• Pgr2026-00008Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 6, 2026 · PGR2026-00008 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review

  The Director denied institution of PGR2026-00008 after finding that the petitioner failed to meet the merits threshold.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

    “merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as appropriate. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00070 PGR2026-00008 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of the merits, the” slip op. at 1

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as appropriate. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00070 PGR2026-00008 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of the merits, the” slip op. at 1

  None
  Patents in suitUS 12,337,715
• Pgr2025-00061Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 23, 2025 · PGR2025-00061 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Director review

  The Director denied institution of PGR2025-00061 after finding the petitioner failed to meet the applicable merits threshold.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

    “Before JOHN A. SQUIRES, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as applicable. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 1

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and § 324(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as applicable. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review or post-grant review is denied in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 1

  None
  Patents in suitUS 12,110,780
• Geotab Inc. / Geotab USA, Inc. v. Fractus, S.A.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · PGR2025-00056 · APJ Steven M Amundson · PGR · Institution

  Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that claims 1–20 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “to institute a post-grant review. We may not institute a post-grant review unless we determine that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2024). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Hence, we deny the Petition and do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 10 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 39. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 22. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’149 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 1:35–6:56, 42:44–46:28, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2, III.G.1–III.G.2, III.H.1.” slip op. at 25

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “more likely than not” standard for instituting a post-grant review. As Petitioner recognizes, the ’149 patent defines many of the claim terms Petitioner discusses in the “Claim Interpretation” section of the Petition. See Pet. 14–16. For instance, the patent defines “antenna rectangle” as “the orthogonal projection of the antenna box along the normal to the face with largest area of the antenna box.” Ex. 1005, 14:21–24. Further, the patent defines “complexity factor F21” and “complexity factor F32” consistent with the independent claims. See id. at 17:16–21, 17:49–61, 18:8–18, 19:12–25, 20:5–17, 42:62–43:25, 44:5–30, 45:8–46:3. E. Alleged Obviousness over Dou and Ciais-Multiband: Claims 7–9, 11–14, 16, 17, 19, and 20 Petitioner contends that claims 7–9, 11–14, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan who used Ciais-Quadband’s antenna for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208 would have departed from the commonly accepted rule of thumb and Dou’s preference for at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas at the lowest frequency to the extent needed to implement the proposed combination, i.e., with only about 55% of the preferred spacing between antennas. See Pet. 60–69; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 172–187. Hence, based on the current record, Petitioner does not establish sufficiently for purposes of institution that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Ciais-Quadband’s teachings with Dou’s teachings in the way Petitioner proposes. Further, the addition of two Nakano InvFL antennas extending from the ground plane both above and below the PCB does not remedy the insufficient spacing between “the swapped-in Ciais-Quadband antennas.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 67.” slip op. at 69

