• Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00966 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not explain whether the component limitations invoke § 112(f) or identify corresponding structure, as required by Rule 42.104(b)(3).

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied

    “The Consolidated Trial Practice Guide[1,2](“CTPG”) . . . instructs that “[w]here claim language may be construed according to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), a petitioner must provide a construction.” CTPG 45 (emphases added) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)). The CTPG advises that a party “may choose to elaborate why § 112(f) should or should not apply to the limitation at issue.” Id. Notably, the CTPG warns that “[a] petitioner who chooses not to address construction under § 112(f) risks failing to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id.” slip op. at 6

  • BurdenDenied

    “Given these facts, we determine that rule 104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition either identify “the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function” recited in the “component” term limitations or explain why the “component” term limitations are not subject to a means-plus-function construction. This, it fails to do. To be clear, we note that our rules do not prohibit a petitioner from taking inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and a district court. See 10x Genomics, Inc. v. Bio-Rad Labs, Inc., IPR2020- 00086, Paper 8 at 18 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2020). However, where, as here, a petitioner has proposed a claim term be construed solely as a means-plus-function limitation in a district court proceeding and emphasized that the issue is not only “most significant” but potentially “case . . . dispositive,” we determine the petition is obliged to either apply that construction in this proceeding or explain why that construction is not applicable. Accordingly, we find the Petition to be deficient under rule 104(b)(3).4” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other

    “connote a definite structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (identifying words such as “mechanism,” “element,” “device,” and others as verbal constructs that do not connote sufficiently definite structures). Indeed, the Specification discloses all of the “components” recited in claims 1, 8, and 15, including the “comparing component,” can be “implemented as a computer having tangible computer-readable media for carrying or having computer-executable instructions or data structures stored thereon.” Ex. 1001, 5:35–43. Thus, like the word “module,” a recognized nonce word, each of the recited “components” is nothing more than “a generic description for software or hardware that performs a specified function” and their recitation “operate[s] as a substitute for ‘means’ in the context of § 112, para. 6.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, we construe the “comparing component” limitation recited in claims 1, 8, and 15 as a meansplus-function limitation whose function is “generating a comparison signal.”2” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelNot reached
  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Markman
  Patents in suitUS 9,333,946
• Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00952 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–18 because the Petition failed to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) by omitting required claim-construction analysis.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • BurdenDenied

    “Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Under these facts we determine that 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) mandates that the Petition “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” The Petition failed to do so. At a minimum, the Petition should have explained why the plain and ordinary meaning of the “component” terms should apply in this proceeding (why the inconsistent positions are warranted) or set forth an alternative means-plus-function claim construction. CTPG 45.” slip op. at 8

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Markman
  Patents in suitUS 8,989,952
• Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Surgetech LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2023 · IPR2023-00738 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–6 because the Petition failed to identify its numerous, ambiguous obviousness grounds with the particularity required by § 312(a)(3).

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may be instituted if the information presented by the petitioner in the petition, in view of the patent owner’s preliminary response and the preliminary record, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenDenied

    “to the issue of thousands of asserted combinations of art. Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that Petitioner presents in the Petition “a single, omnibus claim chart that cites to numerous pages of prior art without any substantive explanation describing how those quotations are relevant or how they should be combined” and “exacerbates this confusion by citing to Dr. Regan’s seven-hundred seventy-eight page expert report, which, despite its length, is equally conclusory.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12. Moreover, by citing “dozens of disparate passages from Jacob” in regard to a single limitation, along with “numerous citations to multiple prior art references,” the Petition fails to “identify how the prior art teachings should be combined in the grounds of a petition.” Id. at 18–19. In sum, rather than present its challenges with particularity, the Petition simply reproduces large excerpts from multiple references, while improperly incorporating by reference hundreds of pages from an expert declaration that frequently includes conclusory assertions. See generally Pet.; Ex. 1003. Accordingly, we find that the Petition falls short of the requirement that it present “with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). In our view, the large number of ambiguous grounds is far out of proportion with the number of claims and the complexity of the issues involved. This excessiveness indicates that it would impose an undue burden for Patent Owner to respond to and for the Board to resolve all of the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner asserts: POSITA would at minimum have a bachelor’s degree in software/computer/electrical engineering, computer science, or industrial engineering and management with at least two years’ experience in inventory and pricing management, including with respect to systems for dynamically managing inventory and pricing of transportation services or other types of inventory, or the equivalent. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant inventory and pricing management experience could substitute for formal education. EX1003, ¶17. POSITA are presumed knowledgeable of all relevant art, and would thus have been familiar with each reference cited herein and its full teachings. Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner applies this same definition. Prelim. Resp. 10. For the purposes of this Decision, we accept Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art (or ordinarily skilled artisan), which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’047 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[]” evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). B.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes a construction for the claim language “receiving . . . in real time.” Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner does not argue for any specific claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that, here, no construction of any claim term is necessary for purposes of rendering this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. C. LEGAL STANDARDS CONCERNING INSTITUTION AND” slip op. at 11

