• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00573 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7 or 11 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’772 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’772 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) pertaining to the ’772 patent “would have had an educational background of, engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’772 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In this inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We do not need to construe any terms expressly to determine whether or not to institute a trial. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,481,772
• Liberty Energy Inc. / Liberty Oilfield Services LLC v. U.S. Well Services, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00066 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’258 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’258 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art would have either (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production, or (2) at least four years of industry experience in the oil and gas industry including well drilling, completion, or production. Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 48). Patent owner applies the same level proposed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’258 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner does not propose any explicit constructions. Pet. 12. Likewise, Patent Owner does not propose any explicit constructions. Prelim. Resp. 11. We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found

    “Planetary gear systems are designed differently for different purposes. See, e.g., Ex. 2002, iv (“All characteristics of the drive system from the driver to the driven equipment . . . can influence gearbox operation and must be considered . . . .”); Ex. 2024 ¶ 63 (testimony of Michael Nikolaou that “[f]ailing to meticulously design, test, and manufacture a gear system for a specific application can be catastrophic.”). Petitioner does not sufficiently show that a POSITA would have known that Bergan’s planetary gear system, which is designed to drive, and provide heave compensation to, a hoisting drum on a floating platform, would be suitable for use in Buckley to drive an electric drive pump used to drive a fluid end for the pumping of a fracturing fluid into a well. Petitioner appears to acknowledge that at least some changes would be needed to Bergan’s planetary gear system to make it suitable to drive Buckley’s fracturing pump. Pet. 18 (“A POSITA would have been motivated to combine Bergan’s planetary gear system, with appropriate changes to gear sizes that would have been obvious to a POSITA, with Buckley’s pump system . . . .”). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Durham sufficiently explains what changes would be needed or why a POSITA would have been motivated to make such changes. See id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 143, 149 ). We, thus, are not persuaded that a POSITA would have been motivated to used Bergan’s planetary gear system to drive Buckley’s fracturing pump. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Buckley is merely applying a known technique to improve a similar device in the same way, that design incentives would have prompted the propose combination, or that the proposed combination is a simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable results.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,598,258
• Ubiquiti Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01290 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer foundTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “interview to incorporate prosecution dependent claim 2 into prosecution claim 1 and cancel prosecution dependent claim 3. See § I.F, supra. We determine that this agreement and the corresponding amendment constitutes a clear disavowal of subject matter that supports Patent Owner’s construction. Prosecution claim 2 required that the second communication frame follow the first communication frame after a SIFS (corresponding to Figure 5 of the ’122 patent), while prosecution claim 3 required that there be a SIFS and an intervening response between the first and second communication frames (corresponding to the embodiments of Figures 3 and 4 of the ’122 patent). Before the amendment, original claim 1 included both of these embodiments, but the incorporation of prosecution claim 2 into prosecution claim 1 and the cancellation of prosecution claim 3 limited issued claim 1 to only the embodiment of prosecution claim 2. Because Larsson disclosed an intervening response to the first communication frame before the second communication frame, the clear import of the amendment was to limit claim 1 to the embodiment where the second communication frame follows immediately after the SIFS in order to distinguish claim 1 from Larsson. Indeed, in the Reasons for Allowance, the examiner explained that claim 1 distinguishes over the prior art (including Larsson) because “[t]he prior art of record fails to teach or fairly suggest ‘receiv[ing] the second communication frame after a short inter frame space (SIFS) that follows the first communication frame,’” as added from prosecution claim 2. Ex. 1002, 47. If, as Petitioner argues, prosecution claim 2 was broad enough to cover the embodiment of prosecution claim 3, then the amendment would have served no apparent purpose. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that “[t]here is no other plausible explanation for why, when faced with Larsson’s disclosure of an intervening response, the Examiner initiated an interview to incorporate the SIFS limitation of dependent claim 2 into claim 1, and cancel dependent claim 3, which, like Larsson, included an intervening response.” See Prelim. Sur-reply 1–2.” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “of the alleged invention would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in wireless communications standards and/or product development.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 25–26). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not advance a proposed level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp.; Prelim. Sur-reply. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’122 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to show that Gu teaches that “the second communication frame follows after a short inter frame space (SIFS) after the first communication frame with the transmit announcement indication.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. As discussed above, we construe this limitation to require that “the second communication frame follows substantially immediately after the first communication frame (without any intervening response to the first communication frame),” as Patent Owner proposes. See § II.A, supra. Petitioner has not shown that Gu meets this construction because Gu includes an intervening response between the first and second communication frames. Consequently, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over the combination of Gu and Trainin.” slip op. at 31

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on any grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,594,122
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Headwater Research LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01180 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16 were unpatentable, chiefly because Rao did not teach blocking network access.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) held at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) had three to five years of experience with networking, power consumption of networked computing devices, and/or wireless digital communications systems.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–26). Petitioner further argues that “[m]ore related education would compensate for fewer years of work experience (and vice versa).” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 24–26). Patent Owner “does not challenge the Petition’s proposed definition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of a person having ordinary skill in the art, which is not disputed and consistent with the invention claimed in the ’076 patent.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Patent Owner argues that the term “disallow[]” should be given the same construction the parties agreed upon during the district court proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 9. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “However, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain where Rao teaches “allow[ing] or disallow[ing]” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 13–18, 25–30. To the extent Petitioner and Dr. Bims cite to Rao, they reference paragraphs 191 through 193, which discuss how Rao’s filter 322 is used to implement prioritization. See Pet. 15; Ex. 1003 ¶ 65. More specifically, those paragraphs recite using prioritization to place the network packets in different queues based on their priority. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 191–193. We see nothing in Rao that teaches or suggest that the network packets would be disallowed, as opposed to simply delayed, based on priority. Id. And, as Patent Owner argues, this finding is consistent with factual findings made by a different panel considering the teachings of Rao in an inter partes review of a related patent. See Prelim. Resp. 16–18 (citing Samsung Elecs. Co v. Headwater Research LLC, IPR2023-01361, Paper 8 (PTAB Mar. 29, 2024) (Decision Denying Institution)). Even if one reads the Petition as arguing that a person having ordinary skill would have modified Rao to include Araujo’s blocking—which we do not—we would not be sufficiently persuaded by that argument. Although Petitioner explains why a person having ordinary skill in the art would want to consider power usage along with whether the application is in the foreground or background, Petitioner does not explain why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have changed prioritization to blocking. See Pet. 13–18. Indeed, such a modification appears to be one that would render Rao “inoperable for its intended purpose.” In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984).” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,198,076
• Quotient Technology, LLC v. Intelligent Clearing Network Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01325 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would have been obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented shows there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’729 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not expressly proffer a different level of skill in the art, but faults Petitioner for relying on the testimony of a declarant who allegedly lacks experience relating to coupon processing. See Prelim. Resp. 15–21. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he Petition repeatedly contends that a POSITA would require a deep and specific understanding of various aspects of the business and technology of validating, redeeming, and clearing coupons to reach the proposed obvious determinations.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 18–19 (citing examples from the Petition that allegedly rely on 9 The current record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. a skilled artisan “having extensive knowledge [of] coupon processing business practices and technologies”). In this regard, Patent Owner contends that Dr. Mowry does not identify any education or experience relating to coupon processing. Id. at 20. As a consequence, Patent Owner urges us to disregard Dr. Mowry’s opinions relating to the coupon-processing industry. Id. at 21. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, it is not expressly disputed, and it does not impact our analysis below.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms need construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 12. Patent Owner further argues, however, that “in the [co-pending litigation], Petitioner has advanced numerous limiting constructions that are inconsistent with Petitioner’s invalidity theories.