• Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00701 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–14 were obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’138 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–14 of the ’138 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner states that “the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and no claim construction is necessary to find the claims unpatentable.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “a Ph.D. or master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and at least one year or four years, respectively, of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 25–29). Petitioner contends that less work experience can be compensated for by a higher level of experience and vice versa. Id. (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25). Petitioner also asserts that the proposed level of skill would be the same under any of the United States, Japanese, or PCT application dates. Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed level of qualifications for one of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 20. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As discussed above, Petitioner relies upon Parkin, and its layers 115 and 175, as the claimed first and second ferromagnetic material layers, respectively. See Pet. 10, 16. Petitioner admits that these layers are 8 In the Petition, Petitioner refers to the lower electrode “ferromagnetic layer 110’ as discussed in Claim 1[a]” in the discussion of limitation 1[d]. Pet. 18. Petitioner’s reference to “layer 110’” appears to be in error because the Petition’s discussion for limitation 1[a] refers to layer 115 of Parkin, as does Dr. Bokor’s testimony related to limitations 1[a] and 1[d]. Pet. 10; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 109, 136. amorphous, but contends that, as Parkin discloses, these layers may be annealed. Id. at 17. Petitioner, however, refers to Parkin’s disclosure that only “a portion of the storage layer 175” is crystallized after annealing. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1062, 18:51–55) (emphasis added). Petitioner also relies upon Parkin’s “thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer” that is crystallized to teach limitation 1[d]. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1062, 18:55–59; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 131–132) (emphasis added). Dr. Bokor additionally testifies that it is “Parkin’s ‘thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer’ of CoFeB” that meets the “entirely crystallized” requirement of limitation 1[d]. Ex. 1024 ¶ 132. Parkin, however, states that a thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer is formed, but “the bulk of storage layer 175 remains amorphous.” Ex. 1062, 18:55–60 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to reconcile how its assertions that the first and second ferromagnetic layers, which are mapped to the totality of layers of 115 and 175, meet the limitation that the first and second ferromagnetic layers are each “entirely crystallized” when Petitioner relies only a thin layer, that is, a portion, of the 115 and 175 layers for the teaching that the respective layers are entirely crystallized. Put another way, Petitioner’s mapping is inconsistent: Petitioner relies upon the full depth of certain “layers” of Parkin for the teaching of the ferromagnetic layers, but then only relies upon thin portion of that depth for the assertion that the “layers” are entirely crystallized.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,367,138
• Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01449 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 2 were unpatentable under any of the four asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons that follow, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent,” or “a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and four years of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent,” where “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of relevant education, and vice versa.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 17. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’463 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’463 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “C. Claim Interpretation We interpret each challenged claim using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that “the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and no claim construction is necessary.” Pet. 25–26. Patent Owner does not propose interpretations of any claim terms in its Preliminary Response. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Further, because Bowen’s disclosed barrier height is outside the claimed range, Petitioner relies on Soukup’s purported teaching of a barrier height of “about 0.33 eV” and contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “achieve” that barrier height for the MgO barrier of Bowen’s device. Id. at 34–36. The data that Petitioner relies on from Soukup for the “about 0.33 eV” barrier height, though, was determined using the slope of an Arrhenius plot, not Simmons’ formula. Ex. 1028, 3229 (Abstract), 3231–33, Table I. In Soukup, apparent barrier heights for the samples were determined using (1) the slope of an Arrhenius plot, and (2) the zero-field intercept of the straight line logI versus V1/2 plot. Id. at 3229 (Abstract), 3230–32, Fig. 3, Table I. Reproduced below is Table I of Soukup, as annotated by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 39): Annotated Table I of Soukup includes the results of analyses of sample test data, with the column highlighted in yellow showing the barrier heights obtained by a zero-field intercept method and the column highlighted in blue showing barrier heights obtained from the slope of an Arrhenius plot. See Ex. 1028, 3233; Prelim. Resp. 38–39. Dr. Bokor testifies that “Soukup disclosed that Simmons’ formula was used to approximate tunnel barrier height” and “[o]ne of skill would have understood the ‘height and the bias dependence of the insulator potential-energy barrier’ [referenced in Soukup] included the tunnel barrier height.” Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 145–147 (quoting Ex. 1028, 3229; citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 45–49). We do not find this testimony persuasive. Although Soukup refers to “Simmons’ model” and the Simmons 1963 paper in its “Introduction,” it does not teach any calculation using Simmons’ formula to obtain a barrier height within the claimed range. See Ex. 1028, 3229, 3236 n.1; Prelim. Resp. 63. Soukup plainly recognizes that there are methods of calculating barrier height other than Simmons’ formula, and discusses at length its calculations using two such methods: the Arrhenius plot method and the zero-field intercept method. See, e.g., Ex. 1028, 3229 (Abstract) (“These results . . . indicate a potential barrier height of about 0.72 eV when determined from the zero-field intercept of the straight line logI vs V1/2 plot and about 0.33 eV when obtained from an Arrhenius plot.”), 3232–33. Petitioner does not address whether the 0.33 eV barrier height it relies on from Soukup (determined using the Arrhenius plot method) would still be within the claimed range if calculated using Simmons’ formula. See Prelim. Resp. 63. Nor does Petitioner rely on any values from Soukup’s disclosure that would be used as the variables in Simmons’ formula—Petitioner relies solely on Bowen. See Pet. 39–42. Thus, Petitioner’s argument that Bowen and Soukup teach a barrier height within the claimed range, obtained using equation (1), is not persuasive. See id. at 34–42.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,123,463
• Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01384 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’403 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–8 of the ’403 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a “Ph.D. in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent,” or “a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and four years of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25). Patent Owner “does not challenge Petitioner’s POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] definition.” Prelim. Resp. 17. In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner, as it is consistent with the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner “submits the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and no claim construction is necessary to find the claims unpatentable.” Pet. 26. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Importantly, Soukup indicates a different relationship between the amount of oxygen vacancy defects in the barrier layer and the barrier height, depending on which method is used. Specifically, Soukup explicitly found that “[t]he apparent barrier height determined from the zero-field intercept went up for increasing oxygen pressure [(i.e., less oxygen vacancy defects)] and the barrier height determined from the Arrhenius plot went down.” Ex. 1028, 3229 (Abstract) (emphasis added).15 That disclosure is reflected in Table I, where Soukup shows the results for three fabricated samples with increasing oxygen pressure during MgO deposition. Id. at 3233. Patent Owner provides another annotated version of Table I below (Prelim. Resp. 45): 15 Soukup’s conclusion appears to refer to the trend of the respective increasing or decreasing barrier heights values under the two different mathematical analyses methods. Annotated Table I above shows (in red) that the barrier height decreases as oxygen vacancies increase (i.e., as the oxygen pressure admitted during MgO deposition, shown in the PO2 column, decreases) using the zero-field intercept method, and shows (in blue) that the barrier height increases as oxygen vacancies increase (i.e., as the oxygen pressure admitted during MgO deposition decreases) using the Arrhenius plot method. Prelim. Resp. 45. In other words, Petitioner’s alleged inverse relationship is present for the zero-field intercept method, but not for the Arrhenius plot method. See id.; Pet. 37–38. “The barrier height cannot both increase and decrease with more oxygen vacancy defects,” and Petitioner does not attempt to reconcile or explain Soukup’s disparate teachings. See Prelim. Resp. 45 (emphasis omitted). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner is inconsistent in relying on one method as allegedly teaching a barrier height within the claimed range, while at the same time relying on the other method for a motivation under its obviousness theory. Prelim. Resp. 45–49. If a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the Arrhenius plot method was the appropriate method for determining barrier height, as Petitioner argues in asserting that Soukup teaches a barrier height of 0.33 eV, that person would have understood that “the barrier height increases as oxygen vacancies increase” (in blue above), and Petitioner’s obviousness theory of adding oxygen vacancies to lower Bowen’s barrier height is incorrect. See id. at 47. If, however, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to the zero-field intercept method, that person “would have understood that all of Soukup’s tested samples . . . had barrier heights” (in yellow above) “above the claimed range of 0.2–0.5 eV.” See id. at 48. Petitioner cannot have it both ways. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,884,403
• Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01385 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4 would have been obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’263 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–4 of the ’263 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’263 patent would have had a “Ph.D. in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent,” or “a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and four years of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “As discussed above, Petitioner fails to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected the barrier height value it relies upon. And given the disparity of Soukup’s barrier tunnel values under the different methods of analyses, the reference is, at best, ambiguous as to which values are accurately representative of barrier height. Additionally, the evidence supports that the apparent barrier height value that Petitioner relies upon (“about 0.33 eV”) will be a different higher value, so the actual value of the barrier height is uncertain. Accordingly, we do not find that Petitioner has met its burden to sufficiently demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Soukup to teach or suggest the claimed range of limitation 1[e] in that there is insufficient evidence presented that supports that the selected Soukup barrier height value represents an accurate value.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,319,263
• Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution denied
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01386 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 were unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that, for the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Pet. 28–29 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25). Petitioner further states that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of relevant education, and vice versa” and that “[t]his level of ordinary skill would be the same if the relevant time period were around the March 12, 2004 or October 28, 2004 Japanese priority applications, or the March 10, 2005 PCT filing date.” Id. at 29 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Patent Owner Response only, Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] definition because the Petition fails even if Petitioner’s POSA definition is adopted.” Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Pet. 28–29). To resolve the institution question, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art. The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and its progeny. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner states that “the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and no claim construction is necessary to find the claims unpatentable.” Pet. 25. Patent Owner does not directly” slip op. at 7

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Thus, the cited teachings of Sunai support Patent Owner’s position that, even if adding boron into a ferromagnetic layer of CoFe results in a higher TMR as taught by Sunai, the addition suppresses crystallization. As to the issue of the teaching of the BCC structure of the alloy, not only does Petitioner’s challenge applying Bowen and Sunai fail to demonstrate a teaching or even a suggestion of a CoFeB alloy with a BCC cited by Petitioner does not either. Only one of Petitioner’s cited pieces of underlying evidence refers to a BCC lattice structure, Parkin, but Parkin’s BCC structure is disclosed with respect to a CoFe layer, and not a CoFeB layer. Ex. 1062, 18:55–59 (“The simple cubic crystalline MgO layer thus provides a template for the formation of a thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer which has the bcc structure of CoFe and is oriented in the same (100) direction as the MgO layer.” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,608,198
• Biofrontera Inc. / Biofrontera Bioscience GmbH et al. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00874 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, failing to show Bansal's claimed light intensity arrangement.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An obviousness determination requires finding both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” CRFD Research, Inc. v. Matal, 876 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367– 68 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Obviousness grounds must be supported with “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” and not by “mere conclusory statements.” See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S at 418. slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown for institution that Bansal teaches or suggests arranging light sources “such that a higher intensity of light is emitted proximate the second edges compared to the intensity of light emitted not proximate the second edges,” as required by the challenged claims. Instead, Petitioner demonstrates how Bansal describes varying the density of light source distribution throughout the array to provide a higher density of light in the entire peripheral area of the array, which includes the areas proximal to both the first and second edges, as compared to the central area of the array. See Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1005 ¶ 25. In this regard, Petitioner relies on Bansal’s Figure 9b, asserting that it “shows one embodiment where more light sources are placed near the edges of the panel compared to the light sources in the center.” Pet. 36–37. The comparison of Bansal’s light density between the entire periphery and the central area of the array is insufficient. What is missing from Petitioner’s argument and discussion of Bansal is how Bansal teaches or suggests a configuration that provides a higher density of light proximate to the second shorter edges of the periphery in comparison to the remaining areas of the array, which includes the first longer edges of the periphery. Without that discussion, we find that Petitioner has not shown sufficient for institution that Bansal is persuasively relied upon for the light source arrangement limitation of the challenged claims. likelihood of prevailing in its obviousness challenge of independent claims 1, 5, 16, 20, or 21, or dependent claims 2, 4, 6–8, and 17–19 over Larsen, Bansal, and Jones.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelOther

