• Dental Recycling North America, Inc. v. Solmetex, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · PGR2023-00055 · APJ Michael A Valek · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that any challenged claim was unpatentable under the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of post-grant review is authorized only when “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. Upon considering the present record, we determine that Petitioner has not satisfied its burden to show that it is more likely than not that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Relying on the testimony of its declarant, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill (“POSA”) “would have been an individual with at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or at least 3 years of experience designing or manufacturing vacuums, filters, medical devices, or the related components.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 94–95). Patent Owner does not respond to Petitioner’s contention in its Preliminary Response, but asks its declarant to apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art in his analysis. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 86. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends that “[a]ll terms of the ’175 patent should be given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a POSA,” but does not propose any express claim construction for consideration. See Pet. 22–23. Petitioner further asserts that the preambles of the independent claims are limiting. Id. at 23–25. Patent Owner argues “that claim construction is not necessary at this time,” but urges that “in the event the Board determines that claim construction is necessary, Petitioner’s proposal to construe the preambles of the independent claims as limiting should be rejected.” Prelim. Resp. 65. We need not determine whether the preambles of the independent claims are limiting to reach the outcome in this decision. Accordingly, no express claim construction is necessary here. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”). D. Grounds 1–4 and Petitioner’s Related Priority Challenge” slip op. at 11

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on the record before us, Patent Owner has the better position. It is well settled that the original drawings may themselves be sufficient to provide description for later-filed claims. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1565 (holding that “drawings alone may provide a ‘written description’ of an invention as required by § 112”). That is the case here with respect to the original figures submitted with the Great-Grandparent application. We agree with Patent Owner and Dr. Garris that original Figures 4A–B and 5B show a flange or “radially protruding structure” configured as in the challenged claims. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 106–113. Moreover, the original description in the Great-Grandparent application describes “removable retaining pins 13” that “ensure the recycling container,” i.e., container 12 in Figures 4A–B, “does not detach from the air-water separation tank 5 when there is no vacuum in the system.” Ex. 1002, 213 (¶ 92). Based on this description and the depiction of retaining pin 13 in the original Figure 2, a POSA would have understood that the pins engage with the radially protruding structure to hold the container in place as recited in the challenged claims. Ex. 2001 ¶ 114. Petitioner’s argument that the original figures do not depict the radially protruding structure and retaining pins working together to hold the container in place is unpersuasive. Patent Owner has sufficiently demonstrated that a POSA would have understood how the structures in original Figures 2 and 4A interact based on a side-by-side comparison of the same. See Pet. 38–43; Ex. 2001 ¶ 114. Indeed, the applicants made a similar comparison during prosecution, which proved persuasive to the Examiner. Ex. 1002, 87, 98. The Petition provides no reason to doubt that a POSA would understand the original figures and description just as Patent Owner contends. Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the fact that the specification and drawings were amended does not mean that Patent Owner had to add new matter to overcome the Examiner’s rejections. See Pet. 16– 17. In this case, the amendments to the specification during prosecution of the ’175 patent made the operation of the retaining pin and radially protruding structure, as shown by the original figures, even clearer. But that does not mean that the original description was inadequate.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,660,175
• Atea Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 21, 2024 · PGR2023-00046 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Atea did not show claim 1 was more likely than not unpatentable for lack of written description, lack of enablement, or anticipation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of post-grant review is authorized by statute only when “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. Upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the cited evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has not satisfied its burden under 35 U.S.C. § 324 to show that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The major differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions of a skilled artisan include the number of years of drug discovery experience that is necessary and the breadth of the fields of endeavor with which a POSA should be familiar. We agree with Patent Owner that a POSA includes a team of skilled artisans with skill sets in the various aspects of drug development, but determine that Petitioner has addressed those necessary skill sets in its definition. We also determine on this record that Petitioner has assessed adequately the level of experience needed, and do not agree with Patent Owner that greater years of experience are necessary for a POSA in this instance. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Because Petitioner’s definition of a person of skill in the art appears commensurate with the level of skill reflected in the asserted art in this case as well as the ’361 patent itself, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art to determine whether it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail on its challenges to claim 1. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claims “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200. Therefore, we construe the challenged claims under the framework set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under this framework, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id. Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Both parties agree that we need not construe any claim terms here to resolve the issues in this proceeding. See Pet. 16; Prelim. Resp. 18–19. We agree with the parties that we need not construe any claim terms in this proceeding to resolve whether to institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 11