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,095,149
• Inari Agriculture, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 1, 2024 · PGR2024-00025 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that claims 1–20 were more likely than not unpatentable over either obviousness ground, for lack of utility, or as indefinite.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–20 of the ’033 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–20 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “level of skill, with a doctoral degree in plant breeding or a related field, at least five years of experience with corn breeding, and additional experience interfacing with laboratory-side personnel (including a computational biologist along with genetics specialists) and field-side personnel.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–22, 44–45). Petitioner also states that, “[a]lternatively, additional experience could take the place of an advanced degree.” Pet. 15. Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the qualifications of person of skill in the art” and “reserves its right to challenge Petitioner’s definition and to provide its own definition, should trial be instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 25. Petitioner’s unopposed proposed definition is consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’033 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level”” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner does not offer a specific construction for any claim terms. Pet. 19–20. Rather, Petitioner contends that “the outer boundary of the Challenged Claims lacks reasonable certainty,” and, therefore, “the Challenged Claims are unpatentable as indefinite under §112(b).” Pet. 20. Petitioner further contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious “regardless of the outer boundary of the claims.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s arguments regarding indefiniteness, and does not construe any claim terms. See generally Prelim. Resp. As explained in detail below, based on the record before us, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s indefiniteness arguments, and determine that none of the claim terms require an explicit construction to determine whether to institute post-grant review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner focuses its obviousness challenge on 1PNZQ23’s phenotype, and does not address its genotype. Prelim. Resp. 41–42; see Pet. 26–32 (comparing 1PNZQ23’s phenotype with the phenotypes of the asserted prior art). Petitioner does not direct us to, nor do we discern, any information in the Petition or Reply regarding 1PNZQ23’s genotype that supports Petitioner’s arguments regarding obviousness. Furthermore, Patent Owner offers information suggesting that “the breeding of 1PNZQ23 was unpredictable even with both parents being known in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 47. Dr. Schnable addresses unpredictability in the breeding process, stating: distinct even when the F1 plant itself results from a cross of two inbreds. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not expect that a cross of the same parents will produce F2 or D1 progeny identical to 1PNZQ23. . . . [T]he genome of a progeny plant is the result of genetic segregation and recombination in the F1 plant of the two parental genomes and the chance of the exact same child resulting from that initial biparental cross is infinitesimally small. Ex. 2004 ¶ 123. This information undermines Petitioner’s arguments regarding an expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,707,033
• Kelonia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Interius Biotherapeutics, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2024 · PGR2024-00008 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing and maintained its denial of PGR because Petitioner did not show that Perkins and RCSB PDB made claims 1–30 more likely than not unpatentable.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion exists where a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A rehearing request is not an opportunity for the requesting party to reargue its case or merely to express disagreement with the underlying decision. Nor is it an opportunity for the moving party to present new arguments that were not in its original submissions.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Owner’s argument persuasive because Perkins discloses embodiments with “mutations at I182 among a group of 20 other possible locations for modifications,” 13 of which are mutations of specific amino acids that “can be changed to any of the 19 other natural amino acids.” Id. Perkins discloses further that modifications at each of those 20 possible sites can be combined such that “one, two, or more” of the mutations can be made together in other embodiments (Ex. 1006, 17–18), or in other words, “each species [is] combinable to create a vast number of species.” Dec. 35. In addition to the locations of modifications expressly listed in Perkins, Perkins adds yet another option in which “the mutated VSV-G envelope protein is as described in Nikolic et al.” (Ex. 1006, 18), which “describes the crystal structures of VSV G bound to its native LDL-R receptor” that RCSB PDB depicts in entries 5OY9 and 5OYL (Dec. 18). We also considered Dr. Rose’s testimony about the crystal structures depicted in RCSB PDB, namely that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Perkins based on the VSV-G crystal structures in the RCSB PDB. Perkins taught that mutations to VSV-G “inhibit binding of VSV-G to the low-density lipoprotein receptor (‘LDL-R’), while preserving the VSV-G protein’s fusogenic function,” and expressly disclosed making a mutation at I182. (See, e.g., Ex. 1005 at 19:29-20:2, 20:29-21:14, 21:16-27; Ex. 1006 at 16.) The VSV-G crystal structures in the RCSB PDB taught that I182 is nearby negatively charged amino acids on the LDL-R. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate a mutation which negated an interaction with the negatively charged residues in the LDL-R. (Ex. 1005 at 19:29–20:2; Ex. 1006 at 16.) Dec. 37. discussed above, “Perkins provides a list of many mutations and combination[s] thereof, but provides no direction as to which of the many possible choices is likely to be successful.” Id. at 37–38. Thus, we were not persuaded that choosing an embodiment with a mutation at I182 from Perkins’s other listed embodiments with 20 possible locations for modifications, combinations of modifications at 20 possible locations, and the mutations described in Nikolic and depicted in RCSB PDB is an “easily traversed, small or finite number of alternatives that KSR suggested might support an inference of obviousness.” Id. at 35. In view of these findings, we noted that we did not “find sufficient evidentiary support for a determination that the navigation of RCSB PDB crystal structures to achieve the missing limitation would have been ‘evidently and indisputably within the common knowledge of those skilled in the art.’” Id. at 38.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “discussed above, “Perkins provides a list of many mutations and combination[s] thereof, but provides no direction as to which of the many possible choices is likely to be successful.” Id. at 37–38. Thus, we were not persuaded that choosing an embodiment with a mutation at I182 from Perkins’s other listed embodiments with 20 possible locations for modifications, combinations of modifications at 20 possible locations, and the mutations described in Nikolic and depicted in RCSB PDB is an “easily traversed, small or finite number of alternatives that KSR suggested might support an inference of obviousness.” Id. at 35. In view of these findings, we noted that we did not “find sufficient evidentiary support for a determination that the navigation of RCSB PDB crystal structures to achieve the missing limitation would have been ‘evidently and indisputably within the common knowledge of those skilled in the art.’” Id. at 38.” slip op. at 7

