• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01238 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 14–16 would have been obvious over Doshi, Guichard, and Ashwood Smith.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Based on the record before us, Petitioner does not set forth sufficient argument and evidence to demonstrate that the combined teachings of Doshi, Guichard, and Ashwood Smith teach or suggest “digital logic . . . configured to determine a probability of concurrent failure of said working entity and said protection entity,” as recited in claim 14. Accordingly, there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that the subject matter of independent claim 14 would have been obvious over Doshi, Guichard, and Ashwood Smith. Due to the dependency of claims 15 and 16 from claim 14, and for the same reasons as those explained above addressing claim 1, based on the record before us Petitioner does not set forth sufficient argument and evidence to demonstrate that the combination of Doshi, Guichard, and Ashwood Smith teaches or suggests the limitations of claims 15 and 16. Accordingly, there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that the subject matter of dependent claims 15 and 16 would have been obvious over Doshi, Guichard, and Ashwood Smith.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s arguments. We find that Petitioner does not show sufficiently that Ashwood Smith discloses, teaches, or suggests “digital logic . . . configured to determine a probability of concurrent failure of a working entity and a protection entity,” as required by claim 14. Petitioner implicitly construes “digital logic . . . configured to determine a probability of concurrent failure of said working entity and said protection entity” to require “calculat[ing] the probability of concurrent failure of the paths.” Pet. 77; see also id. (“calculating such probability for two paths”), 78 (also implicitly construing “digital logic . . . configured to determine an entity cost of said plurality of transport entity descriptors” to require “cost calculation”). We agree with Petitioner’s implicit construction because it is consistent with the claim language and the ’821 Patent Specification which discloses a simultaneous failure probability (SFP) function (Eq. 1) and SFP values calculated by a concurrent failure probability matrix. See Ex. 1001, 3:44–47, 6:5–11, 6:39–40. Similar to Doshi’s description of the probability of failure in terms of “very insignificant” (see Ex. 1005 ¶ 40), Petitioner’s cited disclosures of Ashwood Smith describe the probability of failure at a common point in terms of “fairly low” (see Ex. 1037, 3:21–23) “highly unlikely” (see Ex. 1037, 10:32), and “below a certain level” (see Ex. 1037, 11:7–8). Although Petitioner asserts that Ashwood Smith’s method determines the probability of failure at a common point between two paths (see Pet. 67), the teachings of Ashwood Smith cited by Petitioner do not support a finding that Ashwood Smith discloses, teaches, or suggests “digital logic . . . configured to determine the probability of concurrent failure,” as implicitly construed by Petitioner to require calculating a probability of concurrent failure of a working entity and a protection entity. Petitioner also cites Ashwood Smith’s disclosure suggesting a possible refinement to the disclosed method that would take into account the actual probability of failure at a common point shared by two or more working paths. See Ex. 1037, 10:21–24. Petitioner, however, does not direct us to any disclosure in Ashwood of digital logic configured to determine or calculate the probability of failure at a common point. See Pet. 66–69, 74–78. Instead, Petitioner overlooks Ashwood Smith’s disclosure that the probability of failure at a common point is allocated (i.e., distributed, assigned, given out) by the data transport network operator. See Ex. 1037, 11:4–6. This allocation of failure probability by the data transport operator is similar to the ’821 Patent Specification’s disclosure that “[s]pan failure probabilities may be assigned, for example, manually by a network operator based on network knowledge” and “[n]ode failure probabilities may be configured by the operator, typically based on vendor-provided mean time between failure (MTBF) parameters, and on infrastructure failure probability, for example, power failure probability.” Ex. 1001, 6:20–23, 6:29–33. We also give little weight to Petitioner’s witness Dr. Min’s testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 234–237) that Ashwood Smith teaches determining a probability of concurrent failure of two paths because, for the same reasons, it is not supported by an underlying factual basis. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “IPR2023–00402, we find that Doshi does not disclose, teach, or suggest “digital logic . . . configured to determine a probability of concurrent failure of said working entity and said protection entity,” as required by claim 14. Although Doshi discloses selecting a subset of path pairs based on cost (see Ex. 1005 ¶ 144, Fig. 11), and that disjoint path pairs may have very insignificant probability of failure, Petitioner does not direct us to where Doshi discloses, teaches, or suggests “digital logic . . . configured determine the probability of concurrent failure of the primary path and the restoration path.” See Pet. 67, 74–76. We also give little weight to Petitioner’s witness Dr. Min’s testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶ 255) that determining path disjointedness corresponds to determining a probability of concurrent failure is entitled to little weight because, for the same reasons, it is not supported by an underlying factual basis. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). For example, Petitioner does not provide a factual basis for equating a determination of path disjointedness (e.g., strictly disjoint, partially disjoint) with a determination of the probability of concurrent failure of the primary and restoration path. We also give little weight to Dr. Min’s testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶ 258) that Doshi’s disclosure of selection logic configured to perform the method of Figure 11 teaches logic configured to determine probability of concurrent failure of said working entity and said protection entity because it also is not supported by an underlying factual basis. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 256–258; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 142–145; Fig. 11.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(‘POSITA’) would have had a working knowledge of network communications and multiprotocol label switching (‘MPLS’) techniques available at the time.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–51). Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of network communications and been knowledgeable regarding MPLS techniques.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). Patent Owner does not address the skill level of a person of ordinary of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. For the purpose of determining whether to institute trial, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’821 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,830,821
• Google LLC v. Dialect, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00747 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Google did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “c) Summary Based on the record before us, Petitioner does not set forth sufficient argument and evidence to demonstrate that the combination of Coffman, Kanevsky, and Ronning teaches or suggests “the parser selects at least one of the plurality of domain agents based on the determined meaning,” as Petitioner would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Coffman, Kanevsky, and Ronning.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “We have reviewed Coffman’s disclosure and Mr. Schmandt’s testimony cited by Petitioner in support of its arguments in light of the Preliminary Response arguments, and agree with Patent Owner that Coffman does not disclose the NLU (i.e. parser) selects a conversationally- on the determined context. Petitioner’s citations to page 6, line 32 through page 7, line 3, page 37, lines 2 through 4 and page 41, lines 1 through 7 of Coffman fail to provide adequate support for Petitioner’s arguments. We agree with Patent Owner that page 6, line 32 through page 7, line 3 of Coffman discloses mouse clicks and stylus pointing by a user. See Prelim. Resp. 39; Ex. 1003, 6:32–7:3. We further agree with Patent Owner that page 37, lines 2 through 4 is directed to queries, not selecting applications. See Prelim. Resp. 32–33; Ex. 1003, 37:2–4. Finally, we agree with Patent Owner that page 42, lines 1 through 7 associates a process with tasks and threads performed at the conversational virtual machine. See Prelim. Resp. 30; Ex. 1003, 42:1–7, 42:16–17, Fig. 4. Mr. Schmandt’s cited testimony is nearly identical to the arguments presented in the Petition. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71, 85. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony is conclusory and fails to provide a sufficient underlying factual basis for the testimony because it relies on the same citations to Coffman’s deficient disclosure. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71, 85. Petitioner does not rely on the teachings of Kanevsky and Ronning in combination with Coffman for teaching “the parser selects at least one of the plurality of domain agents based on the determined meaning.” See Pet. 24– 25, 25–26, 31–32. c) Summary Based on the record before us, Petitioner does not set forth sufficient argument and evidence to demonstrate that the combination of Coffman, Kanevsky, and Ronning teaches or suggests “the parser selects at least one of the plurality of domain agents based on the determined meaning,” as Petitioner would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Coffman, Kanevsky, and Ronning.” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We have reviewed Coffman’s disclosure and Mr. Schmandt’s testimony cited by Petitioner in support of its arguments in light of the Preliminary Response arguments, and agree with Patent Owner that Coffman does not disclose the NLU (i.e. parser) selects a conversationally- on the determined context. Petitioner’s citations to page 6, line 32 through page 7, line 3, page 37, lines 2 through 4 and page 41, lines 1 through 7 of Coffman fail to provide adequate support for Petitioner’s arguments. We agree with Patent Owner that page 6, line 32 through page 7, line 3 of Coffman discloses mouse clicks and stylus pointing by a user. See Prelim. Resp. 39; Ex. 1003, 6:32–7:3. We further agree with Patent Owner that page 37, lines 2 through 4 is directed to queries, not selecting applications. See Prelim. Resp. 32–33; Ex. 1003, 37:2–4. Finally, we agree with Patent Owner that page 42, lines 1 through 7 associates a process with tasks and threads performed at the conversational virtual machine. See Prelim. Resp. 30; Ex. 1003, 42:1–7, 42:16–17, Fig. 4. Mr. Schmandt’s cited testimony is nearly identical to the arguments presented in the Petition. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71, 85. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony is conclusory and fails to provide a sufficient underlying factual basis for the testimony because it relies on the same citations to Coffman’s deficient disclosure. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71, 85.” slip op. at 19

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’738 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,502,738
