- Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Conformis, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 26, 2017 · IPR2017-00307 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable over the asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 are unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“unexpired patent according to the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definitions for claim terms must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Petitioner asserts no claim construction is necessary and that it “construes the claim language such that the claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the ’025 patent.” Pet. 19. Patent Owner does not dispute this assertion. See generally Prelim. Resp. Having considered the evidence presented, we determine that express construction of any term is not necessary. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (court construes claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Moreover, while Petitioner seemingly acknowledges that Schuster I and Schuster II are separate and distinct references (see Pet. 21), we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to provide an articulated rationale for combining features of Schuster I and those of Schuster II, as required by KSR. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)). Claim 1 recites that “the patient-specific surface ha[s] at least a portion that is substantially a negative of a corresponding portion of a diseased or damaged cartilage surface of the joint of the patient.” Petitioner asserts that both Schuster I and Schuster II disclose a patient-specific surface. Pet. 27. Yet, Petitioner relies primarily on Figure 2 of Schuster II to describe how “a portion of the patient specific surface is substantially a negative of the cartilage surface.” Id. As discussed below, Petitioner’s arguments and evidence do not demonstrate sufficiently why one of skill in the art would have combined the tool of Schuster I with the tool of Schuster II, which includes a portion that is substantially a negative of the cartilage surface. According to Petitioner, “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to use MRI (as taught by Schuster I & II) to image the patient’s cartilage surface (as was common knowledge) and to make at least a portion of the patient-specific surface of the implantation aid be substantially a negative of the patient’s damaged cartilage surface.” Id. at 29–30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 82–85). Relying on the testimony of its declarant, Petitioner proffers several reasons why one of skill in the art would have wanted to match the patient-specific surface to the corresponding cartilage. Id. at 30. For example, Petitioner asserts that “the Schuster references themselves provide the motivation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 3:57–67, Fig. 2; Ex. 1046 ¶ 11; Ex. 1002 ¶ 84). In context, Petitioner is relying on the teachings from both Schuster I and Schuster II that the implantation aids are “set on the damaged knee joint.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 3:57–67, Fig. 2; Ex. 1046). However, such reasoning lacks rational underpinnings because it does not address the proposed modification of the tool of Schuster I using the tool of Schuster II, in which a portion of the tool is substantially a negative of the patient’s damaged cartilage surface. Petitioner further suggests that the combination would have been obvious as a matter of design choice, or as a choice from a limited number of finite options, to simplify the surgery, or to ensure “very exact positioning on the damaged knee joint.” Pet. 30–31 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 84); see also Ex. 1002 ¶ 84 (providing near verbatim discussion). We determine that these statements, as well as the portion of the Mabrey Declaration to which Petitioner refers, are conclusory as well, and do not provide significantly more than an assertion that they are directed to the same problem. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements”); see also In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (reviewing case law and explaining that findings must be supported by a reasoned basis).” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claims 1–20 of the ’025 patent are unpatentable. 4 IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition is denied. 4 Because we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of success of prevailing on its contentions and do not institute an inter partes review, Petitioner’s request for joinder, or a consolidated schedule with, with Case IPR2017-00115 is also moot. See Pet. 24–25; see also id. at 22–24 (arguing lack of redundancy with Case IPR2017-00115).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,216,025 - Lavelle Industries, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 4, 2017 · IPR2017-00159 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 6, 11, or 14 unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id. Petitioner does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Mr. Jones, Patent Owner, asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “typically would have had (a) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the design of plumbing components; or (b) a high school degree and at least four years of experience in the design of plumbing components.” Prelim. Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 24). Mr. Jones testifies that his opinion is based on his “experiences working in the field of product design in the plumbing industry in addition to the specification and claims of the ‘455 Patent in light of the state of the art in the 2012 time frame.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 24. