- Biocon Biologics, Inc. / Biocon Biologics Limited v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2026 · PGR2026-00039 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review
The Director denied the petition and instituted no trial because it was filed more than nine months after the patent issued, contrary to § 321(c).
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“I agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is barred by § 321(c). Section 321(c) provides that “[a] petition for a post-grant review may only be filed not later than the date that is 9 months after the date of the grant of the patent or of the issuance of a reissue patent (as the case may be).” Joinder is authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 325(c), which provides that “[i]f more than 1 petition for a post-grant review under this chapter is properly filed against the same patent and the Director determines that more than 1 of these petitions warrants the institution of a post-grant review under section 324, the Director may consolidate such reviews into a single post-grant review.” Notably, the statutory authorization for joinder under § 325(c) does not provide an exception to the nine-month statutory bar, as it requires any petition considered for joinder to be “properly filed,” i.e., to meet the statutory filing requirements including the nine-month filing deadline recited in § 321(c). Petitioner argues that I have broad discretion to promulgate rules and permit exceptions, such as here where institution would increase efficiency. See Reply 2–3. I agree that my institution discretion is broad. But § 325(c) provides no exception to the time period in which a petition for post-grant review may be filed.1 The board rule on which Petitioner relies cannot override a clear statutory requirement, and Petitioner does not point” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Section 321(c) provides that “[a] petition for a post-grant review may only be filed not later than the date that is 9 months after the date of the grant of the patent or of the issuance of a reissue patent (as the case may be).” Joinder is authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 325(c), which provides that “[i]f more than 1 petition for a post-grant review under this chapter is properly filed against the same patent and the Director determines that more than 1 of these petitions warrants the institution of a post-grant review under section 324, the Director may consolidate such reviews into a single post-grant review.” Notably, the statutory authorization for joinder under § 325(c) does not provide an exception to the nine-month statutory bar, as it requires any petition considered for joinder to be “properly filed,” i.e., to meet the statutory filing requirements including the nine-month filing deadline recited in § 321(c). Petitioner argues that I have broad discretion to promulgate rules and permit exceptions, such as here where institution would increase efficiency. See Reply 2–3. I agree that my institution discretion is broad. But § 325(c) provides no exception to the time period in which a petition for post-grant review may be filed.1 The board rule on which Petitioner relies cannot override a clear statutory requirement, and Petitioner does not point 1 Although the Office continues to encourage joinder and early challenges to increase efficiency and resolve patentability challenges early in the life of the patent, these considerations must follow the statute.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,168,036 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Omni Medsci, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 14, 2026 · IPR2025-01253 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director vacated institution and denied the IPR petition because the patent was determined eligible for PGR and therefore not eligible for IPR.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedDecided for patent owner
“Given my determination in PGR2026-00003 as to the ’790 patent’s PGR eligibility, and because a patent cannot be both PGR eligible and IPR eligible at the same time, it is appropriate to vacate institution of this IPR. See, e.g., Philip Morris Prods., S.A. v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc., IPR2020-01188, Paper 12 at 10–12 (PTAB Jan. 13, 2021); Paper 6, 3 n.2 (Samsung acknowledging that the ’790 patent is not eligible for simultaneous IPR and PGR). Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that the Notice granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 19) is vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,193,790 - Google LLC v. Soundclear Technologies LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 17, 2026 · IPR2025-01597 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Institution
The Director denied Google’s petition for IPR of claims 1–5 because Google filed it after the § 315(b) deadline and showed no exceptional circumstances.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“is acknowledged. Google’s statutory deadline to file a proceeding, however, expired on July 31, 2025, one year after service of the complaint in the parallel litigation between Google and SoundClear Technologies LLC. See Pet. 75. Accordingly, Google’s Petition was filed more than one year after the date on which it was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’337 patent and Google is time-barred from filing a petition under § 315(b). “Petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances.” Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 (June 25, 2025) (designated precedential January 9, 2026). Google does not present an exceptional circumstance here beyond its goal of judicial efficiency. Judicial efficiency, however, absent other considerations, does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance that would justify institution and joinder of a time-barred party. The better course in a situation like this would have been for Google to file the petition and motion for joinder before the statutory time bar. Here, the Amazon IPR was filed in January 2025, giving Google ample time to file the petition and joinder motion. Parties do not have to wait to request joinder until the case they are seeking to join is instituted. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,069,337 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00726 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not adequately explain which of its three alternative constructions of “risk indices” applied to the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least 1 claim of the ’141 patent is unpatentable. 1” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“risk index” differ in several “particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. The Board does not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied. For example, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus-function term. However, Petitioner does not provide any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Rather, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term(s), and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,894,141 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00725 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition failed to explain how the challenged claims should be construed or how the prior art rendered them unpatentable under the proposed constructions.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the Petition fails to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) to set forth how the challenged claims are to be construed. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review. IV.ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition for an inter partes review is denied and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenDenied
“particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which claim construction the Board is being asked to apply, and under what circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. To be sure, we do not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied or an explanation of how the prior art renders the claims unpatentable under alternative constructions. For instance, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a meansplus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus- any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Instead, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term, and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,424,035 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00630 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition failed to explain which of three alternative constructions of “risk map” applied or how the prior art met the claims under those constructions.
