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  • PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15

    § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 12,119,463
  • PTAB · May 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01178 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Bio-Rad’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because the petition relied on Saxonov material not shown to be prior art and could not be supplemented on rehearing.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Such an approach is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s statements that in an inter partes review, “the petitioner is master of its complaint,” and “the petition [is] the centerpiece of the proceeding.” SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 363, 369 (2020). “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). In contravention of these principles, Petitioner’s approach improperly shifts the onus to Patent Owner or the Board to identify and parse out erroneous, and purportedly non-essential, citations to Saxonov and piece together an argument based on the remaining citations. As we stated in the Decision, we decline to assume this task. See Dec. 20. Finally, in the Request, Petitioner attempts to “show[] how Ground 6 is fully supported by undisputed prior art material.” Req. 6. This attempt is improper. Petitioner cannot use the Request as a means to supplement the Petition to identify purportedly essential citations and disavow erroneous or non-essential citations.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “In the Decision, we determined that Petitioner had not shown that all of the portions of Saxonov that Petitioner relied on in its unpatentability arguments qualify as prior art to the challenged claims. See Dec. 17–24. On this basis, we found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’170 patent.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,770,170
  • PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01360 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Cargill’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1, 6–9, and 11–24 because the petition did not show a reason to combine the selected prior-art data without hindsight.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Upon request for rehearing, we assess a decision on institution “for an abuse of discretion” (37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2020)), which occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law,” “clearly erroneous factual findings,” or “a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2020). The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence. We have reviewed Petitioner’s Rehearing Request and carefully considered all the arguments presented. For the following reasons, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “As discussed in the Decision, “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). No matter the result of combining the allegedly “readily available and well-known” information taken from particular examples from the “documentary evidence” with Petrauskaite’s disclosure, a POSITA had to have been motivated to do so at the time the invention was made.1 What is missing from the Petition is the “why.” The only motivating force in this case appears to be hindsight spurring Petitioner on to choose particular examples of palm stearin disclosed in Deffense and the soybean oil in Neff in order to justify its assertion that Petrauskaite discloses the claimed wt% ranges of triglyceride classes.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). No matter the result of combining the allegedly “readily available and well-known” information taken from particular examples from the “documentary evidence” with Petrauskaite’s disclosure, a POSITA had to have been motivated to do so at the time the invention was made.1 What is missing from the Petition is the “why.” The only motivating force in this case appears to be hindsight spurring Petitioner on to choose particular examples of palm stearin disclosed in Deffense and the soybean oil in Neff in order to justify its assertion that Petrauskaite discloses the claimed wt% ranges of triglyceride classes.” slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner’s. We find no instance in the Petition in which “motivation” and “iodine value” are discussed together or linked in any way. The same can be said of Dr. Marangoni’s declaration. And, as noted in the Decision, it was not until the Preliminary Reply that Petitioner argued that specific data on fatty acid wt% used for the conversion calculations were selected to represent “knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art” due to similarity of the iodine value (“IV”) of the palm stearin (and soybean oil) disclosed in Petrauskaite. See Prelim. Reply 2–3. New evidence or argument in the Preliminary Reply that could have presented earlier is not permitted. On this record, we find Petitioner relies its Rehearing Request on arguments about a motivation to combine, stemming from the significance of iodine values, that were not raised in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to support that the Decision misapprehended or overlooked arguments in the Petition about the significance of iodine values.” slip op. at 8