• Google LLC v. Dialect, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00749 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable, including failing to persuasively show parser-based domain-agent selection.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and the associated evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing with respect to any challenged claim. For example, Petitioner and Mr. Schmandt do not address the challenged claims’ selecting limitations in a sufficiently persuasive manner. Coffman’s disclosure is high-level, which Petitioner and Mr. Schmandt recognize. See, e.g., Pet. 48; Ex. 1002 ¶ 125. Coffman’s high-level discussion lacks clear disclosures of certain key things that Petitioner and Mr. Schmandt perceive in Coffman’s disclosure. And Petitioner and Mr. Schmandt do not provide sufficiently clear, persuasive explanation to substantiate their position that Coffman teaches the challenged claims’ selecting limitations.” slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “patent “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of speech- and natural language-interfaces for interacting with and directing computer systems and software, including speech recognition and processing (and more experience could substitute for less formal education, and vice versa).” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 11–15). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. See, generally, Prelim. Resp. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears to be consistent with the ’720 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Both Parties express that we do not need to construe any claim language explicitly. Pet. 23; Prelim. Resp. 13. We agree that no explicit claim construction is necessary for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,693,720
• Google LLC v. Dialect, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00748 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–6 and 9 obvious, including the domain-agent limitation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Because Petitioner’s arguments and evidence do not address sufficiently persuasively the challenged claims’ “domain agent associated with the determined context,” the record does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing with respect to any of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “patent “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of speech- and natural language-interfaces for interacting with and directing computer systems and software, including speech recognition and processing (and more experience could substitute for less formal education, and vice versa).” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 11–15). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. See, generally, Prelim. Resp. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears to be consistent with the ’006 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Both parties express that we do not need to construe any claim language explicitly. Pet. 21; Prelim. Resp. 14. We agree that no explicit claim construction is necessary for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Mr. Schmandt rests his opinion regarding the processing limitation on his testimony that “[a]s explained above, Coffman teaches that the conversationally-aware application associated with the determined context (‘the domain agent associated with the determined context’) is invoked to process the user’s request.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1003, 37:2–4, 13:8–13, 58:9–11, 40:9–19, 30:4–10); see also Pet. 49–50 (same position citing same Coffman passages). This alleged teaching is not clearly in the cited passages of Coffman. And, although Mr. Schmandt represents that he “explained above”11 why he reads Coffman this way, he does not provide a cohesive, persuasive explanation of his reading of Coffman. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139. Instead, Mr. Schmandt’s testimony resorts significantly to conclusory statements without logical, persuasive support. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 125 (“making clear that an application is automatically selected and carries out a request as a result of processing by the conversational system.”). Petitioner does no better. See, e.g., Pet. 44.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,015,006
• Databricks, Inc. v. R2 Solutions LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00659 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Pike, Pike with Chowdhuri, or Pike with Chowdhuri and MacLeod rendered claims 1–46 obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’610 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert a POSITA would have found it obvious to include file names to identify the data in each of Pike’s input files “because it would have allowed for locating that data group in Pike’s system and understanding the data in that file.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 93).13 Petitioner then makes the leap that, by understanding the data in an input file, a MapReduce programmer would have had reason “to identify input files and write ‘application-specific’ map and reduce functions on those files.” Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002, 10:1–7, 11:28–47, 14:12–27; Ex. 1005 ¶ 93). The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Pike nor other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation to write application-specific map and reduce functions that process each input file by identifiable schema or data type, i.e., by “data group” as recited in claim 1. Pike teaches application-specific programming “to process the input data one record at a time” or “to generate its output data in the form of key/value pairs,” nothing more. Ex. 1002, 7:31–36; see Pet. 29 (citing same); Prelim. Resp. 40–41, 50–51, 56 (citing same). Petitioner’s posited file names for Pike’s input files, moreover, could not serve as the claimed “data group” mechanism to identify the data in each input file by schema (or data type) for separate map and reduce processing. Each of Pike’s 13 Linn Declaration paragraph 93 is substantially identical to Petitioner’s argument and does not add any further insight or analysis on this point. data blocks can include data from more than one input file, a portion of one input file, or an entire input file. Ex. 1002, 6:55–7:6; see also Prelim. Resp. 47 (“Pike’s ‘data blocks’ (purported ‘partitions’) can be entire ‘input files,’ parts of ‘input files,’ or parts of multiple ‘input files’”). Therefore, a file name for one input file could not uniquely identify all of the data within a given data block, which could include data from different input files. Id. We agree with Patent Owner’s reasoning and argument on this point as well. In sum, Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that a POSITA would have had reason or motivation to use input file names in Pike as “data group” identifiers, as recited in claim 1 of the ’610 patent. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (obviousness requires “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentable

    “We further agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s asserted motivation for tracking processed data “derived from a particular [input] file” to improve efficiency “by enabling a data set to be selectively reduced after it is mapped” (Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 119)), is speculative hindsight-based reasoning. Petitioner’s posited motivation is grounded in benefits residing in the ’610 patent, not in the prior art or knowledge of a POSITA. Prelim. Resp. 48. Petitioner’s evidence—Dr. Linn’s naked opinion that a POSITA “could” have used the identification of processed output file data as “derived from a particular file” to selectively reduce intermediate data (Ex. 1005 ¶ 119)—is unpersuasive for the reasons given above and legally insufficient. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 35

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to the patentability of any of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent. Therefore, we deny institution of inter partes review of the challenged claims. We need not address Patent Owner’s argument for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) in view of our decision denying institution on the merits.” slip op. at 50

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,190,610
• Cloudera, Inc. v. R2 Solutions LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00303 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on the merits, finding that Pike and Pike with Chowdhuri, alone or with MacLeod, did not show a reasonable likelihood of rendering claims 1–46 unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’610 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “someone having “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related [to] performing data analytics and/or related data processing tasks.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 67–69; In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Petitioner further asserts that work experience can substitute for formal education and additional formal education can substitute for work experience. Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 14.” slip op. at 14

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “13–31; Ex. 1008, 10–19); Prelim. Resp. 10 n.1, 17 (citing Pet. 10; Ex. 1007, 24– 25); see also Paper 7, 2 (Updated Mandatory Notices).10 The parties each provided proposed constructions of “data group” and related arguments to the court. Id. The district court construed “data group” as “a group of data and a mechanism for identifying data from that group (e.g., a group identifier).” Ex. 1007, 23–25. Having reviewed the district court’s construction of “data group,” and given the parties’ application of that construction here, we apply the district court’s construction of “data group” for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim terms “need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument explicitly and implicitly relies on the teachings of the ’610 patent, not Pike or some other MapReduce reference or teaching, for the proffered motivation that a “POSITA would have understood,” “recognized,” or “found it obvious to implement” Pike’s MapReduce system to include input file names as the “data group” identifiers in claim 1 of the ’610 patent. See Pet. 17–18. Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert a POSITA would have found it obvious to include file names to identify the data in each of Pike’s input files “because it would have allowed for locating that data group in Pike’s system and understanding the data in that file.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 93).14 Petitioner then makes the leap that, by understanding the data in an input file, a MapReduce programmer would have had reason “to identify input files and write ‘application-specific’ map and reduce functions on those files.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 10:1–7, 11:28–47, 14:12–27; Ex. 1005 ¶ 93). The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Pike nor other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation to write application-specific map and reduce functions that process each input file by identifiable schema or data type, i.e., by “data group” as recited in claim 1. Pike teaches application-specific programming “to process the input data one record at a time” or “to generate its output data in the form of key/value pairs,” nothing more. Ex. 1002, 7:31–36; see Pet. 27 (citing same); Prelim. Resp. 39–40, 49–50, 55 (citing same).” slip op. at 31

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,190,610
