• Curio Bioscience, Inc. v. Prognosys Biosciences Inc. And 10x Genomics, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00237 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 17, 21, 23, 27, 28, or 30 were unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least 1 claim of the ’879 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Patent Owner does not contest the level of ordinary skill in the art set forth in the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 19. Because Petitioner’s unopposed definition is consistent with the ’879 patent and the prior art of record, we adopt that definition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579–80 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “In particular, we agree with Patent Owner that Cantor does not teach or suggest contacting a ‘tissue section’ with its beads, let alone that its beads could be contacted with a tissue section to identify spatial location. Prelim. Resp. 36–48. In this case, we are persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Cantor, sole inventor of Cantor (Ex. 2002 ¶ 29), that Cantor’s nucleic acid samples are made in bulk from the extraction of nucleic acids from a biological sample and mixed together “to create the sample nucleic acid prior to mixing that with the solid phase nucleic acids to capture molecule(s) from the sample nucleic acid.” Id. at ¶ 36 (citing EX.1031 1:5–6). More specifically, according to Dr. Cantor, “[f]or bulk-analysis methods, nucleic acids are extracted from the different types of cells within a tissue sample without preserving their spatial distribution.” Id. at ¶ 19. Dr. Cantor further explains that in bulk-analysis methods, the mixture is analyzed to determine if a particular nucleic acid was present in the tissue sample or not. They cannot, however, determine where the molecule was in the tissue sample. As such, bulk-analysis techniques provide no information about spatial location of biological molecules in tissue samples. This is in contrast to spatial analysis methods such as those claimed in the ’879 patent which can determine both if a biological molecule was present in a tissue sample and where the molecule was in the tissue sample. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. Although we recognize that Cantor discloses “providing the beads according to an (X,Y) array” (Pet. 24, 30–31 (citing to Dr. Puglisi, Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 133, 155, respectively), this disclosure makes no mention of using this array to map where the nucleic acids of Cantor came from relative to the original sample, let alone when that original sample is a tissue. See e.g. Ex. 1031, 17. The only mention of “tissue” made in Cantor is in reference to where the sample may be obtained, for example, “[t]he biological sample can be in any form, including without limitation a solid material such as a tissue.” Id. at 6. Cantor provides no teaching, however, regarding how to use a tissue sample with the probes and methods described in Cantor to identify where the target nucleic acids of Cantor were spatially located within the tissue section itself. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 142, 143 (Dr. Cantor testifying that (1) “a POSA would only be able to determine where on the array a target nucleic acid was captured, but not where in the original tissue section the nucleic acid came from,” because “all information about the spatial location of a target nucleic acid in a tissue sample is lost when the nucleic acid sample is prepared as Cantor teaches”; and (2) “Cantor [] does not teach or suggest contacting its solid supports (e.g. beads) with a tissue section and certainly not with its beads at known locations to obtain spatial information.”).” slip op. at 23

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “3. Discussion Petitioner challenges whether certain elements of independent claim 1 are supported by the’124 provisional and/or whether the ’879 patent’s priority chain is intact. Pet. 57–66. Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, however, we agree with Patent Owner’s written description analysis, summarized above, and find that (1) the’124 provisional provides adequate written description support for each of the challenged claim elements; (2) the ’879 patent’s priority chain is intact; and (3) the ’879 patent is therefore entitled to the priority date of April 5, 2010. Consequently, Frisen is not prior art to the challenged claims. Because Frisen is not prior art, we do not specifically comment on its teachings, nor the factual assertions regarding its teachings provided by Petitioner or Patent Owner. 4. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of showing that Frisen anticipates any of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 17, 21, 23, 27, 28, and 30.” slip op. at 32

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,001,879
