- PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01492 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner fails to establish that Coccia discloses “a resulting solvent valve” as required by claim 1 and as alleged in the Petition. See Pet. 35–42. 4. Conclusion Based on our review of the current record, Petitioner does not establish a reasonable likelihood of proving that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Coccia and Anson. The remaining challenged claims, claims 2–9, all ultimately depend from claim 1. See Ex. 1001, 18:42–19:48. Petitioner’s obviousness challenges to claims 2–9 build on its analysis for claim 1. See Pet. 10, 43–70, 79–86. Accordingly, for the same reasons we discuss above in the context of claim 1, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood in prevailing on its challenge to any of the dependent claims.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., 46 F.4th 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). “The patent’s purpose can also be informative.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“cites the specification for support, but that argument largely misses the point and elides the claim requirements tied to the resulting solvent valve. See Pet. 35; Prelim. Reply 4. Patent Owner agrees with the general proposition that “a resulting solvent valve” means one or more resulting solvent valves. See Prelim. Resp. 10 (acknowledging that “two duplicative resulting solvent valves having the three positions” could each qualify as “a resulting valve”); Prelim. Sur-reply 4–5 (“Had Petitioner cited to multiple ‘resulting solvent’ valves that each” meet the claim requirements, “Patent Owner would not have raised an issue.”). The general statement that “a” or “an” means “one or more than one,” however, does not support Petitioner’s argument that the limitation broadly covers systems where no single resulting valve meets the three claimed valve positions. The dispute does not turn on whether “a” means “one or more than one”; the dispute, rather, concerns whether the claim allows for multiple valves to meet the three claimed states or whether a single valve must meet those claim requirements.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to establish that Coccia discloses the claimed “resulting solvent valve.” Importantly, Petitioner premises its argument for this limitation on a claim construction that we rejected in our analysis above. Because we determine that the claim requires at least one resulting valve to meet the three claimed states identified in the claim, Petitioner may not rely on a combination of Coccia’s valves 26 and 36 to provide the three claimed states, as Petitioner does throughout its analysis. See Pet. 35–42; Prelim. Reply 4. As to Petitioner’s alternative argument that Anson discloses the claimed resulting solvent valve, we decline to consider the argument because it was not included in the Petition and was made for the first time in Petitioner’s Preliminary Reply. See Pet. 35–42; Prelim. Reply 5. Petitioner relied on Anson in the Petition as an alternative reason to find that it would have been obvious to place Coccia’s valve 36 in the claimed location (downstream of the conduit joint and upstream of the brewing chamber), not to meet all of the limitations associated with the resulting solvent valve. See Pet. 38–39. Moreover, Petitioner’s limited argument and evidence in the Preliminary Reply lacks adequate development and fails to persuade us that Anson’s valve 28 performs all of the “claimed functions” associated with the resulting solvent valve, including the two “active” states that the Petition addresses with reliance on Coccia alone. See Pet. 40–42; Prelim. Reply 5. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner fails to establish that Coccia discloses “a resulting solvent valve” as required by claim 1 and as alleged in the Petition. See Pet. 35–42. 4. Conclusion Based on our review of the current record, Petitioner does not establish a reasonable likelihood of proving that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Coccia and Anson. The remaining challenged claims, claims 2–9, all ultimately depend from claim 1. See Ex. 1001, 18:42–19:48. Petitioner’s obviousness challenges to claims 2–9 build on its analysis for claim 1. See Pet. 10, 43–70, 79–86. Accordingly, for the same reasons we discuss above in the context of claim 1, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood in prevailing on its challenge to any of the dependent claims.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,772,456 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01483 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–12 would be unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the challenged claims in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the challenges in the Petition. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least the following (or equivalents): a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering with at least five years of experience in product design; or an M.S. degree in mechanical engineering with at least two years of experience in product design.