- Charter Communications, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01232 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any obviousness ground; it also found the petition time-barred.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“later than one month after we initially instituted inter partes review in the Comcast IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As discussed above, however, inter partes review is no longer instituted in the Comcast IPR. Under these circumstances, we do not grant Petitioner’s Joinder Motion because there is no pending proceeding to join. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition . . . that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review.”). Petitioner’s Joinder Motion is denied.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format.’” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1104, 168–173). The cited portion of the prosecution history shows that the applicant distinguished its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats. The applicant argued in particular, Applicant submits that [the prior art] is completely silent with regard to “receiving, from the remote server device, a first message that includes at least one command in a first format, wherein the first message is received based at least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format having been sent from the associated remote computing device.” In fact, [the prior art] never describes commands in different formats. . . . Ex. 1104, 170. Based on the applicant’s argument in this regard, we find that the prosecution history limits the scope of claim 1 to different first and second formats. In other words, the applicant’s argument during prosecution distinguishing its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats overcomes the presumption based on claim differentiation that claim 1 encompasses first and second formats that are the same. See Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Although claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.”). Accordingly, claim 1 is limited to different first and second formats.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“argument and evidence. As discussed above in the claim construction section, the recited first and second formats are limited to different formats. See supra Part IV.A. To satisfy this aspect of limitation 1D under its theory, Petitioner needs to show that in Danciu the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server is different from the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device. The cited disclosures in Danciu, however, do not teach or suggest that these formats are different. Nor does Petitioner explain adequately how Danciu’s disclosures teach or suggest the two formats are different. We recognize that the control information in Danciu may be “processed” or “repackaged,” as Petitioner asserts, but it is not clear that the control information is processed or repackaged such that the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server and the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device are different. Petitioner does not rely on Mahajan to teach or suggest the recited first and second formats but relies on Mahajan instead as providing “implementation details for transmission of commands for controlling a client.” Pet. 27. Petitioner contends that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Id. at 31. In other words, the controlled device would receive the generic commands sent from the remote control and then translate the generic commands. It is not clear how the proposed combination in this way teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the remote control to a server is different from the format of a command sent from the server to the controlled device.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Aldrey and Mahajan meets limitation 1D under Petitioner’s second theory. Petitioner only alleges that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could operate at a server like Aldrey’s service provider network 103. Pet. 65. The Federal Circuit has explained that “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s abstraction module at a server, even if the abstraction module could operate at the server. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). We note Petitioner further argues that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 66–67; see also id. at 66 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 65–67. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider–– teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner does not close these logical gaps.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,048,751 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00825 · APJ Andrew L Nalven · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Step 1 of Figure 7 begins by obtaining the geographic information of the area to search for possible remote targets. Id. at 8:57–59. In step 2, the next geographic region where a possible search for a PRU is estimated. Id. at 8:64–66. In step 3, a page is sent out to that geographic region for remote units in the region to reveal their location. Id. at 9:2–4. In steps 4 and 5, if remote units are identified in the paged area, that information is forwarded to the network and the process continues to step 7 where the process is aborted. Id. at 9:4–6. Step 6 is performed if no units are identified in the paged area. Id. at 9:6–9. There, a check is done to establish if there are any remaining cells or grids higher up in the chain to be searched, and if so, the process returns to step 2 to search additional geographic areas. Id. at 9:9–12. The iterative process described in Figure 7 is consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring forwarding a notification to only one or more PRUs currently located in a specific geographic boundary. Ex. 2001 ¶ 55; see also Ex. 1001, 8:32–54 (describing a grid search technique that may be implemented by the process of Figure 7).