- Google LLC v. Alex Is The Best, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 18, 2019 · IPR2017-02058 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request and left in place the denial of institution for claims 1–3, 10–14, and 21 because the Petition did not sufficiently show the cited references taught the claimed limitations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the challenging party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Because Petitioner seeks rehearing of our Decision denying institution of trial based on the Petition, it must show an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“certain teachings in Inoue about the claimed “WSARC.” Req. Reh’g 3. In the Decision, we found that, although the Petition appears to map Inoue’s file server to the claimed “WSARC” by mentioning “WSARC (Inoue’s file server)” (Dec. 16–17 (citing Pet. 17)), aside from that single mention, the Petition does not discuss the term “WSARC” or “website archive and review center” in relation to Inoue, and does not explain adequately why Inoue’s file server teaches or suggests the “WSARC” recited in the claims (id. at 17, 19 (citing Pet. 15–18)). Thus, based on the record presented, we determined that simply stating “a WSARC (Inoue’s file server)” in the Petition without any elaboration does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden required for institution of a review in this case (id. at 19–20 (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“At best, Petitioner’s arguments in its Request for Rehearing attempt to remedy the deficiencies in the Petition our Decision identified, by supplementing the arguments in the Petition. A request for rehearing is not a supplemental petition. Nor is it an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented and developed in the first instance in the Petition. As explained in the Decision (Dec. 19–20), it was Petitioner’s burden “from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphases added) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he expedited nature of IPRs bring with it an obligation for petitioners to make their case in their petition to institute.” (emphases added)). The record shows that, rather than overlooking any teachings of Inoue or any “background” discussion by Dr. Madisetti, the Decision simply considered the arguments and explanations of the evidence Petitioner presented in the four corners of the Petition, and properly determined that the Petition did not meet this burden required on Petitioner. Dec. 19–20.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“certain teachings in Inoue about the claimed “WSARC.” Req. Reh’g 3. In the Decision, we found that, although the Petition appears to map Inoue’s file server to the claimed “WSARC” by mentioning “WSARC (Inoue’s file server)” (Dec. 16–17 (citing Pet. 17)), aside from that single mention, the Petition does not discuss the term “WSARC” or “website archive and review center” in relation to Inoue, and does not explain adequately why Inoue’s file server teaches or suggests the “WSARC” recited in the claims (id. at 17, 19 (citing Pet. 15–18)). Thus, based on the record presented, we determined that simply stating “a WSARC (Inoue’s file server)” in the Petition without any elaboration does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden required for institution of a review in this case (id. at 19–20 (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,581,991 - Apple Inc. v. Saint Lawrence Communications, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 25, 2017 · IPR2017-01244 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Apple did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–21 and 29–42 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For at least the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing any of claims 1, 8, 15, 29, and 36 are unpatentable as obvious over the proposed combination of Salami and Kroon.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“encoding device of, for example, claim 1. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Salami does not disclose that the preemphasized input speech signal is used as an input to a perceptual weighting filter as recited in claim 1. See PO Resp. 35–37. Specifically, claim 1 specifies both the synthesis filter calculator and the perceptual weighting filter are responsive to the preemphasized signal generated by the preemphasis filter, which is, in turn, responsive to the input wideband speech signal, and further specifies that the perceptual weighting filter is also responsive to the coefficients generated by the synthesis filter calculator. In other words, the claim requires an arrangement of the various elements of an encoder in which the output of the preemphasis filter (the preemphasized signal) is applied to the synthesis filter calculator and applied to the perceptual weighting filter, and the coefficients generated by the synthesis filter calculator are applied to the perceptual weighting filter. An excerpt of Figure 1 of the ’524 patent, reproduced below, shows a block diagram of relevant portions of such an encoder arrangement. The above excerpt of Figure 1 of the ’524 patent depicts preemphasis filter 103, coupled to receive wideband speech signals (“Sp”) and configured to generate preemphasized speech signal (“S”). Ex. 1001, 7:64–8:18. The output of preemphasis filter 103 (“S”) is applied to LP analysis quantization and interpolation calculator 104 and perceptual weighting filter 105. Id. at 8:19–9:45. Petitioner directs us to no disclosure in Salami of such an arrangement of filters in an encoding device.” slip op. at 17
- BurdenInstitution denied
