- Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00966 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not explain whether the component limitations invoke § 112(f) or identify corresponding structure, as required by Rule 42.104(b)(3).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“The Consolidated Trial Practice Guide[1,2](“CTPG”) . . . instructs that “[w]here claim language may be construed according to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), a petitioner must provide a construction.” CTPG 45 (emphases added) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)). The CTPG advises that a party “may choose to elaborate why § 112(f) should or should not apply to the limitation at issue.” Id. Notably, the CTPG warns that “[a] petitioner who chooses not to address construction under § 112(f) risks failing to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDenied
“Given these facts, we determine that rule 104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition either identify “the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function” recited in the “component” term limitations or explain why the “component” term limitations are not subject to a means-plus-function construction. This, it fails to do. To be clear, we note that our rules do not prohibit a petitioner from taking inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and a district court. See 10x Genomics, Inc. v. Bio-Rad Labs, Inc., IPR2020- 00086, Paper 8 at 18 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2020). However, where, as here, a petitioner has proposed a claim term be construed solely as a means-plus-function limitation in a district court proceeding and emphasized that the issue is not only “most significant” but potentially “case . . . dispositive,” we determine the petition is obliged to either apply that construction in this proceeding or explain why that construction is not applicable. Accordingly, we find the Petition to be deficient under rule 104(b)(3).4” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other
“connote a definite structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (identifying words such as “mechanism,” “element,” “device,” and others as verbal constructs that do not connote sufficiently definite structures). Indeed, the Specification discloses all of the “components” recited in claims 1, 8, and 15, including the “comparing component,” can be “implemented as a computer having tangible computer-readable media for carrying or having computer-executable instructions or data structures stored thereon.” Ex. 1001, 5:35–43. Thus, like the word “module,” a recognized nonce word, each of the recited “components” is nothing more than “a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified function” and their recitation “operate[s] as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, we construe the “comparing component” limitation recited in claims 1, 8, and 15 as a meansplus-function limitation whose function is “generating a comparison signal.”2” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelNot reached
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 9,333,946 - Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00952 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–18 because the Petition failed to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) by omitting required claim-construction analysis.
RulingsInstitution decision- BurdenDenied
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 8,989,952 - College Products, Inc. v. Intirion CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-01042 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1, 21, 26, and 28 of the ’876 patent because the petitioner’s earlier Iowa declaratory judgment action triggered § 315(a)(1).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherDenied
“The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1). For these reasons, after considering the parties’ evidence and arguments, we determine that § 315(a)(1) bars institution of inter partes review for these proceedings.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“their declaratory judgment action included counterclaims to infringement allegations under § 315(a)(3) because the declaratory judgment complaint was filed after and in response to infringement allegations. Avigilon, Paper 11, 10. The Board determined that “a counterclaim typically is asserted in an existing civil action, in contrast to a complaint, the filing of which begins a civil action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (defining counterclaims as distinct from pleadings, including a complaint, set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”)). The Board also noted the definition of “counterclaim” as “a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 11 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Here, there is no evidence that Patent Owner filed a claim as a plaintiff against Petitioner in the Northern District of Iowa and that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim in opposition to or against such a claim. Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner should be precluded from arguing that the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim is also not persuasive. Pet. 7. Regardless of whether Patent Owner subsequently argued that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim (an argument made in the context of a motion of consolidation), subsequent arguments by Patent Owner would not retroactively transform the Iowa DJ action, which was filed before any claim was filed by Patent Owner against Petitioner in that jurisdiction, into a counterclaim. Thus, we find that Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent. The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1).” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,274,876 - College Products, Inc. v. Intirion CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-01043 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petitioner’s earlier Iowa declaratory judgment action challenging the patents triggered the § 315(a)(1) bar.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards Section 315(a)(1) of 35 U.S.C. states that “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” Section 315(a)(3) states that “[a] counterclaim challenging the validity of a claim of a patent does not constitute a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent for purposes of this subsection [section 315(a)].”” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“their declaratory judgment action included counterclaims to infringement allegations under § 315(a)(3) because the declaratory judgment complaint was filed after and in response to infringement allegations. Avigilon, Paper 11, 10. The Board determined that “a counterclaim typically is asserted in an existing civil action, in contrast to a complaint, the filing of which begins a civil action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (defining counterclaims as distinct from pleadings, including a complaint, set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”)). The Board also noted the definition of “counterclaim” as “a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 11 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,495,374 - Apple Inc. v. Rfcyber Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 24, 2022 · PGR2022-00003 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · PGR · Institution
