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  • PTAB · May 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00134 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged, undisclaimed claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute inter partes review on any of the alleged grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

      “it filed with the Office a statutory disclaimer of claims 22, 24, 39, and 40 of the challenged patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Ex. 2028, 1; see Prelim. Resp. 7 n.1. The disclaimer of a claim “shall . . . be considered as part of the original patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 253(a). The language “considered as part of the original patent” means that a patent subject to a disclaimer under § 253(a) “is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.” Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in section 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”) (citing Altoona Publix Theatres v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 492 (1935)); Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Board’s interference jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 291 required “the existence of an interference, and a claim that ‘never existed’ [due to a statutory disclaimer] cannot form the basis for an interference”); Facebook, Inc. v. Skky, LLC, CBM2016- 00091, Paper 12 at 8 (PTAB Sept. 28, 2017) (precedential as to § II.B.2) (“The Federal Circuit has held consistently that claims disclaimed under § 253(a) should be treated as though they never existed.”). Thus, even though claims of the challenged patent existed at the time the Petition here was filed, we must now treat the challenged patent as if it had never included those claims. Accordingly, no inter partes review will be instituted for disclaimed claims 22, 24, 39, and 40 of the ’950 patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”). Nevertheless, our analysis continues because not all of the claims challenged in the Petition have been disclaimed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Based on our review of the record, we do not construe any limitations or terms of the challenged claims because construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” and we do not discern any such controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Here, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’950 patent would have had “at least a Master’s degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of work experience relating to power electronics and the design of switching power converters, with more experience potentially substituting for education or vice versa.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 35–38; Ex. 1010, 80). Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Additionally, Dr. Rivas-Davila applies Petitioner’s definition in his declaration. Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with (1) the problems addressed in the ’950 Patent and (2) the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,199,950
  • PTAB · May 17, 2024 · IPR2024-00187 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 22, and 31–35 were unpatentable under any asserted § 103 ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369. This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Therefore, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combination of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Master’s degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of work experience relating to power electronics and the design and control of switching power converters, with more experience potentially substituting for education, or vice-versa.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1017, 79; Ex. 1003 ¶ 29).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term, or decide whether the preamble of claim 1 is limiting, for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner cites to Dr. Hopkins’ Declaration, which repeats nearly verbatim the contentions in the Petition, and then adds testimony that “[t]he resonant period and frequency is what the ’481 Patent refers to as the ‘standard’ operating period and frequency.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81). Dr. Hopkins, however, does not provide any citation to the ’481 patent to support this testimony, nor any further explanation as to how or why the resonant period and frequency teaches the “standard operating period and frequency” recited in limitation 1[c]. Therefore, “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory 17 As discussed below, Petitioner also relies on this theory for all of the remaining six challenges in the Petition, and does not provide further explanation in any of those challenges. Accordingly, as explained below, each of Petitioner’s remaining challenges is insufficient for the same reasons described here. assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”) (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,166,481
  • PTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01129 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Meta did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 29, 31–44 were obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine Petitioner has not shown that there is a 1 Petitioner identifies itself, Meta Platforms, Inc., as the real party-in-interest. Pet. 93. 2 Patent Owner identifies itself, Jawbone Innovations, LLC, as the real partyin-interest. Paper 7, 2. reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we deny institution of an inter partes review of claims 29 and 31–44 in the ’611 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner and Patent Owner’s proposed levels of skill in the art are similar, except that Patent Owner proposes slightly more experience, i.e., “three years of industry or academic experience” versus “at least two years of relevant experience.” Prelim. Resp. 14; Pet. 7. Based on the current record and for purposes of analysis, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan, with the exception of the qualifier “at least” with respect to experience which renders the level of ordinary skill in the art ambiguous and may encompass levels beyond ordinary, as it is consistent with the ’611 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Petitioner contends that “[n]o formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner proposes a claim construction for the claim 1 term of “forming a filter” and “filter” which are used in claims 29 and 44. Prelim. Resp. 12. As discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden on the merits and, because the construction of these terms is not relevant to that determination, we need not address the construction of the terms that Patent Owner proposes for construction.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “a. Claim 29 We determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to show a reasonable likelihood that Avendano ’880 and Hou would have rendered claim 29 obvious. This determination is based on the evidence and argument presented for limitation [29b], so we solely address this issue below.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,326,611
  • PTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01083 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3, 5–9, 12, and 13 were obvious over Avendano ’880 and Hou.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Limitation [1b] requires, in part, “generating a first quantity by applying a calibration to at least one of the first signal and the second signal.” Petitioner’s proposed combination does not disclose this portion of limitation [1b] because Avendano ’880’s alleged calibration does not generate the first quantity. Rather, Petitioner relies on Avendano ’880’s gain to generate a calibrated second signal, which “would be subsequently processed to generate a ‘first quantity.’” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). That is, Petitioner relies on Hou’s “first minimum estimate unit 508” to subsequently process the calibrated second signal to generate the first quantity. Id. But the combination does not meet the claim because claim 1 requires the calibration to generate the first quantity: “generating a first quantity by applying a calibration,” and Petitioner relies on subsequent processing after Avendano ’880’s alleged calibration to generate the first quantity. Petitioner’s alternative argument, that “[a]s another example, a calibration also would be applied to the second signal x2 by Hou’s ‘first minimum estimate unit 508’ to generate a first quantity,” also fails. Id. at 36–37. This argument is untenable because Hou’s first minimum estimate unit 508 merely “estimates the minimum for the first electronic sound signal.” Ex. 1008, 5:36–38. Hou does not describe unit 508 as performing a calibration. Nor does Petitioner explain how Hou’s minimum estimate constitutes a calibration. Pet. 36–37. And Petitioner’s expert merely parrots the Petition. Ex. 1003 ¶ 135. Thus, Petitioner’s conclusory assertion is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “We determine below that Petitioner has not met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood that Avendano ’880 and Hou would have rendered independent claim 1 obvious. As the remaining claims all depend from claim 1 and Petitioner’s second challenge only addresses dependent claims, Petitioner’s failure to meet its burden on this challenge is dispositive, and we need not address Ground 2. See Pet. 1.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We determine that we need not construe this term because, for the reasons we explain below, Petitioner has not met its institution burden regardless of the construction of this term. We further determine that no other terms require construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had “at least a bachelor of science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, mechanical engineering, or a related discipline, with at least two years of relevant experience in a field related to acoustics, speech recognition, speech detection, or signal processing.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education or industry experience may compensate for a deficit in the other.” Id. Patent Owner proposes a nearly identical definition and asserts that “Petitioner generally agrees with this level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23). Based on the current record, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’213 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,321,213
  • PTAB · Dec 28, 2023 · IPR2023-01130 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that Brandstein teaches or suggests the independent claim requirement, “wherein the first virtual microphone and the second virtual microphone are distinct virtual directional microphones with substantially similar responses to noise.” Contrary to Petitioner’s interpretation of Brandstein Figure 5.2, that figure does not lead to an inference that the individual microphone responses have similar responses to noise. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. In effect, Petitioner is arguing that knowing that the sum of two numbers is equal to “2” necessarily means that each number is “1”, as opposed, for example, to one number being “2” and the other “0”. Moreover, as discussed above, Brandstein’s description of Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the virtual microphones of Brandstein do not have “substantially similar responses to noise.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. Likewise, Figure 5. 3 of Brandstein also refutes Petitioner’s assertion the virtual microphone noise responses are substantially similar. Prelim. Resp. 13.8” slip op. at 24