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Zilkr Cloud Technologies, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00809 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Cisco did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 13, 14, and 17 were obvious over de Castro and Robb.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review. B. Real Party in Interest” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “having “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of relevant experience in telecommunications and networking.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–34). Further, Petitioner asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the subject matter of the ’048 patent. This is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Houh. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–34. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Here, Petitioner explains that, “for the purposes of this proceeding and the grounds presented herein, no claim term requires express construction.” Pet. 11 (citing Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017). Nevertheless, Petitioner identifies exemplary uses of the claim terms “definition of a service” and “definition of a plan” in the ’048 patent. See id. at 11–12. In addition, Petitioner asserts the claim term “test environment” during prosecution, but that even if we construe this term consistent with applicant’s proposed construction, Petitioner should prevail on the asserted obviousness ground. See id. at 12–13. For purposes of this Decision and based on this preliminary record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction at this stage of the proceeding. C. Patentability Challenge” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “the plurality of application service provider systems, wherein at least two of the API interfaces are different.” Ex. 1001, 60:13–15. Limitation 13.2 thus requires that the “API interfaces” must be received from the “application service provider systems.”” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,883,048
• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 20, 2023 · IPR2023-00837 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness challenges to claims 1–26 over either combination of references.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’369 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a degree in electrical 1 The ’605 patent was filed before the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 became effective. Therefore, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103; however, our analysis would be the same under the AIA version of the statute. 2 US 5,841,788; issued Nov. 24, 1998. Ex. 1008. 3 US 4,685,102; issued Aug. 4, 1987. Ex. 1009. 4 US 2003/0101426 A1; published May 29, 2003. Ex. 1011. 5 US 4,074,352; issued Feb. 14, 1978. Ex. 1010. engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, with at least two years of relevant industry or research experience (or additional education)” and “a working understanding of networks, switches and electronic devices including devices that possess a backplane.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 17). Petitioner also states that “[m]ore experience can substitute for less education and vice versa.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, which is supported by the testimony of Dr. Min (Ex. 1003 ¶ 17) and is consistent with the level reflected by the ’369 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “describes techniques for testing backplane interconnects in which “test vectors are applied to circuit boards individually, while the remaining boards in the system are disabled.” Ex. 1008, 2:24–26; see Ex. 1008, 3:61–67, 4:20–23, 5:35–39, 7:26–34, Figs. 11, 13. In particular, Ke describes two testing techniques, a “walking enable test” and an “intraboard counting technique,” both of which begin with a step of disabling all boards and then enabling only one individual board for testing. Ex. 1008, 5:35–39, 7:26–34, Figs. 11, 13. In one instance, Petitioner acknowledges these teachings of Ke: “Ke” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

    “may create contentions, whereby components on different boards simultaneously attempt to drive the same interconnect on the backplane. It could therefore damage the system if the intermediate vectors shown in FIG. 2 were to be applied.”). Yet, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Min adequately explains why or how a person of ordinary skill would have chosen Ke’s teachings for combining with Lewis’s teachings, when Ke directly warns against testing with more than one board enabled. Cf. Pet. 15 (arguing “because Ke acknowledged that there were multiple possible techniques for testing backplanes. A POSITA would therefore have a reasonable expectation of success to apply different testing techniques to the backplane structure in Ke, including the one from Lewis.” (citing Ex. 1008, 1:30–2:18; Ex. 1003 ¶ 83)). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons for combining Ke and Lewis with a reasonable expectation of success. Further, particularly in light of the teachings of Ke, Petitioner employs improper hindsight in suggesting that a POSITA would have combined Ke and Lewis to arrive at the claimed invention. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to any of claims 1–26 as being unpatentable in view of Ke and Lewis and claims 3, 6, 8, 13, 14, 17, 21, 25, and 26 as being unpatentable in view of Ke, Lewis, and Sarkinen.” slip op. at 8

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,957,369
• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 9, 2023 · IPR2023-00805 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on the merits because Smith did not teach or suggest the claimed MAC destination address, a limitation shared by every asserted ground against claims 1–20.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that Petitioner has not shown that Smith’s “destination logical identifier” is a MAC destination address, as claimed. Prelim. Resp. 6–9. Smith uses the phrase “destination logical identifier” only once, in paragraph 60, stating: “For example, whenever virtual network device sub-unit 122(2) receives a packet from a local network device, client, or server and that packet’s destination logical identifier identifies an uplink interface bundle, virtual network device sub-unit 122(2) sends the packet from a local uplink interface within the identified uplink interface bundle.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 60 (emphasis added). Smith also describes “logical identifiers” in paragraph 53, stating: “Within virtual network device 202, each interface in the same interface bundle is assigned the same logical identifier. For example, interfaces 320(13), 320(9), and 320(16) are each assigned the same logical identifier.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 53. And in paragraph 54, Smith explains that logical identifiers can be associated with MAC addresses:” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We construe claims using the principles set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2022). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 5; Prelim. Resp 4; see also Ex. 2002, 3 (Claim Construction Order from district court applying plain and ordinary meaning). At this stage, we determine it is unnecessary to expressly construe any terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, with at least two years of relevant industry or research experience (or additional education).” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Petitioner also states that relevant experience would include a working understanding of networking systems, including distributed bridges, MAC forwarding tables, LAG groups, and virtual LAN services and that a lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, which is consistent with the level reflected by the ’400 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that Petitioner has not shown that Smith’s “destination logical identifier” is a MAC destination address, as claimed. Prelim. Resp. 6–9. Smith uses the phrase “destination logical identifier” only once, in paragraph 60, stating: “For example, whenever virtual network device sub-unit 122(2) receives a packet from a local network device, client, or server and that packet’s destination logical identifier identifies an uplink interface bundle, virtual network device sub-unit 122(2) sends the packet from a local uplink interface within the identified uplink interface bundle.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 60 (emphasis added). Smith also describes “logical identifiers” in paragraph 53, stating: “Within virtual network device 202, each interface in the same interface bundle is assigned the same logical identifier. For example, interfaces 320(13), 320(9), and 320(16) are each assigned the same logical identifier.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 53. And in paragraph 54, Smith explains that logical identifiers can be associated with MAC addresses:” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,593,400
• Dell Technologies Inc. / Dell Inc. et al. v. Corrigent CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Aug 30, 2023 · IPR2023-00464 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–26 obvious over the asserted combinations of Ke, Lewis, Cook, and Sarkinen.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’369 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “engineering, computer engineering or a similar discipline, with at least two years of relevant industry or research experience (or additional education)” and “a working understanding of backplanes and other printed circuit boards, including the connections thereto.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 17). Petitioner also states that more experience can substitute for less education and vice versa. Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill, which is consistent with the level reflected by the ’369 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Ke states that “other techniques for providing test vectors can be used, provided that test vectors are applied to drivers on a single board at a time while the remaining boards in the system are disabled.” Ex. 1008, 7:26–34 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Mir recognizes that warning: “Ke discusses testing the backplane traces by disabling certain parts of the system to avoid damage to circuit components.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 77 (citing Ex. 1008, 2:29–35); see Ex. 1008, 3:38–60 (stating that synchronization problems can occur with boundary scan backplane testing with multiple boards; “intermediate vectors between the current vector and the next vector may create contentions, whereby components on different boards simultaneously attempt to drive the same interconnect on the backplane. It could therefore damage the system if the intermediate vectors shown in FIG. 2 were to be applied.”). Yet, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Mir adequately explains why or how a person of ordinary skill would have chosen Ke’s teachings for combining with Lewis’s teachings, when Ke directly warns against testing with more than one board enabled. Cf. Pet. 17 (arguing “because Ke acknowledged that there were multiple possible techniques for testing backplanes. A POSITA would therefore have a reasonable expectation of success to apply different testing techniques to the backplane structure in Ke, including the one from Lewis.” (citing Ex. 1008, 1:30–2:18; Ex. 1003 ¶ 78)). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons for combining Ke and Lewis with a reasonable expectation of success. Further, particularly in light of the teachings of Ke, Petitioner employs improper hindsight in suggesting that a POSITA would have combined Ke and Lewis to arrive at the claimed invention. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to any of claims 1–26 as being unpatentable in view of Ke and Lewis and claims 3, 6, 8, 13, 14, 17, 21, 25, and 26 as being unpatentable in view of Ke, Lewis, and Sarkinen.” slip op. at 7

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,957,369

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.