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Jones is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence that Turner’s sleeves 20, 52 are collapsible. We agree with Patent Owner and Mr. Jones that “flexibility is not the same as collapsibility,” and that Turner thus does not disclose that flexible sleeves 20, 52 necessarily are collapsible. Furthermore, Mr. Jones testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would not find Turner’s sleeves to be collapsible and “a cylindrical polyethylene wall that is 1/16 or 5/32 of an inch [as disclosed in Turner] would actually be relatively rigid (although still capable of flexing).” Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 65–66. We find this testimony, which is based on Mr. Jones’ “experiences with polyethylene and similar materials and how they have been used in the plumbing industry,” credible and persuasive. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 66. Petitioner, on the other hand, offers no objective evidence supporting its assertion that Turner’s sleeves are collapsible.” slip op. at 28
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Having considered Petitioner’s argument and evidence, we are not persuaded that Schwartz’s intermediate portion 24 is collapsible. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that the passage of Schwartz cited by Petitioner as disclosing collapsibility (line 21 of column 2), fails to suggest that intermediate portion 24 is collapsible. Indeed, this passage merely discloses that ferrule 12 is shaped with radial flange 18. Ex. 1002, 2:21. As such, we are not directed to any disclosure in Schwartz that suggests intermediate portion 24—or any part of ferrule 12—is collapsible. Schwartz discloses that ferrule 12 is made of “chemically inert plastic material” (Ex. 1002, 2:13–14), but insufficient reasoning is given to establish that this material necessarily would be collapsible. Regarding Petitioner’s argument noted above that intermediate portion 24 “must” be collapsible, we agree with Patent Owner that this argument is not persuasive. The assertion that the intermediate portion must at least partially collapse to provide a sealing force against the soil pipe and to take up any variable space present above the pipe is not supported sufficiently by objective evidence or analysis. Furthermore, this assertion is contradicted by Mr. Jones’ testimony, which we credit. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 51.” slip op. at 14
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,273,455 - Amit Agarwal v. Immersion CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 19, 2016 · IPR2016-00807 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for all challenged claims because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on either asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“A claim is anticipated only if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind. 2. Overview of Rosenberg (Ex. 1002)” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A claim is anticipated only if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it] discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the elements must be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation with the principles identified above in mind. 2. Overview of Rosenberg (Ex. 1002)” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Rosenberg and Simon. Pet. 17– 20. Claims 5 and 15 depend from claims 1 and 12, respectively, and further recite “wherein the display signal is configured to display a keypad comprising a plurality of softkeys.” Claims 7 and 17 depend from claims 1 and 12, respectively, and further recite “wherein the plurality of softkeys comprises one softkey for each digit from 0 to 9.” Similar to its challenges based on anticipation discussed above, Petitioner relies on Rosenberg as disclosing all of the limitations of underlying independent claims 1 and 12. Id. at 17. Simon is relied upon by Petitioner only to teach the additionally recited limitations of claims 5, 7, 15, and 17. Id. at 17–19. Hence, Simon cannot and does not remedy the above-identified deficiencies in Petitioner’s analysis of challenged independent claims 1 and 12. Accordingly, on this record, the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing in its challenge to claims 5, 7, 15, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Rosenberg and Simon.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “no claim interpretation is needed” (Pet. 1), and Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions in this case (Prelim. Resp. 10). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented, we determine that no claim terms require express interpretation for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,773,356 - PTAB · Apr 18, 2016 · IPR2015-01542 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petition on July 02, 2015 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319, requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–10 and 20–38 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,519,581 B1 (Ex. 1004, “the ’581 patent”). Paper 2, (“Pet.”). Pursuant to our December 7, 2015 Order (Paper 16), Intellectual Ventures I LLC (“IV”), timely filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition on January 20, 2016 (Paper 17, “Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“single prior art reference arranged as in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As recently reiterated by the Federal Circuit, “a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). We analyze the ground based on anticipation in accordance with the above-stated principles.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We also are not persuaded by Dr. Taylor’s supporting testimony because it is not supported by underlying facts. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65. For example, Dr. Taylor testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood, even when a particular action is not required of the control point subsystem, the information generated is received there to facilitate system management. (Ex. 1001 ¶113). In addition, Dr. Taylor testifies that: one of ordinary skill would understand, any changes to the system resulting from a rule’s action would be reflected in updates to this database. (Id. ¶ 114). Thus, we understand Dr. Taylor to testify that Seiffert’s control point C necessarily could perform the same function of receiving the information from Managed System A. “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Although Seiffert’s system may indeed be capable of receiving the generated information, mere probabilities or possibilities fall short of demonstrating that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in Seiffert, as is required for a ground based on anticipation.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not found
“Moreover, a ground of obviousness must include “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “[T]his analysis should be made explicit” and it “can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We have considered Petitioner’s arguments (Pet. 55– 59), however, Petitioner does not articulate sufficiently why or how one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined or modified the teachings and suggestions of Fawcett and Ghezzi, or Fawcett, Ghezzi or Berry, to address with sufficient specificity the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that claims 1–8, 10, 20–26, 28–36, and 38 would have been obvious over the combination of Fawcett and Ghezzi. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that claims 9, 27, and 37 would have been obvious over the combination of Fawcett, Ghezzi, and Berry.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,519,581 - PTAB · Apr 18, 2016 · IPR2015-01543 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds because IBM did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 11–19 and 39–47 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petition and Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we conclude that the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging the patentability of claims 11–19 and 39–47 of the ’581 patent. We, therefore, deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“Seiffert expressing that the information generated by transmitting a watchdog rule from control point C to Managed System A and applying the rule to values returned by watchdog checks within Managed System A, is also communicated back to control point C. See Pet. 24–26. Indeed, the passage of Seiffert cited by Petitioner is silent with respect to any correlation between action agent 12, 22, and 33 that carries out the specified action(s) and a particular rule evaluator module 13, 23, and 33. See Ex. 1005, 5:49– 58. Petitioner’s argument, i.e., because control point C maintains information about Managed Systems A and B and the computer system as a whole, it would receive any changes resulting from a rule, is not supported by a sufficient factual basis. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 114; Ex. 1005, 4:47–55, 6:9–14). We also are not persuaded by Dr. Taylor’s supporting testimony” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not found
“Moreover, a ground of obviousness must include “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “[T]his analysis should be made explicit” and it “can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We have considered Petitioner’s arguments (Pet. 51– 52), however, Petitioner does not articulate sufficiently why or how one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined or modified the teachings and suggestions of Fawcett and Ghezzi, or Fawcett, Ghezzi or Berry, to address with sufficient specificity the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that claims 11–17, 19, 39–45, and 47 would have been obvious over the combination of Fawcett and Ghezzi. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its assertion that claims 18 and 46 would have been obvious over the combination of Fawcett, Ghezzi, and Berry.” slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“We also are not persuaded by Dr. Taylor’s supporting testimony because it is not supported by underlying facts. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65. For example, Dr. Taylor testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood, even when a particular action is not required of the control point subsystem, the information generated is received there to facilitate system management. (Ex. 1001 ¶113). In addition, Dr. Taylor testifies that: one of ordinary skill would understand, any changes to the system resulting from a rule’s action would be reflected in updates to this database. (Id. ¶ 114). Thus, we understand Dr. Taylor to testify that Seiffert’s control point C necessarily could perform the same function of receiving the information from Managed System A. “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed Cir. 1999). Although Seiffert’s system may indeed be capable of communicating the generated information, mere probabilities or possibilities fall short of demonstrating that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in Seiffert, as is required for a ground based on anticipation.” slip op. at 13