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,767,366
• Life Vac, LLC v. Dcstar Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 29, 2023 · PGR2023-00032 · APJ Michael L Woods · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show that claims 1–17 were more likely than not unpatentable over Lih, Tarrats, and da Costa or anticipated by Lih.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “institute an post-grant review if “the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the Petition fails to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of post-grant review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions are similar, with a primary difference being that Petitioner’s definition more broadly includes people having experience with “medical devices in general.” Compare Pet. 18–19, with Prelim. Resp. 6–7. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s standard is “unreasonably broad,” arguing that Patent Owner’s definition for a skilled artisan “more reasonably focuses on the nature of the subject invention.” Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We are not persuaded that a skilled artisan would have necessarily required experience with respiratory devices, as Patent Owner proposes. See Prelim. Resp. 6–7. We find Petitioner’s definition, which would include “a mechanical or biomedical engineer with at least 5 years of experience in designing or developing medical devices in general,” is consistent with the ’575 patent and the asserted prior art. Pet. 18–19; see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner expressly construes “bottom plate” and “check valve.” See Pet. 20–21. Patent Owner proposes a construction for “bottom plate,” “check valve,” and “connector.” Prelim Resp. 8–11. For purposes of this Decision, we need not and do not formally construe any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Each of the Challenged Claims requires a connector with a “bottom plate,” yet Petitioner fails to explain how the combined references would yield a connector with such a plate. See Prelim. Resp. 30–33 (arguing the same); see also Ex. 1001, 10:14–17 (independent claim 1), 10:46 (independent claim 3), 11:63 (independent claim 9); 12:35–36 (independent claim 13). Neither of Lih’s connector (element 118, Fig. 3) nor Tarrats’s “connector” (element 15, Fig. 1) has a “plate,” and Petitioner fails to explain how the lower surface of da Costa’s piston is being used to modify Lih’s or Tarrats’s connector to satisfy the claimed structure. See 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b)(5); see also Pet. 28–29. Further, Petitioner relies on da Costa’s heart resuscitating device, rather than its dechoking device, in modifying Lih. See Pet. 29 (citing da Costa’s Figure 6 and relief valves 55, 56). da Costa’s heart resuscitation device, however, is used for pumping air into a patient’s lungs for the purpose of initiating blood circulation in the event the patient’s heart stopped working. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 6:43–52. The pressure relief valves cited by Petitioner are presumably used to prevent over-pressurizing and under-pressurizing the patient’s lungs, which we understand would be dangerous for the patient. We do not see a skilled artisan as incorporating da Costa’s pressure relief valves into Lih’s choking intervention device, which is structured to prevent pumping air into a patient. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 4:3–5 (“bellows assembly 102 may include a relief valve 108 configured to allow air to escape . . . when the bellows 104 is being compressed”). Petitioner explains that the combination would “avoid pushing the obstruction farther into the user’s airway while in use and to initiate blood circulation” (see Pet. 29), yet Lih’s valve 108 already “avoid[s] pushing the obstruction farther into the user’s airway” and “initiat[ing] blood circulation” benefits a heart-resuscitation device, not Lih’s dechoking device. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that the proposed combination lacks sufficient reasoning. See Prelim. Resp. 33–37. We further agree with Patent Owner that modifying Lih’s device so that it pumps air into a patient’s lungs for the purpose of “initiating blood circulation,” as reasoned by Petitioner (see Pet. 29), would render Lih’s device unsuitable as a dechoking device, which is its intended purpose. See Prelim. Resp. 37–38 (arguing the same). To reiterate, Lih’s dechoking device avoids introducing air into the patient’s lungs, which would further lodge an obstruction in the patient’s trachea. See Ex. 1004, 4:3–5.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,478,575
• Sandoz Inc. v. Biogen Ma Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 2, 2023 · PGR2022-00054 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–16 because Petitioner did not establish that the patent was eligible for post-grant review, finding adequate written-description support in the pre-AIA priority applications.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “1. Legal Standard – Written Description 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) requires that a patent’s specification “contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This provision ensures that as of the filing date “the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Id. at 1350–51. The test “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 1351. Adequate description of a genus requires “disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Id. at 1350. “[F]unctional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function.” Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner

    “were insufficient in view of the state of the art as of the filing date of each of these three pre-AIA applications (i.e., as of the 2006, 2007, and 2010 filing dates). Prelim. Resp. 24. “This requires [Petitioner] to establish that at each of those times, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not have understood, in light of the specification and the then-current state of the art, that [Patent Owner] possessed the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”) (emphasis added); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The descriptive text needed to meet [the written description] requirement varies with the nature and scope of the invention at issue, and with the scientific and technologic knowledge already in existence.”)). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner “makes no attempt to engage with this requirement, instead focusing its arguments on the state of the art as it existed in 2006 (the filing date of the ’931 Application) and 2007 (the filing date of the ’628 application), while ignoring the 2010 application.” Prelim. Resp. 24. We also agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s failure to address the state of the art as of the filing of the 2010 application “is fatal, specifically because the Petition and the declaration repeatedly assert and admit that the field was advancing substantially between 2006 and 2010.” Id. at 27 (citing Pet. 18–19, 23–25; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 87, 114).” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner. The ’845 patent specification defines “seroconversion” as “the change of a serologic test from negative to positive, indicating the development of antibodies.” Ex. 1001, 9:3–5. Petitioner acknowledges this definition, but asserts that “in 2006, at the time the earliest patent application in the priority chain was filed,” “there were no established thresholds for JCV positivity . . . and without such thresholds, [serological tests to detect JCV] could produce false positives (e.g., by crossreacting with BK virus) and false negatives.” Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 29, 99–100). Thus, Petitioner asserts, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “‘seroconversion . . . of JCV antibodies’ requires a test ‘indicating the development of antibodies’ that is sufficiently accurate to exclude most false positives and false negatives.” Id. at 33. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. First, as Patent Owner points out, the claims themselves “do not require any specific serological test or degree of sensitivity or specificity,” and “are agnostic as to which of the various available methods known in the art and described in the specification for measuring JCV antibodies may be used.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13. Second, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s construction “impermissibly imports into the claims subjective requirements such as sensitivity, specificity, reliability, accuracy, or some particular rate of false positives or negatives,” none of which are “grounded in the intrinsic record.” Id. at 14, 15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the ’845 patent specification’s express definition of “seroconversion,” i.e., “the change of a serologic test from negative to positive, indicating the development of antibodies.” Ex. 1001, 9:3–5.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art On this record the parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) a Ph.D., M.D., or equivalent degree and (2) at least two years of experience with the use of natalizumab to treat patients with inflammatory or autoimmune diseases, including MS, RA, and/or CD.” Pet. 33; Prelim. Resp. 3, n.2. For purposes of this Decision we adopt this undisputed proposal.” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,292,845
• Boehringer Ingelheim Animal Health USA Inc. v. Kansas State University Research FoundationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2022 · PGR2022-00021 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on Grounds 1–5 under § 325(d) and found Ground 6 had not shown any challenged claim more likely than not unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

    “met (e.g., substantially the same art is presented), we move to part two of the framework, asking “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of [the] challenged claims.” Id. at 8. Factors (c), (e), and (f) of Becton, Dickinson fall within part two of the framework. Id. at 10 (“[F]actors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated material error by the Office.”). Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we then consider whether petitioner has demonstrated error. Id. at 8–10. “If the petitioner fails to show that the Office erred, the Director may exercise his discretion not to institute.” Id. at 8–9. “At bottom, this [§ 325(d)] framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9 (“If reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.”).” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “specific citations to evaluate its assertions, Petitioner does not direct our attention to any portion of the Nordgren Declaration providing information on why the partial sequences disclosed by the references teach or suggest the claimed 90% sequence homology. Pet. 76, 79 (citing Ex. 1026 at VII.C, ¶¶ 247–269). For example, Dr. Nordgren’s assertion “a POSITA would anticipate natural genetic variation of PorkNW2/USA/2009 ORF2 would bring it within the scope of the Claim 1 genera” is not supported by substantial evidence. Ex. 1026 ¶ 256. Claim 1, for example, recites a PCV3 protein and does not recite partial proteins. Without knowing what portion of complete proteins are disclosed by the references, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to predict the variation expected among a group of complete proteins to arrive at the claimed subject matter as is implied by Petitioner. Petitioner’s conclusory statements are insufficient to support a legal conclusion of obviousness. And while we agree with Petitioner that the protein sequences disclosed in the cited references do not necessarily have to be designated as PCV3 sequences, we determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that any of the PCV3 deposit references teach or suggest the recited sequences within the claimed range. Pet. 79. Therefore, Petitioner has not met its burden in showing that every claimed element is taught by its cited references, and we need not reach Petitioner’s argument on motivation to combine. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to carry its burden to show that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable based on Petitioner’s Ground 6.” slip op. at 25