“Ex. 1008, 23. We discern no teaching or suggestion in this text of Salami that the preemphasized signal is used on a perceptual weighting filter. We find no support in the cited portions of Salami for Petitioner’s assertion that the preemphasized signal is first applied to LP analysis and then the same preemphasized signal is perceptually weighted (i.e., applied to a perceptually weighted filter). Petitioner’s argument in the Petition does not explain specifically how the cited text teaches the identified claim limitations and, thus, amounts to little more than an unsupported conclusory remark. Dr. Cohen merely repeats the same argument without providing any further explanation. Ex. 1003, 65 (the portion of the claim chart of paragraph 114 for this element of claim 1).” slip op. at 19
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,807,524 - Kingston Technology Company, Inc. v. Spex Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00825 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all asserted grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 55 or 57.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Our Rules require that a petition for inter partes review identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified” and must specify “where each element of [a challenged] claim is 3 Petitioner proposes a definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 13; see Ex. 1010 ¶ 20. Patent Owner does not challenge this definition. For purposes of this Decision and to the extent necessary, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Moreover, “a challenger who seeks to demonstrate that a means-plus-function limitation was present in the prior art must prove that the corresponding structure—or an equivalent—was present in the prior art.” Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“2. “security module” and “target module” The terms “security module” and “target module” both are recited in each challenged claim. Petitioner identifies a dispute between itself and Patent Owner in related district court litigation as to whether those terms require only “functional (not necessarily physically distinct) modules.” Pet. 15. Specifically, Petitioner points to a statement in an infringement claim chart that appears to have been attached as an exhibit to Patent Owner’s complaint in the litigation that the accused device “has at least two modules, a security module (e.g., cryptographic functionality) and a target module (e.g., storage functionality).” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 2). Petitioner states that it “expressly disagrees with Patent Owner’s broad construction of the ‘modules’ language as covering structures that are not physically distinct.” Id. Petitioner contends that the proper construction of “module” “requires a structure that performs as a ‘security’ module and another separate (potentially connected) structure that performs as a ‘target’ (e.g., memory module, second security module, etc.).” Id. at 18.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner does not sufficiently, persuasively explain how Jones’s disclosure of a memory card that “stores information enabling [a] host computer to automatically identify the particular . . . card as soon as the card and host are connected, and to automatically establish [an] appropriate hardware/software interface” teaches or suggests “receiving a request from the host computing device for information regarding the type of the modular device” and “providing the type of the target module to the host computing device in response to the request,” as recited in claim 55. Indeed, Jones’s statement that the card includes information enabling the host to “automatically” identify the card “as soon as the card and host are connected” suggests not only that receipt of a request is unnecessary, but also that the information is not provided “in response to [a] request.” We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s alternative argument based on a device driver “directly interrogat[ing] the CIS structures in the attribute memory.” Pet. 20. As Patent Owner points out (Prelim. Resp. 16), Jones describes that as separate from the embodiment relied upon by Petitioner as disclosing all other limitations of claim 55, whereas anticipation requires that all of the limitations be arranged or combined in the same way in the prior art as recited in the claim. Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Moreover, because Petitioner does not advance any argument that the “CIS structures in the attribute memory” perform the remaining claim steps or explain how the “operably connecting” step of claim 55 would be taught or suggested by Jones “in cases wherein the host computer is not provided with PCMCIA Card Services and Socket Services functions,” we agree with Patent Owner that this alternative argument also fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its obviousness challenge to claim 55 over Jones.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner does not sufficiently, persuasively explain how Jones’s disclosure of a memory card that “stores information enabling [a] host computer to automatically identify the particular . . . card as soon as the card and host are connected, and to automatically establish [an] appropriate hardware/software interface” teaches or suggests “receiving a request from the host computing device for information regarding the type of the modular device” and “providing the type of the target module to the host computing device in response to the request,” as recited in claim 55. Indeed, Jones’s statement that the card includes information enabling the host to “automatically” identify the card “as soon as the card and host are connected” suggests not only that receipt of a request is unnecessary, but also that the information is not provided “in response to [a] request.” We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s alternative argument based on a device driver “directly interrogat[ing] the CIS structures in the attribute memory.” Pet. 20. As Patent Owner points out (Prelim. Resp. 16), Jones describes that as separate from the embodiment relied upon by Petitioner as disclosing all other limitations of claim 55, whereas anticipation requires that all of the limitations be arranged or combined in the same way in the prior art as recited in the claim. Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Moreover, because Petitioner does not advance any argument that the “CIS structures in the attribute memory” perform the remaining claim steps or explain how the “operably connecting” step of claim 55 would be taught or suggested by Jones “in cases wherein the host computer is not provided with PCMCIA Card Services and Socket Services functions,” we agree with Patent Owner that this alternative argument also fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its obviousness challenge to claim 55 over Jones.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,003,135 - Kingston Technology Company, Inc. v. Spex Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00824 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Kingston did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6–8, 11–15, 23–28, and 36–39 were unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded, on this record, that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims on the asserted grounds. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 6–8, 11–15, 23–28, and 36–39 of the ’802 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“A claim limitation using the phrase “means for” creates a rebuttable presumption that the drafter intended to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.2 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Section 112 ¶ 6 provides that: An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process, wherein we first identify the claimed function and then determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351; Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Moreover, “structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cardiac Pacemakers, 296 F.3d at 1113. This analysis applies similarly under both the broadest reasonable construction and district court-type claim construction standards. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348 (affirming application of § 112 ¶ 6 in district court litigation); In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2011)” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified” and must specify “where each element of [a challenged] claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Moreover, “a challenger who seeks to demonstrate that a means-plus-function limitation was present in the prior art must prove that the corresponding structure—or an equivalent—was present in the prior art.” Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193). slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified” and must specify “where each element of [a challenged] claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Moreover, “a challenger who seeks to demonstrate that a means-plus-function limitation was present in the prior art must prove that the corresponding structure—or an equivalent—was present in the prior art.” Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193). slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,088,802 - Alstom Grid LLC v. Dominion Resources, Inc. And Virginia Electric And Power CompanyInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 6, 2016 · IPR2016-00504 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1-3, 5-10, 12, 13, and 15-20 were unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review of claims 1‒3, 5‒10, 12, 13, and 15‒20 of U.S. Patent No. 8,437,883 B2 (Ex. 1002, “the ’883 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Dominion Resources, Inc. and Virginia Electric and Power Company (collectively, “Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and associated evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing unpatentability of all the challenged claims. We, therefore, deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner argues that Deaver fails to disclose “a signal reporting what was sensed by a sensor that is not included in the subset.” Prelim. Resp. 14‒15. We agree with Patent Owner. As argued by Patent Owner, Petitioner contends that Deaver discloses “alerts” that are transmitted when the minimum and maximum voltage thresholds are exceeded. Prelim. Resp. 14‒15; see Pet. 23. However, the CPVMs transmitting the alerts are monitors at each customer premises that are “selected by an electric utility company as a desired point within the power distribution system [] that will be voltage monitored.” Ex. 1004, 4:1‒3. As such, the CPVMs are all in the subset of sensors being monitored, and none of CPVMs are “not included in the subset.” Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Deaver fails to disclose “at least one other sensor of the plurality of sensors that is not included in the subset is further configured to send a respective reporting signal.”” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner fails to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). “[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner generally states that Deaver, LaPlace, Richeson, and Bell are analogous to the ’883 patent because they are in the same field of endeavor, dealing with power distribution systems and power management in power distribution systems, and metering technology. Pet. 16. Petitioner goes on to characterize each of the references in this field of endeavor. Id. at 16‒17. Although a determination that the cited prior art is analogous to the ’883 patent provides insight into the scope and content of the prior art to be examined, such a determination is, by itself, insufficient to support the conclusion of obviousness. Petitioner must set forth an articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning in supporting its legal conclusion of obviousness, and must provide a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements disclosed by each of the references. Here, Petitioner has failed to provide such a reasoning.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that there is no need to construe expressly any of the claim terms at this time. Although Petitioner and Patent Owner disagree as to the construction of the term “energy delivery parameter,” we need not construe this term because it is not necessary to resolve the dispositive issues discussed below. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“only those terms need to be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,437,883 - Alstom Grid LLC v. Dominion Resources, Inc. And Virginia Electric And Power CompanyInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 6, 2016 · IPR2016-00503 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–5, 7–13, 15, 16, and 18–34 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner fails to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). “[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that there is no need to construe expressly any of the claim terms at this time. Although Petitioner and Patent Owner disagree as to the construction of the term “energy delivery parameter,” we need not construe this term because it is not necessary to resolve the dispositive issues discussed below. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“only those terms need to be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner argues that Deaver fails to disclose “a signal reporting what was sensed by a sensor that is not included in the subset.” Prelim. Resp. 14‒16. We agree with Patent Owner. As argued by Patent Owner, Petitioner contends that Deaver discloses “alerts” that are transmitted when the minimum and maximum voltage thresholds are exceeded. Prelim. Resp. 14‒16; see Pet. 22. However, the CPVMs transmitting the alerts are monitors at each customer premises that are “selected by an electric utility company as a desired point within the power distribution system [] that will be voltage monitored.” Ex. 1004, 4:1‒3. As such, the CPVMs are all in the subset of sensors being monitored, and none of the CPVMS are “not included in the subset.” Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Deaver fails to disclose “at least one other sensor of the plurality of sensors that is not included in the subset is further configured to send a respective reporting signal.” Patent Owner further argues that Deaver fails to disclose “add[ing] to the subset the at least one other sensor that sent the respective reporting signal,” as recited by independent claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 8‒14. We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner contends that Deaver discloses voltage adjustment instructions based on the reported measurement data, and “because any number of customer premises may be selected for voltage monitoring, the reporting meter could be added to the monitored subset.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:45‒60, 5:47‒62, 6:46‒51; Ex. 1001, 38‒42). However, as argued by Patent Owner, Deaver is silent as to adding to the subset of CPVMs being monitored. See Prelim. Resp. 9. At best, Petitioner’s argument that any number of customer premises may be selected, and meters could be added to the subset is an argument towards the obviousness of this limitation, not anticipation, as challenged by Petitioner. See Pet. 23. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Deaver fails to disclose “wherein the voltage controller is further configured to add to the subset the at least one other sensor in response to receiving the reporting,” as recited by independent claim 1.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner fails to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). “[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner generally states that Deaver, LaPlace, Richeson, and Bell are analogous to the ’510 patent because they are in the same field of endeavor, dealing with power distribution systems and power management in power distribution systems, and metering technology. Pet. 14. Petitioner goes on to characterize each of the references in this field of endeavor. Id. at 14‒15. Although a determination that the cited prior art is analogous to the ’510 patent provides insight into the scope and content of the prior art to be examined, such a determination is, by itself, insufficient to support the conclusion of obviousness. Petitioner must set forth an articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning in supporting its legal conclusion of obviousness, and must provide a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements disclosed by each of the references. Here, Petitioner has failed to provide such a reasoning. We further agree with Patent Owner that testimony from Dr. Kezunovic’s Declaration should not be incorporated in to the Petition. See Prelim. Resp. 31‒33. The Petition itself does not address a rationale to combine Deaver, LaPlace, Richeson, Bell, Keefe, and ANSI C84.1-2006, and further does not direct us to discussion in Dr. Kezunovic’s Declaration for a rationale to combine. At best, Dr. Kezunovic asserts that “DMS, smart meters, and substations are well-known prior art elements, whereby their combination yields predictable results.” Ex. 1001, 95; see Ex. 1001, 176, 238, 250. However, Dr. Kezunovic does not provide any explanation as to why the combination of “DMS, smart meters, and substations” would yield predictable results. Accordingly, even if we were to incorporate Dr. Kezunovic’s Declaration in to the Petition, which we do not, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has set forth articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning in supporting its legal conclusion of obviousness. As such, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood in prevailing in its obviousness challenges.