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12. We acknowledge that Petitioner has proposed specific claim constructions for various ’729 patent claim limitations in the co-pending litigation. See Ex. 2001, 2–14. However, Patent Owner does not advance specific arguments as to why we should apply those constructions here and how Petitioner’s challenges to the claims would fail thereunder. See Prelim. Resp. 11–12. Moreover, after reviewing the evidence and argument presented by the parties, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of our analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “1. Independent claim 1 Patent Owner contends, inter alia, that the combination of Aggarwal and Deaton does not teach or suggest limitation [1d]. Prelim. Resp. 26–29. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that limitation [1d] would have been taught or suggested by Aggarwal and Deaton. This issue is dispositive so we do not provide analysis on the other challenged claim limitations. (a) Limitation [1d] Limitation [1d] recites, “receiving, at the ICN server from the retail server, redeemed coupon related information indicating successful redemption of a coupon, wherein the redeemed coupon related information comprises identification information from a product purchased, customer identification information, an application identifier, and retailer identification information.” Ex. 1001, 52:52–58 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,846,729
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01226 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Lenovo had not shown a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “identifies and refers to a valid region of the integrated circuit memory device as having a three-dimensional boundary delimited by phase ranges in command/address signals, data signals, and sampling signals. Nowhere does the ’835 patent specification indicate a valid region of the integrated circuit device as a whole can be represented by values for less than three parameters x, y, and z, all together, e.g., the command signals, the data signals, and the sampling signals. Also, the ’835 patent describes that the purpose of determining the boundaries of a valid region is to configure an optimal operating point for the integrated circuit device. Ex. 1001, 5:48–51. We have also considered other language in the claims. Each of independent claims 1 and 7 requires adjustment of the phase of all three command signals, data signals, and sampling signals, to determine the “valid operation range.” Ex. 1001, 6:56–7:4, 7:18–34. Each of independent claims 12, 20, and 23 requires adjustment of the phase of all three command signals, data signals, and sampling signals, to determine the “valid operating range.” Ex. 1001, 7:46–60, 8:28–44, 8:62–10:4. Based on the foregoing, the specification informs us that “valid operation range” is a three-dimensional range. We recognize that the specification does not expressly exclude a two-dimensional range or multiple two-dimensional ranges from being a “valid operation range” of the integrated circuit device. However, that is why we construe the claims to determine what, if anything, may be required despite a lack of express recitation in the claims.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Baker, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter “POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or the equivalent, and two to three years of experience designing high speed computer memory devices.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–35). Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Lee, testifies: “I agree with Petitioner that [Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill] would be the minimum qualifications for a POSITA.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 35. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art, i.e., that a POSITA “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or the equivalent, and two to three years of experience designing high speed computer memory devices.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 34. The stated level is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker and not disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Petitioner still has not made a sufficient showing for limitation [1.4.a]. That is because Petitioner has, at best, identified only two 2-parameter valid operation ranges, i.e., an operation range involving just command and sampling signals, and an operation range involving data and sampling signals. Pet. 29–34. This does not satisfy “valid operation range” as we have construed above in Section III.C. Specifically, we determined that “valid operation range” is a three-dimensional range including a boundary for each of three underlying parameters which, for example, may be the phases of the command signals, the data signals, and the sampling signals. Nowhere has Petitioner identified or explained how Johnson discloses a valid operation range that is a function of three parameters together, e.g., the respective phases of command signals, data signals, and sampling signals. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner’s reasoning for adjusting the phase of clock signals DCLK, which Petitioner regards as sampling signals, to synchronize with the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus is unpersuasive, because Johnson, as Petitioner has recognized, already adjusts the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus to synchronize with clock signals DCLK. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 136; Ex. 1004, 4:55–59, 6:46–48, 7:25–31, 7:36–42). The proposed adjustment is redundant and serves little, if any purpose. Petitioner has not proposed to stop adjusting the data signals relative to DCLK. Nor has Petitioner articulated a reason to do the adjustment in both directions, i.e., adjusting the data signals relative to the sampling signals and adjusting the sampling signals relative to the data signals. We have also determined above, in discussing limitation [1.3], that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Johnson’s CCLK signal is a sampling signal. Further, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 24) that neither delay 55 nor delay lock loop 41 in Johnson’s Figure 4 is used for systematic calibration of any signal or in a signal calibration process. We find that the mere presence of a delay element in a signal path does not reasonably suggest systematic calibration. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner still has not made a sufficient showing for limitation [1.4.a]. That is because Petitioner has, at best, identified only two 2-parameter valid operation ranges, i.e., an operation range involving just command and sampling signals, and an operation range involving data and sampling signals. Pet. 29–34. This does not satisfy “valid operation range” as we have construed above in Section III.C. Specifically, we determined that “valid operation range” is a three-dimensional range including a boundary for each of three underlying parameters which, for example, may be the phases of the command signals, the data signals, and the sampling signals. Nowhere has Petitioner identified or explained how Johnson discloses a valid operation range that is a function of three parameters together, e.g., the respective phases of command signals, data signals, and sampling signals. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner’s reasoning for adjusting the phase of clock signals DCLK, which Petitioner regards as sampling signals, to synchronize with the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus is unpersuasive, because Johnson, as Petitioner has recognized, already adjusts the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus to synchronize with clock signals DCLK. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 136; Ex. 1004, 4:55–59, 6:46–48, 7:25–31, 7:36–42). The proposed adjustment is redundant and serves little, if any purpose. Petitioner has not proposed to stop adjusting the data signals relative to DCLK. Nor has Petitioner articulated a reason to do the adjustment in both directions, i.e., adjusting the data signals relative to the sampling signals and adjusting the sampling signals relative to the data signals. We have also determined above, in discussing limitation [1.3], that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Johnson’s CCLK signal is a sampling signal. Further, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 24) that neither delay 55 nor delay lock loop 41 in Johnson’s Figure 4 is used for systematic calibration of any signal or in a signal calibration process. We find that the mere presence of a delay element in a signal path does not reasonably suggest systematic calibration. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that” slip op. at 31

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,646,835
• Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00955 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any of claims 1–33 unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “1. Legal Standards “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (hereafter cited as “KSR”). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if made available in the record, which has not happened here. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 17

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “To be sure, the pixel belief values used in the Luo-250 device are based on color. The Luo-250 device determines pixel probabilities “by assigning to each pixel a belief value as belonging to the subject matter region based on color and texture features.” Id. ¶ 42. However, using probability values or binary 1s and 0s to map the probability or “belief” that a pixel or area of pixels in an image either is, or is not, a subject matter target, is not the same as designating “certain pixels as certain colors” as asserted by Petitioner. Thus, we are not persuaded that the Petition has adequately supported or explained how the Luo-250 device designates “certain pixels as certain colors.” We also are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 discloses, teaches, or suggests a device or method that “determines the color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 34–39). First, as indicated above, we are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 “designates certain pixels as certain colors,” which is foundational to Petitioner’s argument that the Luo-250 method determines a “color range exhibited by the pixel data groups.” Second, the evidence cited by Petitioner when attempting to map the quoted claim language regarding “color range” to Luo-250, refers to the designation of individual pixels as “either skin-tone or non skin-tone” in a binary belief map, not a range of colors. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 35–39). Petitioner’s argument—that “[b]y analyzing the pixels to designate each as ‘either skin-tone or non skin-tone,’ Luo-250’s device determines ‘[r]egions of skin-tone colored pixels’ in the image” (id.)—is not persuasive evidence of “determin[ing] a color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. The Petition does not adequately explain how Luo-250 discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the determination of color ranges for pixel data groups in an image. We are further persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument and evidence that the Petition has not adequately explained how the Luo-250 device would “determine[] a color range” based on a determination of probability values for each pixel, rather than a range of colors. Prelim. Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 32, 34, 36, and 38). Dr. Papanikolopoulos’s Declaration testimony further supports Patent Owner’s position. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 78–81. Dr. Papanikolopoulos testifies, in particular, that Mr. Parulski asserts only “that Luo-250 considers the color of individual pixels. He does not assert that Luo-250 anywhere ‘analyzes the image data . . . and determines the color range, as claimed.’” Id. ¶ 80. We agree.