- Sports Nutrition Research, Ltd. v. Chemi NutraRehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 3, 2020 · DER2013-00001 · APJ Jameson Lee · DER · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because Petitioner showed no abuse of discretion in finding insufficient evidence of derivation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“On request for rehearing, the burden of showing a decision on whether to institute trial should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). After considering the Request for Rehearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in denying institution. For reasons discussed below, we decline to modify the Decision. Accordingly, the Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In essence, Petitioner is arguing that a derivation proceeding should always be instituted no matter how deficient is the initial evidence presented by Petitioner in the Petition, because both Petitioner and Respondent can submit evidence after institution of trial. We disagree. In the above-quoted argument, Petitioner is referring to hypothetical evidence “to be” developed during trial. We cannot make a decision on whether to institute trial based on non-existent evidence. We properly reviewed the evidence submitted by Petitioner and determined that that evidence does not meet the substantial evidence standard for instituting a derivation proceeding.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for patent owner
“The constitutional arguments are without merit. The Federal Circuit has held that there is “no constitutional infirmity in [an] institution decision as the statute clearly bestows such authority on the Director pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314.” Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1340. Arthrex’s reasoning likewise applies to derivation proceedings under the AIA. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)(1). The Decision will not be vacated. Nor will a new panel be appointed.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“of the MPEP. Paper 17, 4. These authorities, however, articulate general principles and do not support Petitioner’s assertion that the specific wherein clause at issue here represents merely an intended result and thus should not be accorded weight in determining patentability. Indeed, in Hoffer, the Court upheld the district court’s reading of the “whereby clause” at issue there as an actual limitation and not merely an intended result.3 Hoffer, 405 F.3d at 1330. “[W]hen the ‘whereby’ clause states a condition that is material to patentability, it cannot be ignored in order to change the substance of the invention.” Id. at 1329.” slip op. at 9
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 10,869,843 - Edwards Lifesciences Corporation v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 25, 2017 · IPR2017-01294 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“challenged claim contains a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, Petitioner is required to construe the limitation and “must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). (Emphasis added). Here, the Petition fails to identify any portion of the ’962 patent Specification that describes the structure, material, or acts that correspond to the functions recited in the above-referenced limitations, and references a different document. See Pet. 24–25; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). It is not this panel’s responsibility to identify the portions of the Specification upon which it believes Petitioner may rely to support its positions with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Our Rules place this burden on Petitioner, so that the panel may evaluate effectively the challenged claims vis-à-vis the asserted prior art, as discussed below. B. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability To show that a challenged claim containing a means-plus-function limitation is unpatentable over the asserted prior art, Petitioner must show that the structure that corresponds to a claimed function, or its equivalent, is found in, or obvious over, the applied prior art. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1299–1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is firmly established in our precedent that a structural analysis is required when means-plus-function limitations are at issue; a functional analysis alone will not suffice.” (emphases added)). In this case, Petitioner’s failure to construe the claims in accordance with our Rules is determinative. By failing to identify the structure, material, or acts in the ’962 patent Specification that correspond to the claimed functions, Petitioner necessarily has not shown where that structure, material, acts, or their equivalents are disclosed in the applied prior art. Compare Pet. 24–25, with id. at 37 (discussing “expandable inflatable means”), 37–38 (discussing “mounting and retaining means”), 45–46 (discussing “means for inflating”).” slip op. at 11
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“challenged claim contains a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, Petitioner is required to construe the limitation and “must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). (Emphasis added). Here, the Petition fails to identify any portion of the ’962 patent Specification that describes the structure, material, or acts that correspond to the functions recited in the above-referenced limitations, and references a different document. See Pet. 24–25; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). It is not this panel’s responsibility to identify the portions of the Specification upon which it believes Petitioner may rely to support its positions with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Our Rules place this burden on Petitioner, so that the panel may evaluate effectively the challenged claims vis-à-vis the asserted prior art, as discussed below.