- Geotab Inc. / Geotab USA, Inc. v. Fractus, S.A.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · PGR2025-00056 · APJ Steven M Amundson · PGR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that claims 1–20 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to institute a post-grant review. We may not institute a post-grant review unless we determine that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2024). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Hence, we deny the Petition and do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 10 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 39. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 22. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’149 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 1:35–6:56, 42:44–46:28, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2, III.G.1–III.G.2, III.H.1.” slip op. at 25
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “more likely than not” standard for instituting a post-grant review. As Petitioner recognizes, the ’149 patent defines many of the claim terms Petitioner discusses in the “Claim Interpretation” section of the Petition. See Pet. 14–16. For instance, the patent defines “antenna rectangle” as “the orthogonal projection of the antenna box along the normal to the face with largest area of the antenna box.” Ex. 1005, 14:21–24. Further, the patent defines “complexity factor F21” and “complexity factor F32” consistent with the independent claims. See id. at 17:16–21, 17:49–61, 18:8–18, 19:12–25, 20:5–17, 42:62–43:25, 44:5–30, 45:8–46:3. E. Alleged Obviousness over Dou and Ciais-Multiband: Claims 7–9, 11–14, 16, 17, 19, and 20 Petitioner contends that claims 7–9, 11–14, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner does not explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan who used Ciais-Quadband’s antenna for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208 would have departed from the commonly accepted rule of thumb and Dou’s preference for at least a quarter-wavelength spacing between antennas at the lowest frequency to the extent needed to implement the proposed combination, i.e., with only about 55% of the preferred spacing between antennas. See Pet. 60–69; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 172–187. Hence, based on the current record, Petitioner does not establish sufficiently for purposes of institution that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Ciais-Quadband’s teachings with Dou’s teachings in the way Petitioner proposes. Further, the addition of two Nakano InvFL antennas extending from the ground plane both above and below the PCB does not remedy the insufficient spacing between “the swapped-in Ciais-Quadband antennas.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 67.” slip op. at 69
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,095,149 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC v. Nokia Technologies OYInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00920 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 22–24, 26, 29–33, 35, or 38 were unpatentable over the asserted Koga-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in proving the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’991 patent. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a (1) bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video and/or image processing or coding.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditonal experience can substitute for the level of education, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner also identifies knowledge that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). Patent Owner states that it “has applied Petitioner’s [person having ordinary skill in the art] for the sake of this Response.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’991 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Based on the ordinary meaning of the phrases, “spatial samples” and “spatial information” must refer to different information. Because the “spatial samples [are] decoded into spatial information,” the decoded “spatial information” must be different than the coded “spatial samples.” If “spatial information” were the same as “spatial samples,” then there would be nothing to decode. That construction is consistent with the claim construction rule that different terms are presumed to have different meanings. See MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects Ams., 238 F. App’x 605, 609 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”); Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings . . . .”)). Here, we see no evidence that the claim phrases have the same meaning. To the contrary, the ’991 patent uses the term spatial samples to refer to the image’s pixel values. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:65–67 (“the prediction error signal for a single image block is constructed using both transform basis functions and spatial samples (i.e., pixel values)”) (emphasis added); id. at 4:21–26 (same). The spatial information, however, refers to the result of decoding. See, e.g., id. at 3:29–30 (“the plurality of spatial samples are decoded into decoded spatial information”) (emphasis added); id. at 6:53–55 (“the decoded spatial information and reconstructed prediction of the image block are added together to form the decoded representation of the image block”) (emphasis added); id., Fig. 5, 520 (showing “Decoded Spatial Info”). This is consistent with the claim’s plain language. See id. at 10:1–2 (claim 22 reciting “decoding, by a processor, the plurality of spatial samples into decoded spatial information”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, “spatial samples” and “spatial information” do not refer to the same thing.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. Petitioner maps both spatial samples and spatial information to the residual of the prediction error. Compare Pet. 37 (referring to spatial samples as the residual of the prediction error), with id. at 44 (referring to spatial information as the residual of the prediction error). However, because spatial samples and spatial information cannot refer to the same thing, they cannot both be the residual of the prediction error. See Section II.C.1 supra. Accordingly, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that claim 22, along with dependent claims 23, 24, 26, and 30 would have been obvious over Koga. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[D]ependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”); Pet. 47–63 (relying on the analysis of claim 22 for the spatial samples and spatial information limitations). With regard to independent claim 31, along with dependent claims 32, 33, and 35, Petitioner relies on the same arguments discussed above for limitation 22a and 22c to show that Koga teaches commensurate limitations 31c and 31d. See Pet. 54 (“As explained above, Koga teaches the shared substantive limitations of [22a]–[22d] (supra §§VI.A.1) that correspond to limitations [31b]–[31e].”). Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above for claim 22, we are not sufficiently persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that independent claim 31, along with dependent claims 32, 33, and 35 would have been obvious in view of Koga.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,077,991 - Intel Corporation v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 18, 2024 · IPR2024-01008 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends that the challenged claims do not need construction to demonstrate unpatentability. Pet. 14. Petitioner, however, notes that the parties in the ITC proceeding identified above dispute the meaning of several claim terms. Id. (citing Ex. 1026). Petitioner specifically notes that “the parties dispute what is required of independent claims 1, 5, and 16 to ‘determin[e] how many pixels’ to filter in each block.” Id. (citing Ex. 1026, 6–7). Petitioner argues that “ITC Respondent Lenovo mathematical basis (no relationship) with the pixel values of the pixels in said neighboring block’” (id. (citing Ex. 1026, 6–7)), but Patent Owner “contends that no construction is necessary,” “and the ‘plain meaning’ does not foreclose some ‘mathematical basis’ existing as long as separate decision values are calculated for each block” (id. (citing Ex. 1027, 14–19)). Petitioner indicates that Ground 1 adopts Patent Owner’s broader construction from the ITC proceeding and Ground 2 adopts Lenovo’s narrower construction. Id. at 14–15. Patent Owner argues that “none of the asserted grounds disclose or render obvious the Challenged Claims under the plain meaning of the claims (which is [Patent Owner’s] proposed construction) or under Lenovo’s narrower proposed construction.” Prelim. Resp. 29. On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Furthermore, we are not persuaded that modifying Aksu in view of Gonzalez in the manner proposed by Petitioner overcomes this problem. As noted above, Petitioner asserts that, in the proposed combination, one of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that the Laplacian’s output would be compared directly to a threshold based on β—just like Aksu’s difference calculations—to determine how many pixels to filter.” Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1019, 13:15–19; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 406–410). We disagree with this assertion, however, because it relies on erroneously equating the output of calculations (i.e., |r1-rj| and |r1-ri+1|). In other words, Aksu’s difference calculations, although used in setting dr, are not the same as dr; and we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered comparing Gonzalez’s Laplacian output to threshold β because Aksu discloses comparing its difference calculations to β. As noted above, we are not directed to any disclosure in Aksu of comparing dr to β. In addition, Dr. Schonfeld’s testimony on this point is not persuasive. Specifically, Dr. Schonfeld testifies that “dr can simply be defined as the output of the Laplacian (dr=|r3-2r2+r1|), and dr could be directly compared to a threshold based on β.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 408 (underline emphasis added). This testimony, however, is entitled to little weight because Dr. Schonfeld fails to provide a sufficient underlying basis for his opinion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Board can reject arguments based on expert testimony that lacks specificity or detail). Moreover, opining that output of the Laplacian, dr, could be directly compared to β does not establish sufficiently that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 26
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“G. Discretion Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 64–66; Paper 8. Petitioner argues that discretionary denial is not appropriate in this case. Pet. 85–86; Paper 7. Because we are not persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim as discussed above, we need not reach Patent Owner’s arguments regarding discretionary denial under § 325(d).” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,641,841 - Google LLC v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 28, 2022 · IPR2022-00888 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution: Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability for claims 1–13, and trying claim 42 alone would be inefficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“institution that Elko discloses a “first virtual microphone” according to claim 1 and Petitioner does not rely on Boll or Buck for teaching a “first virtual microphone” according to claim 1, Petitioner does not establish sufficiently for purposes of institution that the combined disclosures in Elko, Boll, and Buck teach claim 1’s subject matter. See Pet. 23–25; Prelim. Reply 1–2; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 55–58; supra § IV.D.4(a). Hence, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in proving claim 1 unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Elko, Boll, and Buck.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“for purposes of institution that Elko discloses a “first virtual microphone” according to claim 1. See Pet. 23–25, 36–38; Prelim. Reply 1–2; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 55–58, 81–82. For forming the “first virtual microphone” and the “second virtual microphone” claim 1 recites three different signals: “a first signal,” “a second signal,” and “a first intermediate signal” formed by applying a filter to “the first signal.” Ex. 1001, 37:5–9, 37:16–19. “Different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.” Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,” slip op. at 30