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,475,047
• Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Surgetech LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2023 · IPR2023-00735 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and failed to identify its grounds and supporting evidence with particularity.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Even when that standard is satisfied, however, the Board has discretion to deny institution.4” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenDenied

    “Accordingly, we find that the Petition falls short of the requirement that it present “with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). In our view, the large number of grounds is far out of proportion with the number of claims and the complexity of the issues involved. This excessiveness indicates that it would impose an undue burden for Patent Owner to respond to and for the Board to resolve all of the grounds asserted in the Petition. Moreover, in addition to the number of grounds asserted, Petitioner’s arguments in support of those grounds are unclear and impossible to discern. Petitioner does not separately discuss each individual ground, but instead lumps together the discussion of all grounds under a single heading. This grouping together of multiple grounds obscures the specific arguments advanced and the claims challenged in each individual ground. Moreover, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not adequately explain these multiple-reference combinations, or why ordinarily skilled artisans would be motivated to combine them in the manner recited. In these circumstances, we determine that denial is appropriate because the Petition asserts voluminous and excessive grounds and fails to identify them with the requisite particularity. See Microsoft Corp. v. FG SRC, LLC, 860 Fed. Appx. 708, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“It is not the Board’s job to cobble together assertions from different sections of a petition or citations of various exhibits in order to infer every possible permutation of a petitioner’s arguments. Arguments in a petition must be made with particularity, not opacity”). We further determine that Petitioner fails to” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would at minimum have a bachelor’s degree in software/computer/electrical engineering, computer science, or industrial engineering and management including with respect to systems for dynamically managing inventory and pricing of transportation services or other types of inventory, or the equivalent.” Pet. 16. Petitioner also contends “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant inventory and pricing management experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill identified by Petitioner. See Prelim. Resp. 10. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill because, on the current record, it is consistent with the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention reflected by the ’598 patent and the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In sum, rather than present its challenges with particularity, the Petition simply reproduces large excerpts from multiple references while improperly incorporating by reference hundreds of pages from an expert declaration that frequently includes conclusory assertions. See, e.g., Ex 1003 ¶¶ 162, 188, 201, 226, 227, 240, 250, 264, 274, 282, 292, 302, 309, 318, 326, 332, 341, 363, 384, 387, 416, 428, 444, 456, 458, 476, 495, 504, 511, 521, 535, 633, 641 (stating in substantially similar terms that it “would have been routine to make such an implementation choice,” and “clear it results with a reasonable expectation of success”). Accordingly, we find that the Petition falls short of the requirement that it present “with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). In our view, the large number of grounds is far out of proportion with the number of claims and the complexity of the issues involved. This excessiveness indicates that it would impose an undue burden for Patent Owner to respond to and for the Board to resolve all of the grounds asserted in the Petition. Moreover, in addition to the number of grounds asserted, Petitioner’s arguments in support of those grounds are unclear and impossible to discern. Petitioner does not separately discuss each individual ground, but instead lumps together the discussion of all grounds under a single heading. This grouping together of multiple grounds obscures the specific arguments advanced and the claims challenged in each individual ground. Moreover, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not adequately explain these multiple-reference combinations, or why ordinarily skilled artisans would be motivated to combine them in the manner recited.” slip op. at 19

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,334,598
• Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Surgetech LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00737 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

  Denied institution of IPR for claims 1–10 because the petition lacked particularity and failed to show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s citations to Dr. Regan’s testimony, as well as to Jacob, Tamura, and Kono, fail to show a reasonable likelihood that the cited art satisfies that the steps recited in limitations 9(g) and 9(h) are performed “based on the query,” as required in limitation 9(f). Petitioner’s treatment of these limitations lacks sufficient substantive analysis. See Pet. 60–62.” slip op. at 17