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,645,473
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01360 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6–9, and 11–24 were unpatentable as obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “institute review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and the associated evidence, we determine that Petitioner does not meet the reasonable likelihood standard, and we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “For purposes of this institution decision, and based on the present record including the disclosure in the ʼ473 patent, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, consistent with pre-AIA section 103(a). See Pet. 9–10. We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ473 patent and the prior art of record. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner proposes constructions for several terms, all such constructions based on statements in the ’473 patent. See Pet. 10–12. Patent Owner presents no claim construction issues. Prelim. Resp. 8 n.3. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner’s representation of the problem as merely converting Petrauskaite’s disclosed mol% of triglycerides into wt% of triglycerides with simple calculations represents a form of prohibited reliance on hindsight. See Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (hindsight to use the invention to define the problem the invention solves); see also Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (”Defining the problem in terms of its solution reveals improper hindsight in the selection of the prior art relevant to obviousness.”). “[W]hen someone is presented with the identical problem and told to make the patented invention, it often becomes virtually certain that the artisan will succeed in making the invention.” Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377. Here, Petitioner urges that one of ordinary skill in the art need merely convert mol% of triglycerides in a specific fat blend into wt% of triglycerides in the specific fat blend. See Pet. 14–15 (“[T]he wt% of Petrauskaite’s fat blends can easily be calculated based on the generally available prior art knowledge of fatty acid compositions of palm stearin and soybean oil.”). Petitioner’s reasoning says no more than that a skilled artisan, once presented with Petrauskaite and prior art knowledge, “would have understood that they could be combined, but that is not enough.” PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (that two references could be combined does not imply a motivation to pick out those two references and combine them to arrive at the claimed invention). Our reviewing court instructs that indicating that a skilled artisan could have made modifications to arrive at the claimed invention does not establish that a person of ordinary skill would have made such modifications. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” (citing InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Communications, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner attempts to check the “would have been motivated to modify Petrauskaite” box with testimony from its declarant, Dr. Maragoni. See Pet. 37–38. Such testimony includes [C]ombining such prior art elements according to known methods would have yielded nothing more than predictable results. A POSITA would naturally have turned to these references to understand Petrauskaite’s references better. Ex. 1003 ¶ 178. [T]he corresponding wt% of Petrauskaite’s fat blends] was readily-available and well-known in the art. Id. at ¶ 181. [T]he available information [on characterizations of oils and fats] is voluminous. Id. at ¶ 182. See Pet. 38. We find that such testimony fails to explain why the skilled artisan would have been motivated, without hindsight, to take the steps to reproduce the claimed invention, and to be conclusory, at best. On this record, we detect the taint of impermissible hindsight bias in” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,645,473
  • PTAB · Mar 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01435 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

    Institution was denied for claims 6–10 and 21 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Portelli or Meadors rendered the claims obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we find that the ’222 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and the ’222 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededOther

      “Petitioner argues that “the challenged claims are invalid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 5. Petitioner further contends that “[t]he scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of certain claim terms must at least encompass the disclosure and accompanying illustrations in the ’222 patent.” Id. at 6 (citing no legal support for its proposition). Petitioner also refers to how Patent Owner applied certain “terms” and “other features to Petitioner’s product” in its district court complaint against Petitioner. See id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1007, 7–8; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 53–57). Patent Owner does not address claim construction and does not dispute the meaning of any claim term in regard to Petitioner’s contentions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, in view of the issues we address below, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms and further determine that it is not necessary to address the express interpretation of any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Figure 13 of Portelli, however, does not show the profile of an article prior to a method step of impinging to further shape it, but instead shows “a schematic sectional view of the edge of the tray . . . after it has been deformed out of the wrap path in accordance with the invention [of Portelli].” Ex. 1004, 8:11–13 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to show any method taught by Portelli that further alters the configuration of the profile of the tray shown in Figure 13 of Portelli by, for example, an additional method step of impingement.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,562,222
  • PTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01178 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Bio-Rad did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable, as relied-upon Saxonov disclosures were not shown to qualify as prior art.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

