• Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01462 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “experience working on the development of materials or components for electronic devices such as batteries.” Pet. 2. Petitioner further contends that “[a]dditional education, such as a graduate degree, could compensate for less work experience, and additional work experience could compensate for less formal education.” Id. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and the disclosure of the ’014 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). in this proceeding.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe any term in order to determine that institution should be denied.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Hanafusa in light of Dobashi with a reasonable expectation of success as Petitioner contends. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that the subject matter of claim 1, and claims 4 and 8 that depend therefrom, would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Hanafusa and Dobashi.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner also focuses on Hanafusa’s teaching that all known methods can be used to make a rough surface low-profile, and Dobashi’s teaching that RSm can be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface, to support its contention that a POSITA would have been motivated to apply Dobashi’s RSm to further achieve Hanafusa’s purpose, without explaining how and why that would be the case. In particular, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz adequately explain why a POSITA looking for ways to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile would look to methods to achieve as the period of waviness, RSm can also be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface.” Ex. 1005, 2:66–3:1, 6:23–26. Dobashi explains that waviness is “an indicator for determining whether the fine pattern forming performance is good or bad,” and “[t]he surface has small waviness and is smooth when RSm is large, and the surface has large waviness and is rough when RSm is small.” Id. at 3:1–3, 6:27–29. Dobashi also teaches that surface roughness Rzjis is used as a low-profile indicator. Ex. 1005, 2:66– 3:1. Dobashi, therefore, teaches that RSm is an indicator of surface waviness, which Dobashi explains is different than surface roughness. Id. at 2:66–3:3, 6:23–29. Given these teachings in Dobashi, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz sufficiently explains how or why a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Dobashi’s RSm values to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile. See Pet. 10–12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–52.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,346,014
• Cargill, Incorporated v. Bunge Loders Croklaan USA, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01360 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6–9, and 11–24 were unpatentable as obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “institute review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and the associated evidence, we determine that Petitioner does not meet the reasonable likelihood standard, and we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of this institution decision, and based on the present record including the disclosure in the ʼ473 patent, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, consistent with pre-AIA section 103(a). See Pet. 9–10. We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ473 patent and the prior art of record. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes constructions for several terms, all such constructions based on statements in the ’473 patent. See Pet. 10–12. Patent Owner presents no claim construction issues. Prelim. Resp. 8 n.3. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s representation of the problem as merely converting Petrauskaite’s disclosed mol% of triglycerides into wt% of triglycerides with simple calculations represents a form of prohibited reliance on hindsight. See Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (hindsight to use the invention to define the problem the invention solves); see also Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (”Defining the problem in terms of its solution reveals improper hindsight in the selection of the prior art relevant to obviousness.”). “[W]hen someone is presented with the identical problem and told to make the patented invention, it often becomes virtually certain that the artisan will succeed in making the invention.” Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377. Here, Petitioner urges that one of ordinary skill in the art need merely convert mol% of triglycerides in a specific fat blend into wt% of triglycerides in the specific fat blend. See Pet. 14–15 (“[T]he wt% of Petrauskaite’s fat blends can easily be calculated based on the generally available prior art knowledge of fatty acid compositions of palm stearin and soybean oil.”). Petitioner’s reasoning says no more than that a skilled artisan, once presented with Petrauskaite and prior art knowledge, “would have understood that they could be combined, but that is not enough.” PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (that two references could be combined does not imply a motivation to pick out those two references and combine them to arrive at the claimed invention). Our reviewing court instructs that indicating that a skilled artisan could have made modifications to arrive at the claimed invention does not establish that a person of ordinary skill would have made such modifications. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” (citing InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner attempts to check the “would have been motivated to modify Petrauskaite” box with testimony from its declarant, Dr. Maragoni. See Pet. 37–38. Such testimony includes [C]ombining such prior art elements according to known methods would have yielded nothing more than predictable results. A POSITA would naturally have turned to these references to understand Petrauskaite’s references better. Ex. 1003 ¶ 178. [T]he corresponding wt% of Petrauskaite’s fat blends] was readily-available and well-known in the art. Id. at ¶ 181. [T]he available information [on characterizations of oils and fats] is voluminous. Id. at ¶ 182. See Pet. 38. We find that such testimony fails to explain why the skilled artisan would have been motivated, without hindsight, to take the steps to reproduce the claimed invention, and to be conclusory, at best. On this record, we detect the taint of impermissible hindsight bias in” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,645,473