    “would have had at least a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering, physics, biomedical engineering, computer engineering, chemical engineering, material science, or a related scientific or engineering field, and at least one year of work or research experience in optics, optoelectronics, radiometry, photometry, photodynamic diagnosis (PD), photodynamic therapy (PDT), phototherapy (PT), or a related field. Pet. 8. Petitioner asserts that, alternatively, a “POSITA in the relevant time frame would have had at least four years of industry or academic experience in optics, optoelectronics, radiometry, photometry, PD, PDT, PT, or a related field.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 37). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the application for the ’028 patent was filed, “would have had a M.D. and/or a Ph.D. in an electrical engineering, physics, optical sciences, optical engineering, or a related scientific or engineering field, and at least one to two years of work or research experience in optical engineering, optics, optoelectronics, phototherapy (‘PT’), PDT, or a related field.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner asserts that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA could have a Bachelor’s degree in one of the above areas and at least three to four years of work or research experience in that area.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 30–31). We note that the parties’ proposed definitions are largely similar. To the extent that the proposed definitions differ, we do not need to resolve those differences as our findings and conclusion in this Decision would be the same under any of the proposed definitions.” slip op. at 9

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,697,028
• Motorola Mobility LLC v. Largan Precision Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00688 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–22 would have been obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We determine, on the record before us, that Petitioner does not have a likelihood of success of showing that the “prolonged” etching process that Petitioner proposes to arrive at the structure of limitation 1.6 to be “unusually simple” nor is “the technology particularly straightforward.” CN182’s etching process uses an alkali (sodium bicarbonate) solution with a concentration from 5% to 35% at a temperature of 35 to 55°C stirred for a period of 3 to 5 hours in an ultrasonic generator with power of 300 to 500 watts. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 7–12. This is done in CN182 to create a matte structure on the inner surface of the body composed of plastic material (polyethylene terephthalate (PET)) between two antistatic coatings comprised of carbon powder layers. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 5–6. Petitioner does not indicate how much time beyond CN182’s stated range of 3 to 5 hours would be required for the “prolonged” etching process it proposes to achieve a minimum depth of 2.0 μm relative to the outer carbon powder layer, nor whether a POSITA would have considered the prolonged time to be practically viable. Petitioner also does not explain what the reaction is, what its etch rate is, whether its effect would be diminished or exhausted as reactants are consumed or affected by other substances present, or whether other variables, such as the alkali concentration, temperature, or power and frequency of the ultrasonic generator, would need to be changed and how much over the course of the “prolonged” etching process.” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner states as follows: The person of ordinary skill in the art in November 2016 (“POSITA” or “POSA”) would have held a bachelor’s degree in physics, optical sciences, or a closely related field, and approximately three years’ experience in optical system design, including stray light suppression. More education would compensate for less work experience and vice versa. POSITAs understood the fundamentals of stray light suppression. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1008, 587:18–20, 167, 595:32–33, xiii:24–26; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–37). Petitioner further asserts that various texts in the record reflect the knowledge of a POSITA. Id. at 36 (citing Exs. 1007–1010). Petitioner alleges that a POSITA could be part of a team that includes a lens designer and a stray light specialist. Id. (citing Ex. 1007, 120; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33, 36, 38–41). Patent Owner states that Patent Owner “does not dispute Motorola’s articulation of the level of skill in the art in November 2016.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (citing Pet. 35–36). For this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal for the level of ordinary skill in the art as consistent with the evidence of record, including the ’660 patent and the prior art references on which Petitioner relies. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “Patent Owner correctly argues that the evidence does not show that Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Milster, has expertise in etching of plastic materials such as PET which CN182 discloses for use as the inner substrate layer. Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–37). Dr. Milster states that he has “education, knowledge, skills, and experience in the fields of optics and lens design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 29. This statement does not provide any evidence of expertise in etching plastic materials. Nor does he indicate that he has any expertise in this field in his curriculum vitae. Ex. 1003, Appendix A. Consequently, on this record, Dr. Milster’s testimony on the subject of etching plastic materials is entitled to little or no weight.” slip op. at 33