  • BurdenDenied

    “1. Petitioner fails to clearly map how the claim limitations are mapped to the prior art, and “simply combines the references together in a single, omnibus chart, with no delineation between grounds.” Id. at 9. 2. The Petition fails to identify how the references are being combined. Id. at 14. 3. Petitioner’s motivations to combine are deficient, as Petitioner simply relies on boilerplate language without “address[ing] the combination of any specific teachings in the prior art, let alone explain why a POSITA would have understood such combinations.” Id. at 20. We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner has a duty to identify “with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); see also Playtika Ltd. V. NexRF Corp., IPR2021- 00952, Paper 14 (denying institution based on discretionary factors and lack of sufficient particularity). The importance of this requirement has been stressed by our reviewing court. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”). Our Rules further require that the Petition must identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)) and that each petition must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent” (id. § 42.22(a)(2)). Our Practice Guide also instructs that “parties should avoid submitting a repository of all the information that a judge could possibly consider, and instead focus on concise, well-organized, easy-to-follow arguments supported by readily identifiable evidence of record.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (Nov. 14, 2019), at 39.2 The Petition falls short of these requirements. Rather than present its challenges in a concise and understandable” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “would at minimum have a bachelor’s degree in software/computer/electrical engineering, computer science, or industrial engineering and management with at least two years’ experience in inventory and pricing management, including with respect to systems for dynamically managing inventory and pricing of inventory, or the equivalent. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant inventory and pricing management experience could substitute for formal education. Pet. 10; see also Prelim. Resp. 7 (“This is the same level of skill agreed to by the parties in the litigation. Patent Owner applies this definition for purposes of this Preliminary Response.”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the parties’ assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We find that their assessment is consistent with the ’999 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

    “Rather, the parties do not propose competing constructions for any term. Compare Pet. 8–9, with Prelim. Resp. 42–45. For purposes of this Decision, we give the claims their plain and ordinary meaning, and we need not and do not expressly construe any term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,360,999
• Apple, Inc. v. Koss Corp.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 13, 2021 · IPR2021-00693 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims, finding no reasonable likelihood of success on the signal-strength claims and declining the duplicative remaining claims for efficiency.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Neither Seshadri nor Seshadri-818 teaches transitioning between sources of digital audio. Seshadri teaches transitioning between two types of wireless communication (e.g., from piconet to WLAN) in order for headphones (wireless headset 10) to continue communicating with the same source (e.g., cellular telephone 36) when the signal strength of the first communication type (e.g., piconet) becomes too low. Ex. 1007 ¶ 42. In another example, Seshadri teaches headset 10 transitioning between one device, wire line telephone 37, and another device, cellular telephone 36. Id. ¶ 44. However, cellular telephone 36 is connected via another path (e.g., the WLAN) to wire line telephone 37 and essentially is acting as a repeater to communicate the telephone information from its source, wire line telephone 37, to headset 10. Id. It is in this context that Seshadri teaches that “headset 10 extends the mobility of its user, extends the range of headset use and expands on headset functionality while preserving privacy and security by seeking service from base units to which it may be registered.” Id. In other words, by using cellular telephone 36 as an intermediary, headset 10 can travel farther away from wire line telephone 37, the source of the phone call, and still communicate with it. This is not, however, an example of transitioning between two sources, as required by claim 58. Wire line telephone 37 still is the only source with which headset 10 communicates in this example. Seshadri-818’s teaching is similar to this second example in Seshadri. Although Seshadri-818 describes transitioning headset 12 from one device to another (e.g., from wire line telephone 14 to cellular telephone 22) based on signal strength, the second device (cellular telephone 22) is used merely as an intermediary between headset 12 and wire line telephone 14 so that the headset can continue to communicate with the wire line telephone, the source of the data. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 11, 26, 49–50. Again, it is in the context of the second device acting as an intermediary between a headset and a single source that Seshadri-818’s invention “extends the mobility of its user, extends the range of headset use and expands on headset functionality.” Id. ¶ 26 (“Thus, a logical connection is established between the universal wireless headset 12 and the wire line telephone 14 via the cellular telephone 22 and access point 24.”). See also id. ¶¶ 11 (“[A] logical connection may be established between the new device and a host device supporting the communication,” with the benefit that “a universal wireless headset is provided that extends the mobility of the user, extends the range of the headset and expands on its functionality.”), 50 (“This enables the universal wireless headset to roam within the local area network and maintain its wireless headset functionally with one of its host devices as it roams.” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 23