• Ningbo Linhua Plastic Co., Ltd. v. Converter Manufacturing, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01435 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 6–10 and 21 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Portelli or Meadors rendered the claims obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we find that the ’222 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and the ’222 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

    “Petitioner argues that “the challenged claims are invalid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 5. Petitioner further contends that “[t]he scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of certain claim terms must at least encompass the disclosure and accompanying illustrations in the ’222 patent.” Id. at 6 (citing no legal support for its proposition). Petitioner also refers to how Patent Owner applied certain “terms” and “other features to Petitioner’s product” in its district court complaint against Petitioner. See id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1007, 7–8; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 53–57). Patent Owner does not address claim construction and does not dispute the meaning of any claim term in regard to Petitioner’s contentions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, in view of the issues we address below, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms and further determine that it is not necessary to address the express interpretation of any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Figure 13 of Portelli, however, does not show the profile of an article prior to a method step of impinging to further shape it, but instead shows “a schematic sectional view of the edge of the tray . . . after it has been deformed out of the wrap path in accordance with the invention [of Portelli].” Ex. 1004, 8:11–13 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to show any method taught by Portelli that further alters the configuration of the profile of the tray shown in Figure 13 of Portelli by, for example, an additional method step of impingement.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,562,222
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01178 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Bio-Rad did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable, as relied-upon Saxonov disclosures were not shown to qualify as prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “benefit of its provisional application’s filing date for pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior art purposes when two conditions are met: (1) the provisional provides sufficient support for at least one claim in the reference patent or published patent application; and (2) the provisional application provide sufficient support for the subject matter relied upon for prior art purposes in the reference patent or application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1377, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MPEP §§ 2136 (I), 2136.03 (III), 2136 (Examples 2, 4, 7); see, e.g., Google LLC v. Ikorongo Tech, LLC, IPR 2021-00058, Paper 14 at 10–12 (PTAB May 10, 2021). The burden of production is on the Petitioner to show in its Petition that the asserted references qualify as prior art. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (explaining that a petitioner bears the initial burden of production to establish that the asserted references qualify as prior art).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “Each of the remaining grounds asserted in the Petition relies on Saxonov to reach a number of limitations of independent claim 1 and the challenged dependent claims. Because Petitioner has not shown that all of the relied-upon portions of Saxonov are prior art to the ’170 patent, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’170 patent in any of the remaining grounds.” slip op. at 24

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

    “Because we deny institution upon consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, Patent Owner’s argument that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution is moot.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,770,170
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01177 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 1–9 because Bio-Rad did not show a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on any ground relying on Saxonov, which was not established as prior art.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 26. Because Petitioner’s uncontested definition of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’051 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner has identified certain claim terms for which it has proposed constructions in a parallel proceeding. Pet. 27–29. Petitioner notes that it has that “[o]ther terms, as used herein, are consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments and positions in the parallel proceeding,” without identifying those terms. Id. at 28. Patent Owner requests that the Board adopt Patent Owner’s proposed constructions from the parallel proceeding for certain claim terms. PO Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Neither party provides a discussion for their proposed constructions. In any event, for purposes of this Decision, we determine there is no need to expressly construe any claim term, as the parties appear to agree to the ordinary and customary meaning of the identified terms.