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes that the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms applies, and does not propose any specific construction for any claim term. Pet. 36. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s statement regarding claim construction, i.e., that the plain and ordinary meaning applies and no express construction is required. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 82–87). As Petitioner and Patent Owner do not dispute the meaning of any claim term, we decline to expressly construe any claim term, and instead apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,997,660
• Dyson Technology Ltd. / Dyson, Inc. v. Omachron Intellectual Property Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00766 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over the asserted prior-art grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious over the prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “However, each of these asserted modifications is based on a teaching that is not present in Brown. Brown does not teach “a projection that provides resistance against ‘handle’ movement” or that “opening Brown’s ‘cover’ requires bending Brown’s ‘port,’” as asserted by Petitioner. See PO Resp. 22. As repeatedly noted, the identified “projection” appears to be nothing more than a portion of cover 14 the accessory/hose port. Petitioner’s arguments regarding a projection that provides resistance and a bendable port in Brown, appear to be nothing more than an effort to create the limitations of the claims in the prior art based on improper hindsight. For at least the above reasons, the Petition does not show how Brown teaches or suggests all of the limitations of the independent claims.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner argues that when cleaning tool 10 (i.e. accessory) is in position on the vacuum, end wall 26 cannot open and, thus, that end wall is inhibited from opening. Pet. 45–46 (citing Ex. 1005, ¶ 37, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–145 (similar statements from Petitioner’s declarant)). Petitioner then asserts that the catch is therefore inhibited from moving to the disengaged position. Id. at 46. The combination of Dimbylow and Howes does not teach this limitation and Petitioner’s assertions are not persuasive. As can be seen from the above annotated Figure, nothing inhibits Dimbylow’s catch 42 from moving to a disengaged position. See also Prelim. Resp 11–14. Rather, any time Howe’s button is pressed, thereby moving the push-rod (to the right in the Figure), catch 42 would disengage, whether the door opened or not. Though cleaning tool 10 (i.e. accessory) inhibits end wall 26 from opening, it has no impact on movement of catch 42 (i.e. lock engaging member) from the engaged to disengaged position as required by the claim. Thus, the lock engaging member of Petitioner’s combination, i.e., the catch, is not inhibited from moving to a disengaged position when the accessory, i.e., the cleaning” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSA”). Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner’s declarant asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and 2-3 years of experience in machine design, such as vacuum cleaners. Additional education could offset less experience and vice versa, and a POSA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means. Ex. 1002 ¶ 42; see also Pet. 22 (making the same assertion without citation to declarant). Patent Owner does not contest the level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 2. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s (and its declarant’s) proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’477 patent and prior art of record. We adopt the above definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,568,477
• Dexcom, Inc. v. Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00520 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Dexcom did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 5–7 were unpatentable under either Stafford–Raymond ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Burden of Proof “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity … the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Therefore, in an inter partes review, the burden of proof is on the Petitioner to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable; that burden never shifts to the patentee. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). At the institution stage, Petitioner must show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not find these arguments persuasive. It may be so that Turner teaches that its recesses 77 receive rotation-restricting protrusions 71, which “extend[] into each recess 77 such that the recess side walls interfere with the protrusions to prevent rotation of the insertion device relative to body 20.