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied

    “The Petition further challenges claims 1–3, 5, 10, 11, 14–16, 19, 23– 25, 28, 32–36, 39, and 42. Pet. 1–2. As noted above, however, each of these claims is challenged in the ’592 IPR on nearly identical grounds. Thus, it would be a waste of resources to institute a duplicative trial on these claims when Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of success in its challenges to the non-overlapping signal strength claims. Accordingly, we exercise discretion and do not institute a trial on this Petition, which Petitioner filed to challenge the signal strength claims. See supra § II.G. 5. Summary Petitioner filed this Petition to challenge the signal strength claims, claims 4, 6, 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 26, 27, 29, 31, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 58– 62. See supra § II.G; Notice 2–3. For the reasons addressed above in connection with illustrative signal strength claim 58, Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of the signal strength claims. But for the signal strength claims, this Petition challenges the same claims as the ’592 petition. See supra § II.G; Notice 2–3. Accordingly, in the interest of efficiency and not duplicating the trial based on the ’592 petition, we exercise our discretion and do not institute a trial on this Petition.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “This, however, ignores Petitioner’s asserted evidence of reasons to combine the references, namely, to maintain a connection between a headset and a host while roaming within a WLAN network that is wider than the piconet that could be established between the headset and that host. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 44; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 26, 50; Ex. 1003 ¶ 103). Specifically, Petitioner relies on Seshadri’s and Seshadri-818’s similar “use-case[s] in which this transition between two different devices would be useful,” namely the examples in which a cellular phone is used as an intermediary between a headset and a wire line telephone, with the wire line telephone serving as the single source. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 44; 8 The Dissent also argues that a skilled artisan would have made the combination because the headset receiving some audio would have been better than it receiving no audio. We do not read the Petition as having made this argument. Ex. 1013 ¶ 26).9 Dr. Cooperstock repeats this reasoning in his testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105. Thus, Petitioner’s asserted evidence of reasons to combine, taken directly from the two Seshadri references, describes the benefits of maintaining the connection between a headset and a single source (i.e., the host device), and transitioning between devices to maintain that connection. Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence of reasons to transition a headset from playing digital content from one source to playing digital content from another source while roaming within a WLAN, e.g., transitioning among a phone call on a cellular phone, a podcast on a PDA, streaming music on a PC, and an audio book on a laptop computer as the user moves from room to room in their house, changing proximity of the headset to the various devices. Even Petitioner’s citation to Haupt does not provide such evidence. As noted above, Petitioner’s theory for claim limitation 58[h] (“wherein the processor is configured to, upon activation of a user-control of the headphone assembly, initiate transmission of a request to a remote, network-connected server that is in wireless communication 9 Petitioner’s argument, cited by the Dissent, that the method of Seshadri- 818’s Figure 8 “would ensure that the headset only transitions to a better connection and therefore improves audio transmission to the headset,” PO Resp. 30, is still in the context of maintaining a connection between a headset and a single source. In particular, the testimony of Dr. Cooperstock cited to support this argument continues that “[n]otably, Seshadri-818 teaches making a ‘determination’ about ‘which device, or access point, to hand the communication off to’ and discloses an example of ‘determin[ing] that device K is to facilitate the ongoing communication.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 101 (quoting Ex. 1013 ¶ 40). Paragraphs 39 and 40 of Seshadri-818 describe communication between headset 12 and device C, first using access point H, which has a logical connection to device C, and second using device K, which has a logical connection to device C. with the mobile, digital audio player”) has Seshadri’s PDA 30 and cellular telephone 36 both communicating and receiving audio files from the same server (i.e., the same source) “in the same manner as the operating element BE taught by Haupt.” Pet. 26. Here, Petitioner refers to the server, not either PDA 30 or cellphone 36, as “a source for the audio streams to which Seshadri teaches the base units 16 have access.” Id. at 26–27.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner also constructs an “alternative example” or “additional configuration” in which Haupt’s headset hands off streamed audio from one playback device to another based on signal strength, e.g., “transition[ing] from playing streaming audio (e.g., internet radio) from Seshadri’s cellphone 36 to Seshadri’s PDA 30 as the headphones/headset move out of piconet range of the cellphone 36 and into piconet range of the PDA 30.” Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 106). Petitioner’s alternative theory rests on Dr. Cooperstock’s testimony which, in turn, merely repeats the Petition’s arguments without providing any basis for the testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶ 106. Here, Petitioner appears to rely on Seshadri’s general teaching that a headset could communicate with any one of several devices (Ex. 1007 ¶ 43 (“Wireless headset 10 may establish a piconet with any one of the devices 30–37.”)); that more than one of these devices would have been capable of transmitting digital audio content to the headset (id. ¶ 67); and that Seshadri-818 includes a general teaching of transitioning from one device to another based on signal strength (Ex. 1013 ¶ 50). A user wearing the headset, then, would roam from device to device, giving the user wider range of movement. The Dissent appears to accept this reasoning.8” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,469,934
• Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Apr 1, 2020 · IPR2020-00046 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–5 and 9 because the Petition failed to identify required corresponding structure and did not explain how the prior art applied under its asserted construction.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “Thus, if we were to proceed now on allegedly incorrect “assumed” constructions (i.e., corresponding structure is a microprocessor executing software that performs the functions), but ultimately agree with Petitioner’s proposed constructions (i.e., corresponding structure requires special programming or an algorithm for performing the function), we would be put in the position of attempting to apply prior art to claims that might not be amenable to construction, and without Petitioner telling us how the art should be applied in that circumstance. In such an event, “the proper course for the Board to follow, if it cannot ascertain the scope of a claim with reasonable certainty for purposes of assessing patentability, is to decline to institute the IPR or, if the indefiniteness issue affects only certain claims, to conclude that it could not reach a decision on the merits with respect to whether petitioner had established the unpatentability of those claims under sections 102 or 103.” Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). We exercise our discretion and decline Petitioner’s invitation to adopt allegedly incorrect claim constructions and institute an inter partes review on the basis of those constructions.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenDenied