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “benefit of its provisional application’s filing date for pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior art purposes when two conditions are met: (1) the provisional provides sufficient support for at least one claim in the reference patent or published patent application; and (2) the provisional application provides sufficient support for the subject matter relied upon for prior art purposes in the reference patent or application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1377, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MPEP §§ 2136 (I), 2136.03 (III), 2136 (Examples 2, 4, 7); see, e.g., Google LLC v. Ikorongo Tech, LLC, IPR2021-00058, Paper 14 at 10–12 (PTAB May 10, 2021). The burden of production is on the Petitioner to show in its Petition that the asserted references qualify as prior art. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (explaining that a petitioner bears the initial burden of production to establish that the asserted references qualify as prior art).” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “explains how each of the relied-upon disclosures in Saxonov Figures 9 and 10, and Saxonov paragraphs 17, 18, 37, 76, and 79, which are not present in the ’013 provisional, are supported by the ’013 provisional, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that those cited portions of Saxonov are entitled to the priority date of the ’013 provisional. Accordingly, on this record, we determine that those relied-upon portions of Saxonov do not qualify as prior art to the ’051 patent.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,068,051
• Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00976 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because BOE did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–3 under any of its three obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “We have authority to institute an inter partes review where a petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). For reasons that follow, Petitioner does not meet that evidentiary threshold. We decline to reach the issues raised in the Reply or Sur-reply, which relate to Patent Owner’s alternative argument that a discretionary denial of the Petition is warranted.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 26. Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art” as “set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition (Pet. 26) because, on this record, it is consistent with the specification. We take note that neither party indicated that the result would change under any different definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner discusses the terms a “data line having a broad-width portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 1, as well as a “data line having a broad portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 2. Petitioner cites the ’079 patent for “offering a lexicographic definition of the term ‘broad width’” to support the plain meaning interpretation of the terms “‘broad-width portion’ and ‘broad portion’ as a portion that is broader than another portion of the subject element.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not provide arguments directed specifically to Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Taking account of the information presented, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. Compare Pet. 16 (addressing issues of claim construction, citing the ’079 patent for supporting the plain and ordinary meaning of “broad-width portion” and “broad portion” without demonstrating that an express construction is necessary to resolve whether to institute review), with Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (addressing the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, without asserting an express claim construction). To the extent that the scope of any claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in the following analysis of the challenges.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Id. (emphasis added). Sato ¶ 26 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “data lines composed of an Al film.” Id. Importantly, Petitioner does not connect Sato’s disclosure, relating to benefits associated with a data line arrangement, to any particular arrangement of scan lines. Sato ¶ 28 is equally deficient. Sato ¶ 28 also discusses benefits of utilizing a specific “arrangement,” namely, “capacitance lines formed of [a] metal film.” Id. ¶ 28. [0028] With this arrangement, the provision of the function as the shading layer with the capacitance lines formed of the metal film, the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as the wiring, as well as the provision of the function as the light absorption layer with the capacitance electrodes formed of the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as electrodes, prevents the laminated structure from becoming complex by additionally forming a dedicated shading layer and a dedicated light absorption layer. Accordingly, this arrangement is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof. Id. (emphasis added). Here again, Sato ¶ 28 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “capacitance lines formed of metal film.” Id. Petitioner does not bridge the gap in its rationale to combine by attempting to explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have extrapolated benefits, pertaining to an arrangement of capacitance lines, to a similar arrangement of scan lines. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Flasck, provides no further insight as to how or why Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 would have been understood to apply to scan lines. Dr. Flasck’s comments on Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 merely repeat, nearly verbatim, the Petition’s conclusory contentions. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 139 (Dr. Flasck declaring “Sato specifically teaches that its device ‘is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof.’”); Pet. 37. Dr. Flasck does not cite to any additional supporting evidence other than Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139.” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,502,079
• Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00977 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 7–13 and 15–20 unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing semiconductor display devices, including LCD displays.” Pet. 19. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Id. On the record presented, Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any particular proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’606 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute review without resolving the construction of any claim terms. Accordingly, we need not and do not construe any terms expressly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “view. First, as Petitioner admits, data line 6a is not connected to image signal line 101d and line 109 other than when sample hold circuit 101c connects them due to shift register 101b outputting an enabling signal. Pet. 49. This is supported by the layout of the four elements in Fujikawa’s Figure 2. Ex. 1005, Fig. 2 (depicting sample hold circuits 101c between and connecting data lines 6a and signal lines 101d). In addition, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. E. Fred Schubert, testifies that “two separate lines straddling circuitry are [not] one line.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. The dispute between the parties on this issue is largely one of claim construction: should the term “wiring line” in claim 7 be construed broadly enough to encompass a collection of lines separated by a sample hold circuit? In order to determine that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the recited wiring lines, we would need to answer this question in the affirmative. Yet, as discussed above, neither party proposes construing “wiring line,” or any other term used in the claims of the ’606 patent. Pet. 18; Prelim. Resp. 7. The failure to argue for and sufficiently support a broad construction of the term “wiring line” means that Petitioner does not show sufficiently, for purposes of supporting institution of review, that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the “wiring line” limitation of claim 7. b) Conclusion Regarding Claim 7 Based on the record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 7 is unpatentable as anticipated by or obvious in view of Fujikawa.” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,557,606
• Honeywell International Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00493 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Honeywell did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9 were unpatentable over any of its three obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its obviousness challenge of independent claim 1 or dependent claims 2–9 over the combination of Simmelink and Section 73.1015.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelOther

    “PHOSITA) at the time of the ’532 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in the field of chemistry, chemical engineering, polymer chemistry, or materials science and at least three years of relevant work experience in the field of high strength fibers.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). Petitioner adds that individuals with different educational backgrounds could still be of ordinary skill in the art if they have “additional experience [that] compensates for a deficit in their education and experience stated above.” Id. According to Patent Owner, a person or ordinary skill in the art, would have (i) a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, polymer chemistry, materials science, chemical engineering, or biomedical engineering and (ii) three years of experience in designing and manufacturing gel-spun UHMWPE yarns. At this level of skill, a PHOSITA would have a detailed understanding of the information provided in the Technology Background, Section II, supra, including (i) the differences between linear HDPE and UHMWPE, (ii) the history underlying Section 73.1015 and the early failures of the 1960s-era blue, melt-extruded polyethylene sutures, (iii) why the molecular orientation of polyethylene molecules leads to strong yarns in the special case of gel-spun UHMWPE, and (iv) the challenges associated with coloring gel-spun UHMWPE yarns, especially for end-use medical applications. Prelim. Resp. 33–34. We note that the parties’ proposed definitions are largely similar, except that Patent Owner additionally recognizes a Bachelor’s degree in biomedical engineering and requires experience in designing and manufacturing gel-spun UHMWPE yarns. In any event, we do not need to the same under either proposed definition.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “a skilled artisan would have understood that the “gel spinning” process recited in the claims requires the use of a solvent during the spinning process. Indeed, the Specification describes this term, as follows: Gel spinning is understood to include at least the steps of spinning filaments from a solution of ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene in a spin solvent; cooling the filament obtained to form a gel filament removing at least partly the spin solvent from the gel filament; removing at least partly the spin solvent from the gel filament; and drawing the filament in at least one drawing step before during or after removing spin solvent. Ex. 1001, 2:31–37. We recognize the inventor’s lexicography as dispositive with respect to the meaning of the term “gel spinning.” See Phillips v. AWHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