• Tesla, Inc. v. The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy (Intellectual Ventures II LLC)Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00341 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Tesla had not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Having considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply, as well as the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’743 patent. We accordingly do not institute inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the areas of networking and distributed computing that are pertinent to the ’743 patent,” would “have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately 2-3 years of professional experience relating to distributed computing,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex.1003, ¶¶ 32-34). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. B.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “of “event,” in which Petitioner argued that the term should be broad enough to include “processing radar sensor data, performing radar tracking initialization and refinement, and distributing radar tracking information to other modules,” and Patent Owner argued that the specification uses the term as “as an umbrella term to cover various types of ‘internal event and performance data’ such as ‘application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.’” Reply 1; Sur-reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that that claimed “events” must concern “application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.” See Ex. 1001, 7:44–45. The patent explains that function group 2 collects that type of information from applications using an API and then “correlate[es], combin[es], and reformat[s] [the] application data into higherlevel metrics (composite events) for use by displays or other Resource Management components.” Id. at 7:52–54. The middleware described and claimed in the ’743 is concerned with how applications are performing, not what they doing.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “This claim limitation, however, also requires “event correlation capabilities.” For that, Petitioner asserts that “Welch’s metrics calculation component (part of the ‘second function group’) provides ‘event correlation capabilities’ because the QoS management software “implementation includes the following capabilities: . . . (2) track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1003, 4). This, we find, mischaracterizes Welch’s disclosure, because Welch’s metrics calculation component does not perform the identified “correlation.” The language quoted by Petitioner comes from the experimental results section of Welch, which describes how the implementation of the NSWC HiPer-D testbed, the system that was used test Welch’s QoS middleware, included “track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Ex. 1005, 4. Welch is not explaining that the middleware correlates the QoS system level events that Petitioner has identified as the claimed “events,” but, instead, that the NSWC HiPer-D system that was used to test the middleware included the ability to correlate radar data in a shipboard anti-air-warfare system.6 The correlating mentioned in Welch occurs at the application level, not in the middleware.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,181,743
• Apple Inc. v. DH International Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00173 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 1–13 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’333 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–13 of the ’333 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the parties’ agreed level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’333 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “element” (limitation [1(e)]) onto a McGregor “device” placed in an RF field generated by Palmer’s reader/writer device. Pet. 28–31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–105), 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125–127). The Petition is unclear as to which McGregor device is being referenced, e.g., the smart card of Figure 2, the wallet embodiment of Figure 4, or some combination of embodiments disclosed in McGregor and Palmer. Id. Regardless, the proposed modification of McGregor in view of Palmer, as we understand it, is based on conclusory reasoning and appears to be motivated by hindsight rather than the teachings of the applied references. Prelim. Resp. 38–40 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 97–102). 7 Ground 2 challenges independent claim 11 for asserted obviousness over McGregor, Palmer, and Tuttle. The Petition’s reliance on Tuttle for its teaching of distinct data transmitter, data receiver, and cue receiver ports does not alter our analysis for claim 11. Pet. 55–62. POSITA would have understood that a series of instructions would be programmed into McGregor’s microprocessor to function as a switching element (pursuant to Palmer’s teachings), and as described.in the ’333 Patent. See Claim [1(b)]; see ’333 Patent, 6:9-14. Accordingly, McGregor’s microprocessor is a switching element (1) that is placed into an activated state after receiving a handshake signal (an activation cue) that establishes a communication during the handshake process and (2) that remains in an inactivated state if no reader/writer device is detected (no activation cue). Ex. 1003 ¶ 127 (emphases added). Dr. Buehrer’s citation to the ’333 patent, without explaining his mapping of limitation [1(e)] onto McGregor-Palmer beyond a general reference to 10-plus pages of limitation [1(b)] “control device” analysis, suggests hindsight reasoning. Id; see also Pet. 42 (generally referring to limitation [1(b)]). The Petition’s analysis, moreover, does not address why or how McGregor’s microprocessor would “accordingly” act as a data conveyance switching element or why a POSITA would want to program McGregor’s microprocessor to execute such a switching function in view of Palmer. We find the Petition and Dr. Buehrer’s testimony lacking in articulated reasoning supported by rational underpinnings sufficient to support the conclusion that limitation [1(e)] reads on the proposed McGregor-Palmer combination. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “element” (limitation [1(e)]) onto a McGregor “device” placed in an RF field generated by Palmer’s reader/writer device. Pet. 28–31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–105), 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125–127). The Petition is unclear as to which McGregor device is being referenced, e.g., the smart card of Figure 2, the wallet embodiment of Figure 4, or some combination of embodiments disclosed in McGregor and Palmer. Id. Regardless, the proposed modification of McGregor in view of Palmer, as we understand it, is based on conclusory reasoning and appears to be motivated by hindsight rather than the teachings of the applied references. Prelim. Resp. 38–40 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 97–102). 7 Ground 2 challenges independent claim 11 for asserted obviousness over McGregor, Palmer, and Tuttle. The Petition’s reliance on Tuttle for its teaching of distinct data transmitter, data receiver, and cue receiver ports does not alter our analysis for claim 11. Pet. 55–62. POSITA would have understood that a series of instructions would be programmed into McGregor’s microprocessor to function as a switching element (pursuant to Palmer’s teachings), and as described.in the ’333 Patent. See Claim [1(b)]; see ’333 Patent, 6:9-14. Accordingly, McGregor’s microprocessor is a switching element (1) that is placed into an activated state after receiving a handshake signal (an activation cue) that establishes a communication during the handshake process and (2) that remains in an inactivated state if no reader/writer device is detected (no activation cue). Ex. 1003 ¶ 127 (emphases added). Dr. Buehrer’s citation to the ’333 patent, without explaining his mapping of limitation [1(e)] onto McGregor-Palmer beyond a general reference to 10-plus pages of limitation [1(b)] “control device” analysis, suggests hindsight reasoning. Id; see also Pet. 42 (generally referring to limitation [1(b)]). The Petition’s analysis, moreover, does not address why or how McGregor’s microprocessor would “accordingly” act as a data conveyance switching element or why a POSITA would want to program McGregor’s microprocessor to execute such a switching function in view of Palmer. We find the Petition and Dr. Buehrer’s testimony lacking in articulated reasoning supported by rational underpinnings sufficient to support the conclusion that limitation [1(e)] reads on the proposed McGregor-Palmer combination. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). The Petition does assert an obviousness theory within the analysis of the “control device” limitation [1(b)]. Pet. 25–35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85– 109). The Petition asserts that a “POSITA would have been motivated to implement McGregor’s device pursuant to Palmer such that the security code would be automatically transmitted when the device detects the receive the security code.” Pet. 28; see also id. at 31 (“A POSITA would have been motivated to implement Palmer’s (1) RF field detection and handshake processes and (2) Palmer’s transceiver hardware in McGregor’s device.”) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–105). We find the Petition’s obviousness theory to be inherently inconsistent and non-specific with regard to the “data conveyance switching element” recited in limitation [1(e)].” slip op. at 16

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,628,333
• Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00144 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because neither obviousness ground showed a reasonable likelihood of establishing claims 1–20 were unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “III. CONCLUSION The Petition fails to show there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Accordingly, we deny the Petition. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “claim 15). We agree that the Specification supports Patent Owner’s construction. Although Petitioner bases its construction on extrinsic evidence, Petitioner argues that its construction “is consistent with” the intrinsic evidence, which, according to Petitioner, “indicates a sole is optional.” Pet. 31. A sole is optional, Petitioner argues, because the Abstract of the ’511 patent states that “[t]he footwear may include an upper and a sole structure.” Pet. 31 (quoting Ex. 1001, Abstr. (Petitioner’s emphasis)). We are not persuaded. Petitioner reads too much into the sentence it quotes from the Abstract and its use of the word “may.” Indeed, by Petitioner’s logic, both the upper and the sole structure would be optional and footwear would lack any required structure. Petitioner also argues that “[o]ther intrinsic evidence” supports its construction. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1053, 4:55–58; Ex. 1002 ¶92). The alleged intrinsic evidence, however, is an unrelated patent, US 2,675,631, which purportedly was cited during the prosecution of the ’511 patent. Id. This argument is undeveloped by Petitioner. First, Petitioner fails to substantiate that US 2,675,631 is cited in the prosecution history, merely asserting it as fact without pointing to supporting evidence. See id. (no citation to the prosecution history provided). Further, even assuming US 2,675,631 is cited in the prosecution history of the ’511 patent and thus part of the intrinsic evidence,8 Petitioner fails to show that it is probative of 8 The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the ‘intrinsic evidence,’ consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (emphasis added). what the inventors of the ’511 patent meant by “article of footwear.” Petitioner points out that the inventor of US 2,675,631 considers “knitted footwear” as encompassing “hose, golf hose, three-quarter hose, half-hose and socks” but does not explain why such meaning should be incorporated into the ’511 patent. Ex. 1053, 4:55–58 (partly quoted at Pet. 31–32). US 2,675,631 is titled “Footwear Article of The Slipper-Sock Type.” Ex. 1053, Title. As is evidently clear from the specifications of both patents, the ’511 patent and US 