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “In applying the rubric set forth in Ariad to determine whether claim 1 has appropriate written description support, we can look for structural features common to the members of the subgenus of claim 1 so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of the subgenus. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. To do this, we look “for blaze marks within the disclosure that guide attention to the claimed species or subgenus.” See Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 61 F.4th at 1356. In this regard, the fourteenth aspect of the third embodiment is the blaze mark that points to the subgenus of claim 1. We do not need to find blaze marks that identify the fourteenth aspect of the third embodiment as the only formula of merit or the only one that should be claimed. Rather, we look to the written description to see if it describes sufficient structural features common to the members of the subgenus of claim 1 such that a POSA can visualize or recognize the members of that subgenus, thereby demonstrating that the inventors possessed the subject matter of the claim at the time they filed their application.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,642,361
• Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00838 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Vrazel’s encoder or encoder and pre-distorter provided the claimed m-ary modulator for claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10–17, 22, and 23.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator” in any of the challenged independent claims. We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claims 1, 22, or 23 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Because it is dispositive, we focus our analysis on each independent claim’s recitation of “an m-ary modulator for increasing the number of bits per symbol in the first electrical data signal to produce a first m-ary modulation signal.” Ex. 1001, 15:6–8 (claim 1), 17:13–15 (claim 22), 18:9– 11 (claim 23). In addressing this limitation, Petitioner relies solely on Vrazel, which Petitioner contends “discloses this limitation in at least two ways.” Pet. 28 (addressing claim 1), 64 (addressing claim 22 by referring to analysis for claim 1), 66 (addressing claim 23 by referring to analysis for claim 1).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,771,181
• Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00835 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 were unpatentable over Pang and Vrazel.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering or a similar degree and at least two years of professional experience with optical communications, networking, and signal processing.” Pet. 7. Petitioner adds that “[m]ore experience can supplement less education and vice versa,” and supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Min. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner does not specifically address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by Dr. Min’s testimony, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6–7. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,263,723
• Trend Micro, Inc. v. Webroot Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 13, 2023 · IPR2023-00662 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We may institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review. B.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

    “4 Petitioner also cites page 10 of Tahan, but we find no mention of either SVP or SVM there, and Petitioner does not explain where it might be disclosed. 5 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition based on the state of the related litigation. See Prelim. Resp. 3–18.” slip op. at 19

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or a related field, or an equivalent technical degree or equivalent work experience, and an additional one to two years of education or experience in the field of computer security topics such as malware/exploit detection and/or machine learning” and that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 94). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill.” Prelim. Resp. 29. 1 Gil Tahan, et al., Mal-ID: Automatic Malware Detection Using Common Segment Analysis and Meta-Features, Journal of Machine Learning Research 13, 949–979 (April 13, 2012) (Exhibit 1003). 2 Eitan Menahem, et al., Improving Malware Detection by Applying Multi- Inducer Ensemble, Computational Statistics & Data Analysis 53, 1483–1494 (2009) (Exhibit 1004). 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2009/0254992 A1 (Exhibit 1005). For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’844 patent. B.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that “all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 9. For its part, Patent Owner “agree[s] that no claim terms need be construed for this petition,” and that “all claim terms should carry their plain and ordinary meaning in light of the intrinsic record.” Prelim. Resp. 27. We find that no express claim construction is necessary to resolve the institution question. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,599,844
• Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00594 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 45–46; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals. Second, we have also considered Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, and he provides no meaningful additional information to support reading Shimizu as Petitioner advocates. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 118, 120–127. In testimony not cited by Petitioner, Mr. Schmandt admits that “Shimizu does not appear to disclose further details about how duration information is specified or stored within its system, or whether such intervals between nodes can be changed.” Id. ¶ 119. This testimony undermines Petitioner’s position that Shimizu’s hypertext nodes include duration information. Mr. Schmandt elaborates in testimony that Petitioner cites, but does not explain: In a real-world implementation of the proposed combination, for example, the display time could have been specified within the node information structure 9 of Shimizu. I note that node information structure 9 in Shimizu also contains display procedure slot 62 (Fig. 6), which points to “a procedure program function used when the node in question is to be displayed on the screen.” (Shimizu, 6:52–55.) Shimizu thus contemplates that node information structure 9 may contain information about how the node will be displayed to the user, and as such, it would have been obvious that durational information could also have been included as part of node information structure 9. This durational amount could have been a default display time specified by the user, or a display time specific to the node in question, as explained above. * * * Shimizu itself clearly contemplates the ability to customize the display of nodes, and as explained above, node information structure 9 (Fig. 6) includes display procedure slot 62 which points to a program function or procedure used to display the node content, thus making clear that node information structure 9 can hold information about how the node will be displayed. Id. ¶¶ 123, 127. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that Shimizu would need to be modified for its hypertext nodes to include duration information is strong evidence that Shimizu does not disclose hypertext nodes that include duration information. This testimony (from ¶ 123) also suggests that Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times could be included in the procedure program function to which display procedure slot 62 points, rather than in the hypertext node, thereby providing additional evidence Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times are included in structure other than hypertext nodes. See also Ex. 1003, 6:52–55.” slip op. at 27