    “Claim 1 describes gel spinning as the manner by which the filaments comprised in the claimed colored multi-filament yarn are obtained. This, on its face, is a product-by-process claim element because it describes the filament structure being obtained in a particular way, i.e., by gel spinning. See Kamstrup A/S v. Axioma Metering UAB, 43 F.4th 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (agreeing with the Board that “cast in one piece” is a product-by-process claim element as it describes the structure being cast “in a particular way”). For this element to be limiting, it must impart “structural and functional differences” that distinguish the claimed product from the prior art. See Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd, 580 F.3d 1340, 1365–67 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Patent Owner argues persuasively that gel spinning imparts structural and functional differences to the claimed product because the process “creates overlap between polyethylene molecules within the UHMWPE filaments that maximizes the intermolecular Van der Waals interactions, resulting in highly crystalline filaments with high tensile strength.” Prelim. Resp. 38, 22 (citing Ex. 1014, 62–66). According to Patent Owner, “the structure of the gel spun UHMWPE is substantially different from other types of UHMWPE such as compression-molded and ram-extruded UHMWPE used to make joint replacements and other orthopedic implants.” Id. at 38.” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,280,532
• Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GmbHInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00239 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 would have been obvious over either asserted combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of claims 1–20 of the ’094 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “The express language of the claim, however, does not support using the “central axis” as the measuring point for determining if one object is laterally offset from another. For example, the term “central axis” is not used in the relevant claim phrase and the dictionary definitions of “lateral” relied upon by Petitioner and Mr. Jobin to show the ordinary meaning of the claim term do not suggest that the “central axis” is the reference point for determining whether a first object is “laterally offset” from a second object. As such, we determine that the claim language supports Patent Owner’s construction requiring that the “groove” be “off to the side” of the entire mandrel, and not merely the “central axis” of the mandrel. Prelim. Resp. 54. We must also resolve whether the entire groove is required to be laterally offset from the chamfered mandrel, or only a portion of it. On this point, the claims do not use the term “portion,” but rather specify that the “groove” is “laterally offset from the chamfered mandrel.” Ex. 1001, 14:4– 5, 15:19–20. This suggests that the entire “groove” must be offset from the “chamfered mandrel.”” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “That argument, however, does not explain why it would have been obvious to laterally offset the groove of Yoakim from the chamfered mandrel. Rather, as demonstrated by Mr. Jobin’s testimony, this argument relates to the general use of a sealing member in a groove, to the extent it was ultimately determined that such a configuration is not expressly disclosed in Yoakim. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶ 296 (“It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to position a sealing member in a groove to solidify the between counter-force portion 161 and engaging portion 157 in Figure 35 of Yoakim is more appropriately identified as the claimed “groove.” Prelim. Resp. 60–61. We need not resolve this issue, however, as Petitioner does not persuasively demonstrate that either potential “groove” is “laterally offset” from the chamfered mandrel. placement of the seal and improve its sealing stability and strength. Furthermore, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to utilize a groove and seal configuration in the brewing head . . . .”) (emphasis added). Even if we interpret the recited portion of the Petition as an argument for placing the groove entirely to the side of the mandrel in Yoakim, the Petition does not persuasively explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to do so. In Figure 35 of Yoakim, the seal and groove, as well as an elastic loading means, act as a valve means to control the level of pressure exerted in the capsule and “optimize interaction of water and the ground coffee particles to obtain a good extraction of the coffee and aroma compounds.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 370–372, 382, 396–398, 434–436, 445; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 286–290; Pet. 63. These are the same beneficial properties relied upon by Petitioner to support the proposed combination, and Petitioner does not persuasively explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Yoakim in order to achieve results that are already obtained in the identified embodiment. Pet. 63. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 12 would have been obvious over the combined disclosures of Yoakim, Jarisch 929, and Rossi.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,542,094
• Mahle Behr Charleston Inc. v. Frank Amidio CatalanoOther
  PTAB · May 24, 2024 · IPR2023-00861 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Remand