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,519,581 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. NVIDIA CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 10, 2016 · IPR2015-01863 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–19, 21–23, 25–30, 34–36, and 38–43 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of success on its obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the ground that claims 1–19, 21–23, 25–30, 34–36, and 38–43 of the ’685 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Selzer and Fiske or Selzer, Fiske, and Van Hook. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable based on the asserted grounds. We, therefore, do not institute an inter partes review on the asserted grounds as to any of the challenged claims. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition is DENIED.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“[W]hen the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention,” it is generally not limiting. Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, when a preamble phrase provides antecedent basis for a term in the body of a claim, or is clearly relied upon to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art during prosecution, this reliance on the preamble to define the scope of the invention “transforms the preamble into a claim limitation.” Id. at 808; Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that when the limitations in the body of the claim “rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention”). As noted by Patent Owner, the preamble of claim 1 provides antecedent basis for the terms “at least two sample types” and “threads.” Moreover, during prosecution the patentee amended the preamble of claim 1 to include the term “simultaneous” and argued this newly added limitation distinguished claim 1 from the prior art of record. Ex. 1012, 2, 12 (“Thus, the references do not teach the limitations found in all claims that the threads can process any of the two or more samples (vertex, pixel, primitive) simultaneously, and therefore, the pending claims should be allowed.”). Given this reliance on the preamble to define the invention, we are persuaded that the preamble of claim 1 is properly considered a claim limitation. See Catalina Marketing, 289 F.3d at 808 (“Moreover, clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.”). slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“On this record, we are not persuaded by this argument. Selzer’s dynamic load balancing system achieves greater than 95% processor utilization and ensures that “no computational power is going to be wasted by a rendering module starting out to run an idle state.” Ex. 1006, 46–47. Petitioner and Dr. Fussell do not persuasively explain why this load balanced system of Selzer would benefit from incorporation into a single multithreaded processor. Moreover, Fiske does not necessarily support Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to transition from a multiprocessor architecture to a multithreaded one. For example, Fiske discloses both a multiprocessor architecture (Figure. 1.1) and the benefits of multithreaded processors, yet despite these disclosures, we are directed to no disclosure or suggestion in Fiske to collapse the multiprocessor architecture of Figure 1.1 into a single multithreaded processor; instead, Fiske discloses replacing each individual processor with a multithreaded processor to maximize processor utilization during periods of extended latency. See Ex. 1004, 21–22, Figure 1.1 (noting that the disclosed scheduling mechanisms make more efficient use of the processor pipeline on shared memory multiprocessor systems). Thus, we are not persuaded—on this record—that the general benefits of multithreaded processors would necessarily have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to consolidate the physical processors of Selzer into one of the single, multithreaded processors of Fiske.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable
“As noted by Petitioner, Fiske discloses the use of a RISC processor. Ex. 1004, 23. Fiske also instructs that in order “[t]o allow a traditional RISC pipeline design” to be used in the disclosed method, a block multithreading model is assumed. Id. We note, however, that Petitioner’s claim chart for claim 1 relies upon a finely multithreaded architecture, which interleaves instructions from different contexts on a cycle-by-cycle basis. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1004, 41 (noting that some “multithreaded architectures interleave instructions from different contexts on a cycle-by-cycle basis”); Ex. 1005 ¶ 105); see also Ex. 1004, 41 (discussing the difference between block multithreading, which “allows a single thread to fully use the processor pipeline,” and a finely multithreaded architecture which interleaves instructions from different contexts on a cycle-by-cycle basis). Petitioner provides no reasoned explanation as to how or why both methods of multithreading would be used in the RISC processor of Fiske, nor an explanation as to how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would modify the RISC processor of Fiske to interleave the graphics and rendering instructions of Selzer on a cycle-by-cycle basis, especially given Fiske’s disclosure that “[c]ycle-by-cycle interleaving” involves “a significant hardware cost to redesign the processor core and pipeline to allow the different contexts to issue instructions simultaneously.” Ex. 1004, 41. With respect to Petitioner’s argument that the general industry trend was from multiprocessor to multithreaded designs, we note that Petitioner and Dr. Fussell provide no persuasive evidentiary support for this conclusion. See Pet. 25–26; Ex. 1005 ¶ 85. Nor does Petitioner provide a persuasive explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand this general trend to apply specifically to the multiprocessor design of Selzer. Thus, we are not persuaded that Petitioner provides sufficient detailed explanation as to how or why the RISC processor of Fiske could be combined with Selzer as proposed by Petitioner. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the ground that claims 1–19, 21–23, 25–30, 34–36, and 38–43 of the ’685 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Selzer and Fiske or Selzer, Fiske, and Van Hook.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,038,685 - Qualcomm, Incorporated v. NVIDIA CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 10, 2016 · IPR2015-01862 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Qualcomm did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable under the asserted anticipation or obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons given below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“calculation, claims 9 and 10 recite, in part, “saving the output,” claims 11 and 19 recite, in part, “a code segment for saving the output,” and claims 21 recites in part, “logic for saving the output” of a first shading calculation. In a related proceeding, we determined that the plain and ordinary meaning of “save” is “to write data (typically a file) to a storage medium, such as a disk or tape.” See Ex. 3001, 463 (see also IPR2015-01070, Paper 9). Consistent with this ordinary meaning, the ’372 Patent discloses that the “saving” may be done using a storage device, namely using a First-in-First-Out (“FIFO”) Buffer. Ex. 1001 7:1–7. The ’372 Patent also discloses that “the loopback FIFO 407 may be utilized to hold barycentric weights, colors from previous passes, triangle information, and additional scheduling information,” and that the “FIFO 407 may include a plurality of bits that can be reconfigured to store whatever piece of data is appropriate.” Id. Although there are conceivably multiple way of “saving” output, our review of the Specification of the ’372 Patent does not indicate a clear intent to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “saving.” As such, we are persuaded, on this record, that the “saving” limitations recited in the challenged claims are directed to “saving in a storage device” and should be construed as such. Patent Owner has acceded to this construction, and Petitioner provides no specific construction for this claim term. Prelim. Resp. 6–7; Pet. 14–18.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence. Such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[A] reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” (citations omitted)). In the instant case, we are persuaded that Cf could be reused without saving in a storage device, i.e., directly passed without any saving, in the context of Kajiya. Although the value could be saved, that is insufficient to anticipate the claim limitation “(b) logic for saving the output,” based on the applied claim construction. As discussed above, claims 1, 10, 11, and 20 also contain the same limitation, and those other independent claims cannot be anticipated by the disclosure of Kajiya. slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We have found previously that the recirculation of data within Gossett is not necessarily equivalent to “saving,” per the challenged claims, or that indefinite recirculation necessarily requires storage in a storage medium or device. See IPR2015-01070, Paper 9, 10. The evidence presented in this proceeding does not persuade us that this previous interpretation was incorrect or provide a reason to deviate from that conclusion. Thus, even if we determined that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the recirculation pipes of Gossett with Kajiya, it is not clear that such ordinarily skilled artisans would have saved output, per the claim limitations, given that neither Gossett nor Kajiya explicitly discloses the same. Because the Petition assumes that both Gossett and Kajiya disclose saving, the Petition does not provide any specific arguments why the combination would have necessarily utilized the saving of output, as recited by the challenged, independent claims. Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Fussell, makes similar arguments made in the Petition and testifies that “to save the output of the first shading calculation for its use in the second shading calculation would have been obvious.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 167. This testimony, however, is conclusory, and must be weighed against the disclosure of Gossett, which warns against using unnecessary hardware that could slow down operations. Ex. 1003, 2:52–54, 7:32–35. Therefore, the combination of Gossett and Kajiya could have provided a system that allowed for recirculation of values from a first shading calculation, but that would not necessarily result in the saving of that input. Although the saving of such output could have been obvious in view of Gossett and Kajiya, the Petition does not provide support for such a proposition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,690,372 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. NVIDIA CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 10, 2016 · IPR2015-01861 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Qualcomm did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–19, 21–23, 25–30, 34–36, and 38–43 were obvious over Amanatides, Van Hook, and Fiske.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has presented sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the proposed combination of Amanatides, Van Hook, and Fiske. See KSR Int’l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the ground that claims 1–19, 21–23, 25–30, 34–36, and 38–43 of the ’685 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Amanatides, Van Hook, and Fiske. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable based on the asserted ground. We, therefore, do not institute an inter partes review on the asserted ground as to any of the challenged claims. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition is DENIED.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner provides no persuasive evidence or argument to explain why the specific auto load balanced system of Amanatides would benefit from a transition to a multithreaded design. See Ex. 1003, 157, 160. For example, although Petitioner notes that “a multithreaded architecture permits rapid switching between tasks (threads), which prevents the processor from remaining unused when one task goes idle,” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 21), Petitioner does not explain why this would benefit the load balanced system of Amanatides, which already ensures that the processors will be “kept busy” doing “useful work.” Ex. 1003, 157, 160. Second, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has presented sufficient argument or evidence to demonstrate that the general understanding in the art, as disclosed in Van Hook, that multithreaded processing units may be advantageously applied to graphics processing, would motivate one of ordinary skill to replace the multiprocessor configuration of Amanatides with a single multithreaded graphics processor. In particular, although Van Hook discloses the benefits of multithreaded graphics processors, it does not teach or suggest modifying a multiprocessor configuration to incorporate all the functions of the individual processors within a single, multithreaded processor. Van Hook discloses, instead, the benefits of multithreading in dedicated vertex or pixel processors, which may be part of a larger graphics pipeline. See Ex. 1002, 6:1–2, 11:6–14; Ex. 2006, 66:21–67:23. Finally, although Dr. Fussell asserts that the transition from a multiprocessor architecture to a multithreaded architecture was part of a general industry trend, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Fussell provide any citation to support this conclusion, or an explanation as to why this general industry trend would apply specifically to the graphics processing architecture of Amanatides.6 Pet. 25–26; Ex. 1005 ¶ 85. 6 Dr. Fussell does cite to the 1997 disclosure of Song that multithreading was being given “another look.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 85 (citing Ex. 1007, 1). Dr. Fussell does not identify, however, where Song discloses or suggests Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has presented sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the proposed combination of Amanatides, Van Hook, and Fiske. See KSR Int’l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the ground that claims 1–19, 21–23, 25–30, 34–36, and 38–43 of the ’685 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Amanatides, Van Hook, and Fiske.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention,” it is generally not limiting. Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, when a preamble phrase provides antecedent basis for a term in the body of a claim, or is clearly relied upon to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art during prosecution, this reliance on the preamble to define the scope of the invention “transforms the preamble into a claim limitation.” Id. at 808; Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that when the limitations in the body of the claim “rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention”). As noted by Patent Owner, the preamble of claim 1 provides antecedent basis for the terms “at least two sample types” and “threads.” Moreover, during prosecution the patentee amended the preamble of claim 1 to include the term “simultaneous” and argued this newly added limitation distinguished claim 1 from the prior art of record. Ex. 1012, 2, 12 (“Thus, the references do not teach the limitations found in all claims that the threads can process any of the two or more samples (vertex, pixel, primitive) simultaneously, and therefore, the pending claims should be allowed.”). Given this reliance on the preamble of claim 1 to define the invention, we are persuaded that the preamble is properly considered a claim limitation. See Catalina Marketing, 289 F.3d at 808 (“Moreover, clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,038,685 - Spectrum Brands, Inc. v. Assa Abloy ABInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01563 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1, 4, 6, 8, 10-14, 16-18, 22-25, 28-31, 33, and 34 because neither asserted §103 ground showed a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims of the ’778 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner does not provide sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning explaining why one with ordinary skill in the art would modify the teachings of the applied references to address the noted differences. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)). Petitioner’s observation that both references were published in the same year and are from the same field of endeavor falls short of an adequate rationale. The same field of endeavor analysis is merely the jumping-off point in the determination of whether a claimed invention is obvious. See K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (to qualify as prior art in an obviousness analysis, references must be analogous art—either from the same field of endeavor, or reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor is involved). Moreover, as explained in KSR, “a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Here, Petitioner’s arguments do not provide the required articulated reasoning with rational underpinning, based on the evidence, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. Petitioner’s conclusory argument regarding the general feasibility of incorporating the features of Karkas into Nielsen do not explain adequately how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would attempt to improve Nielsen by looking to Karkas. Thus, having considered Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded Petitioner has provided an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning sufficient to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. 