    “Although Petitioner asserts that aside from the “transceiver means for . . .” and “antenna means for . . . ,” the corresponding structure for each of the claimed means-plus-function limitations requires special programming (see Pet. 8), Petitioner does not direct us to disclosure of special programming or an algorithm in the ’522 Patent Specification (see Pet. 10). Therefore, with respect to at least the “ranking means for determining a rank representative of the station’s suitability for acting as master in the network using performance characteristics of the antenna means in view of its local environment,” recited in independent claims 1 and 3 and all other challenged claims, which depend therefrom, the Petition fails to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other

    “Petitioner asserts that there are several means-plus-function limitations recited in the challenged claims, specifically “transceiver means for . . . ,” “antenna means for . . . ,” “control means for . . . ,” “ranking means . . . ,” comparison means . . . ,” “master transfer means . . . ,” and “inquiry means . . .”. See Pet. 8–11. The use of the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 64 applies. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Accordingly, we presume that each of the aforementioned means-plus-function limitations recited in claims 1–5 and 9 should be construed to cover the corresponding structure described in the specification and equivalents thereof. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 5

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,980,522
• Viptela, Inc. v. Fatpipe Networks Private LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 3, 2017 · IPR2017-01125 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 4–15, 19, and 22–24, exercising discretion under §§ 314(a) and 325(d) based on overlapping petitions, follow-on arguments, and inefficient use of resources.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

    “’684 IPR, which in turn was a “copy-cat” of the ’976 IPR petition. Prelim. Resp. 2, 5. However, in deciding whether we should exercise our discretion and decline to go forward with this Petition, our concern is not only whether “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office,” as expressed in § 325(d), but also whether other factors weigh in favor of denying institution in light of the discretion afforded to us pursuant to § 314(a).” slip op. at 9

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied

    “whether at the time of filing of the ’684 petition, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of Pearce, Zhang, and McCullough (“the Additional References”); the length of time that elapsed between learning of the Additional References, and the filing of the instant Petition; whether Petitioner has provided adequate explanation for the time lapse; whether at the time of filing of the instant Petition, Petitioner already had access to Patent Owner’s response in the ’976 IPR; and the finite resources of the Board. See Gen. Plastic Indus. at 16 (Paper 19) (informative). Petitioner provides no explanation of whether it knew or should have known of the Additional References when filing the ’684 petition; of when it first learned of these references; or of any time lapse between learning of these references and the filing of the instant Petition.” slip op. at 13