  • BurdenInstitution denied

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 45–46; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals. Second, we have also considered Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, and he provides no meaningful additional information to support reading Shimizu as Petitioner advocates. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 118, 120–127. In testimony not cited by Petitioner, Mr. Schmandt admits that “Shimizu does not appear to disclose further details about how duration information is specified or stored within its system, or whether such intervals between nodes can be changed.” Id. ¶ 119. This testimony undermines Petitioner’s position that Shimizu’s hypertext nodes include duration information. Mr. Schmandt elaborates in testimony that Petitioner cites, but does not explain: In a real-world implementation of the proposed combination, for example, the display time could have been specified within the node information structure 9 of Shimizu. I note that node information structure 9 in Shimizu also contains display procedure slot 62 (Fig. 6), which points to “a procedure program function used when the node in question is to be displayed on the screen.” (Shimizu, 6:52–55.) Shimizu thus contemplates that node information structure 9 may contain information about how the node will be displayed to the user, and as such, it would have been obvious that durational information could also have been included as part of node information structure 9. This durational amount could have been a default display time specified by the user, or a display time specific to the node in question, as explained above. * * * Shimizu itself clearly contemplates the ability to customize the display of nodes, and as explained above, node information structure 9 (Fig. 6) includes display procedure slot 62 which points to a program function or procedure used to display the node content, thus making clear that node information structure 9 can hold information about how the node will be displayed. Id. ¶¶ 123, 127. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that Shimizu would need to be modified for its hypertext nodes to include duration information is strong evidence that Shimizu does not disclose hypertext nodes that include duration information. This testimony (from ¶ 123) also suggests that Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times could be included in the procedure program function to which display procedure slot 62 points, rather than in the hypertext node, thereby providing additional evidence Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times are included in structure other than hypertext nodes. See also Ex. 1003, 6:52–55.” slip op. at 27

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Certain terms recited in the challenged claims were construed during prior litigation of the ’451 patent, i.e., an ancestor of the challenged ’819 patent that Petitioner characterizes as “shar[ing] a near-verbatim written description with the ’819 patent”). Ex. 1023 (claim construction order in cases involving Microsoft and Apple); Ex. 2003, 5 (clarification of certain claim constructions on summary judgment); Pet. 8–9. Patent Owner advocates that we adopt such prior constructions in this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 6. Although “Petitioner does not believe express claim construction is necessary at this time,” Petitioner takes the position that its asserted prior art “renders the challenged claims obvious under the district court’s constructions.” Pet. 10. And we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition “presents extensive arguments” that apply the district court’s constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 6 (citing Pet. 9–10, 12–20, 33). We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1023, 16–17; Prelim. Resp. 8–10. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 1, 16, 23, and 26, as well as in certain dependent claims, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1023, 2–13; Ex. 2003, 5; Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Third, we construe “interactively variable duration information,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 1, 23, and 26, as “a parameter specifying how long a content is to be displayed by default before a subsequent content is displayed, where the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” Ex. 1023, 22–23; Prelim. Resp. 10–12.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with at least two years of experience developing and implementing network-based computer systems, such as systems for storing and retrieving information over the Internet or communicating using the Web.” Pet. 7. Petitioner adds that “[s]uch a person could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems. A person of ordinary skill in the art would also have approximately 3-5 years of professional experience with these topics.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In addition, Patent Owner say that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Id. Petitioner supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Schmandt. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 16. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. See id. (Dr. Schmandt testifying that “Patent Owner’s proposed articulation is not meaningfully different” and that his “analysis, opinions and conclusions . . . would not change if Patent Owner’s articulation were applied”). Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 13

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,606,819
• Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00593 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 22–62 were unpatentable under the asserted §103 grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 39; see also id. at 45–46 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt.” slip op. at 26