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,577,510 - C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Medical Components, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 9, 2016 · IPR2015-01660 · APJ Kerry Begley · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 5–13, 15–19, 21, and 22 were obvious over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that the information presented does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that any of the challenged claims of the ’325 patent are unpatentable. Therefore, we deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“E. REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST Patent Owner argues in its Preliminary Response that the Petition should have named Bard Access Systems, Inc. as a real party-in-interest in addition to C.R. Bard, Inc. Prelim. Resp. 54–59. In view of our determination that Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that it would prevail in establishing that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“First, we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not provide adequate reasoning with rational underpinning for why it would have been obvious in view of Powers to modify the Titanium Implanted Port of PORTS—which Petitioner does not allege is indicated for power injection— to be rated for power injection. See id. at 8–11; Pet. 24–25, 31. Although claim 1 does not require the recited port assembly to be rated for power injection, modifying the Titanium Implanted Port to handle power injection is an important first step in Petitioner’s obviousness analysis. See Pet. 31. Specifically, as noted above, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that the Titanium Implanted Port “could be constructed to handle power injection” by modifying it “in view of Powers to handle the higher pressures and flow rates associated with power injection.” Id. (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 147–48). This assertion, however, is conclusory, and relies exclusively on Mr. Tallarida’s declaration testimony, which merely repeats the conclusory statements in the Petition without citation to the asserted prior art references or any other evidence. See id.; Ex. 1009 ¶ 148. Accordingly, his testimony has little, if any, probative value. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Nothing in the [federal] rules [of evidence] or in our jurisprudence requires the fact finder to credit the unsupported assertions of an expert witness.”). The Petition and Mr. Tallarida’s cited testimony do not explain how the Titanium Implanted Port of PORTS would have been modified so as to be rated for power injection, nor do they point to any disclosure in Powers that would have suggested how such a modification would have been made. See Pet. 31; Ex. 1009 ¶ 148.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous art
“asserted ground based on PORTS, Powers, PowerPort, and Hickman, Petitioner has not provided adequate reasoning with rational underpinning for combining PORTS, Powers, Meyer, and Hickman to arrive at the invention recited in the challenged claims. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown that Meyer cures the deficiencies of PORTS and Powers. See Prelim. Resp. 35–37. Petitioner alleges that the alphanumeric cutouts in the plastic collar of Meyer would be visible under X-ray examination, yet neither Meyer nor the cited paragraphs from Mr. Tallarida’s declaration testimony sufficiently support this assertion, particularly in light of contradictory evidence in the record. See Pet. 55 (citing Ex. 1006; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 278–84); see also Ex. 1009 ¶ 193 (opining that silicone is radiotransparent); Ex. 1001, [57], 2:13–17, 4:61–5:3 (explaining that radiopaque agent can be applied to plastic material, such as silicone elastomer, to allow indicia to appear under X-ray examination). Moreover, even if the collar in Meyer can be considered a flange,4 it is not a flange of anything resembling a venous access port. Petitioner also has not shown adequately that Meyer, which discloses collars for containers, is “from the same field of endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem” 4 We note that Meyer’s collar does not meet Petitioner’s proffered construction of the term “flange,” “a rim extending outwardly from the base for attachment of the port to a patient.” Pet. 5; see Prelim. Resp. 36. addressed by the inventors of the ’325 patent in developing the venous access ports recited in the challenged claims, as required to be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see Ex. 1006, 3 (Summary); Prelim. Resp. 35. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Meyer “emphasize[s]” the obviousness of including X-ray discernable indicia in the form of cutouts or voids in the flange of the Titanium Implanted Port of PORTS. See Pet. 57.