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“for purposes of institution that Elko discloses a “first virtual microphone” according to claim 1. See Pet. 23–25, 36–38; Prelim. Reply 1–2; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 55–58, 81–82. For forming the “first virtual microphone” and the “second virtual microphone” claim 1 recites three different signals: “a first signal,” “a second signal,” and “a first intermediate signal” formed by applying a filter to “the first signal.” Ex. 1001, 37:5–9, 37:16–19. “Different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.” Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,” slip op. at 30
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“the ’213 patent. Pet. 3, 23–83. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to satisfy the “reasonable likelihood” institution standard for four of the five challenges and thirteen of the fourteen challenged claims. See supra §§ IV.D–IV.E. At best, Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” institution standard for only one of the five challenges and only one of the 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. fourteen challenged claims. See supra § IV.F. These circumstances weigh in favor of exercising our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution. See, e.g., Netscout Sys., Inc. v. Longhorn HD LLC, IPR2021-01258, Paper 11 at 23–24 (PTAB Feb. 10, 2022) (exercising discretion to deny institution); Sling TV L.L.C. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, IPR2019-01391, Paper 7 at 25–27 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2020) (exercising discretion to deny institution).” slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,321,213 - Google LLC v. Defenders Of The American Dream, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 18, 2022 · IPR2022-00112 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–17 were obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Because Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Silva discloses “an image recognition task [that] comprises an instruction to select one image corresponding to the selected image category from the matrix of non-overlapping randomly selected images,” we find that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that claims 1–17 would have been obvious in view of Silva, either alone or in combination with Osborn or Osborn and Pinkas.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field with coursework relating to computer science, plus two years’ academic and/or industry experience in computer security and/or artificial intelligence” and that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–39). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, and because we find it generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’578 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. C.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim Construction Petitioner asserts that it interprets the claims “using the standard used in civil actions under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a POSA and the patent’s prosecution history,” but does not identify any constructions. Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in the Preliminary Response. Under these circumstances, we find that we need not engage in formal claim construction, although we do address some claim language in the course of the obviousness analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). D.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“Moreover, the prosecution history removes any doubt about whether these claims are limited to an instruction to select only one image. As explained above, the applicant changed “an instruction to select an image” to “an instruction to select one image” in response to a rejection in which the Examiner was relying on the Pratte reference for the instruction. See Ex. 1002, 404, 427. The applicant then argued that Pratte failed to teach the “image recognition task” because “Pratte does not instruct a user to select ‘one image,’ but instead ‘instructs a user to select all images that are associated with animals.’” Id. at 435. We conclude that the amendment and associated argument evidence a clear and unmistakable narrowing of the claims to systems with instructions to select one image corresponding to the category, and excluding systems, like Pratte, in which the user is instructed to select all images associated with a category. See Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 29 F.4th 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (explaining that “for a statement during prosecution to qualify as a disavowal of claim scope, it must be ‘so clear as to show reasonable clarity and deliberateness’ and ‘so unmistakable as to be unambiguous evidence of disclaimer’”) (quoting Omega Engr., Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); see, e.g., SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 998 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (limiting claims where “the applicants argued that [the prior art] had a ‘hierarchical’ relationship between fields and values that fell outside the scope of the amended claims”). The disclaimer arises even though the applicant made other arguments in the same response. See SpeedTrack, 998 F.3d at 1380. Silva, like Pratte, instructs the user to select all images that fall into a category––see Ex. 1005, 1325 (“The user is then asked to identify, from each column available in the test, which image relates to the label.”)––and thus does not meet the claim language requiring an instruction to select “one” image. Notably, this problem cannot be cured by mapping the claimed “matrix” to a single column of Silva, because the claims also require that the “matrix” comprise at least one of each of the three categories of images, and Silva has three columns that are a mix of images known to be in the category and known to not be in the category, and a fourth column that consists of entirely unknown images. See Ex. 1005, 1325 (“One special column will contain all those images whose relation to the current label we want to verify, while all the others contain the remaining images whose relation to the label the system is confident about, i.e. they certainly do or do not relate to the label.”).” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,621,578
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.