RulingsInstitution decision- BurdenDenied
“particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given that Petitioner acknowledges there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which claim construction the Board is being asked to apply, and under what circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. To be sure, we do not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied or an explanation of how the prior art renders the claims unpatentable under alternative constructions. For instance, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a means- construction assuming the term is not found to be a means-plus-function term. Unlike this example, however, Petitioner does not provide any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Instead, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term, and summarily contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,665,346 - Walmart Inc. / Walmart Stores Texas, LLC v. Security Technology LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00809 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution of Walmart’s petition because Walmart was time-barred and did not show exceptional circumstances justifying joinder.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 14. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01420). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 19, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDenied
“infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 14. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01420). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 19, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 14. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01420). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 19, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,562,402 - Walmart Inc. / Walmart Stores Texas, LLC v. Ravenwhite Security, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00810 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied the petition, finding Walmart time-barred and no exceptional circumstances justifying joinder.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDecided for patent owner
“In particular, Petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 12. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01316). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 18, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“infringement of the challenged patent on September 15, 2023. DD Req. 12. Petitioner waited until March 28, 2025 to file this Petition, more than eighteen months later. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing a petition. Petitioner seeks to join a recently instituted inter partes review filed by Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. Paper 3 (motion to join to IPR2024-01316). However, petitions filed by time-barred parties should proceed only in exceptional circumstances. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. ParkerVision, Inc., IPR2025-00324, Paper 11 at 3 (Director June 25, 2025). Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate exceptional circumstances here. For example, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner requested consolidation of its district court proceedings against Petitioner and Home Depot; that an initial district court proceeding was dismissed for standing, causing delays; and that the parallel district court proceeding is stayed. Paper 18, 3. However, Petitioner fails to persuasively demonstrate that these circumstances are exceptional and justify the joinder of a time-barred party. Accordingly, discretionary denial is appropriate under these circumstances.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,594,823 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00092 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Orca disclaimed all challenged claims 1–19 before institution.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e), “[t]he patent owner may file a statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. 253(a) in compliance with § 1.321(a) of this chapter, disclaiming one or more claims in the patent” and, if the statutory disclaimer is filed properly, “[n]o [IPR] will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” A statutory disclaimer is “considered as part of the original patent” as of the date on which it is “recorded” in the USPTO. 35 U.S.C. § 253(a). “A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.” Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Raytheon Techs. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 993 F.3d 1374, n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Disclaimed claims are treated as if they never existed.”)” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,516,231 - 2985 LLC D/B/A Mountain Voyage Co. v. The Ridge Wallet, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01264 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–24 as time-barred under § 315(b), and denied joinder as moot because the Shenzhen IPR had terminated.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied
“instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” There is no dispute that Patent Owner served Petitioner with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’808 patent on March 15, 2023. See Mot. 2 (Mountain Voyage identifying March 15, 2023 as the date it was served with Patent Owner’s complaint in the United States District Court of Colorado). There is also no dispute that Mountain Voyage filed the instant Petition more than one year later on August 6, 2024. Pet. 91. Therefore, the evidence in this record shows that Mountain Voyage’s Petition was filed more than 1 year after the date on which Mountain Voyage was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’808 patent. Mountain Voyage relies on its request to join the Shenzhen IPR to avoid the time bar of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Mot. 1 (“This Motion for Joinder and the accompanying Instant Petition are timely being filed within one month of the decision to institute trial in the Shenzhen IPR.”). The Shenzhen IPR, however, has been terminated. Shenzhen IPR Termination 3–4. Thus, there no longer is a pending proceeding in the Shenzhen IPR for Petitioner to join. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to join the Shenzhen IPR is moot, and the Petition is not timely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Mountain Voyage relies on its request to join the Shenzhen IPR to avoid the time bar of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Mot. 1 (“This Motion for Joinder and the accompanying Instant Petition are timely being filed within one month of the decision to institute trial in the Shenzhen IPR.”). The Shenzhen IPR, however, has been terminated. Shenzhen IPR Termination 3–4. Thus, there no longer is a pending proceeding in the Shenzhen IPR for Petitioner to join. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to join the Shenzhen IPR is moot, and the Petition is not timely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). III. CONCLUSION The Motion for Joinder is denied as moot because the Shenzhen IPR” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,791,808
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.