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  • PTAB · Jan 12, 2017 · IPR2015-01595 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12–16, and 23 are unpatentable under §103 as obvious over the FIFA 2001 References and over Pisanich with the Madden References.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “White Knuckle also argues that EA failed to provide a rationale for combining the FIFA 2001 References. PO Resp. 14. That is not the case. As explained in the Petition, the FIFA 2001 References are all directed to solving the same problem, namely, providing the most realistic gaming experience through the availability of updates to various parameters of the video game, including updates that reflect changes to the real-life stadiums and fields depicted in the game. See Pet. 28–29. A skilled artisan would have realized the benefit of combining the FIFA 2001 References from the references themselves, as they describe features of the same video game system, FIFA 2001, and illustrate contemporaneously how actual users were playing the game. Ex. 1003 ¶ 118. Indeed, FIFA 2001 News cross-references FIFA MRA Support extensively, even providing direct links to relevant pages of the MRA website.12 Ex. 1008, 1, 4, 6 (“MRA Patches Database,” “the MRA site”); Ex. 1009, 1, 3 (same).” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner

      “[A]n inventor’s testimony, standing alone, is insufficient to prove conception—some form of corroboration must be shown.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “An evaluation of all pertinent evidence must be made so that a sound determination of the credibility of the inventor’s story may be reached.” Id. at 1195 (citation omitted). Here, to corroborate Mr. Angelopoulos’s testimony, White Knuckle introduces the declaration of the co-worker, Mr. Huffaker, with whom Mr. Angelopoulos met and first described his invention. Ex. 2010. Mr. Huffaker testifies that he was a licensed attorney engaged by Mr. Angelopoulos to assist him in reducing the invention to practice and drafting the application for the ’350 patent. Id. ¶¶ 4(a), 5(a). Accompanying the declarations of Mr. Huffaker and Mr. Angelopoulos is a series of exhibits, consisting of emails and attachments sent around the time of their meeting, which White Knuckle submits as additional evidence of corroboration, namely Exhibits 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008.13 slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “Although there is a presumption of nexus when the patent owner shows the asserted praise or success is tied to a specific product embodying the claimed invention, that presumption is rebuttable when the patent challenger “respond[s] by presenting evidence that shows the proffered objective evidence was due to extraneous factors other than the patented invention.” WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1329–1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotes and citation omitted). Here, EA responds with evidence from the MIT article itself, which touts the NCAA Football 2008 game’s success as due in part to “many other new features,” including “new trick plays, a highlight reel, and advanced animations,” as well as the fact that “[t]he game is playing far smoother than it [was] a year ago.” Reply 20 (citing Ex. 2012, 2). White Knuckle offers no rebuttal to EA’s evidence that the MIT article ascribes the game’s success to these extraneous features. Thus, EA succeeds in rebutting the presumption of nexus. See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (evidence that success was due to “unclaimed or non-novel features” of product “clearly rebuts the presumption that [product’s] success was due to the claimed and novel features”). In the absence of any further proof, White Knuckle falls short of tying the success of NCAA Football 2008 to the claimed invention. As such, we attribute little, if any, weight to White Knuckle’s evidence of commercial success and industry praise. Furthermore, even assuming the success and praise of NCAA Football 2008 was attributable to the live-weather update feature, the evidence shows that live-weather feeds for video games already existed in the prior art, as reflected in Pisanich. Evidence of industry praise attributable to a feature already known in the prior art is not a persuasive secondary consideration. South Alabama Med. Sci. Found. v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 823, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, Pisanich (which is prior art, as determined above) illustrates that a live-weather feed for a sports video game was well-known. Ex. 100616; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 179–183. As such, White Knuckle’s evidence of success and praise, insofar as it concerns live-weather feeds for video games, must fail because it is “focused on conventional features in the prior art.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In the end, upon weighing all the evidence, we conclude that White Knuckle’s relatively weak evidence of commercial success and industry praise fails to undermine our initial findings of obviousness with respect to the ground based on the FIFA 2001 References, as well as the grounds based on Pisanich and the Madden References.” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 8,529,350 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,529,350
  • PTAB · May 11, 2016 · IPR2015-00300 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 27, 28, 88, 101, and 108 are unpatentable as obvious over Dell, Sweere, and Allan, with Planar additionally applied to claim 108.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (internal citations omitted). Generally, “the ‘real party-in-interest’ [on the petitioner side] is the party that desires review of the patent. Thus, the ‘real party-in-interest’ may be the petitioner itself, and/or it may be the party or parties at whose behest the petition has been filed.” Id.” slip op. at 8

