construction the Board is being asked to apply, and under what circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. To be sure, we do not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied or an explanation of how the prior art renders the claims unpatentable under alternative constructions. For instance, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a means- construction assuming the term is not found to be a means-plus-function term. Unlike this example, however, Petitioner does not provide any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Instead, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term, and summarily contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,665,346 - Walmart Inc. / Walmart Stores Texas, LLC v. Security Technology LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00809 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution of Walmart’s petition because Walmart was time-barred and did not show exceptional circumstances justifying joinder.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 14. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01420). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 19, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDenied
“infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 14. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01420). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 19, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 14. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01420). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 19, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,562,402
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.