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner

    “E. Real Parties in Interest Petitioner identifies Google LLC and YouTube, LLC as real parties in interest. Pet. 1. Patent Owner identifies Robocast, Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 5, 2.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Schmandt. See Ex. 1102 ¶ 16. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. See id. (Dr. Schmandt testifying that “Patent Owner’s proposed articulation is not meaningfully different” and that his analysis, opinions and conclusions . . . would not change if Patent Owner’s articulation were applied”). Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 14

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1123, 16–17; Prelim. Resp. 10–12. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 22 and 46, as well as dependent claim 45, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1123, 2–13; Ex. 2107, 5; Prelim. Resp. 9. For purposes of this Decision, we accord all other terms recited in the challenged claims their plain and ordinary meaning. See Ex. 1123, 17–20, 26–29 (court adopting plain and ordinary meaning of “plurality of accessible resources,” “content,” “without requiring user input,” “in accordance with said show structure,” “providing,” and “search results”); see Prelim. Resp. 8 (Patent Owner advocating that “any additional claim language be[] accorded its plain and ordinary meaning”).” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,965,932
• Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00592 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–21 and 63–67 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 42; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals. Second, we have also considered Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, and he provides no meaningful additional information to support reading Shimizu as Petitioner advocates. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 119, 121–128. In testimony not cited by Petitioner, Mr. Schmandt admits that “Shimizu does not appear to disclose further details about how duration information is specified or stored within its system, or whether such intervals between nodes can be changed.” Id. ¶ 120. This testimony undermines Petitioner’s position that Shimizu’s hypertext nodes include duration information. Mr. Schmandt elaborates in testimony that Petitioner cites, but does not explain: In a real-world implementation of the proposed combination, for example, the display time could have been specified within the node information structure 9 of Shimizu. I note that node information structure 9 in Shimizu also contains display procedure slot 62 (Fig. 6), which points to “a procedure program function used when the node in question is to be displayed on the screen.” (Shimizu, 6:52-55.) Shimizu thus contemplates that node information structure 9 may contain information about how the node will be displayed to the user, and as such, it would have been obvious that durational information could also have been included as part of node information structure 9. This durational amount could have been a default display time specified by the user, or a display time specific to the node in question, as explained above. * * * Shimizu itself clearly contemplates the ability to customize the display of nodes, and as explained above, node information structure 9 (Fig. 6) includes display procedure slot 62 which points to a program function or procedure used to display the node content, thus making clear that node information structure 9 can hold information about how the node will be displayed. Id. ¶¶ 124, 128. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that Shimizu would need to be modified for its hypertext nodes to include duration information is strong evidence that Shimizu does not disclose hypertext nodes that include duration information. This testimony (from ¶ 124) also suggests that Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times could be included in the procedure program function to which display procedure slot 62 points, rather than in the hypertext node, thereby providing additional evidence Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times are included in structure other than hypertext nodes. See also Ex. 1003, 6:52–55.” slip op. at 27

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with at least two years of experience developing and implementing network-based computer systems, such as systems for storing and retrieving information over the Internet or communicating using the Web.” Pet. 6–7. Petitioner adds that “[s]uch a person could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–17). Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems. A person of ordinary skill in the art would also have approximately 3-5 years of professional experience with these topics.” Prelim. Resp. 6. In addition, Patent Owner say that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Id. Petitioner supports its proposal with testimony by Mr. Schmandt. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 16. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. See id. (Mr. Schmandt testifying that “Patent Owner’s proposed articulation is not meaningfully different” and that his “analysis, opinions and conclusions . . . would not change if Patent Owner’s articulation were applied”). Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 14

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1023, 16–17; Prelim. Resp. 10–12. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 1 and 63, as well as in certain dependent claims, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1023, 2–13; Ex. 2007, 5; Prelim. Resp. 9. Third, we construe “interactively variable duration information,” which is recited in each of challenged claims 1, 11, 12, and 64, as “a parameter specifying how long a content is to be displayed by default before a subsequent content is displayed, where the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” Ex. 1023, 22–23; Prelim. Resp. 12–15.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 42; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals.” slip op. at 27