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 69. And, it may also be so that Turner teaches this assembly as an advantage in that it prevents rotation of body 20. Id. However, Petitioner did not present this “design choice” theory of obviousness in the Petition. Petitioner first raises its “obvious design choice” argument with respect to Turner and Ground 2 in its Reply Brief; it is not to be found in its Petition.12 Petitioner cannot raise an argument in its” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In each of the ’335 Specification, Stafford, Raymond, and Turner, the OBU is universally depicted as having a circular perimeter oriented around a longitudinal axis, and possessing either a cylindrical shape (’335 patent, Stafford, Raymond) or a roughly domed shape, with a circular, circumferential collar. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8, 17, 52, 54; Ex. 1009, Figs 3A–C, 4A; Ex. 1010, Figs. 14–16, Ex. 1011, Figs. 2A–B, 5G, 7A-B, 9, 11, 13A–B, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 29, 30, 37, 38. Moreover, in each description of the location of recesses 3766 in the ’335 Specification, the recesses are described as being located “on the side walls” of the OBU. See Ex. 1001, col. 44, ll. 8–12; col. 45, ll. 61–64. Given the circular perimeter of all of these embodiments of the disclosures of the ’335 Specification, the teachings of Petitioner’s cited references, the dictionary definition of “periphery” as being “the perimeter of a circle or other closed curve,” and the ordinary meaning that the terms would have had to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention, in view of the ’335 Specification and file history” (Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13), we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the “plurality of recesses disposed on a periphery of the on body electronics unit housing” would be located “on the circumference of the on-body housing,” as we concluded in the ’01396 IPR Decision. See Dec. 48; see also Ex. 1001, col. 44, ll. 9–14 (stating that “gripping arms 3762 [of medical device carrier 3730] are provided with engagement boss 3764 which are configured to engage with corresponding recesses 3766 provided on the side walls of the on body housing 322”).” slip op. at 38

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “However, Petitioner did not present this “design choice” theory of obviousness in the Petition. Petitioner first raises its “obvious design choice” argument with respect to Turner and Ground 2 in its Reply Brief; it is not to be found in its Petition.12 Petitioner cannot raise an argument in its 12 The Petition makes a design choice argument with respect to the teachings of Raymond on Ground 1, contending that “it would have been an obvious design choice to implement two spaced-apart plural recesses on the housing—one to engage the protrusions on each of the two arms taught by Raymond.” Pet. 38. However, Petitioner adduced no prior art teaching or evidence of record of “spaced-apart plural recesses on the housing” that Reply Brief if that argument could first have been raised in its Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); see also L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. Univ. of Massachusetts, 2018 WL 4278992, *5 n.4 (PTAB Sept. 7, 2018); Matterport, Inc. v. Appliance Comp. III, Inc., 2021 WL 6340164, *9–10 (PTAB Nov. 19, 2021).” slip op. at 32

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,266,335
• NXP USA, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00142 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16 were unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent “would have had at least the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and one to two years of experience in the field of circuit design, particularly the design of circuits operating at high frequencies.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not identify a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’330 patent or identify any specific shortcoming in Petitioner’s definition. See Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 4. This definition is consistent with the ’330 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

    “Petitioner argues that “no express constructions of the claims are necessary to assess whether the prior art reads on the challenged claims.” Pet. 8. However, Petitioner also cites to a Special Master Report and Recommendation on Claim Construction where “node” was construed to mean “a point of connection or intersection in an electrical circuit.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ex. 1015, 29). Patent Owner adopts this construction for purposes of this Decision on Institution. Prelim. Resp. 8. We find that this construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “node.” We thus apply the construction as such to our analysis below, and we determine that we need not provide an express construction of any other claim term for purposes of this institution decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “[claim] limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “A claim limitation is inherent in the prior art if it is necessarily present in the prior art, not merely probably or possibly present.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite, Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “[t]o anticipate, the reference must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F. 3d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, it is not enough to be able to find all of the pieces of the claimed invention somewhere in a prior art reference; rather, those elements must be set out in the prior art reference in the same way they are in the claimed invention. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because the hallmark of anticipation is prior invention, the prior art reference—in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,535,330

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.