2,675,631 are directed to different types of footwear within the broader (dictionary) definition cited by Petitioner. Ex. 1022, 67, 88. Patent Owner also proffers testimony from Dr. Pastore that a person” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “We construe the preambles of claims 1 and 15 to be limiting, as guided by case law. It is clear that the preambles are being used to help define the invention, i.e., an upper for an article of footwear in the case of claim 1 and an article of footwear having an upper in the case of claim 15. See Bell Communications Research Inc. v. Vitalink Commcations Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it. In other words, when the claim drafter chooses to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the invention so defined, and not some other, is the 9 Claim 15 is similar to claim 1, and, in challenging claim 1, Petitioner merely refers back to and relies exclusively on its analysis for claim 1. See Pet. 84 (Ground 1), 124–125 (Ground 2). Thus, although we may we discuss claim 1 alone at times, our analysis applies equally to claim 15. one the patent protects.”). Moreover, the bodies of both claims recite “the upper” which, in the case of claim 1, derives its antecedent basis directly from the preamble and, in the case of claim 15, relies on the preamble’s article of footwear which is recited as comprising an upper. See Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, it is not enough that Clark discloses a sole. See KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”). Petitioner must show that it would have been obvious to modify Cusinato to include a sole. Id. (“[I]t can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”); see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). On this aspect, Petitioner fails. The Petition summarily states that “a POSITA would consider it obvious to add a sole to Cusinato’s ‘boot-like’ form” but – as noted by Patent Owner – the Petition does not explain why. Pet. 51; see Prelim. Resp. 35 (“The Petition is silent with respect to any alleged motivation.”). Dr. Adanur’s testimony does not add much. He summarily opines that “it would be obvious to add a sole to Cusinato’s ‘boot-like’ form to provide cushioning and protection.” Ex. 1002 ¶160.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,918,511
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00218 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Kim and Vayanos combination did not show that each individual bit indicates a separate time interval, as required by claims 1–12.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “limitation 1.2 because it is more consistent with the claim language and the specification of the ’416 patent. The language “each of the plurality of bits” clearly individualizes the “plurality of bits” and the language “indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels” clearly ascribes to each individual bit the function of identifying a time interval that is separate from the time interval(s) that the other individual bit(s) identify. Petitioner’s claim constriction argument largely ignores the words used in limitation 1.2. Petitioner fails to provide anything to explain how or why the plain meaning of “each” and “respective” in the context of limitation 1.2 could be understood by a skilled artisan to connote something other than the plurality of bits individually identifying a separate and distinct time interval (i.e., a “one-to-one correspondence”). Petitioner similarly does not identify anything from the specification of the ’416 patent that would support deviating from the plain meaning of limitation 1.2. And Petitioner’s reliance on 3M Innovative Properties appears to miss the mark. Pet. Reply 7. In that case, the Federal Circuit held that, when a claim term has an “ascertainable definition in the body of the claim,” their “cases do not support prescribing a more particularized meaning unless a narrower construction is required by the specification or prosecution history.” 3M Innovative Properties Co., 725 F.3d at 1329. Here, however, Patent Owner is not attempting to import a more particularized meaning into limitation 1.2, but to demonstrate that the ’416 specification is consistent with the ascertainable definition of “each” and “respective” within the context of limitation 1.2. In particular, Patent Owner highlights that the ’416 specification describes the resource allocation technique as using an indicator bit, within a plurality of indicator bits, that has a one-to-one correspondence to a specific time window established for a Forward Access Channel (FACH). See Ex. 1001, 13:63–14:25, 14:44–53, Figs. 7, 9; PO Resp. 11–14, 19–20; PO Sur-reply 2–3; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 36–40, 49. And we agree that the ’416 specification informs, and is consistent with, the plain reading of limitation 1.2. See Ex. 1001, 13:63–14:25, 14:44–53, Figs. 7, 9. Therefore, we determine that the plain and ordinary meaning of limitation 1.2 requires all the plurality of bits to individually identify a separate and distinct time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “PICH, which is communicated to Kim’s receiver, has a plurality of bits, the evidence fails to demonstrate sufficiently that each of those bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels, as limitation 1.2 recites. As Patent Owner correctly argues, the Vayanos paging indicators use multiple bits to indicate information about a single time interval in a frame, rather having several bits that individually identify a separate and distinct time interval. PO Resp. 39–41 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 67, 74–75). Vayanos teaches that “[t]he number of paging indicators (Np) in each