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,257,325 - C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Medical Components, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 4, 2016 · IPR2015-01654 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–22 obvious over any of the three asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“the Petition fails to provide adequate reasoning for combining the references in the manner asserted to arrive at the claimed subject matter. Prelim. Resp. 7–38. Having reviewed both parties’ arguments and evidence, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated sufficient rationale with support in the record for modifying the Titanium Implanted Port of PORTS as suggested in the Petition. In particular, we are persuaded by the following arguments presented by Patent Owner. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not provide adequate reasoning based on rational underpinnings for why it would have been obvious in view of Powers to modify the Titanium Implanted Port of PORTS—which Petitioner does not allege can handle power injection—to be rated for power injection. See id. at 8–11. Although claim 1 does not require the recited port assembly actually be rated for power injection, modifying the Titanium Implanted Port to handle power injection is an important first step in Petitioner’s obviousness analysis. See Pet. 29. Specifically, as noted above, Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known the Titanium Implanted Port could be constructed to handle power injection by modifying it in view of Powers to handle higher pressures and flow rates associated with power injection. Id. Petitioner’s assertion, however, is conclusory, and relies only on Mr. Tallarida’s declaration testimony, which merely repeats the conclusory statements in the Petition without citation to the asserted prior art references or any other evidence. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 139. Accordingly, his testimony has little, if any, probative value. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, neither the Petition nor Mr. Tallarida’s testimony explains how the Titanium Implanted Port would have been modified so as to be rated for power injection, nor do they point to any disclosure in Powers that would have suggested how such a modification would have been made. See Pet. 29; Ex. 1009 ¶ 139.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“First, we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not provide adequate reasoning based on rational underpinnings for why it would have been obvious in view of Powers to modify the Titanium Implanted Port of PORTS—which Petitioner does not allege can handle power injection—to be rated for power injection. See id. at 8–11. Although claim 1 does not require the recited port assembly actually be rated for power injection, modifying the Titanium Implanted Port to handle power injection is an important first step in Petitioner’s obviousness analysis. See Pet. 29. Specifically, as noted above, Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known the Titanium Implanted Port could be constructed to handle power injection by modifying it in view of Powers to handle higher pressures and flow rates associated with power injection. Id. Petitioner’s assertion, however, is conclusory, and relies only on Mr. Tallarida’s declaration testimony, which merely repeats the conclusory statements in the Petition without citation to the asserted prior art references or any other evidence. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 139. Accordingly, his testimony has little, if any, probative value. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, neither the Petition nor Mr. Tallarida’s testimony explains how the Titanium Implanted Port would have been modified so as to be rated for power injection, nor do they point to any disclosure in Powers that would have suggested how such a modification would have been made. See Pet. 29; Ex. 1009 ¶ 139.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner
“For substantially the same reasons discussed above with respect to the asserted obviousness ground based on PORTS, Powers, PowerPort, and Hickman, Petitioner has not provided adequate reasoning based on rational underpinnings for combining the references to arrive at the claimed invention. With regard to Meyer, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown Meyer cures the deficiencies of PORTS and Powers. See Prelim. Resp. 35–38. Petitioner alleges the alphanumeric cutouts in Meyer would be visible under X-ray examination, yet neither Meyer nor the cited paragraphs from Mr. Tallarida’s declaration testimony sufficiently support such a statement. See Pet. 50–51 (citing Ex. 1006; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 227–31). Moreover, even if the collar in Meyer can be considered a flange, it is not a flange of anything resembling a venous access port. Petitioner has not shown adequately that Meyer, which discloses collars for containers, is “from the same field of endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem” addressed by the inventors of the ’160 patent in developing the recited venous access port, as required to be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see Ex. 1006, 3 (summary). Therefore, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Meyer “emphasize[s]” the obviousness of including X-ray discernable indicia in the form of voids in the flange of the Titanium Implanted Port of PORTS. See Pet. 53.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“E. Real Party-in-Interest Patent Owner alleges in its Preliminary Response that the Petition should have named Bard Access Systems, Inc. as a real party-in-interest in addition to C.R. Bard, Inc. Prelim. Resp. 54–59. In view of our determination that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,852,160
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.