The Board denied Apple’s untimely joinder motion and denied institution because the petition was filed outside the nine-month PGR filing period.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“motion under§ 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any post-grant review for which joinder is requested.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.222(b). Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder was filed October 20, 2021, which is more than one month after the Board instituted post-grant review in the Google PGR on July 23, 2021. Petitioner, however, argues that special circumstances warrant that the Board exercise its discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5 to waive the one-month joinder period. Mot. 3–6.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“B. Eligibility for Post-Grant Review under 35 U.S.C. § 321 Institution of post-grant review is barred when a petition is filed more than 9 months after the challenged patent is granted. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). The ’046 patent issued on March 24, 2020 (see Ex. 1001, code (45)), and the Petition in this proceeding was accorded a filing date of October 20, 2021 (see Paper 1). Thus, the Petition was filed outside the 9-month statutory period for requesting post-grant review under § 321(c). Accordingly, in view of our decision to deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder, we deny the Petition because it was not filed within the time limit imposed under 35 U.S.C. § 321(c).” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,600,046 - Banilla Games, Inc. v. Savvy Dog Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2020 · CBM2020-00014 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because the remaining claims did not establish that the patent claims a financial product or service, as required for CBM review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). For reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that the challenged patent qualifies as a covered business method patent. Accordingly, we decline to institute a covered business method patent review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the limitations “determining a winning combination” and “testing the game field . . . to ensure that a winning combination more valuable . . .” are not financial in nature. Beginning with “winning combination,” we agree with Patent Owner that “winning,” by itself, is not necessarily monetary in nature. Prelim. Resp. 28. Indeed, other games include the step of determining whether a combination is a “winning combination” or not without necessarily involving any kind of prize or payout. See id. at 29–30. Instead, as is shown in the ’223 patent, some additional step after the determination of who won is necessarily if there is going to be some monetary payout corresponding to the win. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 6 (showing Step 630 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), Fig. 8 (showing Step 820 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), 6:34–40 (explaining a player “may” redeem points earned in the game for cash). Petitioner identifies nothing in the specification requiring that money be paid for just winning. Moreover, the ’223 patent makes clear that the games are intended broadly for “entertainment” and “amusement” and not just for gambling. See id. at 1:13–15 (explaining patent is related to “amusement and entertainment electronic gaming”). As Patent Owner explains, the ’223 patent expressly discusses the use of the games in Ohio, which prohibits gambling, but permits the use of games of skill for entertainment purposes. See Prelim. Resp. 52–58 (discussing Ohio’s laws in detail); Ex. 1001, 1:18–33 (describing Ohio’s laws prohibiting gambling, but allowing “games of skill”). Thus, at best, “winning combination” relates only to the possibility that a monetary payout could be received, not that a player necessarily will receive anything of monetary value for playing the game. This possibility is insufficient to meet the financial product or service requirement. See Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382 (noting “it cannot be the case that a patent covering a method and corresponding apparatuses becomes a CBM patent because its practice could involve a potential sale of a good or service” and “[i]t is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the specification speculates such a potential sale might occur”).” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,736,223 - Fitbit, Inc. v. Philips North America LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2020 · IPR2020-00782 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Philips had recorded a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 15–17.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e), “[t]he patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. [§] 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent. No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” (Emphasis added.) A disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) shall be recorded in the Office, and is “considered as part of the original patent.” See 35 U.S.C. § 253(a).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,976,958 - PTAB · Jan 31, 2018 · IPR2017-01777 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied institution because Patent Owner recorded a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e), “patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent” and “[n]o inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” A disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) is “considered as part of the original patent” once it is “recorded” in the Office. 35 U.S.C. § 253(a).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,167,043 - Keeper Security, Inc. v. Cumberland Systems LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 20, 2017 · CBM2017-00057 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–19 because Petitioner did not show that the patent qualified as a covered business method patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to show adequately that the ’647 patent “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,” to qualify as a covered business method patent. As we explained above, Secure Axcess requires a challenged patent to “have a claim that contains . . . a financial activity element.” Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d at 1381 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to point to any element of claims of the ’647 patent that it contends meets the “financial activity element” required by Secure Axcess. Instead, it merely points to statements in the specification regarding potential applications for the claimed cryptographic algorithm. At best, Petitioner argues that the claimed encryption method can be for financial matters, such as securing e-commerce transactions, but this is not sufficient after the Federal Circuit’s guidance in both Unwired Planet and Secure Axcess. See id. Petitioner has simply failed to identify anything in the claims that are financial in nature.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,023,647 - Cme Group, Inc. v. Volatility Partners, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 28, 2017 · CBM2016-00024 · APJ Trenton A Ward · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1–50 because CME Group failed to establish standing to file the petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a), the Petitioner bears the burden of establishing “petitioner has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” Based on the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we determine the information presented in the Petition and supporting evidence does not establish that Petitioner had standing to file the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“Here, we determine that Petitioner fails to sufficiently establish an “adverse legal interest” by failing to identify an underlying cause of action that Patent Owner could have brought or threatened to bring. First, Petitioner has not sufficiently established that the License Agreement covers the ’RE435 patent. The License Agreement licenses “the inventions claimed in the [’184 patent]” (Ex. 1004, 2). None of the claims in the original ’184 patent was confirmed during the prosecution of the reissue application, as only claim 1 from the ’184 patent was maintained in the reissue application, and this claim was amended during the prosecution of the reissue application. See Ex. 1003, 26–40, 176–182, 189–203. Therefore, Petitioner fails to establish sufficiently how any of “the inventions claimed in the ’184 patent” are currently claimed in the ’RE435 patent.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denial
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.