- Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,726,504 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 3, 2024 · IPR2023-01434 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’898 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention would have been a person with a working knowledge of physiological monitoring technologies and human interface design. That person would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, in combination with training or at least one to two years of related work experience with capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to physiological monitoring technologies and human interface design (Ex. 1003, ¶45). Alternatively, that person could have also had a Master of Science degree in a relevant academic discipline with less than a year of related work experience in the same discipline (Ex. 1003, ¶45). More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa (Ex. 1003, ¶45). Pet. 5–6. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The general rule is that “the indefinite article ‘a’ means ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’” Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 64 F.4th 1311 (2023); see also Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“An exception to the general rule that ‘a’ . . . means more than one only arises where the language of the claims themselves, the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate a departure from the rule.”). And, the use of “the” (as in “the detailed view”) indicates that the recited part of the claim is a reference back to the corresponding part of a previous recitation (i.e., “a detailed view”). Finjan LLC v. SonicWall, Inc., 84 F.4th 963, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Similar to this court’s holding that ‘said’ indicates part of a claim limitation refers to the corresponding part of a previously claimed limitation, . . . , the use of ‘the’ also indicates the claimed term refers to an antecedent term.”). However, whether “a detailed view” means “one or more detailed views” is a separate issue from whether the claims require the same detailed view to have both of the recited components. See Finjan, 84 F.4th at 974 (“[T]hat is a separate issue from whether the claims require the same component to perform multiple functions or satisfy multiple limitations of a claim.”). The plain language of “a detailed view” followed by the recitation of “the detailed view” comprising two components suggests that the “detailed view” must be tied to both of those components. See id. (“In [Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Nokia Sols. & Networks Oy, 15 F.4th 1136, 1143–44 (Fed. Cir. 2021)], we explained that ‘[a]s a matter of plain language, reciting ‘a computer’ (or a ‘first computer’) that performs a function, and then further reciting that ‘the computer’ (or ‘said first computer’) performs multiple additional functions, suggests that such ‘computer’ must be tied to all those functions.’ . . . This same rationale is relevant in analyzing the claims here.”); see also id. (The court agreeing with SonicWall’s argument “that even if the reference to ‘a computer’ may mean ‘one or more computers,’ the subsequent references to ‘the computer’ can only be satisfied by the same ‘one or more computers’ that satisfied the first limitation.”); Salazar, 64 F.4th at 1317 (“We agree with the district court that while the claim term ‘a microprocessor’ does not require there be only one microprocessor, the subsequent limitations referring back to ‘said microprocessor’ require that at least one microprocessor be capable of performing each of the claimed functions.”). We determine that, even if plural detailed views are allowed, the claim requires a single one of those views to have both a graph representation and a selectable data sharing option.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. For the reasons discussed above, we construe independent claims 1 and 23 as requiring the “detailed view” to have both a graph representation and a selectable data sharing option. See supra Section II.C. Petitioner does not identify adequately any disclosure in Molettiere of displaying a single view having both components. Thus, Petitioner has not shown adequately that Molettiere is anticipatory. Additionally, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner does not articulate adequately any obviousness contentions regarding how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the relied-on figures of Molettiere to arrive at the recited detailed view having both components. See Prelim. Resp. 9–10; Pet. 10–14. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to independent claim 1 and independent claim 23 as anticipated by or obvious over Molettiere. For the same reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to dependent claims 2– 11, 18, 20–22, 25–34, 41, and 43–45 as anticipated by or obvious over Molettiere. E. The Alleged Unpatentability of Claims 1, 3, 9, 10, 16, 18, 23, 26, 32, 33,” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,270,898 - Wellmatics, LLC / GR Energy Services Management, LP et al. v. Canatex Completions Solutions, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 8, 2024 · IPR2023-01149 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner “does not dispute” these qualifications. Prelim. Resp. 10. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’122 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the example of “a fluid line that provides gas or liquid to expansion chamber 38 from [the] surface” in the specification, does not require that a fluid line be a source of fluid pressure. We further agree that Petitioner’s analysis ignores the fact that this example makes clear that the source of fluid pressure is at the surface. Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 66–67). Both Patent Owner and Petitioner agree that “source” should be construed in accordance with its ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 13, 18; Pet. 18–19 (Patent Owner has not “identified any clear definition or clear and unambiguous disclaimer that would justify departing from the ordinary meaning of the claim language.”). ordinary meaning of “source.”2 See Prelim. Resp. 13–18 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:55–65, 4:5–12, Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 52–63, Ex. 2003, 7, 8, Ex. 2004, 5, Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 29–30, Fig. 1, Ex. 2006, 4:64–5:9, Fig. 1, Ex. 2007, 13:23–35, Ex. 2009, Abstr., 3:54–60, Ex. 2010. Patent Owner provides dictionary and declaratory evidence that the ordinary meaning of “source” is ‘“origin’— i.e., the place from which something originates.