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  • Ipr2026-00351Institution denied
    PTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2026-00351 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied institution of IPR2026-00351 after determining that the petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,878,049
  • PTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · PGR2026-00036 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Institution

    The Director denied institution because the petition did not show that Biomed was publicly accessible as prior art, so it failed to show any challenged claim was unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16.” slip op. at 3

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

      “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

      “sufficiently that Biomed qualifies as a prior art printed publication. The Board’s precedential decision in Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), addresses prior-art qualification in the related context of instituting an inter partes review. Hulu states that “the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Id. at 13; see also Jazz Pharm. Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC. 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he IPR petitioner . . . had the burden to prove that a particular reference is a printed publication.”). The same guidance applies to post-grant reviews, albeit with the “more likely than not” standard applicable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a); Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 n.5. Hulu also states that “there is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under [37] § 42.108(c).” Hulu, Paper 29 at 16. In this case, Petitioner merely cites a “date of revision” appearing within Biomed. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005, 11). Yet, a revision date alone does not establish that Biomed was disseminated or made publicly available. And, although indicia appearing within a reference can sometimes support the printed publication status of the reference, I find the record to be devoid of any such indicia, or other evidence, supporting that Biomed was publicly disseminated or accessible by the June 15, 2021 “date of revision.” See Hulu, Paper 29 at 16–18. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that it is more likely” slip op. at 3

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 12,370,153
  • PTAB · Jul 28, 2026 · IPR2026-00102 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not sufficiently explain where the prior art taught the claimed elements.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Petitioner is required to show how the construed claim is unpatentable under the asserted grounds by “specify[ing] where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Here, Petitioner fails to specify where in the prior art each claim element is found. For example, Petitioner’s analysis based on Signore and Weaver includes a statement that each reference “discloses pressure mandrels with tap shoes,” with quotations from the references and colorized figures. See Pet. 49–51. Yet Petitioner does not explain why Signore’s “plurality of torque clamps” teach “tap shoes,” and Petitioner’s highlighting of a figure from Weaver does not elucidate which elements from Weaver that Petitioner regards as “tap shoes.” See id. As such, I find Petitioner’s showing to be insufficient for institution. “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)).” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenDenied

      “Petitioner is required to show how the construed claim is unpatentable under the asserted grounds by “specify[ing] where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Here, Petitioner fails to specify where in the prior art each claim element is found. For example, Petitioner’s analysis based on Signore and Weaver includes a statement that each reference “discloses pressure mandrels with tap shoes,” with quotations from the references and colorized figures. See Pet. 49–51. Yet Petitioner does not explain why Signore’s “plurality of torque clamps” teach “tap shoes,” and Petitioner’s highlighting of a figure from Weaver does not elucidate which elements from Weaver that Petitioner regards as “tap shoes.” See id. As such, I find Petitioner’s showing to be insufficient for institution. “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 12,104,578
  • Ipr2026-00305Institution denied
    PTAB · Jul 14, 2026 · IPR2026-00305 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Institution of IPR2026-00305 was denied because the petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

      “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00255 IPR2026-00284 IPR2026-00307 IPR2026-00261 IPR2026-00300* IPR2026-00308 IPR2026-00281 IPR2026-00305 IPR2026-00309” slip op. at 1

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Other

      “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00255 IPR2026-00284 IPR2026-00307 IPR2026-00261 IPR2026-00300* IPR2026-00308 IPR2026-00281 IPR2026-00305 IPR2026-00309” slip op. at 1

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,840,427
  • PTAB · Jul 2, 2026 · IPR2026-00112 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    Institution was denied for claims 1–12 because the petition did not show that the cited search results taught the claimed “data feed.”