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that Brandstein teaches or suggests the independent claim requirement, “wherein the first virtual microphone and the second virtual microphone are distinct virtual directional microphones with substantially similar responses to noise.” Contrary to Petitioner’s interpretation of Brandstein Figure 5.2, that figure does not lead to an inference that the individual microphone responses have similar responses to noise. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. In effect, Petitioner is arguing that knowing that the sum of two numbers is equal to “2” necessarily means that each number is “1”, as opposed, for example, to one number being “2” and the other “0”. Moreover, as discussed above, Brandstein’s description of Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the virtual microphones of Brandstein do not have “substantially similar responses to noise.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. Likewise, Figure 5. 3 of Brandstein also refutes Petitioner’s assertion the virtual microphone noise responses are substantially similar. Prelim. Resp. 13.8” slip op. at 24

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “On June 27, 2023, Petitioner also filed a Motion for Joinder to And Consolidation With Related Inter Partes Review IPR2023-00251, which Patent Owner opposed on July 27, 2023. Papers 2, 7. However, on August 8, 2023, that Proceeding was terminated due to settlement. IPR2023-00251, Paper 15. Accordingly, on September 8, 2023, Petitioner filed an Unopposed Motion To Withdraw Motion For Joinder. Paper 8. We grant that motion.” slip op. at 2