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

      “IV. MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE Petitioner filed a Motion to Exclude Exhibits 2003–2006. Paper 33. Each of Exhibits 2003–2005 is a license agreement, and Exhibit 2006 is a Declaration by Robert A. Sobie. All of this evidence was submitted by Patent Owner as objective evidence of secondary considerations. Because we do not rely on any of that evidence in a manner adverse to Petitioner, we dismiss the Motion as moot. Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude Exhibit 1007, which is a declaration by T.E. Schlesinger, Ph.D., which Petitioner filed with its Reply. Paper 35. Because we do not rely on Exhibit 1007 in any manner, we dismiss the Motion as moot.” slip op. at 28

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Other

      “entity. It was filed without our authorization because it was filed with Patent Owner’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude despite that Exhibit 202316 is not responsive to the Motion to Exclude. Paper 42 (“Opp. to Pet. Mot. to Excl.”). In fact, Patent Owner’s Opposition requests that we enter into the record “new Exhibit 2023, which was finalized subsequent to Patent Owner’s Response.” Opp. to Pet. Mot. to Excl. 1. A request for relief should not be made in an opposition brief. It should be made in a motion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(a) (“Relief, other than a petition requesting the institution of a trial, must be requested in the form of a motion.”). Further, a motion (and, thus, a request for relief) may be filed only if authorization has been obtained. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(b) (“A motion will not be entered without Board authorization. Authorization may be provided in an order of general applicability or during the proceeding.”). Consequently, Exhibit 2023 shall be expunged because it was filed without our authorization. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.7.” slip op. at 29

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “No limitation requires an express construction for purposes of the patentability challenge at issue here. See Pet. 6–7 (offering only one proposed construction, which was not material to the patentability challenge);8 PO Resp. 11 (“Patent Owner agrees that the claim terms involved in the [instituted Grounds] do not require construction for purposes of resolving this [inter partes review (IPR)].”).” slip op. at 7

    Patent outcomesUS 6,721,178 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,721,178
  • Apple Inc. v. Tracbeam, LLCInstitution denied
    PTAB · Feb 19, 2016 · IPR2015-01702 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

    Instituted review in IPR2015-01703 on specified Loomis grounds for claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215; denied institution in IPR2015-01702.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude the information presented shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215, but not of claims 17, 40, or 72. Accordingly, we authorize an inter partes review to be instituted only as to claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215 of the ’231 patent. Our factual findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are based on the evidentiary record developed thus far (prior to Patent Owner’s Response). This is not a final decision as” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “and second location estimation determiners determine geographical indications “independently of one another.” Independent claim 17, similar to claim 40, requires that “wherein the second instance does not depend on a geographical location of the mobile station obtained from information indicative of a distance between the mobile station and at least one of the one or more satellites.” Petitioner’s sole contention with respect to claim 40 and the cited portions of claim 17 is: “Location determiners can be independent of each other. See, e.g., 5:7–9; Figs. 6, 9.” 1703-Pet 39, 44. The portion of Loomis cited by Petitioner states that “[t]he outdoor LD system operates independently of the radio LD signal system, and each of these systems can determine the present location of the user at selected times.” IPR-1703, Ex. 1008, 5:7–9. Thus, Petitioner has shown that the outdoor LD system of Loomis is independent of the radio LD signal system, but has not shown that the radio LD signal system is independent of the outdoor LD system. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the determiners are “independent of each other,” as required by claim 40, or that “second instance does not depend on a geographical location . . . obtained from information indicative of a distance between the mobile station and at least one of the one or more satellites,” as required by claim 17 and claim 72, which depends from claim 17.” slip op. at 15