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 52, Ex. 2003, 7, 8, Ex. 2004, 5). Patent Owner provides further evidence and explanation as to why that definition is consistent with the usage of “source of fluid pressure” in the ’122 patent. Id. at 13–15 (citing e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:55–65, 4:5–12). Patent Owner provides further evidence of how the term “source” is used in other patents and documents “in the oil and gas industry” that is consistent with its definition. Id. at 15–18 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 57–63, Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 29–30, Fig. 1, Ex. 2006, 4:64–5:9, Fig. 1, Ex. 2007, 13:23–35, Ex. 2009, Abstr., 3:54–60, Ex. 2010). Thus, based on the current record, we construe “source of fluid pressure” to mean the place from which the fluid pressure originates.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“As noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner’s declarant merely asserts that Bebak’s hydraulic pump would have been considered part of the second part of a releasable connection, and thus it is entitled to little weight. Prelim. Resp. 28; see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper No. 9 at 15 (Aug 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Dr. Jones does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Thus, the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.”) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). For all of the above reasons, we determine that the Petition does not provide a reasonable basis to determine that Bebak teaches “a second part [of the releasable connection] comprising: . . . a source of fluid pressure,” as required by independent claims 1 and 13.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,794,122 - Guangdong Laitu Imaging Technology Co., Ltd. v. Really Right Stuff, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 25, 2023 · IPR2023-00853 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim, including due to failures to establish prior art status and claim limitations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in any of its challenges to claims 6–8, 15–17, and 25–28 of the ’037 patent. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted; and FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Pro Hac Vice Motion to” slip op. at 34
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Here, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 1–5 and 18–24 of the ’037 patent. Prelim. Resp. 7; Ex. 2004. Based on our review of Exhibit 2004 and Office assignment records, we determine that a disclaimer of claims 1–5 and 18–24 of the ’037 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been filed with the Office as of July 27, 2023. Although the disclaimer does not, on its face, indicate the extent of Patent Owner’s interest in the ’037 patent (see Ex. 2004, 2), Office assignment records indicate that Patent Owner owns the entire interest in the ’037 patent. See Ex. 3001, 2. We also note that notice of the disclaimer was included in the September 12, 2023, Official Gazette, Volume 1514, No. 2 at 228. See Ex. 3002, 1. Based on the information in the public record, we find that the disclaimer complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Because claims 1–5 and 18–24 have been disclaimed under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a), in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), we do not reach challenges to those claims. As a result, the remaining challenged claims are claims 6–8, 15–17, and 25–28 (“the challenged claims”).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s definition, arguing that “a lower level of skill is necessary to understand the mechanical functions of a tripod.” Prelim. Resp. 11. According to Patent Owner, “a hobbyist user of a tripod, such as a hunter or landscape photographer, would have the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Formal education or years of practical experience building equipment supports are unnecessary to understand the function of a tripod.” Id. Neither of the parties provides the testimony of an expert witness or addresses the factors identified above. The challenged claims are directed to a support, such as a tripod, having an apex that is mountable to a platform and to which equipment to be supported by the tripod may be attached. Based on the teachings of the ’037 patent and the disclosure of the asserted references, we find that the lower level of skill proposed by Patent Owner to be more reasonable and for purposes of this Decision adopt it as our own. We note that we would reach the same conclusion to deny institution under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner proffers definitions for two terms. Patent Owner argues that “[a]pex should be construed as ‘the structure of the tripod that joins the legs to each other and the rest of the tripod at the legs’ pivot points’” (Prelim. Resp. 11) and “[e]quipment should be limited to devices that may be used either in conjunction with or independent of a support” (id. at 12). For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,398,037 - Pro-Dex, Inc. v. Intelligent Automation Design LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 19, 2023 · IPR2023-00218 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–8 unpatentable over the asserted prior-art grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims of the ’683 Patent is unpatentable. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Petition is denied, and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 32