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,122,357
  • PTAB · Aug 10, 2023 · IPR2023-00432 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because neither obviousness ground showed a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–4, 8–11, and 13–16 unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. For the reasons set forth below, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we do not institute inter partes review of claims 1–4, 8–11, and 13–16 of the ’823 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We do not find that the Petition presents sufficient reasoning to support why a person of skill in the art would modify Sigurdsson’s priority algorithm in view of Shappell’s and Rao’s teachings. Shappell and Rao simply teach that metadata is sent first and content or raw data is sent second. Petitioner contends that because the metadata is known to usually contain less data than a file and the updated version is newer, Sigurdsson’s priority algorithm should be reconfigured to assign greater priority to the metadata and lower priority to the files. Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1028 ¶ 177. Petitioner asserts that Sigurdsson motivates the modification because of the “natural harmony” of Sigurdsson’s algorithm to prioritizing metadata. Pet. 23; Ex. 1028 ¶ 177. There is no explanation provided in the Petition, however, as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would opt to modify Sigurdsson to assign and compare priorities by reconfiguring the priority algorithm of Sigurdsson when there is the simpler way of using software to simply send metadata first and content second as taught in Shappell/Rao. Absent explanation in the Petition as to why one of skill in the art would opt to reconfigure Sigurdsson’s priority algorithm to assign and compare priorities rather than employing the simpler method taught in Shappell/Rao of just sending metadata first, the Petition lacks rational underpinning.” slip op. at 22

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “We have reviewed the motions and the documents at issue and have considered the explanations of the confidential nature of the materials for which sealing is sought. We find there is good cause and therefore we grant the motions to seal and the associated request to enter the protective order.” slip op. at 30

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,754,823
  • PTAB · Aug 10, 2023 · IPR2023-00431 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on both §103 grounds because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims required priority assignment and comparison.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. For the reasons set forth below, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we do not institute inter partes review of claims 1–4, 8–11, and 13–16 of the ’787 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “bachelor’s degree in computer science (or a similar degree) with two years of work experience in developing software, including at least some experience with storage, synchronization, and human-computer interaction technologies.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 17, 21). Patent Owner does not 2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’787 patent claims priority, through a continuation application, to a provisional application filed before March 16, 2013, and neither party has argued that the provisions of the AIA apply at this time, we apply the pre-AIA versions of the statutory bases for unpatentability. See Ex. 1007, codes (60), (63). 3 U.S. Publication No. 2007/0174246 A1, published July 26, 2007 (Ex. 1016). 4 U.S. Publication No. 2005/0091289 A1, published April 28, 2005 (Ex. 1020). 5 U.S. Publication No. 2006/0190506 A1, published April 24, 2006 (Ex. 1019). 6 U.S. Patent No. 7,035,847 B2, filed March 15, 2002 (Ex. 1025). 7 U.S. Publication No. 2005/0120082 A1, published June 2, 2005 (Ex. 1026). proposed definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this juncture, we determine that the qualifications proposed by Petitioner for an ordinarily skilled artisan are consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and in the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction Neither party requests that we expressly construe any claim term. Pet. 6; see generally, Prelim. Resp. At this juncture, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any claim term for this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We do not find that the Petition presents sufficient reasoning to support why a person of skill in the art would modify Sigurdsson’s priority algorithm in view of Shappell’s and Rao’s teachings. Shappell and Rao simply teach that metadata is sent first and content or raw data is sent second. Petitioner contends that because the metadata is known to usually contain less data than a file and the updated version is newer, Sigurdsson’s priority algorithm should be reconfigured to assign greater priority to the metadata and lower priority to the files. Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1028 ¶ 177. Petitioner asserts that Sigurdsson motivates the modification because of the “natural harmony” of Sigurdsson’s algorithm to prioritizing metadata. Pet. 23; Ex. 1028 ¶ 177. There is no explanation provided in the Petition, however, as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would opt to modify Sigurdsson to assign and compare priorities by reconfiguring the priority algorithm of Sigurdsson when there is the simpler way of using software to simply send metadata first and content second as taught in Shappell/Rao. Absent explanation in the Sigurdsson’s priority algorithm to assign and compare priorities rather than employing the simpler method taught in Shappell/Rao of just sending metadata first, the Petition lacks rational underpinning.” slip op. at 22

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,642,787
  • PTAB · Apr 18, 2023 · IPR2022-01601 · APJ Kristi L R Sawert · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8, 10–18, and 20 were unpatentable over Chung, Olmos, or Olmos in view of Chung.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Petitioner ultimately bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability of each challenged claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an inter partes review if we determine that the information presented in the Petition and Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 9