4. Summary” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Having considered Petitioner’s argument in this regard, we are not persuaded that Petitioner’s articulated reasoning has a rational underpinning and is sufficient to justify the proposed combination of Nielsen and the knowledge of the POSITA. See Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013): Where, as here, the necessary reasoning is absent, we cannot simply assume that ‘an ordinary artisan would be awakened to modify prior art in such a way as to lead to an obviousness rejection.’ It is in such circumstances, moreover, that it is especially important to guard against the dangers of hindsight bias.” (citation omitted) See also KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.”).” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,706,778 - NVIDIA Corporation v. Samsung Electronics Co., LtdInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 20, 2015 · IPR2015-01135 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because NVIDIA did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 7–9, 12, 13, 17, and 19 would have been obvious over Seo and Kong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. As discussed above, Petitioner concedes that neither Seo nor Kong discloses a data strobe buffer that outputs a data strobe signal during a “write operation” or that receives a data strobe signal during a “read operation.” Pet. 35 (“Kong discloses a ‘read’ operation in which the data strobe is output . . . .”); see also Ex. 1107 ¶ 90 (Dr. Jacob testifying that, “[w]hen Seo or Kong talk about outputting a data strobe signal, they are talking about a read operation, because a DRAM outputs the data and data strobe signals during a read operation”). Thus, we are not persuaded that Seo and Kong explicitly disclose or suggest a “first driver configured to output a first data strobe signal to the first input/output node during a write operation” or a receiver “coupled to receive a second data strobe signal from the first input/output node and output a third data strobe signal during a read operation,” as recited in claim 1 of the ’734 patent. Ex. 1101, 8:29–34. Petitioner’s argument that the function of the two data strobe buffers is equivalent, i.e., “regardless of where the data strobe buffer is located (in the memory controller or memory device) it is used for both write and read operations,” is not persuasive, because this argument does not address the claims as written. Pet. 24. Moreover, as noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner does not persuasively argue that it would have been obvious to place the data strobe buffer of Seo and Kong in a memory controller, as opposed to a memory device, such that the data strobe buffer would output a data strobe signal “during a write operation” and receive a data strobe signal “during a read operation.” Prelim Resp. 17 (“Petitioner does not—and cannot—allege that it would have been obvious to place the combined system of Seo and Kong in a memory controller.”). Thus, we are not persuaded that the combination of Seo and Kong, as formulated by Petitioner, discloses or suggests every limitation of independent claims 1 and 17 of the ’734 patent.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. As discussed above, Petitioner concedes that neither Seo nor Kong discloses a data strobe buffer that outputs a data strobe signal during a “write operation” or that receives a data strobe signal during a “read operation.” Pet. 35 (“Kong discloses a ‘read’ operation in which the data strobe is output . . . .”); see also Ex. 1107 ¶ 90 (Dr. Jacob testifying that, “[w]hen Seo or Kong talk about outputting a data strobe signal, they are talking about a read operation, because a DRAM outputs the data and data strobe signals during a read operation”). Thus, we are not persuaded that Seo and Kong explicitly disclose or suggest a “first driver configured to output a first data strobe signal to the first input/output node during a write operation” or a receiver “coupled to receive a second data strobe signal from the first input/output node and output a third data strobe signal during a read operation,” as recited in claim 1 of the ’734 patent. Ex. 1101, 8:29–34. Petitioner’s argument that the function of the two data strobe buffers is equivalent, i.e., “regardless of where the data strobe buffer is located (in the memory controller or memory device) it is used for both write and read operations,” is not persuasive, because this argument does not address the claims as written. Pet. 24. Moreover, as noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner does not persuasively argue that it would have been obvious to place the data strobe buffer of Seo and Kong in a memory controller, as opposed to a memory device, such that the data strobe buffer would output a data strobe signal “during a write operation” and receive a data strobe signal “during a read operation.” Prelim Resp. 17 (“Petitioner does not—and cannot—allege that it would have been obvious to place the combined system of Seo and Kong in a memory controller.”). Thus, we are not persuaded that the combination of Seo and Kong, as formulated by Petitioner, discloses or suggests every limitation of independent claims 1 and 17 of the ’734 patent.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 7,804,734
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.