- SAP SE v. Teradata US, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 1, 2021 · IPR2021-01017 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, failing to show the claimed file management context in non-persistent memory.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’419 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have possessed at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science with at least two years of experience with database system development.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 21–22). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art could have had “some combination of (1) more formal education and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 21–22). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’419 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that no claim terms require explicit construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 16. Patent Owner contends that in related district court litigation, Petitioner has proposed construing several terms in accordance with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, and Patent Owner faults Petitioner for not applying those constructions in the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Based on the record before us, we need not construe any claim terms expressly to decide the issues presented at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“does not show sufficiently that the combination of System R and Lorie teaches a “file management context” stored in “non-persistent memory.” See Prelim. Resp. 16–22. As an initial matter, Petitioner asserts that the “Current Page Table and associated data structures such as free-space bit maps” comprise the claimed “file management context” in “non-persistent memory,” but Petitioner does not cite any passage in System R disclosing that the current page table (or any associated data structure) resides “in memory” rather than “on disk,” as shown in Petitioner’s annotated version of System R’s Figure 7. See Pet. 28–35. Nor does Petitioner point to any disclosure in Lorie in support of its contention that the current page table in the System R database system is stored in non-persistent memory. See id.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,904,419 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 4, 2021 · IPR2021-00821 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As discussed below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“reasonable likelihood of showing any of challenged claims 1–9, 15–22, and 24–27 would have been obvious over the asserted prior art. Independent claims 1, 26 and 27 recite “wherein the graphical user interface comprises at least a plurality of views of digital media content.” Ex. 1001, 47:58–59, 50:66–67, 51:41–52:1. The independent claims further require transitioning “between the plurality of views.” Id. at 47:60, 51:1, 52:4–5. For all of its asserted grounds, Petitioner asserts that the prior art teaches a plurality of views because “[t]he Shimura-Tsuji Computer can orient the displayed content in either a normal view in the laptop mode or an inverted view in the easel mode based on the outputs of the rotation angle and gravity sensors.” Pet. 50; see id. at 82, 84. Petitioner further asserts that in its proffered combination, “image files . . . would be displayed in either a normal view in the laptop mode or an inverted view in the easel mode, thereby disclosing ‘the graphical user interface comprising at least a plurality of views of digital media content.’” Id. at 50–51; see id. at 82, 84. Similarly, Petitioner explains that its asserted prior-art combination teaches transitioning between views because “[w]hen a user configures the Shimura-Tsuji-Aldrich Computing System between the laptop and easel modes, the displayed content . . . would ‘transition between the plurality of views [normal and inverted views] in response.” Id. at 51. In short, Petitioner relies only on different orientations of the same displayed content to meet the claimed plurality of views. Thus, on the current record, Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the asserted combination of Shimura, Tsuji and Aldrich teach or suggest the claimed plurality of views of digital media content and transitioning between those views, as required in all independent challenged claims.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“As Patent Owner explains, the ’888 patent discusses views extensively. See Prelim. Resp. 38–39 (providing numerous citations to the ’888 patent). In particular, the ’888 patent describes many examples of views that each organize content in a different way. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 5 (album view), 7A (single album view), 8 (time view), 16 (a view including cards); see also id. at 21:35–23:58 (describing the ’888 patent’s figures). We agree with Patent Owner that, when discussing views, the ’888 patent consistently refers to different ways of organizing content. See Prelim. Resp. 35–44; see also, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:14–15 (explaining that “[e]ach view may offer the user particular interaction options, features and benefits”), 21:16–19 (time view organizing content chronologically), 21:19-22 (album view organizing content by album), 22:59-64 (single album view showing previews of photographs). But, as Patent Owner notes, “[t]he specification never describes two orientations of the same organization of displayed content as different ‘views.’” Prelim. Resp. 37. Instead, the ’888 patent separately addresses the display’s “orientation,” which, according to the specification, is achieved simply by rotating the display. Ex. 1001, 10:27–30 (“the plurality of orientations comprises a first orientation relative to the longitudinal axis and a second orientation relative to the longitudinal axis,”), 10:46–49 “(the second orientation is 90 degrees relative to the first orientation, and . . . the third orientation is 180 degrees relative to the first orientation”), 10:57–11:8 (characterizing the display’s “orientation” as a “degree of rotation”). The ’888 patent also expressly distinguishes between displayed content and its orientation in describing that “display content and/or display orientation of the portable computer may vary when the portable computer is configured from the laptop mode into the easel mode.” Id. at 37:6–9. The ’888 patent, however, does not refer to merely changing the visual display’s orientation as changing views. “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Consistent with the ’888 patent’s specification, for purposes of this Decision, we construe “a plurality of views of digital media content” as referring to a plurality of ways of organizing visual representations of computer content. The recitation is distinct from merely changing the display’s orientation.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,612,888 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 2, 2021 · IPR2021-00800 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because the Petition’s deficient, unclear arguments did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“intended to cite and to wade through the Petition to separate the teachings of the references, the Ward testimony, Petitioner’s characterizations of the evidence, and Petitioner’s arguments, that is not our role. Rather, Petitioner is required to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” and to both “identify[] specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explain “the relevance of [that] evidence to the challenge raised.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5); see also id. § 42.22(a)(2) (petitions “must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). Petitioner has not complied with our rules. To hold otherwise would require us to “play archaeologist with the record,” which we decline to do. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999). Based on all these deficiencies, the Petition fails to specify sufficiently where the limitations of the challenged claims of the ’154 patent are taught or suggested by any of the asserted references. It also fails to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of the significance of the citations to the asserted references and the Ward Declaration. These failures violate the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5). Because these requirements must be met to show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determine that Petitioner has not made such a showing.” slip op. at 18
- BurdenDenied
“Although it might be possible for us to guess at the support Petitioner intended to cite and to wade through the Petition to separate the teachings of the references, the Ward testimony, Petitioner’s characterizations of the evidence, and Petitioner’s arguments, that is not our role. Rather, Petitioner is required to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” and to both “identify[] specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explain “the relevance of [that] evidence to the challenge raised.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5); see also id. § 42.22(a)(2) (petitions “must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). Petitioner has not complied with our rules. To hold otherwise would require us to “play archaeologist with the record,” which we decline to do. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999). Based on all these deficiencies, the Petition fails to specify sufficiently where the limitations of the challenged claims of the ’154 patent are taught or suggested by any of the asserted references. It also fails to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of the significance of the citations to the asserted references and the Ward Declaration. These failures violate the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5). Because these requirements must be met to show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determine that Petitioner has not made such a showing.” slip op. at 18
NonePatents in suitUS 10,289,154 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 21, 2021 · IPR2021-00822 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Shimura and the other references taught or suggested the required frame mode in claims 1–16 and 18–22.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As discussed below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction Petitioner proposes a claim construction for “content mode,” as well as several related terms, i.e., “first content mode,” “second content mode,” and “mode(s) of content.” Pet. 16–18. We determine we need not explicitly construe those terms to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Figure 26 and the accompanying text characterize frame mode as having the keyboard face down on a surface with the screen face up, and the base and display components forming a non-zero angle 134, similar to easel mode’s inverted “V.” See id. at 16:6–13.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“reasonable likelihood of showing the asserted prior art would have rendered obvious the subject matter of challenged claims 1–16 and 18–22. Independent claims 1, 10, and 18 require a “frame mode in which the main display component is oriented towards the operator, the base contacts a substantially horizontal surface, and the keyboard faces the substantially horizontal surface.” Ex. 1001, 17:47–51, 18:66–19:2, 20:27–30, Certificate of Correction. For all of its asserted grounds, Petitioner relies on Shimura’s Figure 4 for teaching the claimed “frame mode.” Pet. 57, 87, 102. We agree with Patent Owner that Shimura’s Figure 4 does not disclose or suggest a frame mode. See Prelim. Resp. 27–32.