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–30). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proffered definition as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and asserted prior art.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We are further not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that forwarding notifications to the PRUs only within a specified geographic region renders element 12[D]’s step of verifying whether the PRUs exists within said region unnecessary. Pet. 35 n.8. Rather, we credit Mr. McAlexander who testifies that forwarding notifications to individually pollable geographic boundaries “does not obviate the need for the PRU to identify that the notification has been received or verify its location within the individual geographic boundary before responding.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 155.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,199,726 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00827 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 15, or 22 unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Andrews Decl. ¶ 25). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute this contention. Prelim. Resp. 5. For the purpose of determining institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’918 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“means.” See Ex. 1001, 11:60–12:4, 12:6–8, 15:30–37. The use of the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 63 applies. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). 3 Section 4(c) of the AIA re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’918 patent has a filing date before the We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claims 1, 2, and 22. See Pet. 7–12; Prelim. Resp. 9–21. slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Having reviewed Patent Owner’s position on claim limitation 1[C], we determine that we do not need to expressly construe this claim term to effective date of the relevant amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. Owner acknowledges that the asserted network “includes control units programmed to obtain the locations of the offender and victim devices,” and does not base its arguments on the construction of this limitation. Id. at 42.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,756,918 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00826 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Andrews Decl. ¶¶ 25–26). Patent Owner does not dispute this contention or offer an alternative formulation. See Prelim. Resp. 6. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’752 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“1. Means-Plus-Function Terms Challenged claims 14 and 15 recite elements using the word “means.” See Ex. 1001, 13:6–18, 13:20–22. The use of the word “means” in a claim ’752 patent has a filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of §103. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claims 14 and 15. See Pet. 8–12; Prelim. Resp. 11–19.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“geographic region.” The ’752 patent describes polling specific sub-regions of the network for a PRU. Ex. 1001, 2:12–15, 7:22–34. As Mr. McAlexander testifies, “[a] PRU may choose to instruct the network to relay certain information to mobile units in a specific geographic region. That information would then be appended to the geographic boundary information and beamed in the specified geographic region.” McAlexander Decl. ¶ 49 (quoting Ex. 1001, 10:19–23) (alteration in original). For example, a nearby boundary can be polled for the locations of nearby wireless customers within proximity of a distressed wireless customer. As described in the ’752 patent, a distressed mobile user M1 may need to find where another party might exist in that geographic region. The user could initiate a page from their PRU for the closest available PRUs that could be found in that geographic jurisdiction. Looking at FIG. 3, mobile user M1 will provide its location, latitude and longitude (x0,y0) to the closest available ground station serving area C1 or grid G1. As stated earlier, appropriate terrestrial technology will be scattered in that region to serve the PRUs in that area as shown in FIG. 1. Once a ground station picks up this signal, it sends a page for all location reporting devices in the specified boundary surrounding mobile unit M1, FIG. 3 to disclose their location. Ex. 1001, 7:22–34 (emphasis added). slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,441,752 - Alertus Technologies, LLC v. Desktop Alert, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00363 · APJ Andrew L Nalven · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–13 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Although claims 1 and 10 recite slightly different language, both clearly recite a “first triggering step” that precedes two subsequent polling steps. In the case of claim 1, the “first triggering step” precedes the “second step” and “fifth step.” See id. The explicit use of “second” and “fifth” supports limiting the steps to the recited order. See Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires an order of steps.” (cleaned up)).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) “would have (i) a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in electrical engineering, computer engineering, network engineering, computer science, and/or a related field and (ii) 1-3 years of experience relating to computer and networking systems and/or methods including systems and methods for messaging.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 25–26). Patent Owner does not offer a position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, which appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and asserted prior art.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“with Patent Owner that Dillon discloses time-stamps as “alternatives.” Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:36–41). Dillon explains that “[t]he time-stamp . . . may represent the status of the subscriber’s e-mail account in various ways . . . [m]ost commonly, it is an indication of an actual time.” Ex. 1005, 7:19–21. However, Dillon explicitly states that “[a]lternatively, a time-stamp may be a number, such as a version number . . . or it may be a binary indication of whether or not e-mail . . . has been received.” Id. at 7:23–28 (emphasis added). Petitioner has not identified any portion of Dillon that suggests using more than one type of time-stamp in the same process. See generally Pet. 30–36. Dillon’s lack of disclosure of using multiple time-stamps appears consistent with Dillon’s description of the time-stamp as providing “the status of the subscriber’s e-mail account.” Ex. 1005, 7:19–21. Each disclosed alternative — time, version number, or binary indication — provides status information for the same purpose, namely, to indicate “whether or not e-mail for the given e-mail alert service subscriber has been received by the e-mail server 12 at any given time.” Id. at 7:27–29, 9:7–17. Because each of Dillon’s alternatives for a time-stamp serves the same purpose, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Dillon to both add a new polling step requesting a first time-stamp as a Boolean time-stamp and then request a second time-stamp as a version number or time indication. Indeed, Petitioner’s asserted rationale to modify Dillon here is conclusory and fails to explain sufficiently how using a second time-stamp will achieve the asserted benefits of reducing messaging bandwidth or uniquely identifying a particular message. See Pet. 31. Because Dr. Mangione-Smith’s declaration testimony mirrors Petitioner’s argument, his supporting testimony is similarly insufficient. Compare Pet. 31, with Ex. 1003 ¶ 62. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “the Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations”).” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,172,765 - Dropbox, Inc. v. Entangled Media, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00285 · APJ Donald E Daybell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Dropbox did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Conclusion as to Claim 1 Based on the present record, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Havewala teaches at least the following limitations of claim 1: 1. “intercepting the request by a software client on the first device;” and 2. “determining by the software client if the file is physically located on the first device or if the file is a virtual file of a corresponding file physically stored on a second device by reviewing file metadata.” Petitioner does not identify any teachings from Adams that bear on these limitations. Therefore, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success that it would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“At this juncture, the parties only appear to dispute the educational background in the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. The only evidence in the present record regarding the educational background consists of Dr. McDaniel’s declarations in this case and in the underlying litigation. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 21; Ex. 2001, 14–15. We agree with Patent Owner that both of these declarations support that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had either a bachelor’s or a master’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related degree. Prelim. Resp. 2–3. Moreover, Petitioner does not explain why a master’s degree is necessary. Thus, we revise Petitioner’s proposed definition to conform to Dr. McDaniel’s testimony. We additionally remove the qualifier “at least” from Petitioner’s proposed definition, because this qualifier introduces ambiguity. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we apply the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art: a POSITA would have been a person holding a bachelor’s degree or a master’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering or a related degree, with two years of training or experience with networking and file systems. This definition appears to be consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references as well. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). We note, however, that our analysis below would not change even if we adopted Petitioner’s definition as stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Cir. 2017); Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner asserts that it “does not propose that any terms require construction.” Pet. 11. Similarly, Patent Owner asserts that it “does not propose that the Board expressly construe any claims.” Prelim. Resp. 4. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding.” slip op. at 11
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“The instant limitation recites “intercepting the request,” which relies for its antecedent basis on the “accepting a request” limitation recited above. Therefore, this claim requires that the same “request” be both accepted and intercepted. See Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that definite articles such as “the” and “said” create anaphoric phrases that refer to the initial antecedent phrase, and do not alter the meaning of the antecedent “in the slightest”). Petitioner, however, fails to identify any “request” that is both “accepted” and limitation, Petitioner relies on the “open” message sent to the file system as the recited “request” that is accepted. Id. at 20–22. For the “intercepting the request” limitation, however, Petitioner relies on an error message sent back from the file system to the application as the recited “request” that is intercepted. Id. at 33. Thus, Petitioner points to two different features of Havewala for teaching the same required “request” in claim 1. This is fatally inconsistent. Therefore, Petitioner fails to adequately demonstrate that Havewala teaches that the same “request” is first accepted and then intercepted, as required by the claim. Even were we to overlook the inconsistency in Petitioner’s analysis, Petitioner still fails to establish that Havewala teaches the claimed “request to operate on a file.” Petitioner relies for this limitation on an error message generated by the file system as the claimed “request.” Pet. 33. This error message, however, is not a “request to operate on a file,” as claimed. This error message is instead a response generated by the file system to a request from the application or operating system to open a file. Ex. 1005 ¶ 64. The response indicates that the request cannot be fulfilled because the target file has no data. Id. Havewala discusses its messaging paradigm with reference to Figure 6, which is excerpted below: steps performed in reconstituting a ghosted file from the sink. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 27. This excerpt depicts steps 601, 603, and 605. At step 601, the file system 16 receives an open command from an application 30. Id. ¶ 67. In this step, the “file system . . . notes that the ghosted file 14 does not contain the removed data 20.” Id. ¶ 68. Then, after the open command has already been received and processed by Havewala’s file system, the file system returns an error at step 603. Id. at Fig. 6. This “returned error” is what is intercepted by the ghosting filter 26, at step 605. Id. ¶ 68, Fig. 6. Figure 6 of Havewala and the associated text at paragraphs 67 and 68 demonstrate that the error message that is intercepted by Havewala’s ghosting filter is not a request; instead, it is a response to the “open” request. Petitioner’s argument that an error message is the claimed “request” is therefore unsupported by the evidence of record.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,484,260 - Dropbox, Inc. v. Entangled Media, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00284 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Aboulhosn and Phillips teaches “the virtual files [being] indistinguishable from the local files by the local file system,” as recited in claim 1. We additionally note that the same deficiencies discussed directly above infect Petitioner’s rationale for combining Phillips with Aboulhosn. Specifically, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan seeking “a smoother and more seamless user experience with Aboulhosn’s system” would have been motivated to incorporate “Phillips’s visual indistinguishability feature (i.e., displaying virtual files to the user in the same way as local files).” Pet. 54–55. Petitioner characterizes this alleged feature as “provid[ing] the perception that all the shared files are synced/stored locally.” Id. at 55. Yet Phillips’s virtual files are stored in a virtual drive that is segregated from local files. See Ex. 1006, 13:64–15:7, Fig. 4. As such, Phillips’s virtual files are visually distinguishable because they are located in that separate virtual drive, i.e., “the network connected storage device ‘F’” known as “Lets Work on ‘@v-drive.’” See id. Thus, we do not agree that Phillips’s presentation of virtual files in a separate virtual drive would have motivated an ordinarily skilled artisan to combine Phillips with Aboulhosn in the manner suggested by Petitioner. For these reasons, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Aboulhosn and Phillips.” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“The ’338 patent Specification both disparages certain prior art file systems and indicates the criticality of certain transparency features. Specifically, the ’338 patent acknowledges prior art systems where “the data on separate devices is kept separated when synchronized-local data is stored in a set of locations within the operating system’s native file system” and where “remote data on other devices or other online services is kept in a new location such as a new directory/folder or secondary location (e.g., removable hard drive) mounted on the device.” Ex. 1001, 1:58–65. In contrast to this prior art, the ’338 patent states that it is “[c]ritical to the unique nature of this system” that its shared file system is “totally transparent, not requiring the user to interact with software, nor distinguish files in local vs. remote locations.” Id. at 5:24–26. Indeed, the ’338 patent describes the invention in direct contrast to the prior art insofar as “the local operating system’s file system [is] modified to include remote files in the same locations of the local device (such as the ‘My Documents’ folder) as opposed to a separate and segregated location for such remote data (such as a synchronization folder or an additional hard drive ‘mounted’ on the device).” Id. at 6:25–30 (emphasis added). Furthermore, remote or virtual files in the disclosed system are visually represented “as if the files were indeed local, allowing the user to operate on them as if they were local to the device,” thus making their appearance “indistinguishable” from that of local files. Id. at 6:30–36. We find that these disclosures, taken together, indicate a disavowal of claim scope as to file systems where remote or virtual files are kept in a separate location, such as in a separate folder, device, or drive. See SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1341–43. For similar reasons, we find that remote or virtual files that are kept in a separate folder, device, or drive are not “indistinguishable” from local files as that term is used in the claims of the ’338 patent.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“above infect Petitioner’s rationale for combining Phillips with Aboulhosn. Specifically, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan seeking “a smoother and more seamless user experience with Aboulhosn’s system” would have been motivated to incorporate “Phillips’s visual indistinguishability feature (i.e., displaying virtual files to the user in the same way as local files).” Pet. 54–55. Petitioner characterizes this alleged feature as “provid[ing] the perception that all the shared files are synced/stored locally.” Id. at 55. Yet Phillips’s virtual files are stored in a virtual drive that is segregated from local files. See Ex. 1006, 13:64–15:7, Fig. 4. As such, Phillips’s virtual files are visually distinguishable because they are located in that separate virtual drive, i.e., “the network connected storage device ‘F’” known as “Lets Work on ‘@v-drive.’” See id. Thus, we do not agree that Phillips’s presentation of virtual files in a separate virtual drive would have motivated an ordinarily skilled artisan to combine Phillips with Aboulhosn in the manner suggested by Petitioner. For these reasons, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Aboulhosn and Phillips.” slip op. at 27