PICH frame is configurable by the system and can take on a value of 18, 36, 72 or 144,” and that “[e]ach paging indicator is sent in 288/Np consecutive bits in the PICH frame, where 288/Np can take on a value of 16, 8, 4 or 2.” Ex. 1006, 3:26–34. As a result, if there are 18 (Np = 18) paging indicators, 288/NP = 288/18 = 16 (meaning that each paging indicator is 16 bits long), if there are 36 (Np = 36) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/36 = 8 (meaning that each paging indicator is 8 bits long), if there are 72 (Np=72) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/72= 4 (meaning that each paging indicator is 4 bits long), and if there are 144 (Np=144) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/144 = 2 (meaning that each paging indicator is 2 bits long). Ex. 2001 ¶ 66. Each paging indicator (singular) taught by Vayanos includes multiple bits––each paging indicator (singular) has either 16, 8, 4 or 2 bits–– and Vayanos does not disclose or suggest a paging indicator that indicates a time interval with only a single bit. Id. And Petitioner does not cite Kim to show the number of bits used to indicate a time interval; only to show that a UE would receive broadcast information with paging information including paging indicators that identify a time interval in which physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. See Pet. 40–49. Even accepting that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses a UE receiving a paging indicator that is indicative of a time interval in which a Paging Channel PCH may be found or indicative of whether a frame will include a signaling channel (e.g., PCH) at a specific TTI within that frame, the combination does not disclose or suggest using a paging indicator that is a single bit indicating either of those time intervals. On the contrary, as noted above, Vayanos teaches that all paging indicators consist of multiple bits and, thus, the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses a UE that only receives and uses a plurality of bits to indicate a time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This is insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will be able to establish that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses or suggests receiving a plurality of bits wherein the individual bits each identify a separate and distinct time interval. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses or suggests the subject matter limitation 1.2 recites. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Kim and Vayanos disclose or suggest broadcast information that includes a plurality of bits, wherein each of the plurality of bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1 and 7 (in the asserted Grounds 1 and 2) and, as a result, the same deficiency extends through to all of the dependent claims challenged in all of the grounds.4” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “sufficiently that the combination of Kim and Vayanos disclose or suggest broadcast information that includes a plurality of bits, wherein each of the plurality of bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1 and 7 (in the asserted Grounds 1 and 2) and, as a result, the same deficiency extends through to all of the dependent claims challenged in all of the grounds.4 IV. CONCLUSION Based on the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’416 patent challenged in the Petition. Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,136,416
• Innolux Corporation v. Phenix Longhorn LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00044 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition violated Rule 42.104(b)(3) and did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5, and 6 were unpatentable as obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) “would have had at least a bachelor of science degree in physics, electrical engineering, or the equivalent thereof and three (3) years of experience in circuit design or display technologies.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). According to Petitioner “[s]uch a POSA would have had knowledge of integrated circuits, gamma correction, and storage of gamma correction voltage values within memory, and would have understood how to search available literature for relevant publications.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. This assessment is consistent with the ’788 Patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “and 5 recites “means for executing.” Ex. 1001, 7:36–40, 8:35–37. The use of the term “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. Consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments (Prelim. Resp. 36–39), the Petition does not address the presumption and, more specifically, the Petition does not provide any argument or evidence as to why the presumption is rebutted. Furthermore, even if we were to consider Petitioner’s newly presented argument that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of ‘means for executing a predetermined algorithm . . . ’ connotes a general-purpose processor, which is understood as structure sufficient to perform the function” (Pet. Reply 5), such argument is not persuasive as it is not supported by evidence earlier presented in the Petition or otherwise. Furthermore, even if the plain and ordinary meaning of means for executing a predetermined algorithm were a general-purpose processor, for a computer implemented means-plus-function term the corresponding structure must be the specific algorithm implemented by the processor as argued by Petitioner. Pet. Reply 6.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,557,788