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary other

      “E. Additional Grounds We decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215 based on Bruno, in combination with Olsson and/or Geier. We also decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 39, 40, 72, 78, 81, 155, 162, 165, and 215 based on Green and Hashimoto, and additional art, as asserted in IPR-1702. Petitioner asserts multiple grounds to each challenged claim of the ’231 patent across two separate petitions, but does not address the duplicative nature of its arguments across petitions. The Board’s rules for AIA inter partes proceedings, including those pertaining to institution, are “construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b); accord 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(b) (regulations for AIA inter partes proceedings take into account “the efficient administration of the Office” and “the ability of the Office to timely complete [instituted] proceedings”). Because we institute an inter partes review of these claims based on the grounds discussed above, we exercise our discretion not to institute a review based on these grounds for reasons of administrative necessity to ensure timely completion of the instituted proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 23

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,764,231
  • PTAB · Jun 26, 2015 · IPR2015-00171 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Rehearing

    Rehearing was granted in part, instituting review of claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 for anticipation and claim 57 for obviousness.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

      “the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 42 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 43, 44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 27–35. In sum, at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits in showing claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 are anticipated by the ’095 patent. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted and trial is instituted as to this challenge.” slip op. at 5

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureReference is prior artInherency foundInstituted

      “the Petition, and overlooked the fact that Mr. Cooper’s opinion is also based on his own calculations and data in two published articles. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 99. Specifically, Mr. Cooper approximates reactor DME equilibrium concentrations in the ’095 patent examples and explains how these approximations were obtained using readily available data, specifically identifying data in two published articles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 99 (citing Exs. 1029, 1030). Mr. Cooper goes on to explain why, based on the reactor contents and distillation conditions in the ’095 patent examples, DME and acetaldehyde would be present in the overhead distillation streams. Id. ¶¶ 101–102. Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 42 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 43, 44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 27–35. In sum, at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits in showing claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 are anticipated by the ’095 patent. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted and trial is instituted as to this challenge.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found

      “terms, and we agree, for purposes of this decision, that claim 42 does not require a specific quantity of DME in the distillation overhead. We do not agree with Petitioner, however, that the Singh and ’507 patent disclosures are identical with respect to the addition of water to distillation column 22. As indicated in our Decision, both Singh and the ’507 patent describe adding small amounts of water to column 22 for the purpose of inhibiting impurity formation. See Dec. 5–6. The ’507 patent, however, includes additional description of adding water to column 22 for the purpose of producing DME in the distillation overhead. See id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 11). This additional description of adding water to produce DME in the distillation overhead does not refer back to the description of adding water as an inhibitor (see Ex. 1002, 10:9–32), or otherwise indicate that the small amounts of water used to inhibit impurity formation in the ’507 patent and Singh processes would produce DME in a distillation overhead. In addition, for the reasons explained in our Decision (Dec. 25–26), Petitioner has not persuaded us that the prosecution history of the ’507 patent includes an admission by Patent Owner that the addition of any amount of water to the distillation step would result in DME in an overhead stream. See Req. Reh’g 10. In sum, Petitioner has not convinced us that our Decision was based on an erroneous claim interpretation or that we overlooked evidence that the addition of any amount of water in the steps common to the Singh and the ’507 patent processes would necessarily result in the presence of DME in a distillation overhead. With respect to Petitioner’s assertions regarding Akinori, we note the Petition relied on Akinori as evidence that DME was necessarily produced in the ’095 patent process. See Pet. 43. Petitioner did not explain how Akinori was relevant to show the presence of DME in the distillation overhead of Singh. For the above reasons, the Request for Rehearing is denied as to the challenge based on Singh in view of the ’095 patent and Akinori.” slip op. at 7