      “benefit of its provisional application’s filing date for pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior art purposes when two conditions are met: (1) the provisional provides sufficient support for at least one claim in the reference patent or published patent application; and (2) the provisional application provide sufficient support for the subject matter relied upon for prior art purposes in the reference patent or application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1377, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MPEP §§ 2136 (I), 2136.03 (III), 2136 (Examples 2, 4, 7); see, e.g., Google LLC v. Ikorongo Tech, LLC, IPR 2021-00058, Paper 14 at 10–12 (PTAB May 10, 2021). The burden of production is on the Petitioner to show in its Petition that the asserted references qualify as prior art. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (explaining that a petitioner bears the initial burden of production to establish that the asserted references qualify as prior art).” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

      “Each of the remaining grounds asserted in the Petition relies on Saxonov to reach a number of limitations of independent claim 1 and the challenged dependent claims. Because Petitioner has not shown that all of the relied-upon portions of Saxonov are prior art to the ’170 patent, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’170 patent in any of the remaining grounds.” slip op. at 24

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

      “Because we deny institution upon consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, Patent Owner’s argument that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution is moot.” slip op. at 25

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,770,170
  • PTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01177 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

    Institution was denied for claims 1–9 because Bio-Rad did not show a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on any ground relying on Saxonov, which was not established as prior art.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 26. Because Petitioner’s uncontested definition of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’051 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner has identified certain claim terms for which it has proposed constructions in a parallel proceeding. Pet. 27–29. Petitioner notes that it has that “[o]ther terms, as used herein, are consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments and positions in the parallel proceeding,” without identifying those terms. Id. at 28. Patent Owner requests that the Board adopt Patent Owner’s proposed constructions from the parallel proceeding for certain claim terms. PO Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Neither party provides a discussion for their proposed constructions. In any event, for purposes of this Decision, we determine there is no need to expressly construe any claim term, as the parties appear to agree to the ordinary and customary meaning of the identified terms.” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

      “benefit of its provisional application’s filing date for pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior art purposes when two conditions are met: (1) the provisional provides sufficient support for at least one claim in the reference patent or published patent application; and (2) the provisional application provides sufficient support for the subject matter relied upon for prior art purposes in the reference patent or application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1377, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MPEP §§ 2136 (I), 2136.03 (III), 2136 (Examples 2, 4, 7); see, e.g., Google LLC v. Ikorongo Tech, LLC, IPR2021-00058, Paper 14 at 10–12 (PTAB May 10, 2021). The burden of production is on the Petitioner to show in its Petition that the asserted references qualify as prior art. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (explaining that a petitioner bears the initial burden of production to establish that the asserted references qualify as prior art).” slip op. at 18

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “explains how each of the relied-upon disclosures in Saxonov Figures 9 and 10, and Saxonov paragraphs 17, 18, 37, 76, and 79, which are not present in the ’013 provisional, are supported by the ’013 provisional, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that those cited portions of Saxonov are entitled to the priority date of the ’013 provisional. Accordingly, on this record, we determine that those relied-upon portions of Saxonov do not qualify as prior art to the ’051 patent.” slip op. at 24