• New Balance Athletics, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00020 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 11–15 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of the instant Decision, “Nike applies New Balance’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Based on the record presented, we determine that Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the scope and content of the ’932 patent and the asserted prior art, and, at this stage, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner acknowledges that it agreed to the constructions identified by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 12. Patent Owner also notes that it agreed to these proposed constructions in the Related Litigation. Id. at 13. However, Patent Owner argues that for purposes of this Preliminary Response, “no terms require construction.” Id. (citing Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). Based on the record before us, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “limitation would have been obvious because one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Becker’s stiffer outer lining would have “restrict[ed] the mobility of the ankle, “not allow[ed] for tightening,” and known to “hav[e] the inner lining extend up above the outer lining.” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 122–123). Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert that it would have been obvious for “the skin layer [to be] absent from the ankle part of the knitted component,” as required by limitation [11.d]. The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Becker nor the other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation for “the skin layer being absent from the ankle part of the knitted component,” as claimed.” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,898,932
• Skechers U.S.A., Inc. v. Nike, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00150 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Skechers did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 were unpatentable, principally because the asserted art did not disclose the construed integral knit tongue.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’562 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’562 patent in February 2012 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 22. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Nike applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 15. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “inquiries.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “The first step in both analyses is a proper construction of the claims . . . [and t]he second step in the analyses requires a comparison of the properly construed claim to the prior art.” Id. Although an explicit claim construction analysis by a petitioner is not required in every case, a petition nonetheless must identify how the challenged claims are to be construed and how, as so construed, they are unpatentable under the statutory grounds asserted. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4). And, being part of a prima facia case, such an analysis is part of Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its patentability challenges. Petitioner has failed to satisfy the threshold burden for every ground based on this construction.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not find Petitioner’s contentions regarding the two annotated figures to be persuasive. First, those contentions, and the cited opinions of Dr. Adanur, are based on a claim construction that, as discussed above, we reject and for which neither party advocates. Second, Petitioner does not explain adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would discern, even with Petitioner’s added red ovals, a tongue distinct from the upper and tongue extending through the throat area. We also do not find persuasive Petitioner’s contentions regarding differing textures. See Pet. 32–33. Even if differing textures could rise to the level of distinguishing an integral knit tongue from the upper, the purported tongue texture 48" is not confined to the area identified by Petitioner as the tongue. See Pet. 31 (annotated Figure 11, reproduced above). For example, texture 48" outside of Petitioner’s oval appears to wrap approximately halfway around the ankle opening, which is not argued to be consistent with an ordinary artisan’s understanding of a tongue. Or, put another way, there is no indication that the portion of the 48" texture within Petitioner’s red oval, which purportedly represents the tongue, is distinguishable from the remaining portion of the 48" texture outside of the red oval. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that a person of ordinary skill in the art would consider the relatively large area depicted as having texture 48" to be an “integral knit tongue.” In light of the above, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to independent claim 1 and its dependent claims 2–4 as anticipated by Dua-592.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,060,562
• Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Exelixis Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00210 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–3 unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Accordingly, we find that on the current record Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Brown, Kubo, and Remington would inherently result in less than 200 ppm impurity and Petitioner has not shown that it has a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the obviousness ground.” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “Here, there is no dispute that the ’349 patent and Wilson, which issued from a patent application from which priority was claimed for the ’349 patent, share the identical disclosure of a pharmaceutical composition comprising Compound IA or IB; one or more fillers; one or more disintegrants; one or more glidants; and one or more lubricants. In this embodiment, the filler comprises microcrystalline cellulose. In this embodiment, the disintegrant comprises croscarmellose sodium. In this embodiment, the disintegrant comprises croscarmellose sodium and sodium starch glycolate. In this embodiment, the glidant comprises fumed silica. In this embodiment, the lubricant comprises stearic acid. Ex. 1001, 21:1–12; Ex. 1002, 20:51–62. There is express ipsis verbis disclosure of the elements recited in claim 1 of the ’349 patent.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “1. Reason to reduce contaminant levels We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner identifies no teaching in the prior art providing any reason to reduce levels of 6,7-dimethoxy-quinoline-4-ol specifically. And while Brown does teach a desire to form “substantially pure” compounds, Brown focuses on “at least about 90 wt.%” of the compound, then lists specifically “about 90, about 91, about 92, about 93, about 94, about 95, about 96, about 97, about 98, about 99 and about 100% wt. %.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 97. This permits a range of concentration for contaminants from about 0 to 10%.” slip op. at 24

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “to modify Brown’s process with Kubo to eliminate the added step. See, e.g., Id. ¶ 73. But even with that combination, Dr. Dichtel states only that a “POSA would have expected there to be a decrease in the amount of 6,7- dimethoxy-quinoline-4-ol at the end of cabozantinib (L)-malate’s synthesis that was attributable to hydrolytic degradation of the 4- (nitrophenoxy)quinoline intermediate by avoiding its use in the synthesis.” Id. ¶ 78. That is not, however, the standard for inherency. It must be the necessary result, not a possible expected result. The Federal Circuit in Par explained that: Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient. If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.” slip op. at 28

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,298,349
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00251 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because neither asserted obviousness combination showed a reasonable likelihood of success, chiefly due to unsupported webserver teachings and motivation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “c. Analysis We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s rationale for adding a facilitator- type webserver to the Ellis–Spivey combination based on “POSA’s Knowledge.” First, Petitioner’s combination of Spivey with Ellis is already allegedly based on improving latency issues via the incorporation of Spivey’s LDSD and MQSD in Ellis’s system. See Pet. 22–24. Petitioner touts that this modification would result in reduced latency to a time period “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 96). But the Petition does not establish whether this latency improvement would or could be maintained when adding a separate webserver, as it has proposed. And Dr. Rubin testifies that the inclusion of an additional webserver—an additional component—is likely to create latency insofar as it must receive, process, and/or handle data. Ex. 2001 ¶ 305. We are persuaded by Dr. Rubin’s testimony, and we find that adding a webserver to Petitioner’s existing Ellis– Spivey combination tends to undermine Petitioner’s foundational rationale for combining these references, which is the reduction of latency. See Pet. 23.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Third, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 49) that Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have added a facilitator-type webserver to the Ellis–Spivey combination when neither reference teaches or suggests a webserver for facilitating communication between a client and a socket server. Dr. Wicker’s supporting testimony stresses that “webservers were well-known components in streaming systems that were useful for facilitating communication between client devices and socket servers, and client devices and media sources.” Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 128–132. But “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner fails to provide any persuasive reason with a rational underpinning why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to add a webserver to the existing Ellis–Spivey combination.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The differences between the parties’ definitions are minor, as recognized by Dr. Rubin (see Ex. 2001 ¶ 104), and we do not discern any meaningful differences based on the preliminary record. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’088 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 8. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known that a “socket” is “a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server where first event information is provided to a VCD [viewer client device].” Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 163). Thus, Petitioner argues that a “first event socket corresponding to the first event information” is “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to VCDs.” Id. Patent Owner states that “[e]xcept for the ‘socket’ term for which Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s construction . . . for purposes of [its] preliminary response, Patent Owner agrees that no terms require construction and construes all other terms consistent with their plain and ordinary meaning.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,871,088

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.