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,076,507
  • PTAB · Jun 1, 2015 · IPR2014-01448 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Rehearing

    Rehearing was granted for claims 1 and 7 under § 103 over He and Korodi, and denied for the He and Currie ground.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

      “Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, on rehearing, based on our review of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the combination of He and Korodi. Therefore, we modify our Decision to institute an inter partes review of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Korodi. We determine, however, that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute review on the asserted ground based on He and Currie, and rehearing is denied as to that ground. At this stage in the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims, including the claim construction.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther

      “Based on the record before us, we are persuaded Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we are persuaded the combination of He and Korodi is a proper combination.” slip op. at 10

    • Burden

      “With regard to the asserted ground of unpatentability of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Currie, Petitioner does not explain adequately the relative strengths or weaknesses of this ground and the grounds on which we have instituted. See Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Constellation Tech. LLC, Case IPR2014-01180, slip op. at 29–30 (PTAB Feb. 8, 2015) (Paper 8). The Currie reference has a filing date of September 24, 2004 and an issuance date of October 17, 2006. Thus, the Currie reference would not be prior art if Patent Owner were successful in establishing a conception date “at least as early as April 2004” and diligence from conception to reduction to practice. See Prelim. Resp. 11. Accordingly, the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing do not apply to the combination of He and Currie. Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground.” slip op. at 11

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,671,279
  • Microsoft Corporation v. Enfish, LLCSome claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Mar 2, 2015 · IPR2013-00561 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 46 and 54 were held unpatentable; claims 55, 56, and 60 were not shown unpatentable; claims 16, 24–26, and 30 were terminated because their means-plus-function limitation lacked sufficient disclosed structure.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenMixed

      “Microsoft has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 46 and 54 of the ’775 patent are unpatentable. Microsoft has not shown that claims 55, 56, and 60 of the ’775 patent are unpatentable. For the reasons discussed below, we are unable to reach a determination on the alleged grounds of unpatentability over prior art for claims 16, 24–26 and 30. Accordingly, we terminate this proceeding with respect to claims 16, 24–26 and 30 under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Decided for petitioner

      “1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Additionally, specific portions of the specification must clearly link or associate a computer program or algorithm to the function corresponding to the claimed means. See Medical Inst. & Diag. Corp. v. Elektra AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the four steps and other ’775 patent specification portions identified by Enfish do not describe an algorithm for the recited function of “configuring memory according to a logical table.” We further conclude that Enfish has not clearly linked or associated the recited function to the four steps or the portions of the ’775 patent specification that Enfish identifies.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “We determine that Enfish’s proposed construction of OID introduces requirements beyond what is needed for an OID to identify data and retrieve data from memory. Enfish, for example, contends that “an OID is unique among all rows and columns of the logical table.” PO Resp. 29. Additionally, claims 46 and 54 recite that an OID is included “to identify” each attribute set and each record, but do not specifically recite using an OID to retrieve data from memory.” slip op. at 14

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “80, PG 453, 471, 481, 482, 484, Ex. 1219 ¶¶ 67–93, 119–131). For example, we are persuaded that Microsoft has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Visual Basic discloses configuring memory according to a logical table, as recited in claim 54. In the cited portions above, Visual Basic discloses storing data in a computer formatted as a table object, which is “a logical representation of a physical table.” Ex. 1204, LR 558. The table object comprises “records (rows) and fields (columns).” Id. As an additional example, we are persuaded that Microsoft has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Visual Basic discloses each record and each attribute set including an OID, as recited in claim 54. In the cited portions above, Visual Basic describes assigning a primary key and that “[a] table’s primary key is the determining factor when testing to see if the record is unique within the table.” Ex. 1204, PF 39. According to Visual Basic “[Visual Basic] creates an index on the primary key of the table and uses it to find records and to create joins between tables.” Id. Regarding each column including an OID, according to Visual Basic, “[e]ach Field in the Fields collection of a TableDef has a unique value in the OrdinalPosition property.” Id. at LR 425. Furthermore, we are persuaded that Microsoft has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Visual Basic discloses indexing data stored in the table and a cell including a pointer to an index record, as recited in claim 54. In the cited portions above, Visual Basic discloses an index object used for creating indexes to “speed up the process of finding records.” Ex. 1204, LR 276; see also id. at PF 37, 38, PG 482. Visual Basic also discloses a cell pointing to an index object. Id. at LR 280, PG 484.” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 6,163,775 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 6,163,775
  • PTAB · Feb 20, 2015 · IPR2014-00553 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing

    Rehearing was granted in part; review was instituted on four §103 grounds for claims 1–23, while the Boer-based challenge did not meet the institution threshold.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

      “patent in IPR2014-00553 (“this proceeding”). Paper 17 (“Dec.”). We observed that the grounds advanced in this proceeding “rely on teachings from Boer[1] and Wu[2] that Petitioner already identifies as disclosed by Webster” and that “Petitioner [had] not shown, and we [were] not convinced, that any of the additional grounds add substantively to the grounds on which we institute[d] inter partes review [in the related proceeding].” Dec. 16, 18. On January 2, 2015, Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing (Paper 18, “Req. Reh’g”) that notes Patent Owner now raises an issue under 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) with respect to Webster in the related proceeding that it had not raised in its Preliminary Response. Req. Reh’g 1. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that Webster is not prior art to the ʼ195 patent because Webster and the ʼ195 patent “were, at the time the claimed invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1). In view of Patent Owner’s new contention, which was not advanced until after institution, Petitioner requests rehearing of our denial of institution in this proceeding. See Req. Reh’g 4–5. We agree that, under these circumstances, rehearing is appropriate and we therefore reconsider our decision not to proceed on Petitioner’s challenges based on Boer and Wu.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedMixed

      “We agree with Patent Owner that Boer lacks sufficient detail, even in combination with the other cited art, to support Petitioner’s challenge. See Prelim. Resp. 20. Consequently, we conclude that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of claims 1–23 as obvious over Boer and other art.” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Although each of the modulation schemes in this structure is a single- carrier modulation scheme, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have appreciated the benefit of including multi-carrier modulation in the Wu system,” observing that Wu references the 802.11a standard as a multi-carrier OFDM scheme able to achieve data rates faster than the 802.11b transmission rates. Pet. 48. Petitioner supports this contention with testimony by Dr. Almeroth, which we credit. See Ex. 1103 ¶ 66. Petitioner further reasons that the addition of the multi-carrier 802.11a modulation scheme “would have been a simple addition, if a technique was available for using a channel estimate obtained from data modulated according to a single carrier modulation scheme for acquisition of data modulated according to a multi-carrier modulation scheme.” Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1103 ¶¶ 43–47, 65–68). Petitioner cites Böhnke for such a technique. Pet. 49. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s analysis on the present record.” slip op. at 5

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “carrier modulation scheme, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have appreciated the benefit of including multi-carrier modulation in the Wu system,” observing that Wu references the 802.11a standard as a multi-carrier OFDM scheme able to achieve data rates faster than the 802.11b transmission rates. Pet. 48. Petitioner supports this contention with testimony by Dr. Almeroth, which we credit. See Ex. 1103 ¶ 66. Petitioner further reasons that the addition of the multi-carrier 802.11a modulation scheme “would have been a simple addition, if a technique was available for using a channel estimate obtained from data modulated according to a single carrier modulation scheme for acquisition of data modulated according to a multi-carrier modulation scheme.” Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1103 ¶¶ 43–47, 65–68). Petitioner cites Böhnke for such a technique. Pet. 49. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s analysis on the present record.” slip op. at 5

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 6,754,195
  • PTAB · Jan 29, 2015 · IPR2013-00481 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 12 and 22 are unpatentable over Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision under § 103; claim 21 was not shown unpatentable because the art did not teach deriving actual cluster links from generated candidate …