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable under any asserted ground.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Accordingly, the Director instructed us to “determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated that Figure 1 of Godefroy ‘is clear on its face’ or would have reasonably suggested the placement of Godefroy’s sacrificial anode ‘within 10 inches’ of the hot liquid inlet.” Id. at 9. “In making this determination,” the Director instructed us to “consider whether the expert testimony provides sufficient ‘technical detail, explanation, or statements supporting why the expert determines that the feature in question was required or would have been obvious based on the prior art disclosure.’” Id. In addition, although the Director’s decision “is limited to [our] application of Hockerson to the grounds in the Petition involving Godefroy,” the Director instructed us also to “consider what effect, if any, this decision has on the other asserted grounds.” Id. Finally, the Director instructed us to “set forth [our] interpretation” of “the limitation ‘within 10 inches of a hot liquid inlet to the radiator.’” Id. at 8 n.4.” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “original decision, the Director’s decision, and the evidence currently of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim based on any ground asserted in the Petition. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition is denied, and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “evidence. The challenged claims require that a sacrificial anode be placed within a certain distance—10 inches—of the hot liquid inlet, and, because the inlet has some non-zero size, it might be possible for an anode to be within that distance from some parts, but not from all parts, of the inlet. Accordingly, specifying the center axis of the inlet as the point from which to measure the distance to the anode improves on the plain words of the claim in terms of achieving the claim’s objective of placing the anode within a specified distance of the inlet. Moreover, when discussing the distance from the inlet to the anode, the specification of the ’494 patent uses the language “within 10 inches in any direction of the center axis of the inlet connection.” Ex. 1001, 7:61–64. Thus, the intrinsic evidence supports adopting Petitioner’s claim construction. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Medlin, relies on Petitioner’s proposed construction. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 20 (noting that the construction “within 10 inches of the center axis of [a] hot liquid inlet” “ha[s] been adopted by Petitioner”), 96 (“the sacrificial anodes contained in each of the turbulators 2 would be placed within 10 inches of a center axis of a hot liquid inlet to the radiator of Tomosada”), 144 (“A POSITA would understand from Figure 1 that the sacrificial anode 14 is within 10 inches of a center axis of a hot liquid inlet”), 267 (“These teachings would further motivate a POSITA to located the sacrificial anode 12 within 10 inches of a center axis of the hot liquid inlet.”). This support for Petitioner’s proposed construction provides further reason for us to adopt it. Because it is supported by the intrinsic evidence of record, because Patent Owner proposes no alternative construction, and because Petitioner’s expert supports it, we adopt the construction of “within 10 inches of a hot liquid inlet to the radiator” that Petitioner proposes. Thus, we construe this term as “within 10 inches of the center axis of a hot liquid inlet to the radiator.” In other words, when discussing the distance between a hot liquid inlet and a sacrificial anode, we interpret “hot liquid inlet” as “center axis of the hot liquid inlet.”” slip op. at 5

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Inherency may be relied upon in arguing either anticipation or obviousness. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1377 (applying inherency in an anticipation context); Par Pharma. Inc. v. TWI Pharma., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying inherency in an obviousness context). In both cases, however, “[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Instead, “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present, or the natural result of the combination of elements expressly disclosed by the prior art.” Par Pharma., 773 F.3d at 1195–96. Here, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that, in Godefroy, the sacrificial anode necessarily is placed within 10 inches of the center axis of the hot liquid inlet. Dr. Medlin testifies that Figure 1 of Godefroy shows that “an entirety . . . or at least a significant portion of the sacrificial anode 14, is within 10 inches of a center axis of the inlet.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 144. But we cannot say that Figure 1 of Godefroy is clear on its face, or reasonably suggests, that this is necessarily the case. There are no dimensions shown on Figure 1, so it is unclear from the figure what the diameter of pipe 12 is. If that diameter is larger than 20 inches, then it simply is untrue that “sacrificial anode 14 is . . . necessarily placed within 10 inches of a center axis of a hot liquid inlet to the radiator,” as Dr. Medlin testifies. Id. ¶ 361. As noted above, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Medlin relies on the hot liquid inlet of Godefroy having any particular diameter, and Godefroy is silent as to the diameter of its inlet. Pet. 69–70; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 144, 359–361, 381–382, 406–408; Ex. 1008, 1–15. Moreover, as Patent Owner notes, there is a wide range of sizes of radiators, including automobile radiators, available. Prelim. Resp. 3–5; Exs. 2001–2003. In the absence of any testimony or other evidence that tends to show that radiator inlet pipes necessarily have diameters less than 20 inches, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the diameter of Godefroy’s inlet pipe is small enough to ensure that any portion of the anode necessarily is within 10 inches of the center axis of the inlet.” slip op. at 11

  Claim constructioncites Phillips

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.