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“With respect to these limitations, Petitioner contends that these limitations in some instances do and in others do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Pet. 24–25. Petitioner, however, does not discuss the presumption associated with use of the word “means” in these limitations and does not provide a single citation to persuasive intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to suggest that the presumption is either warranted or unwarranted in any case. Instead, Petitioner incorporates by reference a letter between counsel in the co-pending district court litigation. Id. (citing Ex. 1007). Even if Petitioner’s incorporation of counsel’s positions in litigation by reference were proper,5 the cited letter also fails to explain how or why applicable intrinsic or extrinsic evidence warrants in selected instances only deviating from the presumption that use of the term “means” invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Although this letter suggests that the parties may agree that § 112 ¶ 6 should or should not apply to these limitations, a non-binding agreement 5 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3), prohibiting incorporation by reference of arguments. between parties does not constitute persuasive evidence and does not suspend operation of our Rules requiring the Petitioner to identify the corresponding structure and function, or explain otherwise. Further, claim construction, and whether § 112 ¶ 6 applies, is a legal determination made based on a hierarchy of evidence––intrinsic evidence being the most persuasive. Lawyer argument is among the least persuasive.” slip op. at 10
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,371,962 - Tietex International, Ltd. v. Precision Fabrics Group, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 11, 2016 · IPR2015-01671 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on both asserted § 103 grounds, finding no reasonable likelihood of success and exercising § 314(a) discretion for the Radwanski, Rowan, and Murch ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“We approach our discretion to deny a petition on a case-by-case basis. There are sufficient reasons under the specific facts of this case to exercise our discretion to deny institution on Petitioner’s asserted ground that claims 1–30 of the ’162 patent would have been obvious over the combination of Radwanski, Rowan, and Murch. Notably, in this proceeding, the claims of the ’162 patent are so similar in scope and content to those in the ’639 patent that Petitioner is relying on the same arguments that we found to be unpersuasive in the 1248 Final Decision. See Pet. 29; 1248 Final Dec. 22. We do not see how the efficient administration of the Office, or the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding, would be secured by instituting an inter partes review in this proceeding when the same prior art references and arguments are asserted against substantially the same claim limitations as in the 1248 IPR.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“A showing of obviousness must be supported by an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support a motivation to combine the prior art teachings. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 414 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)). An analysis regarding an apparent reason to combine known elements “should be made explicit.” Id.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A showing of obviousness must be supported by an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support a motivation to combine the prior art teachings. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 414 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)). An analysis regarding an apparent reason to combine known elements “should be made explicit.” Id.” slip op. at 12
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“terminology as the claims in related US patent 8,501,639, which is the subject of [the] previously instituted [1248 IPR]” and argues “that for purposes of this proceeding, the same definitions should apply.” Pet. 7. In the 1248 IPR, we determined that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “intumescent” in light of the specification is “a substance that swells and chars upon exposure to heat or flame.” Tietex Int’l, Ltd. v. Precision Fabrics Group, Inc., Case IPR2014-01248, slip op. at 5–6 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2015) (Paper 14); see id., slip. op. at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 27, 2016) (Paper 39). Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that “intumescent” as used in claim 1 of the ’162 patent should be interpreted the same way in this proceeding. Pet. 7; Prelim. Resp. 17. Therefore, for purposes of this Decision, we interpret “intumescent” to mean “a substance that swells and chars upon exposure to heat or flame.” B.” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,796,162 - Netflix, Inc. v. Opentv, IncRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2014 · IPR2014-00274 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Netflix’s rehearing request, leaving in place its denial of inter partes review of claims 1–20 because the petition did not show it was more likely than not to prevail.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply… We grant the request to reconsider the decision insofar as we have reconsidered the decision, but decline to modify our previous decision.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we conclude that the Petitioner has not met its burden to show it is more likely than not to prevail. We, therefore, deny the request for reconsideration.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“This argument does not persuade us to alter our earlier decision. The newly proposed interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of claim 1 reciting that the “browser retrieves the requested Internet information segments under the direction and control of the controller means.” Ex. 1001, col. 13:60-63. An embodiment allowing a user the flexibility to go back to access a list of URLs at the user’s leisure after the presentation does not alter the requirement that the controller means drives the presentation during the audio or video program.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,018,768
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.