• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-01055 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’326 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’326 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, which is supported with testimony of Dr. Easttom (Ex. 1004 ¶ 22–23), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Claim 1 explicitly recites “partially,” not “fully” or “completely.” On its face, “partially” appears to have its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., not completely. The use of “partially” in the subject limitation shows or at least strongly suggests that the claimed invention contemplates at least some frequency gap to remain between the first channel and the second channel. In addition, as argued persuasively by Patent Owner, this interpretation is further supported by claim 1’s requirement of “transmitting data subcarriers occupying the first channel, the second channel, and the frequency gap in parallel to a receiver”: [T]he “transmitting” step in claim 1 requires that the frequency gap be included in the transmitted signal. Inclusion of the frequency gap in the transmitted signal necessarily requires that the frequency gap be only partially filled -- but not fully filled -- with added data subcarriers at the time of transmission, because if the frequency gap were fully filled it would no longer exist at the time of signal transmission. Prelim. Resp. 23. Petitioner offers no explanation for how the language of claim 1 itself would allow for “partially” to encompass “completely.”” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For all but one sentence of Petitioner’s arguments for how each of the subject combinations allegedly would have taught the Partially Filling Limitation as variously recited in claims 1, 16, and 18, Petitioner relies (implicitly) on a construction of “partially” that allows for completely filling the frequency gap between the first channel and the second channel, and alleges that the asserted combinations teach completely filling such gap. See Pet. 26–28 (Gardner and Mori), 64–67 (Mori, Lu, and Williams); Prelim. Resp. 25–29, 38–40 (Patent Owner agreeing that the asserted combinations teach only completely or fully filling the frequency gap.). We reject such a construction of “partially” as discussed above in Section III.C.2, and thus find Petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,027,326
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00931 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1–27 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would be unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’844 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “critical time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Newman, states that for his analysis he uses the definition provided by Dr. Zadok. Ex. 2014 ¶ 13. We discern no meaningful difference between the definitions proffered by Petitioner or its Declarant. Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’844 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Dr. Zadok’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan (Ex. 1003 ¶ 35), which is adopted by Dr. Newman (Ex. 2014 ¶ 13) and is consistent with the asserted prior art references, we apply the level of skill set forth by Dr. Zadok.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner contends “that the challenged claims are obvious under any reasonable interpretation under the Phillips standard, and thus Petitioners submit that the Board need not resolve any express constructions.” Pet. 11 Patent Owner asserts “the Board should resolve this IPR under the plain-and ordinary-meaning standard without adopting any special constructions beyond what is necessary to address a concrete dispute.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Based on our review of the current record, we agree with parties that no express construction of any term is necessary to resolve this case.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to offer sufficient explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Sapuntzakis and Holzmann. Rather, Petitioner appears to argue that, based on the advantages described by Holzmann (Ex. 1007 ¶ 33), and using well-known techniques with unspecified predictable results, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to combine these disparate elements taught in the prior art references to render the challenged claims obvious. Pet. 23–24, 33. Yet, other than Petitioner’s cursory assertion of advantageously incorporating the memory module from Holzmann to provide a caching mechanism (Pet. 33), which cites equally cursory and unsupported testimony by Dr. Zadok (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 329, 333, 336–355), Petitioner fails to identify what particular advantages or efficiencies would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Holzmann’s memory module with Sapuntzakis’s system.” slip op. at 29

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,332,844
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00782 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’469 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that: [A] POSITA would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, business information systems, software engineering, or systems engineering and at least two years of experience in computer networking or telecommunications. Ex.1002 ¶21; see also Ex.1001 (1:14-31). Additional education could substitute for professional experience. Ex.1002 ¶21. Significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Ex.1002 ¶21. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner states that it “do[es] not believe explicit construction is required to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner proposes constructions for “Internet,” “access the Internet,” “subscriber access website.” Prelim. Resp. 12–15. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. D. Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 10, 11, and 24–28 by Bruner and” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “We find Patent Owner’s argument to be persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately how Bruner discloses the positional requirement of a subscriber access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and the router. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently for purposes of institution that Bruner anticipates independent claim 24. Although, for the obviousness challenge, Petitioner contends that Clark discloses a wireless router (for limitation 24c), Petitioner relies solely on Bruner for the “between” limitation. See Pet. 17 (“Bruner and/or Bruner in view of Clark both disclose each limitation of claim 24c, including a router (e.g., Bruner’s ‘ADS’ and Clark’s ‘wireless router’)”); id. at 18–19 (the discussion of the “between” limitation 24d asserting that “Bruner discloses claim 24d,” with no mention of Clark). Furthermore, Petitioner merely asserts that both Bruner and Clark disclose a router. See id. at 17–18. Petitioner, however, does not indicate clearly which is used in the proposed combination, does not describe the configuration of a proposed combination or a proposed modification of Bruner’s system, and fails to set forth an adequate and persuasive reason with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bruner’s system to arrive at the positional requirement of the subscription access unit being coupled between the satellite dish and a router. See id. at 13–14 (motivation section for this ground); id. at 18–19 (addressing the “between” limitation 24d). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to independent claim 24 as obvious over Bruner in view of Clark.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,324,469
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00786 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was obvious over either asserted combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’785 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) relevant to this patent at the time of its invention would’ve had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related technical field, combined with approximately two years of practical experience in fields of networking such as network virtualization, security, or management. Additional professional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 33–35). Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. However, Patent Owner’s proffered declarant, Dr. Noubir, opines that “a person of ordinary skill in the art in March 2003 would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering, and would have one or two years of experience in computer networking or equivalent educational and professional experience.” Ex. 2008 ¶ 53. We discern no material difference between the two definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to apply Patent Owner’s witness’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “name.” See Pet. 11–16 (claim construction section). Patent Owner asserts that “a person of ordinary skill would read ‘a domain name’ in its ordinary networking sense: an ASCII string label used with the Domain Name System (DNS) to resolve to an IP address.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:47–48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 37). This is consistent with the Specification, which explains: Users and software applications do not always refer to hosts or other resources by their numerical IP address. Instead of using numbers, they use ASCII strings called domain names. The Internet uses a Domain Name System (DNS) to convert a domain name to an IP address. Ex. 1001, 1:45–50. According to the Patent Owner, the network in the Specification of the ’785 patent is defined by the domain name X.VCN. Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:18–19, 9:28–31). Patent Owner further contends that “[t]he use of a domain name to define the virtual network in the ‘785 Patent’s claims provides more than an identifier of the virtual network or even a plain language identification of an IP address – it signifies a hierarchical structure for the virtual network that enables [certain functions].” Prelim. Resp. 33–34 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 83–84; Ex. 1001, 14:29–38).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner, however, that Petitioner has not explained adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have further modified the Caronni-I/Caronni-II combination to have DNS capability or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the three references to have a system that returned the three specific addresses recited in the challenged independent claims. Rather than explaining the “why,” the Petition’s motivation argument focuses on the purported capabilities of the resulting combination and implying, but not explicitly stating, that the combination results in the claimed subject matter; this indicates impermissible hindsight. See, e.g., id. at 29 (“This integration would leverage Hipp’s DNS capability for virtual hostnames to return multiple address records from a single query, aligning with the dual addressing requirements of hybrid virtual/physical networks. The combination creates a cohesive system where DNS resolution triggers context-aware routing decisions—using virtual addresses for internal Supernet traffic and NAT-translated addresses for cross-boundary communication.”). We determine that Petitioner has failed to set forth an adequate and persuasive reason with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the three references’ teachings to arrive at the claimed subject matter where the three recited addresses are returned in response to a DNS request.” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,949,785
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00785 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–14 were unpatentable over either asserted § 103 combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenDenied

    “Petitioner’s single-reference allegations do not align with its two “combination” challenges identified above. As for its “combination” allegations, Petitioner does not identify, for example: (1) which limitations in claim 1 are missing in any of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski; (2) which aspects of any of these references requires modification to achieve the invention of claim 1; (3) which specific reference Petitioner posits to teach any such missing limitation in another reference or as the basis to modify a specific feature in a given reference; or (4) a rational reason as to why the skilled artisan would have combined particular teachings from one of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski with particular teachings of another such reference to achieve the invention of claim 1 as a whole.5 Instead, Petitioner improperly punts its burden to define its obviousness challenges to the Board (and Patent Owner). See, e.g., Pet. 38 (“To the extent the Board disagrees that [any particular] limitation is disclosed by the Chow/Reiffin combination 4 See, e.g., Pet. 16, 19 (“Thus, Chow and Reiffin both disclose or suggest claim [1b].” “Therefore, claim 1 was obvious over Chow and Reiffin separately and over their combination.”); see also id. at 12–19, 37–42. 5 Petitioner argues that the skilled artisan would have combined Reiffin with Chow for “increased computational power and the ability to solve larger problems.” Pet. 11. These generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Chow and Reiffin (and Kurowski) lack rational underpinning, particularly because Petitioner does not even identify which teachings of which references are being combined to achieve any particular limitation in claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 40 (“[Petitioner’s] ‘spaghetti on the wall’ approach fails [to] explain how Petitioners’ purported motivation for combining Chow and Reiffin fits with each of the at least 64 different possibilities for combining Chow and Reiffin.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “and quotes various passages in Chow. Pet. 13–14. For example, Petitioner identifies that, under “Description of the Related Art,” Chow states: “Typically, workload is apportioned by somehow logically dividing the data to be processed. For example, a block of data might be divided evenly into a number of parts equal to the number of available threads, so that each thread can independently process a separate portion of the data. This is called ‘static’ or ‘a priori’ partitioning.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:38–42; Ex. 1022 ¶ 144). Petitioner also identifies that Chow describes “aggregate tasks” divisible into “multiple sub-tasks,” and “multiple task execution units are independently operated on-demand to sequentially self-allocate and execute sub-tasks of the aggregate task.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:66–2:15). After presenting such quoted passages from Chow, Petitioner proffers the conclusion that Chow discloses the Partitioning Limitation, but does so without sufficiently explaining why such passages allegedly teach or suggest the features of the Partitioning Limitation not only within the context of claim 1 as a whole, but given that Chow itself disparages such “static” or “a priori” partitioning as posing “a significant problem” (Ex. 1003, 1:52–58). Patent Owner persuasively responds (and we agree for the same” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “combination” challenges identified above. As for its “combination” allegations, Petitioner does not identify, for example: (1) which limitations in claim 1 are missing in any of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski; (2) which aspects of any of these references requires modification to achieve the invention of claim 1; (3) which specific reference Petitioner posits to teach any such missing limitation in another reference or as the basis to modify a specific feature in a given reference; or (4) a rational reason as to why the skilled artisan would have combined particular teachings from one of Chow, Reiffin, and Kurowski with particular teachings of another such reference to achieve the invention of claim 1 as a whole.5 Instead, Petitioner improperly punts its burden to define its obviousness challenges to the Board (and Patent Owner). See, e.g., Pet. 38 (“To the extent the Board disagrees that [any particular] limitation is disclosed by the Chow/Reiffin combination 4 See, e.g., Pet. 16, 19 (“Thus, Chow and Reiffin both disclose or suggest claim [1b].” “Therefore, claim 1 was obvious over Chow and Reiffin separately and over their combination.”); see also id. at 12–19, 37–42. 5 Petitioner argues that the skilled artisan would have combined Reiffin with Chow for “increased computational power and the ability to solve larger problems.” Pet. 11. These generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Chow and Reiffin (and Kurowski) lack rational underpinning, particularly because Petitioner does not even identify which teachings of which references are being combined to achieve any particular limitation in claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 40 (“[Petitioner’s] ‘spaghetti on the wall’ approach fails [to] explain how Petitioners’ purported motivation for combining Chow and Reiffin fits with each of the at least 64 different possibilities for combining Chow and Reiffin.”). slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,257,582