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,068,051
  • PTAB · Jan 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01138 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the single claim would have been obvious over any of the four asserted reference combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “After considering the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in challenging the patentability of the ’151 patent’s claim. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner submits that a designer of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in Industrial Design, Mechanical Engineering, or related field and approximately 5 years of professional experience in the field designing consumer products.” Pet. 42 (citing Fletcher Decl. ¶ 48). Petitioner adds that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed definition. Prelim. Resp. 19. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposal regarding a designer of ordinary skill in the art. See Fletcher Decl. ¶ 48; Rake Decl. ¶ 29.” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “and Petitioner’s failure to persuasively explain why the particular proportion depicted in the ’151 patent is preferable to any other, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that this proportion is primarily functional and should not be considered as part of the ornamental design. See, e.g., LA Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“When there are several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose.”). Moreover, we agree with Patent Owner that the differences in proportion between Neutrogena and the claimed design contribute significantly to the overall visual impression of the design. See Prelim. Resp. 28 (“[T]he two designs considered as a whole present dramatically different visual appearances.”), 33–36 (“To get from the Neutrogena jar design . . . to the design of the D ‘151 patent would require entirely changing the proportions of the jar—from a short neck with a tall base to a tall neck with a short base . . . .”). For example, Patent Owner creates an image showing that simply changing the height of the Neutrogena jar neck to have the same neck-height to base-height ratio as the ’151 patent without changing the other dimensions of the jar would yield a “ridiculous result.” Id. at 37. We agree that the two images, reproduced below, do not convey the same overall visual impression. This figure contains two images side by side. On the left is a side view drawing of the claimed jar. On the right is a front side image of the Neutrogena jar with the image manipulated to show a neck to base proportion equivalent to that of the claimed jar drawing. Prelim. Resp. 38. The images above show a figure from the ’151 patent, above left, and Patent Owner’s created image of Neutrogena, above right, with only the neck height modified to match the proportion of neck to base height shown in the ’151 patent. Although we do not necessarily agree with Patent Owner’s assertion that the created Neutrogena image represents the proposed combination asserted in the Petition, or that the modified image created by Patent Owner is accurate, we do agree with Patent Owner that the image of the modified Neutrogena jar illustrates that the proportion of neck height to base height contributes to ornamental aspects of the claimed jar and significantly affects the overall visual impression.” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We find these aspects of the design significantly affect the overall visual impression of an otherwise simple design, particularly in an otherwise crowded art. Petitioner addresses these differences by stating that a designer of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that different degrees of radius for the concave bottom surface would be a design choice for volume and accessibility to the contents, especially together with the radiused transition between the sidewall and bottom surface.” Pet. 56 (citing Fletcher Decl. ¶ 98). However, the present record does not support a finding that, even though other interior compartment shapes and depths are available, functionality dictates a certain shape and depth. Petitioner cites no other prior art that shows an interior compartment with a shape and depth equivalent to that shown in the ’151 patent. See Pet. 28–29 (showing annotated versions of Huang’s drawings, which do not clearly show the shape or depth of the interior compartment), 63 (proposing to modify Huang’s two chamber interior compartment with that of Canamasas Puigbo), 85–88 (showing the McKernan Jar drawings, which do not indicate the shape or depth of the interior compartment); Ex. 2002, 13 (explaining that the interior of Zamberlan is different in shape and depth than the claimed design). We are not persuaded to the contrary by Petitioner’s expert testimony. Mr. Fletcher testifies that Canamasas Puigbo “explicitly discloses a concave bottom surface in an article having more visually similar design, which would provide ample motivation to incorporate the feature.” Fletcher Decl. ¶ 98 (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Fletcher appears to agree that the shape of the Canamasas Puigbo’s internal compartment is noticeably different than that of the ’151 patent. Mr. Fletcher does not address why a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have overlooked these differences or found them so minimal as to not affect the overall impression of the resulting modified jar. For example, Mr. Fletcher does not support this conclusion with any objective evidence, such as pointing to other prior art with an interior compartment the same shape and depth as that of the ’151 patent. Nor does Mr. Fletcher otherwise explain why a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have chosen to use the particular shape and depth claimed by the ’151 patent as opposed to all other possible configurations. See, id. ¶¶ 83–101. Moreover, as noted above, “expert testimony cannot take the place of disclosure from patents or printed publications.” 2019 Trial Practice Guide at 36. Accordingly, even after combining the visual features of Neutrogena and Canamasas Puigbo as proposed by Petitioner, the record evidence does not support Petitioner’s assertion that a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to modify Neutrogena such that its internal compartment is the same shape and depth as claimed by the ’151 patent.” slip op. at 32

    § 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  • PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00976 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because BOE did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–3 under any of its three obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