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002, 13). Patent Owner “submits a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) would be a mechanical or materials engineer, or other similar degree, having at least two to three years of personal experience in designing or development of espresso machines.” Prelim. Resp. 8. In the alternative, Patent Owner states that “because Petitioner’s definition is so close to that of Patent Owner’s definition, that no express finding is necessary to find Petitioner has not met its burden to show with particularity that claim 1 is unpatentable.” Id. We find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’524 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). The outcome of this case would remain the same if we applied Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under that standard, we give the words of a claim their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by one skilled in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Id. at 1312–13. Only terms in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The parties propose constructions for several claim terms. For example, Petitioner contends that we should construe “conduit,” “coupled,” “another solvent,” and “dynamically modulate.” See Pet. 13–17. Patent Owner reserves its right to challenge Petitioner’s constructions and proposes its own constructions for “another solvent” and “communicatively coupled.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. We determine that we need not construe any of these additional terms to determine whether Petitioner met its burden as to any of its challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that any of them disclose an electronic controller coupled to two pumps and a thermal modulator, such as a heater. Petitioner suggests that Lai’s controller controls two “pump(s),” but Lai appears to describe a single pump 138, and Petitioner fails to point to any disclosure or suggestion in Lai that its system employs more than one pump. See Pet. 38–39 (citing Ex. 1002, 41–42); Ex. 1007 ¶ 98, Fig. 60. Petitioner does not directly assert that Santi discloses a controller connected to two pumps, and it too, like Lai, appears to only disclose a single pump. See Pet. 39; Ex. 1005 ¶ 64, Fig. 1. Petitioner correctly notes that Majer discloses controller 9 connected to two pumps, but we agree with Patent Owner that only one of those pumps meets the requirements of the claimed pumps, which are both connected to conduits that eventually lead to the brewing chamber. See Pet. 40; Prelim. Resp. 28; Ex. 1008, 9:11–12 (describing circuit C2 containing pump 4bis as not including any “brewing means”). In addition, Petitioner does not allege, and Majer does not appear to disclose, a controller coupled to Majer’s heating elements. See Pet. 40. Based on the foregoing, none of the prior art Petitioner relies on discloses an electronic controller that controls both claimed pumps and a thermal modulator. Despite these deficiencies, Petitioner summarily concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized that it would be obvious to combine Startz’s machine with the electronic controller of any of Lai, Santi, and/or Majer, and that such electronic controller would be communicatively coupled to both the thermal modulator and the pumps.” Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1002, 43). The Petition provides no additional rationale or argument in support of this conclusion, and the cited declarant testimony provides no further analysis. See id.; Ex. 1002, 43. Given the lack of any teaching of a controller coupled to two pumps and a thermal modulator, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to provide some reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references in a manner that meets the limitation.14 Because the Petition lacks any such statement or rationale, we find Petitioner’s obviousness argument and evidence lacking in this critical respect.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,576,524 - Babybjörn AB v. The Ergo Baby Carrier, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00110 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus deny institution of inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (“At any time prior to a decision on institution of inter partes review, the Board may deny all grounds for unpatentability for all of the challenged claims. Denial of all grounds is a Board decision not to institute inter partes review.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a four-year degree in a design-based field, which may include fashion design, industrial design, mechanical engineering, or another technical field, or equivalent experience, and familiarity working with child products and/or adjustable products.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Smith Decl. ¶¶ 32–38). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposed definition, which appears consistent with the record in this proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. Furthermore, Patent Owner does not argue that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly the term “at least one thigh support adjuster” because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). More particularly, and as discussed below, Petitioner does not show sufficiently how the prior art teaches the structure identified as corresponding to the alleged claimed function. Further, because we deny on the merits (as discussed below), we do not address Patent Owner’s alternative argument that we should deny institution because “Petitioner fails to construe th[is] limitation and otherwise argues for an advisory opinion from the Board on indefiniteness.” Prelim. Resp. 1; see id. at 1–6 (entire argument). 2. “defined by” Limitations 1j and 11l each recite “a first setting, a second setting, and a third setting defined by the adjustable child carrier.” Ex. 1001, 17:38–39 (emphasis added), 19:43–44 (emphasis added). Limitation 6k recites “a first position, a second position, and a third position defined by the adjustable child carrier.” Id. at 18:36–37 (emphasis added). Patent Owner proposes a construction for “defined by” in these limitations. See Prelim. Resp. 12–15. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly “defined by”” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“Public accessibility “has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ . . . .” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). In Hulu, the Precedential Opinion Panel (“POP”) rejected a petitioner’s argument that a reference necessarily meets “the reasonable likelihood standard for institution where the reference bears conventional markers of publication, such as a copyright date, edition identifiers, publication by a commercial publisher, and the assignment of an ISBN number.” Hulu, Paper 29 at 17. The POP stated: “We do not hold that any particular indicia per se is sufficient at the institution stage. Rather, the indicia on the face of a reference, such as printed dates and stamps, are considered as part of the totality of the evidence.” Id. at 17–18 (citing Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Here, Petitioner provides no citation, no discussion, and no support for its assertion that the Synergy Manual was “published” in “2007.” See Pet. 2. Instead, we are left to assume that Petitioner relies on the text “© BabyBjörn AB, Stockholm, 2007” at the bottom of page 6 of the Synergy Manual. More to the point, Petitioner does not discuss in the Petition any evidence supporting the implicit position that the Synergy Manual was publicly accessible prior to the critical date of the claimed invention.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,786,055 - Stara S.A.-Indústria De Implementos Agrícolas v. Agco CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01459 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or agricultural engineering, or a related study, and two years of experience building or using agricultural implements, such as cultivators, planters, or other implements, or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 64–66).” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“J. Discretionary Denial Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Patent Owner argues that the Board should exercise discretion, and deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office during prosecution. See Prelim. Resp. 47–48. We need not reach this argument having denied institution on the merits.” slip op. at 46
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner states “Patent Owner agrees with the Petition that no construction is necessary.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Patent Owner contends “the ordinary and customary meaning of ‘parallel,’ as used in independent Claims 1 and 17, does not include ‘transverse,’ as used in Hubalek.” Id. Patent Owner further contends “the ordinary and customary meaning of ‘a hinged joint,’ as used in independent Claims 1 and 17, does not include a ‘ball joint.’” Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 45–51). Additionally, Patent Owner contends the ordinary and customary meaning of claim 17 is that the preamble is limiting. Id. at 15–17. Patent Owner also believes the preamble of claim 17 is limiting. Id. at 16. We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. We do not believe any claim term requires express claim construction, as both parties agree that no construction is necessary. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,665,989 - Imperative Care, Inc. v. Inari Medical, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01257 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable, chiefly because Garrison did not disclose the claimed negative-pressure arrangement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Based on the record here and for the reasons discussed below, we find that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable. We, therefore, do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We need only construe the claims to the extent needed to resolve the controversy before us. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner neither disputes Petitioner’s proffered construction nor disputes Petitioner’s contention that Hartley teaches a “filament” as claimed. See, e.g., Pet. 41–43; Prelim. Resp. 17. We need not expressly construe the term “filament” or any other term for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in August 2018 “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline and 2–4 years of catheter design experience.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–36). Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s proposal is “insufficient,” yet Patent Owner provides no alternative definition of the POSA’s qualifications and, instead, applies Petitioner’s proposed definition. Prelim. Resp. 17. We apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA level for the purposes of this Decision, which level does not appear to be inconsistent with the prior art of record.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableInstitution denied