• American Airlines, Inc. / Southwest Airlines Co. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00987 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any of claims 1–37 was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that any one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’722 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’722 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed definition of the skilled artisan, which is supported with testimony of Dr. Easttom (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner submits a proposed construction for the term “activation module” implicated in dependent claims 17–19, 23–25, 29–31, and 35–37. Pet. 10–12. Petitioner otherwise argues, “[n]o express construction of the other challenged claims is necessary in this IPR because the prior art renders these claims obvious under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner argues that “the Board should apply the plain and ordinary meaning to all challenged claim terms under the Phillips standard.” Prelim. Resp. 9. We find that no express construction of any term is necessary to resolve this case.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “generic “reasons” to combine the alleged teachings of Lawson and Choquier lack rational underpinning, particularly for the specific and substantial modifications of Lawson necessary to reach the subject Mapping Limitation, and are beset with impermissible hindsight. The Board must “recognize that we cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.” Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to arrive at the claimed invention, we are left with only hindsight bias that KSR warns against.”); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (2007) (“A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.”). “Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1313–14 (CCPA 1971). In this case, Petitioner does not show sufficiently how or why an alleged desire to “increase efficiency, redundancy, and scalability of Lawson’s routing network” would have led the ordinarily skilled artisan specifically to the subject Mapping Limitation, but for using claim 1 as a roadmap. Indeed, as Patent Owner persuasively argues: The Petition fails to tie these generic design goals to the specific functionality that the Petition seeks to cherry-pick from Choquier and import into Lawson. Put another way, the Petition does not explain what about Choquier’s scalability, load balancing and redundancy techniques would have motivated [the skilled artisan] to have configured Lawson’s servers to “determine which server groups (node types) should receive an event update based on this server groups to event producer mapping.” Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Petitioner never identifies how Lawson’s registries of servers/consumers become the claimed gateway-kept category→node-type mapping (EX1005, 10:63–67; 12:36–43). Nor does Petitioner show that Choquier’s service map—not keyed by message category and used for CPU-based server selection—somehow supplies the missing category→node-type routing rule that controls update-message traffic through routing nodes (EX1007, 11:2–22; 12:33–36; 12:56–61). To the contrary, Choquier’s update path increases processing by replicating each update to every server in the service group (EX1007, 21:27–50), which is the opposite of the claim’s mapping-based control that limits which nodes must process a given update. Id. at 30–31. We find this context shows that Petitioner’s reasons for combining Lawson and Choquier (and Tsutsumitake) to achieve the subject Mapping Limitation lack rational underpinning, and that Petitioner’s proposed combination of teachings is based on impermissible hindsight.” slip op. at 27

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,407,722
• Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00573 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7 or 11 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’772 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’772 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) pertaining to the ’772 patent “would have had an educational background of, engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately three years of experience with electronic payment systems, vending machine technologies, or distributed network systems.” Pet. 19–20; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–26. “Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. generally. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’772 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In this inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We do not need to construe any terms expressly to determine whether or not to institute a trial. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,481,772
• Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00144 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because neither obviousness ground showed a reasonable likelihood of establishing claims 1–20 were unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “III. CONCLUSION The Petition fails to show there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Accordingly, we deny the Petition. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “claim 15). We agree that the Specification supports Patent Owner’s construction. Although Petitioner bases its construction on extrinsic evidence, Petitioner argues that its construction “is consistent with” the intrinsic evidence, which, according to Petitioner, “indicates a sole is optional.” Pet. 31. A sole is optional, Petitioner argues, because the Abstract of the ’511 patent states that “[t]he footwear may include an upper and a sole structure.” Pet. 31 (quoting Ex. 1001, Abstr. (Petitioner’s emphasis)). We are not persuaded. Petitioner reads too much into the sentence it quotes from the Abstract and its use of the word “may.” Indeed, by Petitioner’s logic, both the upper and the sole structure would be optional and footwear would lack any required structure. Petitioner also argues that “[o]ther intrinsic evidence” supports its construction. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1053, 4:55–58; Ex. 1002 ¶92). The alleged intrinsic evidence, however, is an unrelated patent, US 2,675,631, which purportedly was cited during the prosecution of the ’511 patent. Id. This argument is undeveloped by Petitioner. First, Petitioner fails to substantiate that US 2,675,631 is cited in the prosecution history, merely asserting it as fact without pointing to supporting evidence. See id. (no citation to the prosecution history provided). Further, even assuming US 2,675,631 is cited in the prosecution history of the ’511 patent and thus part of the intrinsic evidence,8 Petitioner fails to show that it is probative of 8 The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the ‘intrinsic evidence,’ consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (emphasis added). what the inventors of the ’511 patent meant by “article of footwear.” Petitioner points out that the inventor of US 2,675,631 considers “knitted footwear” as encompassing “hose, golf hose, three-quarter hose, half-hose and socks” but does not explain why such meaning should be incorporated into the ’511 patent. Ex. 1053, 4:55–58 (partly quoted at Pet. 31–32). US 2,675,631 is titled “Footwear Article of The Slipper-Sock Type.” Ex. 1053, Title. As is evidently clear from the specifications of both patents, the ’511 patent and US 2,675,631 are directed to different types of footwear within the broader (dictionary) definition cited by Petitioner. Ex. 1022, 67, 88. Patent Owner also proffers testimony from Dr. Pastore that a person” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “We construe the preambles of claims 1 and 15 to be limiting, as guided by case law. It is clear that the preambles are being used to help define the invention, i.e., an upper for an article of footwear in the case of claim 1 and an article of footwear having an upper in the case of claim 15. See Bell Communications Research Inc. v. Vitalink Commcations Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it. In other words, when the claim drafter chooses to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the invention so defined, and not some other, is the 9 Claim 15 is similar to claim 1, and, in challenging claim 1, Petitioner merely refers back to and relies exclusively on its analysis for claim 1. See Pet. 84 (Ground 1), 124–125 (Ground 2). Thus, although we may we discuss claim 1 alone at times, our analysis applies equally to claim 15. one the patent protects.”). Moreover, the bodies of both claims recite “the upper” which, in the case of claim 1, derives its antecedent basis directly from the preamble and, in the case of claim 15, relies on the preamble’s article of footwear which is recited as comprising an upper. See Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, it is not enough that Clark discloses a sole. See KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”). Petitioner must show that it would have been obvious to modify Cusinato to include a sole. Id. (“[I]t can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”); see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). On this aspect, Petitioner fails. The Petition summarily states that “a POSITA would consider it obvious to add a sole to Cusinato’s ‘boot-like’ form” but – as noted by Patent Owner – the Petition does not explain why. Pet. 51; see Prelim. Resp. 35 (“The Petition is silent with respect to any alleged motivation.”). Dr. Adanur’s testimony does not add much. He summarily opines that “it would be obvious to add a sole to Cusinato’s ‘boot-like’ form to provide cushioning and protection.” Ex. 1002 ¶160.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,918,511
• New Balance Athletics, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00020 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 11–15 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of the instant Decision, “Nike applies New Balance’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Based on the record presented, we determine that Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the scope and content of the ’932 patent and the asserted prior art, and, at this stage, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner acknowledges that it agreed to the constructions identified by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 12. Patent Owner also notes that it agreed to these proposed constructions in the Related Litigation. Id. at 13. However, Patent Owner argues that for purposes of this Preliminary Response, “no terms require construction.” Id. (citing Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). Based on the record before us, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “limitation would have been obvious because one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Becker’s stiffer outer lining would have “restrict[ed] the mobility of the ankle, “not allow[ed] for tightening,” and known to “hav[e] the inner lining extend up above the outer lining.” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 122–123). Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert that it would have been obvious for “the skin layer [to be] absent from the ankle part of the knitted component,” as required by limitation [11.d]. The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Becker nor the other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation for “the skin layer being absent from the ankle part of the knitted component,” as claimed.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,898,932
• Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00151 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any of claims 1–27 unpatentable on the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’636 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “25:5 (limitation 1a1: “a portion of the knitted component defining the upper”). “Where a claim lists elements separately, ‘the clear implication of the claim language’ is that those elements are ‘distinct component[s]’ of the patented invention.” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original). Thus, the claim language suggests that the “integral knit tongue” is a component distinct, at least to some degree, from the “upper.” See also Ex. 1001, 2:27–28 (the Specification stating that “[a] knitted component including the upper and an integral knit tongue is incorporated into the article of footwear.”). Limitation 1d reinforces this understanding by requiring the tongue to be joined to a portion of the throat area of the upper. See id. at 6:35–38 (the Specification indicating that the “throat area” is an area of the upper); cf. Ex. 2014, 18–19 (defining “Throat”: “The main opening of a shoe extending from the vamp [(the front part of a shoe upper that covers the toes and part of the foot)] to the ankle.”). In addition to suggesting that the tongue is a component distinct from the upper, the claim language indicates that the integral knit tongue extends through a throat area. See Ex. 1001, 25:10–11 (limitation 1b: “an integral knit tongue . . . extending through a throat area of the knitted component”). With that context, we turn to the parties’ arguments.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “claim language does not specify it, both parties contend that the “portion of the knitted component” constitutes the majority of the upper. See Pet. 25– 26, 30 (Petitioner applying in this ground that which it characterizes as Patent Owner’s claim construction position); Prelim. Resp. 43 (Patent Owner noting that the Specification states that “a majority of upper 120 is formed from a knitted component 130,” and contending that limitation 1a1 means that “a majority of the upper must be knitted.” (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:57–59)). Nevertheless, we determine for the following reasons that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that central textile element 60 of Dua-956 defines an upper within the meaning of the claims. See Pet. 26. Petitioner contends that, “[w]ith respect to what defines the upper, the ’636 patent discloses that the ‘upper generally extends over the instep and toe areas of the foot, along the medial and lateral sides of the foot, under the foot, and around the heel area of the foot.’” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:44–46, 6:66–67). Petitioner reasons that, “[a]s such, the ’636 patent describes the upper as extending around six parts of the foot: (1) the instep area, (2) the toe area, (3) the medial side, (4) the lateral side, (5) under the foot, and (6) the heel area.” Id. Applying this reasoning to the reference, Petitioner contends that, “[o]f the six upper parts identified in the ’636 patent, only two of them—the medial and lateral sides—are not formed by the central textile element 60,” and therefor “the majority of the parts of the upper are formed by the central element 60.” Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 103–109). Petitioner provides an annotated versions of Figures 8B and 8C of Dua-956, reproduced below, to depict its contentions. Id. at 30. Above are Figures 8B and 8C of Dua-956—which are, respectively, perspective views depicting a second step and a third step in assembling the article of footwear (Ex. 1029, 3:41–45)—with central textile element 60 shaded green. As Petitioner concedes (Pet. 30) and as the annotated figures above show, central textile element 60 does not form the medial and lateral sides of the footwear. Thus, even if central textile element 60 constitutes the majority of parts of the upper, the sides of the upper remain undefined by the central textile element. Petitioner does not explain adequately how the upper is defined when the side components are missing. We determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated adequately for institution that Dua-956 discloses “a portion of the knitted component defining the upper,” as recited in independent claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner contends that “both upper 70 and 30' are constructed as a single, unitary knit element that defines the upper, and it would have been obvious to construct upper 30 in the same manner.” Pet. 65. Petitioner next turns to Horii, asserting that “Horii discloses “shoes 1 that are characterized by the fact that the entire upper is constructed of a single piece of upper member 2 that is made through weft knitting or circular knitting.’” Id. at 67 (citing Ex. 1017, 9) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner reasons that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to manufacture Dua-956’s upper 30, for example, using the multilayer, single fabric of Horii because Horii’s single-piece knit upper would have provided upper 30 with a seamless structure.” Id. at 68. We disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that “[c]onstructing Dua-956’s upper 30 as a single, unitary knit component would not materially change the analysis under Ground 1A.” Pet. 70. In Ground 1A, Petitioner contends that “‘forward portion 61’ of the central textile element 60 is an integral knit tongue that extends through a throat area of the knitted component in the assembled upper 30.” Id. at 34. During the assembly of footwear 10, forward portion 61 is flipped over the top of the footwear and the separate textile elements 40 and 50 (the sides of the footwear) are stitched to the lateral and medial edges (64a and 64b) of forward portion 61—the purported tongue. See Ex. 1029, 9:5–11, Figs. 8B, 8C. Petitioner does not explain adequately how, when modifying the embodiment used in Ground 1A to have a seamless top portion, the purported integral knit tongue is retained in that combination. See Pet. 70 (Petitioner asserting that the proposed combination would still have an exterior surface, an inner surface, lace elements 33, channels 44/54, and loops 35, “along with the other structures identified under Ground 1A,” but not specifically discussing the purported integral knit tongue.). We determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating that claims 1–6, 8–17, and 19–27 would have been obvious over Dua-596 alone or in combination with Horii.” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,510,636

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.