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“that Aboulhosn does not teach “the virtual files [being] indistinguishable from the local files by the local file system.” Pet. 44–45. To fill this gap, Petitioner relies on, inter alia, Phillips’s teachings of virtual files appearing to be the same as local files and appearing to be locally present. Id. at 45 (quoting Ex. 1006, 6:34–36, 14:62–66). Yet Phillips’s virtual storage device and its contents are segregated from local files in Phillips’s display window 1000. See Ex. 1006, 13:44–50, Fig. 4 (discussing and depicting “entry 1034 for the network connected storage device ‘F’” known as “Lets Work on ‘@v-drive’” and its corresponding files 1042 and folders 1044 displayed in sub-window 1040). Thus, virtual files in Phillips’s system are not stored in the same location as local files.6 Because Phillips’s virtual files are stored in a virtual storage device that is separated from Phillips’s local files, those virtual files are not “indistinguishable from the local files by the local file system,” as is recited in claim 1. Petitioner cites Phillips for teaching that “the virtual storage device and its contents . . . appear[], to the client node user . . . to be locally present” and “behave . . . as if locally present on the client nodes.” Pet. 45– 46 (quoting Ex. 1006, 9:36–39, 14:62–66). Based on this, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood Phillips 6 We acknowledge that Petitioner relies on Aboulhosn, not Phillips, for teaching “virtual files stored in the same locations as local files of the local file system.” See Pet. 43–44. However, as we discuss below, the fact that Phillips’s system stores virtual and local files in different locations means that Phillips’s virtual files are not “indistinguishable” from the local files by the local file system. to teach that its virtual files appear indistinguishable from local files, including file extensions.” Id. at 46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 151). Yet the patentees of the ’338 patent disavowed coverage for the term “indistinguishable” as applied to virtual files stored in a separate location, such as a separate folder, device, or drive. See supra § II.C. And that is exactly what Phillips teaches. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 13:64–15:7, Fig. 4. We agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 16–18) that Phillips’s virtual files are distinguishable from local files by the local file system because they are stored separately in the virtual F: drive/storage device. See Ex. 1006, 13:64– 15:7, Fig. 4. Further, we do not credit Dr. McDaniel’s testimony as establishing that virtual files in Phillips are “indistinguishable” (as that term is understood in the ’338 patent (see supra § II.C)) because he includes no reasoning showing why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have interpreted Phillips’s teachings as extending beyond files in a segregated virtual drive appearing to be locally present. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 149–151.” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,296,338 - Medit Corporation v. 3shape A/SInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 29, 2024 · IPR2023-01317 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5–8, 13–16, 18–20, 22, 26, 28, and 29 were unpatentable under § 103 over Orametrix, Faul, Breton, and Knighton.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Conclusion as to claim 1 After reviewing the record, we find Petitioner has not adequately explained with sufficient evidence that “Orametrix and Faul, further in view of Breton, teach” the limitation at [Claim 1h]. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 100). We find Petitioner has not provided sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings in support of its contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Orametrix and Faul in view of Breton and thereby reach an intraoral scanner comprising [Claim 1h] with a reasonable expectation of success. On this record, for the above reasons, we are unpersuaded that the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over the combination of Orametrix, Faul, Breton, and Knighton.” slip op. at 31
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner does not address whether switching Orametrix’s color features, as encoding features, illuminates the object with different colors at different times ([Claim 1h]). Petitioner states that “Orametrix describes changing the color of projected encoded features . . . .” Pet. 26. But Petitioner does not explain how that satisfies what [Claim 1h] calls for. Petitioner does not explain, for example, how changing the encoding features of Orametrix’s digital image projection (i.e., probe light (see discussion supra regarding [Claim 1c])) yields an illuminated object with different colors at different times. Even assuming arguendo that Orametrix’s color features, as encoding features, corresponds to the illuminating “color of the probe light” ([Claim 1h]), Petitioner does not adequately explain how Orametrix’s processor (e.g., data processor 952 (see Ex. 1005, 16:20, Figure 11 ( reproduced in § II.D.1)) is configured to “selectively switch” the encoding features so that the object is illuminated with different colors at different times as [Claim 1h] requires. Petitioner relies on Dr. Liang’s testimony as support for its contention that Orametrix teaches a processor configured to “change the color of projected encoding features” but the testimony simply repeats what is said in the Petition without any discussion of objective facts. Compare Pet. 28, with Ex. 1013 ¶ 100 (“the processor of Orametrix is already configured to change the color of projected encoding features, and is configured to introduce color information from photo data into the three-dimensional model”). The cited evidence does not adequately show that Orametrix’s processor “selectively switch[es]” the color of Orametrix’s digital image projection to illuminate an object with different colors at different times and thereby teach [Claim 1h]. We agree with Patent Owner that Orametrix does not teach a hardware processor “configured to: selectively switch a color of the probe light to illuminate the object with different colors at different times” ([Claim 1h]). Prelim. Resp. 19.