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “1[d] and 11[d] recite that the “second expansion portion” is “longitudinally spaced from the first expansion portion.” Ex. 1001, 21:54–55, 22:38–39 (emphasis added). On this record, we find that the annotated excerpt of Chung’s Figure 2 is inconclusive as to whether dovetail (32) (blue) is longitudinally spaced from the expansion portion (yellow). Based on the excerpt of Chung’s Figure 2, it is equally likely that the structures colored blue and yellow terminate in the same plane, as shown in Patent Owner’s annotated excerpt of Chung’s Figure 2, reproduced below: Prelim. Resp. 45–46. In Patent Owner’s annotated excerpt of Chung’s Figure 2 reproduced above, Patent Owner demonstrates that Chung’s dovetail (32) longitudinally terminates in the same plane as the ramped surfaces that flank the dovetail (shown by the orange arrows), and does not appear to be longitudinally spaced past the plane where the expansion portion terminates. See id. (citing Ex. 1005, 10; Ex. 2001 (Culbert Decl.) ¶ 85). On this record, we find Patent Owner’s interpretation of Chung Figure 2 more plausible than Petitioner’s.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “certain limitations of claims 1 and 11 (i.e., limitations 1[f], 1[g], 11[f], 11[e]), but relies only on Olmos for limitations 1[d] and 11[d]. See Pet. 99 (stating that “Olmos discloses each and every element of” the challenged claims); id. at 99–101 (discussing the combination of Olmos and Chung with respect to only limitations 1[f], 1[g], 11[f], 11[e]); see also Prelim. Resp. 82 (noting that, for claim limitations 1[d] and 11[d], “Petitioner’s analysis of the asserted combination relies completely on its discussion of Olmos”). We refer back to our analysis above in determining that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown for institution that Olmos teaches limitations 1[d] and 11[d] (relating to “second expansion portion” that is “longitudinally spaced from the first expansion portion”). Supra § II.G. Accordingly, for at least the same reasons discussed above for claims 1 and 11, on this record we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that these claims are unpatentable as obvious over Olmos in view of Chung.” slip op. at 30

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “Seal. Paper 3 (“Motion”). Petitioner requests that we seal Exhibit 1010 (a claim chart submitted as an exhibit to Patent Owner’s litigation infringement contentions). Id. at 1. Petitioner represents that the material it seeks to seal contains its trade secrets. Id. at 2–3. Petitioner filed a proposed protective order, which includes modifications to the Board’s default protective order. See Ex. 1018; Ex. 1019. Patent Owner filed a Response to Petitioner’s Motion. Paper 7. Patent Owner indicates that it does not oppose “the Board sealing Petitioner’s confidential information,” but does oppose Petitioner’s proposed protective order. Id. at 1 (citing Ex. 1018; Ex. 1019). However, Patent Owner represents that “the parties have conferred and agree to the terms of the stipulated protective order filed as Exhibit 2100.” Id.; see also Ex. 2101 (redline comparison of Ex. 2100 to the Board’s default protective order). We find that Petitioner has established good cause to seal its trade secret information. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.14. We also enter the stipulated protective order filed as Exhibit 2100.” slip op. at 31

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,925,752
  • PTAB · Feb 7, 2023 · IPR2022-01184 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would have been obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “8. Conclusion Based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner’s proffered arguments, evidence, and supporting testimony fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 12–14, 17, 18, 20–23, 27, 30, and 31 would have been obvious over Pilgrim, Gibbons, Lairson, and Yoda.” slip op. at 32

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

      “II. ANALYSIS A. Discretionary Denial – 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner argues that we should exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because the factors identified in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”), weigh in favor of denying institution (Prelim. Resp. 49–54). Petitioner argues we should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv (Pet. 66–67). Because we determine Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing any of the claims challenged would have been obvious as discussed below, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

      “B. Discretionary Denial – 35 U.S.C. §325(d) Patent Owner contends we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because of the Petition’s “reliance upon the secondary references Gibbons, Lairson, and Yoda. Gibbons and Lairson were considered by the Examiner, and Yoda does not contain any meaningful additional disclosure or basis for unpatentability that was not considered by the Examiner” (Prelim. Resp. 21–22). Because we determine Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing any of the claims challenged in those grounds would have been obvious as discussed below, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “Based on the present record including the disclosure in the ʼ269 Patent, we apply a slightly modified version of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art that removes the qualification of “at least” and clarifies some statements (see Pet. 6). More specifically, we determine a POSITA would have had a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in physics, or in a related science or engineering field, along with five years of experience in optical element design and optical filters although additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree with exposure to optical element design and optical filters) may substitute for some industrial experience in optical element and optical filter design, and more industrial experience can substitute for a different educational background. We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ269 Patent and the prior art of record (cf. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art)).” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,588,269
  • PTAB · Jan 4, 2023 · IPR2022-01103 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Considering the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that the Petition does not demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood that [P]etitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

      “14 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s argument for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 23–39.” slip op. at 21

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Petitioner contends that as of September 15, 2011 (see supra n.1), a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as a “skilled artisan”) “had the equivalent of a graduate degree in pharmaceutics or a related field, and knowledge and experience making oral-dosage formulations. This individual could work with other specialists including, e.g., an M.D., clinical pharmacologist, and medicinal chemist.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Buckton Decl. ¶¶ 81–84). For the purposes of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 42. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that the claims do not require any construction, but also states that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the term “inert low moisture carrier,” which appears in claim 1, to include Avicel PH112. Pet. 12. For purposes of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “does not challenge the claim construction positions set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 41. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,616,097
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