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Although Petitioner asserts that the ’463 patent “does not limit the form of a data feed,” Petitioner does not explain what the ordinary and customary meaning of “data feed” was at the time of the claimed invention or otherwise propose an express construction of “data feed.” Pet. 6–7, 23. Nor does Petitioner point to any prosecution history that bears on the meaning of “data feed.” Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. Accordingly, Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence showing that Kraft’s or Wong’s disclosure of search results in response to a user-entered search query teaches a “data feed,” as recited in each challenged claim of the ’463 patent. As such, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing at least one claim is unpatentable, as 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) requires.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “I agree with Patent Owner. Neither Kraft nor Wong uses the term “data feed” or characterizes its listing of Web pages (Kraft) or nodes (Wong) provided in response to a user-provided query as a “data feed.” See Ex. 1005, 5:8–12, 6:52–59, 16:52–59, 18:31–54, 18:61–19:23; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 28, 35. Petitioner points to a disclosure in the ’463 patent of a user requesting a personal information aggregator (PIA) to “receive a data feed.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:52–64). But Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how this disclosure provides support for broadly construing “browsing a data feed” to encompass a user entering criteria for a search (and not specifically requesting a “data feed”) and receiving a listing of Web pages or nodes in response. See Pet. 23, 58–59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102, 201–202; Ex. 1005, 6:57–59 (describing users searching a data store for models that match “user-specified criteria”), 18:41–54 (describing a user submitting a query); Ex. 1007 ¶ 28 (describing “searching and selecting from keyword identifiers or other search terms”). Petitioner’s reliance on a separate disclosure in the ’463 patent of the PIA “searching . . . the network for information about the situation or event” also is not persuasive, because the ’463 patent does not describe that embodiment as involving a data feed or browsing a data feed. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:46–51) (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1001, 20:46–51.” slip op. at 3

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 12,256,463
  • Pgr2026-00008Institution denied
    PTAB · Apr 6, 2026 · PGR2026-00008 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review

    The Director denied institution of PGR2026-00008 after finding that the petitioner failed to meet the merits threshold.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

      “merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as appropriate. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00070 PGR2026-00008 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of the merits, the” slip op. at 1

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as appropriate. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00070 PGR2026-00008 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of the merits, the” slip op. at 1

    None
    Patents in suitUS 12,337,715
  • Apple Inc. v. Ginko LLCInstitution denied
    PTAB · Mar 2, 2026 · IPR2025-01388 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied institution because the petition did not sufficiently show that the asserted prior art disclosed the challenged claims’ requirement that a contact request include a permission setting.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Petitioner fails to show that Robertson discloses that the request to become a contact with a potential contact includes a first permission level for the potential contact. In other words, Petitioner does not establish that any of the cited passages in Robertson disclose that the request includes a first permission setting. See Pet. 15–17 (citing Robertson, 7:42–45, 7:55–58, 8:10–17, 8:23–24, Fig. 9). In particular, each passage is silent as to when the permission levels are set. At most, Robertson discloses specifying permissions after contact has been established. See Robertson, 7:50–53. But Petitioner fails to account for the claim requirement that the first permission level is part of the request to establish contact. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Furthermore, Petitioner must explain with particularity how the prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”). “The IPR petition, thus, must provide an understandable explanation of the element-by-element specifics of the patentability challenges, including the identification of particular portions of prior art on which the petitioner is relying.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 3

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Petitioner fails to show that Robertson discloses that the request to become a contact with a potential contact includes a first permission level for the potential contact. In other words, Petitioner does not establish that any of the cited passages in Robertson disclose that the request includes a first permission setting. See Pet. 15–17 (citing Robertson, 7:42–45, 7:55–58, 8:10–17, 8:23–24, Fig. 9). In particular, each passage is silent as to when the permission levels are set. At most, Robertson discloses specifying permissions after contact has been established. See Robertson, 7:50–53. But Petitioner fails to account for the claim requirement that the first permission level is part of the request to establish contact. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Furthermore, Petitioner must explain with particularity how the prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”). “The IPR petition, thus, must provide an understandable explanation of the element-by-element specifics of the patentability challenges, including the identification of particular portions of prior art on which the petitioner is relying.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Petitioner fails to show that Robertson discloses that the request to become a contact with a potential contact includes a first permission level for the potential contact. In other words, Petitioner does not establish that any of the cited passages in Robertson disclose that the request includes a first permission setting. See Pet. 15–17 (citing Robertson, 7:42–45, 7:55–58, 8:10–17, 8:23–24, Fig. 9). In particular, each passage is silent as to when the permission levels are set. At most, Robertson discloses specifying permissions after contact has been established. See Robertson, 7:50–53. But Petitioner fails to account for the claim requirement that the first permission level is part of the request to establish contact. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Furthermore, Petitioner must explain with particularity how the prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”). “The IPR petition, thus, must provide an understandable explanation of the element-by-element specifics of the patentability challenges, including the identification of particular portions of prior art on which the petitioner is relying.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 3