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“A principal difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that Petitioner does not sufficiently explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have configured the Orametrix and Faul processors as claimed given that, unlike Orametrix and Faul, Breton is not drawn to transmitting a “probe light towards [an] object along an optical path thereby illuminating at least a part of the object with the time-varying illumination pattern” ([Claim 1c]) based on which, in part, a 3D geometry of at least a part of the surface of an object in an oral cavity is determined ([Claim 1 pre]). As Patent Owner points out, “[b]oth Orametrix and Faul disclose methodologies to process the obtained data and construct three-dimensional representations of the scanned object.” Prelim. Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 1005, 30:7–34:11, Ex. 1004, 13:28–16:6. We agree with Patent Owner that “Breton is silent on this aspect.” Id. Patent Owner quotes various passages from Breton to show that “[a]t best, Breton discusses two-dimensional mapping and measurement of tooth color for the purposes of ensuring the accurate color shade of replacement teeth.” Id. at 25–26 (quoting Ex. 1003, Abstract, 2:43-47, 2:60-64; also citing Title, 1:7– 18, 2:50–52, Figure 3). We agree that the cited passages do not provide adequate support for determining a 3D geometry as Petitioner has shown for Orametrix and Faul. For example, the passage at 2:43-47 discloses: “[a] general drawback of the prior art lies in that the notion of comparison between the measured tooth and a duplicate is limited to a single point to point comparison. Thus, area defects cannot be detected where no measurement has been taken.” Id. at 2:43-47. There is no mention or suggestion of determining a 3D geometry for a tooth. Another difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that Petitioner does not sufficiently explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have configured the Orametrix and Faul processors as claimed given that, unlike Orametrix and Faul, Breton is not drawn to drawn to “[a] handheld intraoral scanner for determining the 3D geometry and color of at least a part of the surface of an object in an oral cavity” ([Claim 1 pre]). We agree with Patent Owner that Breton “is silent on this aspect.” Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 1005, Figure 16; Ex. 1004, Abstract). “At most, Breton employs the use [of] square glass integrator rods, integrating spheres, optic fibers, and custom-made lenses.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1003, 3:52–57, 11:35–38, 11:40-41, 11:47-49; referring to Figure 2 (“square glass integrator rods 20, 20”), Figure 4 (“integrating sphere 152”). “None of these light sources result in an ‘illumination pattern,’ much less a ‘time-varying illumination pattern.’” Id. Petitioner does not address these differences between the Breton apparatus and those of Orametrix and Faul. Petitioner does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Orametrix or Faul in light of Breton given these differences. Instead, to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that the processors described by Orametrix and Faul would be configured to implement the color changing scheme as taught by Breton,” Petitioner relies on Dr. Liang’s testimony. Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 100). But the testimony simply repeats what the Petition says without any discussion addressing the differences between the Breton apparatus and those of Orametrix and Faul. See Ex. 1013 ¶ 100. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner provides insufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings in support of its contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Orametrix and Faul in view of Breton and thereby reach an intraoral scanner comprising [Claim 1h].” slip op. at 27
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “[a]s of June of 2009, the priority date of the ’667 patent,” “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least one or two years of design experience, or alternatively, at least five years of comparable industry experience.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 57–59). Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had experience with and knowledge of, 3D imaging systems and 3D modeling techniques.” Id. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s characterization of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art and apply that definition for our analysis in this Decision. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,368,667 - Medit Corporation v. 3shape A/SInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 29, 2024 · IPR2023-01316 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of success on either §103 ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion does not shift to Patent Owner, except in limited circumstances not present here. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“Reason to combine In order to demonstrate obviousness, a petitioner must demonstrate that a skilled artisan would have had a reason to combine the teachings of the prior art in the manner claimed in the patent. KSR, 550 U.S. at 406 (2007). “To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (‘[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’).” Id. at 418.