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (or “POSITA”) in the field of the ’274 Patent in the October 2015 to October 2019 timeframe would have held a Doctorate in Veterinary Medicine (D.V.M.) or equivalent, or a Ph.D. or equivalent in immunology, vaccinology, virology, molecular biology, animal science, and/or husbandry, or a closely related field. A POSITA would also have practical knowledge of immunology, including how vaccine candidates are first identified and then subsequently developed. The knowledge may come from the POSITA’s own experience, or it may come through research or work collaborations with other experienced individuals in the medical, pharmaceutical, or biotech industry, e.g., as members of a research team or group. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶ 34). Absent opposition from Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s definition because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board applies the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2019). Under that standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner contends that it “does not believe any term of the ’274 Patent needs to be construed in this proceeding.” Pet. 29. We agree and independently determine that it is unnecessary to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of rendering this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,954,274
• CTC Global Corporation v. TS Conductor Corp.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 4, 2022 · PGR2022-00002 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show it was more likely than not that any challenged claim 1–6 was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness or § 112 grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “A post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has not established that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’036 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “a. Reason to Combine A successful obviousness challenge requires articulated reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“An obviousness determination requires finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine or modify the teachings in the prior art . . . .”); KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “a. Reason to Combine A successful obviousness challenge requires articulated reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“An obviousness determination requires finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine or modify the teachings in the prior art . . . .”); KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)).” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,886,036
• Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Dynaenergetics Europe GmbHInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 14, 2021 · PGR2021-00089 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all claims because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “We are authorized to institute a post-grant review where a petition demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least one challenged patent claim is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 324. We are never compelled to institute a review, however, because institution is discretionary. Id.; cf. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that under § 314(a), “the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). As in an IPR proceeding, we deny post-grant review, for example, where a petition fails to identify “with particularity” the challenges or evidence supporting them. Cf. Harmonic, 815 F.3d at 1363; 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3); Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). For the reasons discussed below, we deny the institution of post-grant review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would be expected to have at least a Bachelor’s of Science degree in Mechanical or Electrical Engineering and at least two years of industry experience related to assembling, operating, and/or designing perforating tools.” Pet. 10 (citing Parrott Decl. ¶ 28). Patent Owner “believes that Petitioner’s definition suggests that a field technician who merely assembles guns could be a POSITA, which is incorrect,” and instead proposes “a POSITA would be expected to have a Bachelor’s of Science degree in Mechanical or Electrical Engineering and at least two (2) years of industry experience related to designing perforating gun systems.” Prelim. Resp. 35–36 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 52). For the purposes of institution, we do not see a material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. Nonetheless, because Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art appears consistent with the record, including the prior art, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner for purposes of this Decision. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “D. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2020). This standard requires that we construe claims “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim[s] as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an AIA trial proceeding). Patent Owner proposes constructions for “shaped charge receptacle” and “retention mechanism extending from a portion of the body.” Prelim. Resp. 36–38; see also PO Sur-reply 1–5. In its Reply, Petitioner disputes Patent Owner’s proposed constructions. Pet. Reply 2–3. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires explicit construction. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (construing explicitly only those claim terms in controversy and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “In addition, we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently explained its alternative argument based on the “simple substitution of the circular openings (for inserting the shaped charges) in Vann for the circular openings with tabs in Von Kaenel.” Pet. 90 (citing Parrott Decl. ¶ 485). As an initial matter, Petitioner’s proposed substitution lacks sufficient clarity because it remains unclear which of Vann’s structures remain in the resulting combination. By emphasizing substitution of the “circular openings” alone in Vann, Petitioner suggests that Vann’s tabs 62 remain without explaining why the tabs are necessary if Von Kaenel’s tabs retain the shaped charges. See id. As discussed, Vann requires that the plurality of charge holders are placed in tandem and jointly cooperate together to make up a charge carrier 48. Ex. 1009, 5:50–56. To do so, tabs 62 formed by extended lateral edges 56, 58 are aligned in an overhanging relationship relative to the central lateral face 70 of the two adjacent charge holders. Id. at 6:61–64, Fig. 5. If the proposed combination employs Von Kaenel’s tabs to retain the charges, preserving the overhanging relationship of Vann’s tabs 62 to retain the charges would appear superfluous, and if Petitioner proposes retaining Vann’s tabs 62 but removing the overhanging relationship, Petitioner does not describe such a structure. In either case, a substitution of Vann’s circular openings alone while Vann’s tabs 62 remain in the resulting combination lacks adequate specificity and support. For completeness, we assess Petitioner’s argument based on the assumption that Petitioner proposes removing Vann’s tabs 62 entirely from the proposed combination. Per this theory, a POSITA would have simply substituted Von Kaenel’s side locking tabs 610 for Vann’s tabs 62 because a POSITA would have recognized the advantages of having the retention mechanisms be a part of the body in order reduce the number of tools and assembly required, to allow for differing offsets, as well as to simplify manufacturing, as discussed in each of Vann, Brooks, and Von Kaenel. Pet. 89–90 (emphasis added) (citing Parrott Decl. ¶ 484; Ex. 1013, Abstract, 2:60–3:16, 5:20–41, 8:41–58; Ex. 1009, 1:18–21, 2:22–29, 1:66–67, 1:41– 43, 3:63–68, 4:14–24; Ex. 1010, 9:48–53, 1:52–64). However, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how this substitution would “simplify manufacturing” for Vann’s specific stacked formation. Indeed, Vann’s charge carrier is formed by a plurality of charge holders that jointly cooperate in tandem, which includes the cooperation of extended lateral edges that overhang the central lateral face of adjacent charge holders. See Ex. 1009, 6:61–64; Fig. 5. Substitution of Vann’s tabs 62 with Von Kaenel’s side locking tabs 610 would affect Vann’s tandem construction if tabs 62 are removed. See Pet. 80–95. More importantly, Petitioner has failed to explain adequately why a POSITA would have sought to make this combination to simplify manufacturing or reduce assembly given Vann’s specific charge carrier design, which is dependent on the overhanging relationship between separate, stacked charge holders. Id. Further, Mr. Parrott’s testimony is not helpful on this point. In paragraph 485 (cited by Petitioner), Mr. Parrott states that Von Kaenel’s tabs (retention mechanisms) would have been applied with ease to Vann’s perforating gun apparatus, which would have yielded predictable results. A POSITA would have recognized the combination as a simple substitution of the circular openings for inserting the shaped charges in Vann for the circular openings with tabs in Von Kaenel, and a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success. Parrott Decl. ¶ 485 (emphases added). Like the Petition, these statements by Mr. Parrott are conclusory and do not explain the basis for his conclusions. See id. Looking elsewhere, paragraph 484 mirrors statements and citations in the Petition, which as discussed, are insufficient. Id. ¶ 484. And although paragraph 483 articulates the advantages of using “Von Kaenel’s superior teachings in order to better achieve the goal of reliably securing and positioning the shaped charges,” Mr. Parrott neglects to explain the proposed substitution in the context of Vann’s specific charge carrier design that relies on the overhanging edges/tabs of the charge holders for the in tandem assembly and construction. Id. ¶ 483 (citing Ex. 1013, Fig. 6B, 8:59–67). The Supreme Court has made clear that we apply “an expansive and flexible approach” to the question of obviousness. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. Whether a patent claiming the combination of prior art elements would have been obvious is determined by whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Id. at 417. Reaching this conclusion, however, requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Rather, obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention. Id. Here, Petitioner has failed to make the threshold showing for the” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,844,696

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.