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 11,025,573
  • PTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00750 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–22 under the challenged obviousness grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Petitioner misstates the Decision’s reasoning. As is clear from the previous discussion, we determined that Petitioner’s articulated reasons for combining EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning, not because “EP’536 does not relate to ‘air bags,’” but because the means by which EP’536’s device inflates differs fundamentally from that of CN’180’s device. Dec. 17–18. Petitioner did not acknowledge this critical difference in the Petition, and continues not to do so in its Rehearing Request.” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning because EP’536’s inflation mechanism differs fundamentally from CN’180’s inflation mechanism. Dec. 17–18. As we stated, whereas CN’180’s fall-protection belt uses an airbag that requires an external source of pressurized air to inflate, EP’536’s garment does not need an external inflation device because “the gas generating agent 18 in each envelope automatically generates gas and inflates the envelopes in response to rising temperatures.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 15; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 5, 19). This difference reflects the fundamentally different purposes of the two devices: CN’180’s device is designed to provide “fall protection” to, e.g., “elderly people,” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 1, 3), whereas EP’536’s device provides “adaptive thermal insulation” for, e.g., garments worn by fire fighters. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1–3, 250. Because of the different means by which EP’536’s and CN’180’s devices inflate and the different purposes for doing so, we were not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references as Petitioner proposed. Dec. 18. We further noted that the modification would not have improved the reusability of EP’536’s device “by having only one mechanism to recharge,” because EP’536’s “gas generating agent does not need any ‘mechanism to recharge.’” Dec. 18. Instead, we noted EP’536’s teaching that its gas generating agent “automatically recombines or condenses in response to a temperature decrease to return the envelopes, and therefore the garment, to its original thickness, at which point the gas generating agent is ready for subsequent reactivation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139–141). Finally, we determined that replacing EP’536’s envelopes with CN’180’s airbag “would have made EP’536’s invention unsuitable for its intended purpose: providing a protective garment with ‘adaptive thermal insulation.’” Dec. 19. We stated that “Petitioner does not suggest, and we have found nothing in the record to establish, that CN’180’s airbag would provide this feature.” Id. at 20.” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “rationales for combining EP’536 and CN’180. Reh’g Req. 6–7. First, Petitioner asserts that we “improperly rejected Petitioner’s ‘simple substitution’ evidence in view of [the Board’s] incorrect conclusion that EP’536 does not disclose an ‘external source of inflation [EP’536’s dosing aids].’” Id. at 6 (citing Dec. 18–19). This argument is unpersuasive at least because, as we discussed above, EP’536’s dosing aids do not constitute an external source of inflation. Petitioner further argues that we incorrectly evaluated its “obvious to try” rationale because, contrary to our analysis, Petitioner did in fact identify a problem to be solved by its “finite number of solutions”: “simplify[ing] the design and reduc[ing] the number of required inflation mechanisms.” Id. at 6–7. The Petition’s entire “obvious to try” discussion is as follows: [A] POSITA would have found it obvious to try a one-piece airbag 10 with strip-shaped inflation units 12 in the EP’536- CN’180 airbag system because it would have been a selection from a finite number of identified predictable solutions (i.e., using one chamber with connected individual inflation units 12 versus multiple individual envelopes 20). 5 Petitioner also argues that dosing aids are “needed in order to make the disclosed device reusable.” Reh’g Req. 5–6. This is incorrect, as EP’536 conveys that the reusability of the device is a result of the gas generating agent condensing or recombining when temperatures fall. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139– 141. Even if it were true, however, it is unclear how it would support Petitioner’s argument. Pet. 16. As is evident, Petitioner did not identify a design need, market pressure, or other problem that would have been addressed by its identified “solutions,” and therefore we were not persuaded by this rationale. Dec. 19. Petitioner’s attempt to cure this deficiency in its Rehearing Request is tardy. We cannot misapprehend or overlook an assertion that Petitioner fails to make in the Petition. It is also insufficient. Petitioner does not provide any evidence of a known design need or market pressure to “simplify [EP’536’s] design” or reduce the number of “required inflation mechanism” it uses.” slip op. at 7

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 12,012,065
  • Ipr2025-01316Institution denied
    PTAB · Jan 9, 2026 · IPR2025-01316 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of IPR2025-01316 because the petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as applicable. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,812,646
  • Ipr2025-01274Institution denied
    PTAB · Jan 9, 2026 · IPR2025-01274 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

    The Director denied institution of IPR2025-01274 after finding the petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as applicable. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialOther

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of discretionary considerations, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 1

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,946,284
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