      “We have authority to institute an inter partes review where a petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). For reasons that follow, Petitioner does not meet that evidentiary threshold. We decline to reach the issues raised in the Reply or Sur-reply, which relate to Patent Owner’s alternative argument that a discretionary denial of the Petition is warranted.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 26. Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art” as “set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition (Pet. 26) because, on this record, it is consistent with the specification. We take note that neither party indicated that the result would change under any different definition.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner discusses the terms a “data line having a broad-width portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 1, as well as a “data line having a broad portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 2. Petitioner cites the ’079 patent for “offering a lexicographic definition of the term ‘broad width’” to support the plain meaning interpretation of the terms “‘broad-width portion’ and ‘broad portion’ as a portion that is broader than another portion of the subject element.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not provide arguments directed specifically to Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Taking account of the information presented, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. Compare Pet. 16 (addressing issues of claim construction, citing the ’079 patent for supporting the plain and ordinary meaning of “broad-width portion” and “broad portion” without demonstrating that an express construction is necessary to resolve whether to institute review), with Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (addressing the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, without asserting an express claim construction). To the extent that the scope of any claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in the following analysis of the challenges.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Id. (emphasis added). Sato ¶ 26 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “data lines composed of an Al film.” Id. Importantly, Petitioner does not connect Sato’s disclosure, relating to benefits associated with a data line arrangement, to any particular arrangement of scan lines. Sato ¶ 28 is equally deficient. Sato ¶ 28 also discusses benefits of utilizing a specific “arrangement,” namely, “capacitance lines formed of [a] metal film.” Id. ¶ 28. [0028] With this arrangement, the provision of the function as the shading layer with the capacitance lines formed of the metal film, the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as the wiring, as well as the provision of the function as the light absorption layer with the capacitance electrodes formed of the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as electrodes, prevents the laminated structure from becoming complex by additionally forming a dedicated shading layer and a dedicated light absorption layer. Accordingly, this arrangement is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof. Id. (emphasis added). Here again, Sato ¶ 28 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “capacitance lines formed of metal film.” Id. Petitioner does not bridge the gap in its rationale to combine by attempting to explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have extrapolated benefits, pertaining to an arrangement of capacitance lines, to a similar arrangement of scan lines. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Flasck, provides no further insight as to how or why Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 would have been understood to apply to scan lines. Dr. Flasck’s comments on Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 merely repeat, nearly verbatim, the Petition’s conclusory contentions. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 139 (Dr. Flasck declaring “Sato specifically teaches that its device ‘is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof.’”); Pet. 37. Dr. Flasck does not cite to any additional supporting evidence other than Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,502,079
  • PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00977 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 7–13 and 15–20 unpatentable on any asserted ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing semiconductor display devices, including LCD displays.” Pet. 19. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Id. On the record presented, Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any particular proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’606 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute review without resolving the construction of any claim terms. Accordingly, we need not and do not construe any terms expressly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “view. First, as Petitioner admits, data line 6a is not connected to image signal line 101d and line 109 other than when sample hold circuit 101c connects them due to shift register 101b outputting an enabling signal. Pet. 49. This is supported by the layout of the four elements in Fujikawa’s Figure 2. Ex. 1005, Fig. 2 (depicting sample hold circuits 101c between and connecting data lines 6a and signal lines 101d). In addition, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. E. Fred Schubert, testifies that “two separate lines straddling circuitry are [not] one line.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. The dispute between the parties on this issue is largely one of claim construction: should the term “wiring line” in claim 7 be construed broadly enough to encompass a collection of lines separated by a sample hold circuit? In order to determine that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the recited wiring lines, we would need to answer this question in the affirmative. Yet, as discussed above, neither party proposes construing “wiring line,” or any other term used in the claims of the ’606 patent. Pet. 18; Prelim. Resp. 7. The failure to argue for and sufficiently support a broad construction of the term “wiring line” means that Petitioner does not show sufficiently, for purposes of supporting institution of review, that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the “wiring line” limitation of claim 7. b) Conclusion Regarding Claim 7 Based on the record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 7 is unpatentable as anticipated by or obvious in view of Fujikawa.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,557,606
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