“On this record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Garrison describes the subject matter of claim 1’s system with the subject matter being arranged as recited in the claim. Prelim. Resp. 44–62. Patent Owner argues, for example, that Petitioner “fails to identify any embodiment of Garrison that discloses . . . an aspiration system including an aspiration pump in which negative pressure is generated in a first chamber and a second chamber when a valve is closed.” Id. at 45. Patent Owner cites, inter alia, Petitioner’s identification of “an aspiration pump that is positioned upstream of a receptacle such that the pump delivers fluid (e.g., blood) to the receptacle via positive pressure and thus cannot generate negative pressure in the receptacle”—the alleged “first chamber” identified by Petitioner. Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added). Patent Owner persuasively supports its counterarguments with the teachings of Garrison and the testimony of Mr. Brown. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, Figs. 32–36; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 64–76. We discuss in further detail below. whenever Garrison discloses a pump in the embodiments identified by Petitioner—whether a peristaltic pump as shown in Figures 32–34, a centrifugal pump, or the pump device 3250 shown in Figure 36—the pump is positioned to draw fluid through an inlet and expel the fluid out of an outlet via positive pressure to a downstream delivery location such as a receptacle or blood return line. Such a pump would not and could not generate negative pressure in the downstream delivery location (the receptacle the Petition alleges is the first chamber) for multiple reasons—and therefore would not generate negative pressure in any “first chamber” identified by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 46. We agree with Patent Owner.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,744,691 - PTAB · Nov 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00851 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims 1–7 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of challenged claims 1–7. We thus deny institution of inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (“At any” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112[(f)] applies” and that “the failure to use the word ‘means’ also creates a rebuttable presumption—this time that § 112[(f)] does not apply.”12 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part) (internal citations omitted). Because the “sealing means” limitation includes the word “means,” we start from the rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) applies. Petitioner does not address the applicability of § 112(f) and does not rebut the presumption. We continue the analysis, however, and, for the reasons below, we agree with Patent Owner that § 112(f) applies to the “sealing means” limitation.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“3. “fits behind” In wherein clause (vi), claim 1 recites: “the outwardly pointing outer flange of the first connecting device fits behind the inner flange of the nut unit.” Ex. 1001, 9:4–5 (emphasis added). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner discusses the term “fits behind” in this claim language. See Prelim. Resp. 41–45. We need not construe explicitly this language or any other claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,851,030 - Revcontent, LLC v. Integrated Advertising Labs, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 22, 2023 · IPR2022-01511 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–9 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on either asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’121 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner has the better claim construction position. The “non-” in “non-sponsored posts” indicates that the phrase means “not” or “other than” “sponsored posts.” See Ex. 3001 (https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/non- (accessed March 21, 2023) (defining “non-” as “not: other than: reverse of: absence of”)). In terms of Petitioner’s proposed construction for “sponsored posts,” “non-sponsored posts” are content not from an advertiser. Construing the phrases in terms of the content source rather than whether it is “regular” content, as Petitioner implies, is consistent with the Specification’s description of Figure 6. See Ex. 1001, 13:44–55. The Specification distinguishes post types based on source—posts by members of the forum and press release posts from the advertisers. See id. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that “non-sponsored posts” means content not from an advertiser.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s contentions are based in large part on the assertion that “[Koeppel’s] provider content represents the ‘non-sponsored posts,’ e.g., the regular content provided on the site.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125– 126). As discussed above in the claim construction section, we do not adopt Petitioner’s implied claim construction position, and construe “non-sponsored posts” as content not from an advertiser, rather than simply regular content provided on the site. Both Koeppel references describe the “provider” as one that markets goods and services. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 (Koeppel), 2:34–36 (“Providers associate the users ‘browsing’ these Web pages as potential consumers for the products and services they provide.”); Ex. 1006 (Koeppel-II), 9:46–47 (“The provider governing the Web server determines the types of content it wishes to market.”); see also Prelim. Resp. 26–27 (noting the Petition at page 35, in quoting Koeppel, utilizes ellipses to omit the explanation that the “content selected by a provider” “[m]ay represent alternate products or renderings of existing products or services offered by the provider” (Ex. 1005, 8:41–45)). Figure 4A is consistent with this understanding by depicting Capital One credit card marketing information in the boxes labeled 410, 420, and 425. See Ex. 1006, 9:60–65 (Koeppel-II describing elements 410, 420, and 425 as offers for credit cards offered by “the provider”). Thus, the provider content in Figure 4A—that which Petitioner characterizes as “regular content”—is marketing content, and Petitioner has not explained adequately how that is not content from an advertiser, i.e., “non-sponsored posts.” Petitioner’s contention that elements 420 and 425 are sponsored posts and element 410 is a non-sponsored post also is based on the discussion in Koeppel-II of third party advertising fees. See Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1006, 22:7–12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 144–147); see also id. at 36 (addressing the preamble). Koeppel-II utilizes windows 420 and 425 in Figure 4A as examples of different ad formats for determining how much to charge third party advertisers. Ex. 1006, 22:5–14 (“[The] fee may be altered based on whether the third party content was fully in-view or partially in-view. . . . Assume for purposes of this example that windows 420 and 425 are advertisement content provided by a third party entity 180.”). Koeppel-II is not distinguishing third party ads and non-sponsored content, as Petitioner implies. Pet. 36–37, 39–40; cf. id. at 35 (contending that “Koeppel discloses that ‘sponsored posts,’ or information from an advertiser, is included with the non-sponsored posts” but only identifying a sponsored post (in the form of a third party banner ad), and not identifying a non-sponsored post). Rather, Koeppel-II is distinguishing the amount of content viewable in the two windows for fee-setting purposes. Ex. 1006, 22:8–9 (“Window 425 is in partial view, while window 420 is in full view.”). Even if the Koeppel references were deemed to disclose third party advertisements inserted alongside Capital One’s “regular” marketing content, the pre-existing nature of that “regular” marketing content does not convert it into non-sponsored posts. We determine that Petitioner has not adequately explained how Koeppel, Koeppel-II, or the combination thereof discloses or suggests displaying a sponsored post among non-sponsored posts on a web page. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood in” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“by Google and were filed within months of each other, and contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “reviewing Haveliwala would have naturally looked to other work done by Google engineers, such as Bharat, for further guidance and insight as to the work Google was doing around personalized Web advertising.” Pet. 76 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 259). Petitioner’s reasoning is too generalized. The existence of a common assignee or that a person of ordinary skill in the art might look to another reference in the same broadly characterized field does not provide adequate reasoning as to why such a person would combine the specific relied-on teachings of the two references so as to arrive at the claimed subject matter. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[I]t can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,147,121 - Flowco Production Solutions, LLC v. Well Master CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 20, 2023 · IPR2022-01385 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Flowco did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 3–17 obvious over Victor and Yerian, with or without Davis.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus deny institution of inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (“At any time prior to a decision on institution of inter partes review, the Board may deny all grounds for unpatentability for all of the challenged claims. Denial of all grounds is a Board decision not to institute inter partes review.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“may address the same or similar problems is not adequate to demonstrate motivation to combine, even at this stage of the proceeding. See PO Resp. 22–24; see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that prior art padlocks were analogous art because they “were clearly directed toward the same problem the inventor was trying to solve in the” patent at issue); Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2018-00827, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Oct. 16, 2018) (Decision Denying Institution) (informative) (“Demonstrating that a reference is analogous art or relevant to the field of endeavor of the challenged patent is not sufficient to establish that one of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine its teachings with other prior art in the manner set forth in the claim.”). Even so, Patent Owner provides persuasive argument and evidence through its expert, Mr. Cosby, that Victor and Yerian address very different problems and solve these problems in very different ways. See Prelim. Resp. 23–27 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 56–100). Petitioner’s conclusory attorney arguments do not address these differences and how they would impact the motivation to combine the teachings of Victor and Yerian, despite these differences.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,395,865 - Flowco Production Solutions, LLC v. Well Master CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 20, 2023 · IPR2022-01384 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–16 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving obviousness over Victor and Yerian, with or without Davis.