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “August 14, 2017, and a final decision is due by November 2, 2017. At this point, the decision in the ’976 IPR as to whether to see the matter through to final determination is squarely in our hands, regardless of whether any settlement is reached between the parties. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) (“The parties may agree to settle any issue in a proceeding, but the Board is not a party to the settlement and may independently determine any question of jurisdiction, patentability, or Office practice.”). Thus, if we deem it appropriate, we can reach a final decision on the grounds presented in the ’976 IPR with or without participation from the parties in that matter. These facts weigh in favor of us exercising our discretion not to move forward with the instant Petition, at least with respect to the ’976 instituted claims insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’976 IPR, because the issues raised are fully briefed and ripe for a final decision in the ’976 IPR, and Petitioner’s non-participation in that proceeding is at best neutral to our analysis. Petitioner is a party to the ’684 IPR, and in that proceeding the petition is directed to the same claims of the same patent as in this Petition. This fact weighs in favor of us not moving forward with the instant Petition. Also, at least with respect to the ’684 instituted claims, insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’684 IPR, Petitioner has the opportunity to address the same art and arguments in the ’684 proceeding. It would be an inefficient use of Office resources, and would run counter to securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the challenges to the patentability of the ’235 patent, if we were to allow Petitioner to proceed on the same art and arguments in two separate proceedings.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner submits a list of terms for which Patent Owner has proposed construction in a co-pending district court case. Pet. 7–8. Petitioner, however, asserts that for the purposes of this Decision no terms need to be construed. Id. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. We reviewed the parties’ arguments, and, for the purposes of this Decision, we have determined that no terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 6,775,235
• Google Inc. v. Alfonso Cioffi, Megan Elizabeth Rozman, Melanie Ann Rozman, And Morgan Lee RozmanInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 2, 2017 · CBM2017-00010 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the ’528 Patent does not qualify for covered business method review; its claims are not directed to a financial activity.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We perceive no “issue of material fact” that should be resolved in favor of the Petitioner at the institution stage. Pet. Supp. Brief 3. Although the Petition discusses the construction of several claim terms, none of the proposed interpretations includes any reference to features that are related to internet banking or any other feature that is financial in nature. See Pet. 29 (e.g., proposing that “web browser process” be construed as a “process that can access data on websites” in which “this ‘access’ to website data can be direct or indirect”). In short, none of the claims of the ’528 Patent is “directed to” a financial activity on its face, and we do not read any such financial activity into them based on the Specification’s assertion that malware protection could be useful in internet banking. Thus, we are not persuaded that the ’528 Patent qualifies for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther

    “We agree that the parties’ proposed constructions are consistent with the Specification of the ’528 Patent and, in that context, are the broadest reasonable interpretations of the terms. Therefore, to the extent that claim constructions are relevant to this Decision, we adopt the proposed constructions. Citing the claim construction order entered by the district court in co- pending litigation, Petitioner proposes we construe the term “system file” in claims 21, 44, and 64 to be synonymous with a “critical file” or “critical system file,” which refers to files required for the proper operation of the computer’s systems. Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1012). Patent Owner does not propose a specific construction. We agree that Petitioner’s proposed construction is broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification of the ’528 Patent and we adopt it in this proceeding to the extent that claim constructions are relevant to this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingOther

    “The parties also agree that the preamble of claim 64 is limiting. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 15. The preamble of claim 64 recites specific features of the claimed computer program product, e.g., that the stored code is capable of executing instructions using a common operating system having at least one electronic data processor coupled to other elements in a specific way.” slip op. at 7