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,624,844 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 21, 2021 · IPR2021-00786 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Lenovo did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 would be unpatentable over the asserted combinations of Shimura, Tsuji, and Pogue.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” As discussed below, we determine that Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“above. As we explain in the summary of the ’715 patent provided in Section II.B, supra, the purpose of the ’715 patent is to better organize “more and more features” provided by “feature packing,” so that the typical computer user can better take advantage of features offered. Id. at 1:40–2:44. The ’715 patent explains that “different views [that] present different organizations of the interface elements and in some example[s] display only certain ones of the modes of content in order to reduce the number of options a user must navigate to accomplish an objective.” Id. at 2:45–58. As Patent Owner explains, the ’715 patent discusses views extensively. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 29–33 (providing numerous citations to the ’715 patent. In particular, the ’715 patent describes many examples of views that each organize content in a different way. See, e.g., id. at Figs. 2 (home view), 3A (web page view), 5 (quick access view), 6 (bookmark view), 20A (channel page view), 21 (channel full view), 23 (channel view); see also id. at 12:48–15:15 (summarizing the ’715 patent’s figures). We agree with Patent Owner that, when discussing views, the ’715 patent consistently refers to different ways of organizing content. Prelim. Resp. 29– 33.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As Patent Owner argues, the Petition relies only on different orientations (such as a “normal view” and an “inverted view”) of a single organization of displayed content, to meet claim 1’s views recitation. Id. at 24–25. For example, Patent Owner points out that the Petition considers Shimura’s display of the word “PATENT” right-side-up (normal view) and upside-down (inverted) as meeting the recited “plurality of views.” Id. at 26– 27 (citing Pet. 49–50, 54–55). As we explain above in our claim construction, however, inverting or re-orienting a single way of organizing displayed content does not create a “plurality of views of a plurality of visual representations of computer content” as claimed and described in the ’715 patent. As such, Petitioner’s implicit “construction of ‘plurality of views’ as reading on different orientations of the same organization of displayed content is wrong because it is inconsistent with every embodiment of a ‘plurality of views’ described in the specification.” Id. at 25, 38–41. Indeed, Patent Owner correctly explains that the ’715 patent addresses reorientation of a display but reorientation does not result in the views recitation. Patent Owner makes this distinction by arguing: [in] the claims and the specification of the ’715 Patent—a “view” is a way of organizing displayed content. Ex. 1001, Abstract, 2:54–58 (“[t]he different views present different organizations of the interface elements”); 3:26–28 (“the plurality of views are configured to organize modes of content into different views”); 7:25–27, 9:55–57 (a “plurality of views” of computer content as recited in claims 1, 17 and 20, is a plurality of ways of organizing displayed content). . . . the specification also describes re-orientating the same display organization about the computer’s longitudinal axis to ensure it is right-side-up, but uses different terminology to describe that re-orientation and never refers to two different orientations of the same organization of displayed content as different views. . . . The specification makes clear “views” are particular ways of organizing displayed content—not different orientations of a single organization of displayed content. Prelim. Resp. 27–28; see id. at 29–37, 42–44. We find that Patent Owner’s explanation of this distinction is best supported by the text of the ’715 patent. Thus, on the current record, Petitioner has not made a sufficient” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,880,715 - Autostore System Inc. v. Ocado Innovation LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2021 · IPR2021-00798 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“storage locations, but that this grid is defined by a structural framework. Ex. 1001, 14:5–6. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the language of claims 1 and 23 strongly suggests that the structural framework defines the grid of storage locations, and not merely that the structural framework provides open areas within which storage containers could be arranged in a grid-like pattern.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, for the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed in Section II.A.2 above, we construe “a structural framework defining a grid of storage locations,” as recited in claims 1 and 23, to require that a “structural framework” define the grid of storage locations, as opposed to these locations being defined merely by the orientation or location of stacked containers. Petitioner identifies no Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that independent claims 1 and 23 are anticipated by Lert.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“would have been obvious over Lert. Pet. 21–53. Petitioner’s obviousness arguments with respect to these claims do not resolve the issues noted above with respect to independent claims 1, 13, and 23. In particular, Petitioner provides no persuasive argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Lert to have a structural framework that defines the storage locations or to have delivery containers stored within storage containers and delivered to picking workstations. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8, 13–20, and 23 would have been obvious over the disclosures of Lert.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,796,080 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Litl LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2021-00681 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not sufficiently identify where the challenged claim limitations were taught or explain the evidence supporting its grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“to explain Petitioner’s positions fully. Where the Petition provides some explanation, it does so only through a web of internal cross-references that require the reader to engage in extensive analysis just to decipher what is being argued, much less evaluate the merits of that argument. Although it might be possible for us to wade through this voluminous information and separate the teachings of the references, the Ward testimony, Petitioner’s characterizations of the evidence, and Petitioner’s arguments, that is not our role. Instead, Petitioner is required to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” and to both “identify[] specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explain “the relevance of [that] evidence to the challenge raised.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5); see also id. § 42.22(a)(2) (petitions “must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). Petitioner has not complied with our rules. To hold otherwise would require us to “play archaeologist with the record,” which we decline to do. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999), Based on all these deficiencies, the Petition fails to specify sufficiently where the limitations of the challenged claims of the ’688 patent are taught or suggested by any of the asserted references. It also fails to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of the significance of the citations to the asserted references and the Ward Declaration. These failures violate the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2), and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5). Because these requirements must be met to show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determine that Petitioner has not made such a showing.” slip op. at 16
NonePatents in suitUS 8,289,688 - Facebook, Inc. v. Thaddeus GabaraInstitution deniedPTAB · May 25, 2021 · IPR2021-00201 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable; the cited combinations did not teach or suggest a stationary map.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’698 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“through 14, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently7 that the map shown Figure 13b is stationary, as recited in claim 1. Petitioner does not rely upon Roussos as teaching the “stationary map” recited in claim 1 or assert that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Kim in light of Roussos to satisfy this claim limitation. See, e.g., Pet. 27–30 (relying upon Kim); see also id. at 26 (discussing the proposed combination as including Roussos’s coordinate system). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the combination of Kim and Roussos teaches or suggests a stationary map as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). At this stage of the proceeding, the parties agree that the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 28. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,836,698 - Facebook, Inc. v. Thaddeus GabaraInstitution deniedPTAB · May 25, 2021 · IPR2021-00200 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied on all challenged claims because the petition did not show that Kim, alone or in combination, disclosed or suggested the required stationary map.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For the following reasons, we find Patent Owner’s assertions have merit because Petitioner has not carried its burden of showing Kim discloses or suggests a background image of a stationary map, which is a necessary limitation in each of the challenged independent claims. Because this deficiency is dispositive and leads us to the conclusion that the Petition fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’545 patent, our discussion below focuses on Petitioner’s contentions regarding Kim’s disclosure of a stationary map.” slip op. at 12
- Other 314aNot reached
“V. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner contends that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Prelim. Resp. 3–12. Petitioner opposes Patent Owner’s argument. See Paper 12 (Decision Denying Petitioner’s Request to File Preliminary Replies to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Responses), 3 (noting that Petitioner requested authorization to file a preliminary reply to respond to Patent Owner’s argument regarding discretionary denial under § 314(a)). Because we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that at least one claim of the ’545 patent is unpatentable, we need not reach the issue of discretionary denial pursuant to § 314(a).” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’545 patent and the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNot reached