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus deny institution of inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (“At any time prior to a decision on institution of inter partes review, the Board may deny all grounds for unpatentability for all of the challenged claims. Denial of all grounds is a Board decision not to institute inter partes review.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have [had] at least a bachelor’s degree in physics or an appropriate engineering discipline, as well as at least three years of experience in designing well plungers.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the current record, including the prior art. See Prelim. Resp. 11; GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “proposes that all claim terms be given their ordinary and customary meanings and that no explicit constructions are necessary.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not dispute that position. See Prelim. Resp. 11. We need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As noted by Patent Owner, however, the mere fact that two references may address the same or similar problems is not adequate to demonstrate motivation to combine, even at this stage of the proceeding. See PO Resp. 21–23; see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that prior art padlocks were analogous art because they “were clearly directed toward the same problem the inventor was trying to solve in the” patent at issue); Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, Inc., IPR2018-00827, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Oct. 16, 2018) (Decision Denying Institution) (informative) (“Demonstrating that a reference is analogous art or relevant to the field of endeavor of the challenged patent is not sufficient to establish that one of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine its teachings with other prior art in the manner set forth in the claim.”). Even so, Patent Owner provides persuasive argument and evidence through its expert, Mr. Cosby, that Victor and Yerian address very different problems and solve these problems in very different ways. See Prelim. Resp. 23–27 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 56–100). Petitioner’s conclusory attorney arguments do not address these differences and how they would impact the motivation to combine the teachings of Victor and Yerian, despite these differences.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,793,728 - Flowco Production Solutions LLC v. Well Master CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01386 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–11, 13, 15, 16, 18–21, 23, and 24 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We therefore deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. DISCUSSION A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in physics or an appropriate engineering discipline, as well as at least three years of experience in designing well plungers.” Pet. 5–6. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention. Prelim. Resp. 2; Ex. 2001 ¶ 38. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“The ’892 patent prosecution history evidences that an unimpeded fluid path does not include valves. During prosecution, Patent Owner amended the independent claims to claim “an unimpeded fluid path” in claims 1 and 23 and “an unimpeded narrow passageway within the fluid path” in claim 18. Ex. 1002, 61–64 (emphasis in original). Patent Owner argued that, The Applicant has amended independent claims 1, 18, and 23 to clarify that the fluid path is unimpeded. The alleged fluid path through the body of the plunger disclosed by Brown identified at page 4 of the Office Action is not unimpeded due to the presence of valves 76 and 102/104. Thus, Brown cannot anticipate claims 1, 2, 4–8, 12, 18, 19 or 23 of the present application. Id. at 66. In response, the Examiner issued a Notice of Allowability but did not provide a Statement of Reasons for Allowance. Id. at 43. “Prosecution disclaimer can arise from both claim amendments and arguments.” Tech. Props. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., 849 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Here, Patent Owner’s amendments to claim an unimpeded fluid path/passageway and arguments distinguishing Brown’s fluid path as being impeded by valves 76, 102/104 (versus unimpeded as claimed) clearly and unmistakably disclaimed coverage of plungers having bypass valves in the fluid path and narrow passageway through the plunger body.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“b. Motivation to Combine Further, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that a skilled artisan would not have modified Gray’s bypass valve with Victor’s stopper because their different principles of operation would render Gray’s plunger unsuitable for its intended purpose of providing lift in early stage wells. See Prelim Resp. 35–38 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 66–75, 103–107, 111). Mr. Cosby testifies that Gray and Victor operate differently so adding a narrow passage of Victor to Gray’s plunger would reduce the ability of Gray’s plunger to work in high pressure wells. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 103–07; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 57, 91, 98, 111–12. The record supports Mr. Cosby’s testimony, and Petitioner’s attorney arguments do not address the arguments and evidence. Pet. 14–15. For this additional reason, Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating the unpatentability of any of claims 1–11, 13, 15, 16, 18–21, 23, and 24 under Ground 1.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,627,892
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.