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “[a]s of June of 2009, the priority date of the ’146 patent,” “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least one or two years of design experience, or alternatively, at least five years of comparable industry experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51–53). Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had experience with and knowledge of, 3D imaging systems and 3D modeling techniques.” Id. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s characterization of a person of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art and apply that definition for our analysis in this Decision.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,076,146 - Medit Corporation v. 3shape A/SInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 25, 2024 · IPR2023-01314 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner. Claim 1 requires “determining . . . a first excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the first 3D representation and the second 3D representation.” Petitioner contends that Newcombe’s “first compatibility test can be used to determine an excluded volume,” where “the first compatibility test relies on defining a threshold distance for a measurement between points in two 3D depth images – i.e., a ‘source point’ in a previous depth image and a ‘destination point’ in a current depth image.” Pet. 26. According to Petitioner, “by defining a distance threshold for the two three-dimensional depth images beyond which any point will be deemed an outlier, Newcombe teaches the determination of an excluded volume.” Id. at 28. Without more, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how defining a threshold distance teaches determining a first excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the previous and current depth images. Nor is it clear from the record how defining a threshold distance in Newcombe teaches determining a first excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the previous and current depth images. Regarding Figure 6 of Newcombe, for instance, “only a single destination point is selected for each source point.” Ex. 1005, 8:22–23. According to Newcombe, if that single destination point is in space beyond the distance threshold, then it will be labeled as belonging to a moving object. See id. at 1:57–61, 8:42–48. Contrary to Petitioner’s position, Newcombe does not say that any point in space beyond the distance threshold will be labeled as belonging to a moving object. See Pet. 28.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner. Claim 1 requires “determining . . . a first excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the first 3D representation and the second 3D representation.” Petitioner contends that Newcombe’s “first compatibility test can be used to determine an excluded volume,” where “the first compatibility test relies on defining a threshold distance for a measurement between points in two 3D depth images – i.e., a ‘source point’ in a previous depth image and a ‘destination point’ in a current depth image.” Pet. 26. According to Petitioner, “by defining a distance threshold for the two three-dimensional depth images beyond which any point will be deemed an outlier, Newcombe teaches the determination of an excluded volume.” Id. at 28. Without more, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how defining a threshold distance teaches determining a first excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the previous and current depth images. Nor is it clear from the record how defining a threshold distance in Newcombe teaches determining a first excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the previous and current depth images. Regarding Figure 6 of Newcombe, for instance, “only a single destination point is selected for each source point.” Ex. 1005, 8:22–23. According to Newcombe, if that single destination point is in space beyond the distance threshold, then it will be labeled as belonging to a moving object. See id. at 1:57–61, 8:42–48. Contrary to Petitioner’s position, Newcombe does not say that any point in space beyond the distance threshold will be labeled as belonging to a moving object. See Pet. 28.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated on the record before us a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims of the ’553 patent.7 V. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted. 7 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 43–48.” slip op. at 30
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Regarding the preambles of independent claims 1 and 22, as well as the claim term “excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the first 3D representation and the second 3D representation,” Petitioner asserts that it “applies the claim construction previously adopted by the district court in the co-pending litigation.” Pet. 9–10. Petitioner asserts that “the parties agreed that the preambles of independent claims 1 and 22 are limiting, and the district court adopted this construction in its order.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Ex. 1011, 2 (district court claim construction order)). Petitioner also asserts that “the district court adopted Patent Owner’s preferred construction of [‘excluded volume in space where no surface can be present in both the first 3D representation and the second 3D representation’]: ‘excluded volume in space that is common to both the first and second 3D representations where no surface from either of the 3D representations should be present.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1011, 2). Patent Owner does not respond other than to repeat Petitioner’s assertions regarding the district court’s claim constructions. Prelim. Resp. 9. For purposes of this Decision, we conclude that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,064,553
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.