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). At this stage of the proceeding, the parties agree that the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 15; Prelim. Resp. 28. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,620,545 - Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 13, 2021 · IPR2020-01613 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–3 and 5–15 unpatentable over Milewski, or claims 1–3, 7–9, and 12 obvious over Milewski and Heijden.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“analysis. Petitioner maps the action message shown in Milewski’s Figure 4 to the recited “formatted message” (see, e.g., Pet. 32 (“Figure 4 shows an exemplary screen display of an action message (the ‘formatted message’) presented to the recipient at the receiver communication station.”)), while also mapping Figure 4 to the recited “response message” (see, e.g., id. at 37 (identifying Figure 4 as the “completed reply form (response message)”)). Milewski describes Figure 4 as both the action message and reply form. Compare Ex. 1007, 7:38–39 (“FIG. 4 is a screen of the action message 400 displayed by the controller at the recipient’s station.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 9:11–15 (“In an operation 803, the controller renders the action message body in a reply form shown in FIG. 4 to the recipient using standard World Wide Web protocols and processes (HyperText Transaction Protocols-HTTP; HyperText Mark Up Language-HTML).” (emphasis added)). Milewski appears to explain the basis for its terminology by stating that “[t]hroughout the description, structured responses may also be classified as an ‘action message’ as more descriptive of the reply sought by a sender.” See id. at 5:56–59. The problem Patent Owner identifies with Petitioner’s analysis, however, is that Petitioner fails to explain where Milewski indicates copying information from the action message to the reply form when the action message and reply form appear to be the same. In support of its argument regarding copying, Petitioner cites to column 7, lines 44 through 52, of Milewski. That section states the following: Upon marking the selected response, the recipient completes the response to the action message. In the present instance, the recipient has marked the “other” response and provides text in a field 408 as a response to the text in field 402. A field 410 is available for additional comments which the sender authorized to be entered by checking the field 212 in template 200. In this case, the recipient has chosen not to provide any additional comments. Ex. 1007, 7:44–52. We find that there is nothing in this section that expressly supports Petitioner’s contention that information is copied from the action message to the reply form, especially in light of Milewski’s indication that the action message is the reply form. Furthermore, Petitioner fails to explain sufficiently why a skilled artisan would view this passage as describing the alleged copying.” slip op. at 29
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached
“The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Petitioner contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 3–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Mr. Andrews’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience in the fields of messaging systems, and wireless communication devices, or an equivalent advanced education in the field of messaging systems, including wireless communication devices. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 28). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s offered level of ordinary skill in the art” for purposes of this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 8. At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’308 patent and the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“analysis. Petitioner maps the action message shown in Milewski’s Figure 4 to the recited “formatted message” (see, e.g., Pet. 32 (“Figure 4 shows an exemplary screen display of an action message (the ‘formatted message’) presented to the recipient at the receiver communication station.”)), while also mapping Figure 4 to the recited “response message” (see, e.g., id. at 37 (identifying Figure 4 as the “completed reply form (response message)”)). Milewski describes Figure 4 as both the action message and reply form. Compare Ex. 1007, 7:38–39 (“FIG. 4 is a screen of the action message 400 displayed by the controller at the recipient’s station.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 9:11–15 (“In an operation 803, the controller renders the action message body in a reply form shown in FIG. 4 to the recipient using standard World Wide Web protocols and processes (HyperText Transaction Protocols-HTTP; HyperText Mark Up Language-HTML).” (emphasis added)). Milewski appears to explain the basis for its terminology by stating that “[t]hroughout the description, structured responses may also be classified as an ‘action message’ as more descriptive of the reply sought by a sender.” See id. at 5:56–59. The problem Patent Owner identifies with Petitioner’s analysis, however, is that Petitioner fails to explain where Milewski indicates copying information from the action message to the reply form when the action message and reply form appear to be the same. In support of its argument regarding copying, Petitioner cites to column 7, lines 44 through 52, of Milewski. That section states the following: Upon marking the selected response, the recipient completes the response to the action message. In the present instance, the recipient has marked the “other” response and provides text in a field 408 as a response to the text in field 402. A field 410 is available for additional comments which the sender authorized to be entered by checking the field 212 in template 200. In this case, the recipient has chosen not to provide any additional comments. Ex. 1007, 7:44–52. We find that there is nothing in this section that expressly supports Petitioner’s contention that information is copied from the action message to the reply form, especially in light of Milewski’s indication that the action message is the reply form. Furthermore, Petitioner fails to explain sufficiently why a skilled artisan would view this passage as describing the alleged copying.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,925,308
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.