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenMixed

      “The claim chart persuasively reads all elements of each of claims 12 and 22 onto the teachings of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision, taken together. Despite the counter-arguments in Patent Owner’s Response, and the evidence cited therein, which we have also considered, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 12 and 22 of the ’571 Patent are unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as they would have been obvious over the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision. Petitioner, however, has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 21 of the ’571 Patent is unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as obvious over the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision. 1.” slip op. at 15

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “As taught in Fox SMART, the concentration tests that are cited by Petitioner are performed as part of forming the cluster tree. Id. Petitioner does not identify a teaching in Fox SMART of deleting clusters other than those that simply overlap, or duplicate, other clusters. Overlapping clusters are deleted following a routine that identifies plausible clustering with “no limit on overlap.” Id. Additionally, Fox SMART includes code that collects orphans. Id. at 52. Petitioner, however, has not shown that Fox SMART teaches a subset, which does not include these orphans. Dr. Fox’s supplemental testimony that “Fox SMART teaches that potential (i.e., candidate) clusters are rejected (‘deleted’) if they fail any one of these tests” (Ex. 1032 ¶ 281 (citing Ex. 1005, 51)) suggests that the terms “rejected” and “deleted” are the same. We do not agree. In view of Dr. Fox’s testimony in both of his Declarations and the testimony of Dr. Jacobs, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood Fox SMART as teaching deleting overlap that had been generated by the immediately preceding software routine. Additionally, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood Fox SMART as teaching that the tests referred to by Dr. Fox are processed during formation of the tree. We, therefore, determine that Dr. Fox’s testimony does not address persuasively the requirement in claim 21 of deriving a subset of the already generated candidate cluster links. In light of the Declaration by Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Jacobs, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision teaches deriving actual cluster links. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not established that claim 21 of the ’571 Patent is unpatentable, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as obvious over the combination of Fox Thesis, Fox SMART, and Envision.” slip op. at 27

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Owner contends that the Reply Fox Declaration should be excluded in accordance with Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 702. Paper 44, 1. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the Reply Fox Declaration should be excluded because FRE 702 precludes admission of expert testimony unless “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Id. With regard to this objection, we note that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” Consequently, this objection properly goes to the weight to be given to Dr. Fox’s testimony, and not to its admissibility. It is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to the testimony offered by Dr. Fox. See, e.g., Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). When weighing evidence, we are capable of determining whether the prior art references render obvious the challenged claims without being confused, misled or prejudiced by Dr. Fox’s testimony.” slip op. at 32

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Claim 21 recites a method of displaying information about a network, which includes a determination regarding hyperjump data. As explained in the ’571 Patent specification, exemplary hyperjump data includes hyperjump links, which connect web pages, web sites, and documents on the web. Ex. 1001, 48:37–39. The specification of the ’571 Patent states that a link is a “relationship between two nodes.” Id. at 13:5–6. The ’571 Patent specification continues, “[a] link [] can be represented by a vector or an entry on a table and contain information for example, a from-node identification [] (ID), a to-node ID [], a link type [], and a weight.” Id. at 13:9–12. As described in the ’571 Patent specification, a link is represented in data stored in a computer. We, therefore, construe “cluster links” in light of the specification of the ’571 Patent to mean relationships, which are represented in data stored in a computer and are used for grouping interrelated nodes. 4. “indirect relationships” and “indirect reference” The term “indirect relationships” is recited in claim 12 and the term “indirect reference” is recited in claim 22. As discussed above, the terms “link” and “relationship” are used interchangeably in the ’571 Patent specification. For the reasons discussed above, therefore, we construe “indirect relationships” to mean indirect relationships that are represented in data stored in a computer. For these same reasons, we construct “indirect reference” to mean an indirect reference that is represented in data stored in a computer.” slip op. at 9

    Patent outcomesUS 6,233,571 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 6,233,571

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.