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a twostep process. First, the claimed function must be identified, followed by a determination of what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citing Noah Sys. Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded that Hosokawa discloses, teaches, or suggests “determining a time when the torque reaches a maximum by an average means for determining an average value as a function of a current value and a new value, thereby determining the optimum point of grip,” as recited in claim 1. As explained above in Section II.A., consistent with Petitioner’s proposed construction, we construe this claim term as an algorithm that causes a microprocessor to perform the following steps: averages the torque signal in the microprocessor using the formula: (Current Valuex9.9+New Value*0.1)/10 = New Current Value; monitors the average torque/current using the microprocessor; and determines when a decrease in current, corresponding to a drop in torque, is detected, as well as equivalents thereof. Petitioner’s assertions regarding the teachings of Hosokawa, however, fail to address how or where Hosokawa discloses, teaches, or suggests an algorithm that causes a microprocessor to determine when a decrease in current, corresponding to a drop in torque, is detected. See Pet. 21–25. In particular, Petitioner does not direct us to where Hosokawa discloses, teaches, or suggests an algorithm that causes a microprocessor to determine when a decrease in current is detected. See id. Petitioner’s contentions regarding Hosokawa merely address determining a decrease in the torque signal without addressing current. See Pet. 21–23. Based on the record before us, Petitioner does not set forth sufficient argument and evidence to demonstrate that Hosokawa discloses, teaches, or suggests “determining a time when the torque reaches a maximum by an average means for determining an average value as a function of a current value and a new value, thereby determining the optimum point of grip,” consistent with our construction and Petitioner’s proposed construction for this means-plus-function limitation. See Pet. 21–25. As applied by Petitioner, the teachings of Minogue do not remedy the deficiencies of Hosokawa. See Pet. 36–43. Therefore, Petitioner also does not set forth sufficient argument and evidence to demonstrate that the combination of Hosokawa and Minogue teaches or suggests “determining a time when the torque reaches a maximum by an average means for determining an average value as a function of a current value and a new value, thereby determining the optimum point of grip,” in accordance with our construction and Petitioner’s proposed construction for this means-plus-function limitation.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner’s rationale to combine the teachings of Hartung and Minogue is insufficient. The general desirability of reducing signal noise and extracting meaning from physical sensor signals may prompt the addition of any noise reduction signal processing to any system that utilizes physical sensor signals. This general desirability of reducing signal noise and extracting meaning from physical sensor signals, however, fails to sufficiently address why a person of ordinary skill in the art would modify Hartung’s system and method which already includes a Bessel filter for smoothing the measuring signal to further include Minogue’s specific weighted averaging algorithm. The question of “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan . . . would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A rationale to combine should “imply a motivation to pick out those two references and combine them to arrive at the claimed invention.” Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Indeed, it is often necessary to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added). “[K]knowledge of a problem and motivation to solve it are entirely different from motivation to combine particular references.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Similarly, Petitioner’s assertion that modifying Hartung to include Minogue’s weighted averaging functionality “would have been motivated as a way to help smooth the measuring signal” also lacks sufficient rational underpinning because Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why adding Minogue’s weighted averaging formula to Hartung’s system and method that already includes a Bessel filter for smoothing the measuring signal would be helpful to smoothing the measuring signal. The Petition also does not explain sufficiently how a person of ordinary skill in the art would include Minogue’s weighted averaging formula with Hartung’s system and method that includes a Bessel filter for smoothing the measuring signal. For example, Petitioner does not explain whether Hartung’s Bessel filter smoothed measuring signal would be later processed using Minogue’s averaging formula, or whether Minogue’s averaging formula would be applied first to the measuring signal and then later processed with Hartung’s Bessel filter. Petitioner’s cited declaration testimony of Dr. Klopp largely mirrors Petitioner’s arguments, and, therefore, fares no better than the Petition. Compare Pet. 48–49, with Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 134–136, 191. Like the Petition, Dr. Klopp’s declaration testimony sets forth generic and conclusory statements without explaining why or how the teachings of Hartung and Minogue could be combined, and how any specific combination would operate. “[C]onclusory expert testimony does not qualify as substantial evidence.” TQ Delta, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit has found that, when “[t]he expert failed to explain how specific references could be combined, which combination(s) of elements in specific references would yield a predictable result, or how any specific combination would operate or read on the asserted claims,” the “expert’s testimony on obviousness was essentially a conclusory statement.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also In Touch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F. 3d 1327, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding the expert testimony “failed to provide any meaningful explanation for why one of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine these references at the time of this invention.”). In summary, based on the record before us, Petitioner does not set forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support its argument that “it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to modify Hartung to include Minogue’s weighted averaging functionality (including the weighted averaging formula).” Accordingly, there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 and claims 2–5, dependent therefrom, are unpatentable as obvious over Hartung and Minogue.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,091,683 - Tiktok Inc. v. Advanced Coding Technologies LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 27, 2023 · IPR2022-01546 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–7 were unpatentable as obvious over either asserted combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and do not institute an inter partes review of the ’154 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Lett’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have been a person with a working knowledge of digital video and audio technologies.