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,965,932
• Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00591 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 22–36 and 39–45 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted obviousness grounds would succeed.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 42–43; see also id. at 48 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). We agree with Patent Owner. In its Summary of the Invention, Shimizu describes “mak[ing] it possible to build with ease an application program illustratively causing the display of the nodes to be switched in a specific order and at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1103, with the predetermined intervals being included in the application program, rather than the hypertext nodes. Similarly, in its Description of the Related Art, Shimizu describes “mak[ing] it possible to create an application program that may be displayed on the screen by reading, from primary or secondary storage and within a predetermined time, the node information held by the nodes that are linked sequentially starting from a particular node.” Id. at 3:12–16 (emphasis added). This passage, too, is better read as disclosing that the predetermined times are included in the application program, rather than the hypertext nodes. Neither of Petitioner’s cited passages states that the hypertext nodes include predetermined intervals/times.” slip op. at 24

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

    “1 Petitioner filed a paper explaining its basis for filing multiple petitions challenging the ’451 patent and arguing that we should not exercise discretion to deny one of the petitions pursuant to the guidance in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) at 59 (“Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.”). Paper 3. Patent Owner filed an objection to Petitioner’s filing of multiple petitions, arguing that we should deny one of them pursuant to the Trial Practice Guide’s guidance. Paper 8. Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach whether multiple petitions are appropriate to challenge the ’451 patent.” slip op. at 3

  • Parallel petitionsNot reached

    “1 Petitioner filed a paper explaining its basis for filing multiple petitions challenging the ’451 patent and arguing that we should not exercise discretion to deny one of the petitions pursuant to the guidance in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) at 59 (“Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.”). Paper 3. Patent Owner filed an objection to Petitioner’s filing of multiple petitions, arguing that we should deny one of them pursuant to the Trial Practice Guide’s guidance. Paper 8. Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach whether multiple petitions are appropriate to challenge the ’451 patent.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “possessed a bachelor’s in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with at least two years of experience developing and implementing network-based computer systems, such as systems for storing and retrieving information over the Internet or communicating using the Web,” and “could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner, without citing evidence, contends that a skilled artisan “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems”; “would also have approximately 3–5 years of professional experience with these topics”; and “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and which is supported by expert testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, we do not see a substantial difference between the parties’ proposals. Thus, our Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,155,451
• Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00590 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–21, 37, and 38 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving obviousness on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “16, 5:11–14) describes the hypertext nodes as including the predetermined times or predetermined intervals (what Petitioner argues is the duration). As Patent Owner argues, “even if these ‘predetermined times’ or ‘predetermined intervals’ could be considered relevant default duration parameters, the Petition fails to prove that they would be included within Shimizu’s hypertext nodes—i.e., the putative claimed ‘nodes’ —as the governing claim construction expressly requires.” Prelim. Resp. 45; see also id. at 58–59 (“[T]he passages relied on do not provide any specifics as to how duration information would be implemented. Instead, they are merely speculative and aspirational statements, postulating only about what is ‘possible.’ . . . [I]t is not sufficient for Shimizu to simply teach a time interval between nodes. Rather, . . . the node itself must ‘include . . . the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.’ The Petition fails to provide any argument or evidence demonstrating that the described predetermined intervals are included in Shimizu’s nodes.” (quoting Ex. 1023, 16 (emphasis Patent Owner’s))).” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “possessed a bachelor’s in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with at least two years of experience developing and implementing network-based computer systems, such as systems for storing and retrieving information over the Internet or communicating using the Web,” and “could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–18).” slip op. at 9

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The Microsoft court provided reasoned constructions, which Patent Owner contends that we should adopt. Ex. 1023. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”). Petitioner does not allege any error in the Microsoft court’s decision or provide any alternative constructions. We adopt the Microsoft court’s constructions of “show structure of nodes” and “nodes” for purposes of this Decision. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions for any other claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “16, 5:11–14) describes the hypertext nodes as including the predetermined times or predetermined intervals (what Petitioner argues is the duration). As Patent Owner argues, “even if these ‘predetermined times’ or ‘predetermined intervals’ could be considered relevant default duration parameters, the Petition fails to prove that they would be included within Shimizu’s hypertext nodes—i.e., the putative claimed ‘nodes’ —as the governing claim construction expressly requires.” Prelim. Resp. 45; see also id. at 58–59 (“[T]he passages relied on do not provide any specifics as to how duration information would be implemented. Instead, they are merely speculative and aspirational statements, postulating only about what is ‘possible.’ . . . [I]t is not sufficient for Shimizu to simply teach a time interval between nodes. Rather, . . . the node itself must ‘include . . . the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.’ The Petition fails to provide any argument or evidence demonstrating that the described predetermined intervals are included in Shimizu’s nodes.” (quoting Ex. 1023, 16 (emphasis Patent Owner’s))).” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,155,451

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.