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To be sure, the pixel belief values used in the Luo-250 device are based on color. The Luo-250 device determines pixel probabilities “by assigning to each pixel a belief value as belonging to the subject matter region based on color and texture features.” Id. ¶ 42. However, using probability values or binary 1s and 0s to map the probability or “belief” that a pixel or area of pixels in an image either is, or is not, a subject matter target, is not the same as designating “certain pixels as certain colors” as asserted by Petitioner. Thus, we are not persuaded that the Petition has adequately supported or explained how the Luo-250 device designates “certain pixels as certain colors.” We also are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 discloses, teaches, or suggests a device or method that “determines the color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 34–39). First, as indicated above, we are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 “designates certain pixels as certain colors,” which is foundational to Petitioner’s argument that the Luo-250 method determines a “color range exhibited by the pixel data groups.” Second, the evidence cited by Petitioner when attempting to map the quoted claim language regarding “color range” to Luo-250, refers to the designation of individual pixels as “either skin-tone or non skin-tone” in a binary belief map, not a range of colors. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 35–39). Petitioner’s argument—that “[b]y analyzing the pixels to designate each as ‘either skin-tone or non skin-tone,’ Luo-250’s device determines ‘[r]egions of skin-tone colored pixels’ in the image” (id.)—is not persuasive evidence of “determin[ing] a color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. The Petition does not adequately explain how Luo-250 discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the determination of color ranges for pixel data groups in an image. We are further persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument and evidence that the Petition has not adequately explained how the Luo-250 device would “determine[] a color range” based on a determination of probability values for each pixel, rather than a range of colors. Prelim. Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 32, 34, 36, and 38). Dr. Papanikolopoulos’s Declaration testimony further supports Patent Owner’s position. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 78–81. Dr. Papanikolopoulos testifies, in particular, that Mr. Parulski asserts only “that Luo-250 considers the color of individual pixels. He does not assert that Luo-250 anywhere ‘analyzes the image data . . . and determines the color range, as claimed.’” Id. ¶ 80. We agree.” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,668,365
• Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00945 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–24 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Prelim. Resp. 22; Ex. 2001 ¶ 67. Patent Owner argues Petitioner relies on Freund to “cure this deficiency,” but the “Petition fails to explain why [the skilled artisan] seeking to implement a Rao-based system would look to Freund’s teachings of foreground/background classifications designed to limit an employee’s ‘counterproductive Web browsing.’” Prelim. Resp. 22. According to Patent Owner and its expert, Mr. de la Iglesia, the skilled artisan “would not have been motivated to do so, because directly contrary to Rao which suggests prioritizing foreground activity over background activity, the relevant teachings of Freund restrict foreground activity relative to background activity.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 67–79); see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 69 (“Rao favors foreground activity, and Freund favors background activity”), 70 (“In contrast [to Rao], Freund teaches the opposite—that foreground activity should be disfavored relative to background activity.”); Prelim. Resp. 23–25. Patent Owner argues the “Petition does not explain why [the skilled artisan] would have been motivated to combine these two references’ treatment of foreground/background classifications, given their opposing treatment of foreground and background activity.” Id. at 25; see id. at 25–28 (Patent Owner explaining why “none of the Petition’s motivations would have justified combining Rao’s and Freund’s contradictory teachings regarding treatment of foreground activity.” (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 74–79)). In short, according to Patent Owner’s expert’s persuasive testimony, “if [the skilled artisan] were looking for ways to supplement Rao’s treatment of foreground activity, they would not have looked to teachings that explicitly disfavor foreground activities, contrary to Rao’s teachings.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 79 (cited at Prelim. Resp. 28).” slip op. at 31

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Patent Owner does not present an alternative definition at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. 5–6 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not challenge that definition.”). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues, at least at this stage of the proceeding, that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’613 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan (Ex. 1003 ¶ 61), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes any claim terms for construction. Pet. 3 (“No terms require construction to resolve this Petition.”); Prelim. Resp. 6 (“Patent Owner agrees that no formal claim construction is necessary.”). We do not find that the express construction of any term is necessary for this decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,215,613
• Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00976 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because BOE did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–3 under any of its three obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “We have authority to institute an inter partes review where a petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). For reasons that follow, Petitioner does not meet that evidentiary threshold. We decline to reach the issues raised in the Reply or Sur-reply, which relate to Patent Owner’s alternative argument that a discretionary denial of the Petition is warranted.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 26. Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art” as “set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition (Pet. 26) because, on this record, it is consistent with the specification. We take note that neither party indicated that the result would change under any different definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner discusses the terms a “data line having a broad-width portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 1, as well as a “data line having a broad portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 2. Petitioner cites the ’079 patent for “offering a lexicographic definition of the term ‘broad width’” to support the plain meaning interpretation of the terms “‘broad-width portion’ and ‘broad portion’ as a portion that is broader than another portion of the subject element.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not provide arguments directed specifically to Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Taking account of the information presented, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. Compare Pet. 16 (addressing issues of claim construction, citing the ’079 patent for supporting the plain and ordinary meaning of “broad-width portion” and “broad portion” without demonstrating that an express construction is necessary to resolve whether to institute review), with Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (addressing the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, without asserting an express claim construction). To the extent that the scope of any claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in the following analysis of the challenges.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Id. (emphasis added). Sato ¶ 26 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “data lines composed of an Al film.” Id. Importantly, Petitioner does not connect Sato’s disclosure, relating to benefits associated with a data line arrangement, to any particular arrangement of scan lines. Sato ¶ 28 is equally deficient. Sato ¶ 28 also discusses benefits of utilizing a specific “arrangement,” namely, “capacitance lines formed of [a] metal film.” Id. ¶ 28. [0028] With this arrangement, the provision of the function as the shading layer with the capacitance lines formed of the metal film, the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as the wiring, as well as the provision of the function as the light absorption layer with the capacitance electrodes formed of the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as electrodes, prevents the laminated structure from becoming complex by additionally forming a dedicated shading layer and a dedicated light absorption layer. Accordingly, this arrangement is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof. Id. (emphasis added). Here again, Sato ¶ 28 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “capacitance lines formed of metal film.” Id. Petitioner does not bridge the gap in its rationale to combine by attempting to explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have extrapolated benefits, pertaining to an arrangement of capacitance lines, to a similar arrangement of scan lines. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Flasck, provides no further insight as to how or why Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 would have been understood to apply to scan lines. Dr. Flasck’s comments on Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 merely repeat, nearly verbatim, the Petition’s conclusory contentions. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 139 (Dr. Flasck declaring “Sato specifically teaches that its device ‘is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof.’”); Pet. 37. Dr. Flasck does not cite to any additional supporting evidence other than Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139.” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,502,079
• Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00977 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 7–13 and 15–20 unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing semiconductor display devices, including LCD displays.” Pet. 19. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Id. On the record presented, Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any particular proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’606 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute review without resolving the construction of any claim terms. Accordingly, we need not and do not construe any terms expressly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “view. First, as Petitioner admits, data line 6a is not connected to image signal line 101d and line 109 other than when sample hold circuit 101c connects them due to shift register 101b outputting an enabling signal. Pet. 49. This is supported by the layout of the four elements in Fujikawa’s Figure 2. Ex. 1005, Fig. 2 (depicting sample hold circuits 101c between and connecting data lines 6a and signal lines 101d). In addition, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. E. Fred Schubert, testifies that “two separate lines straddling circuitry are [not] one line.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. The dispute between the parties on this issue is largely one of claim construction: should the term “wiring line” in claim 7 be construed broadly enough to encompass a collection of lines separated by a sample hold circuit? In order to determine that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the recited wiring lines, we would need to answer this question in the affirmative. Yet, as discussed above, neither party proposes construing “wiring line,” or any other term used in the claims of the ’606 patent. Pet. 18; Prelim. Resp. 7. The failure to argue for and sufficiently support a broad construction of the term “wiring line” means that Petitioner does not show sufficiently, for purposes of supporting institution of review, that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the “wiring line” limitation of claim 7. b) Conclusion Regarding Claim 7 Based on the record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 7 is unpatentable as anticipated by or obvious in view of Fujikawa.” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,557,606

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.