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
• LG Electronics, Inc. v. Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L.Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2016 · IPR2015-01987 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 16–28 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “any explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would come to the conclusion that the priority field of a Packet Resource Request is a requested quality of service parameter for a TBF.” Prelim. Resp. 12. We agree. Petitioner’s only support for this argument is the testimony of Dr. Fuja who states, in conclusory fashion, and without citation to evidence, that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that in the context of a connection in the form of a TBF the PRIORITY field is a requested quality of service parameter that is part of request messages communicated by a mobile station to a decision making device.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 76. Dr. Fuja’s testimony includes little persuasive evidence or reasoning. Accordingly, we assign it little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). On this record, Petitioner is not reasonably likely to show that GSM 04.60’s description of establishment of a TBF teaches a request message “indicating at least one requested quality of service parameter associated with the requested communication connection,” as recited in claim 16. Each of independent claims 20, 24, and 25 includes a limitation substantially similar to claim 16’s “indicating at least one requested quality of service parameter associated with the requested communication connection.” For the same reasons, GSM 04.06’s disclosure of TBF establishment does not teach these similar limitations of claims 20, 24, and 25.” slip op. at 12

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. Claim 16 requires that the apparatus be encoded to receive from a decision making device “a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter.” Thus, Petitioner must show that the Channel Coding Command corresponds to the QoS Information Element, or its sub-fields, identified as the at least one quality of service parameter. Petitioner’s only identified evidence of such a correspondence is Dr. Fuja’s testimony that: A POSITA would understand that the channel coding scheme that is included in the CHANNEL_CODING_COMMAND as part of the PACKET UPLINK ASSIGNMENT and the Packet Uplink Ack/Nack message is selected by the network to satisfy the QoS Profile that was negotiated during the PDP context activation procedure under the existing channel conditions. Ex. 1009 ¶ 81. As Patent Owner argues (Prelim. Resp. 9), this testimony is conclusory and lacks any explanation as to why the Channel Coding Command is selected to satisfy the QoS profile. Prelim. Resp. 9. Aside from this conclusory statement, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Fuja points to any evidence that the selection of the Channel Coding Command of GSM 04.60 has any relationship to the QoS Information Element of GSM 03.60. Petitioner’s evidence and argument is insufficient to show that the Prior GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson teach this limitation. Moreover, as explained above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Channel Coding Command is received from the SGSN, which Petitioner identifies as the “decision making device” of claim 16.” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner responds that “neither Petitioner nor its declarant offer any explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would come to the conclusion that the priority field of a Packet Resource Request is a requested quality of service parameter for a TBF.” Prelim. Resp. 12. We agree. Petitioner’s only support for this argument is the testimony of Dr. Fuja who states, in conclusory fashion, and without citation to evidence, that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that in the context of a connection in the form of a TBF the PRIORITY field is a requested quality of service parameter that is part of request messages communicated by a mobile station to a decision making device.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 76. Dr. Fuja’s testimony includes little persuasive evidence or reasoning. Accordingly, we assign it little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “encoded to receive from a decision making device “a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter.” Thus, Petitioner must show that the Channel Coding Command corresponds to the QoS Information Element, or its sub-fields, identified as the at least one quality of service parameter. Petitioner’s only identified evidence of such a correspondence is Dr. Fuja’s testimony that: A POSITA would understand that the channel coding scheme that is included in the CHANNEL_CODING_COMMAND as part of the PACKET UPLINK ASSIGNMENT and the Packet Uplink Ack/Nack message is selected by the network to satisfy the QoS Profile that was negotiated during the PDP context activation procedure under the existing channel conditions. Ex. 1009 ¶ 81. As Patent Owner argues (Prelim. Resp. 9), this testimony is conclusory and lacks any explanation as to why the Channel Coding Command is selected to satisfy the QoS profile. Prelim. Resp. 9. Aside from this conclusory statement, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Fuja points to any evidence that the selection of the Channel Coding Command of GSM 04.60 has any relationship to the QoS Information Element of GSM 03.60. Petitioner’s evidence and argument is insufficient to show that the Prior GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson teach this limitation. Moreover, as explained above, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Channel Coding Command is received from the SGSN, which Petitioner identifies as the “decision making device” of claim 16. We cannot conclude, on this record, that Petitioner is likely to show that the GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson teach an apparatus encoded to “receive from said decision making device a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter,” as recited in claim 16. The remaining independent claims have analogous limitations that Petitioner, for the same reasons, has failed to show in the Prior GSM/GPRS Specifications or Olofsson. Specifically, independent claim 20 recites “a receiver configured to receive from the network element, a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter”; independent claim 24 recites “receive from said decision making device at least one of a channel coding and interleaving scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter”; and independent claim 25 recites “receiving from said decision making device a channel coding scheme corresponding to said at least one quality of service parameter.”” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.