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor of Science, a Bachelor of Applied Science, or a Bachelor of Engineering degree in an academic discipline emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, in combination with training or at least one to two years of related work experience with capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to digital video and audio technologies. Id. Alternatively, Petitioner contends, “the person could have also had a Master of Science, Master of Applied Science, or Master of Engineering degree in a relevant academic discipline with less than a year of related work experience in the same discipline.” Id. at 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Patent Owner states that “[f]or the purpose of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 13. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’154 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms require an express construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 14; Prelim. Resp. 13. Accordingly, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute.7 See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Third, as noted above, Petitioner also argues that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art that elapsed playback time would be indicated by time stamps included in the audio content. Pet. 15–16. But, on this aspect of Petitioner’s contention, neither Petitioner nor Mr. Lett provides any reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to include a time stamp in Lindroos’ audio data. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶ 35. As reflected in our discussion above, Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding Exhibits 1010–1013 is unsupported by the references cited. Thus, Petitioner’s assertion that this limitation was “well known” and “would have been obvious” to one of ordinary skill in the art is not supported on the record before us. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate on the present 13 Mr. Lett states that he “refer[s] to these other publications . . . merely for purposes of corroborating this common background knowledge recognizable to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] at the time.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 35. record that it was “well known and would have been obvious” “for elapsed playback time to be indicated by time stamps included in the audio content.” Pet. 15–16 (citations omitted).14” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,615,154 - Toyota Motor Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 3, 2023 · IPR2022-01127 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Toyota did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, including because Peisa did not disclose selecting data from fewer than all radio bearers.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The following limitation 1[g], however, provides that “in the first iteration . . . data is selected from a subset of the plurality of radio bearers.” Id. at 14:10–11 (emphasis added). This clause does not simply reiterate “the plurality of radio bearers,” but expressly adds “a subset.” The word “subset” plainly modifies “a plurality of radio bearers,” and must have some limiting meaning. For example, if we were to interpret “subset” as encompassing all or less than all of the radio bearers as Petitioner asserts, than the word, i.e., limitation, “subset” is entirely unnecessary, given that the claim already provides such broader meaning. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions that render phrases in claims superfluous). See Bicon Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[C]laims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim”). Indeed, if “a subset” can include data selected from all the radio bearer’s then Petitioner’s interpretation reads the term “subset” essentially, if not entirely, out of the claim.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“This argument and Dr. Akl’s testimony is problematic because it does not explain technically, or logically, why input flows that transmit less than “a determined fair distribution” are “non-selected.” Neither the arguments in the Petition, nor Dr. Akl’s testimony, fully address this particular jump in logic. Even if the input flow transmits less than its fair distribution of bandwidth, (and a backlog counter is incremented to reflect that the input flow has buffered data that was not transmitted), this does not explain that a particular radio bearer is excluded from being allocated bandwidth resources such that it is “non-selected,” i.e., that resources are applied only to less than all of the radio bearers. The Petition even tacitly acknowledges that each input flow in Peisa transmits data, explaining that “[w]hen the scheduling algorithm does reach step 445 in the first iteration, it will ‘update’ the ‘backlog counters’ for each input flow that did not get to transmit all of its data during the first iteration.” Id. at 49 (citing Ex. 1004, 9:1–34).” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable
“Apart from “a processor,” Petitioner does not discuss or analyze any additional limitations, including limitations 1[g] and 8[h], with respect to obviousness. See Pet. 63 (“Thus, the “processor” and ‘processor configured to . . .’ limitations of claims 1 and 8 would have at least been obvious based on Peisa.”). Petitioner relies on its evidence and arguments with respect to ground 1 for the remainder of the obviousness ground. See id. (The Petitioner states “given the above-discussed disclosures of Peisa in Ground 1 for the other limitations of claims 1–4, 6–11 and 13–14, Peisa would have at least rendered obvious claims 1–4, 6–11 and 13–14) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 169–73). Petitioner’s obviousness ground based on Peisa, thus does not provide persuasive evidence or arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Peisa to disclose the limitations in limitations 1[g] and 8[h]. Accordingly, based on the arguments and evidence of parties on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of showing any of the challenged claims as obvious over Peisa.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,292,138
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.