- Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00244 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not sufficiently show that Costa disclosed or suggested claim 11.H’s required arrangement, and the dependent claims did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In view of these deficiencies, the Petition fails to identify the proposed grounds for review with particularity as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) with respect to the limitations of independent claim [11.H]. Petitioner presents no arguments or evidence with respect to the dependent claims challenged under this ground that would remedy the defects noted above with respect to independent claim 11. See generally Pet. Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of claims 11, 12, or 14–19 would have been obvious over Costa.” slip op. at 23
- BurdenDenied
“3. Analysis A petition is required to identify “with particularity[ ] the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). The “petition . . . must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). Our rules require that a petition include fully developed arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) (the “petition . . . must include . . . [a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). The petition must include both an adequate explanation of how the claims should be construed as well as how the construed claims are unpatentable over the asserted prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), (b)(4). Additionally, the “petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). A petition should also “explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does.” ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, based on our rules, we only consider fully developed arguments set forth in the petition.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached
“arguments. See, e.g., id. at 34–35 (arguing that “on” does not require overlap in the Z direction but “includes both objects that are merely touching (in any dimension) and objects that are in proximity to each other but not touching” (citing Ex. 1078, 1; Ex. 1001, 8:3–12)); see also id. at 36–38 (arguing that if “on” is construed to mean “directly on or on with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween,” then Costa’s second stacked layer 232, 242 and third channel structure (173) are “directly on” each other, because their edges are directly touching each other). The Petition, however, does not clearly present any of the claim construction arguments set forth in the Opposition Brief. See Paper 22 (not clearly identifying where the Petition provides the proposed claim construction); see generally Pet.; see also Pet. 33, 43, 56 (arguing “on” does not require “directly on” and permits intermediate layers but not presenting any of the other claim construction arguments set forth in the Opposition Brief). Nor did the Petition provide any particularized argument as to how Costa discloses or suggests a second stacked layer disposed on the third channel structure applying any of the claim constructions proposed in the Opposition Brief. See generally Pet. (presenting no argument that Costa’s second stacked layer 232, 242 is “on” semiconduction portion layer 173 (the asserted third channel structure) because they touch each other as shown above in Petitioner’s annotation of Costa Figure 21A). We will not consider any arguments not sufficiently set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (“the petition must set forth . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“the petition must set forth . . . [h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable”).” slip op. at 19
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“Because we determine that Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits, we do not address Patent Owner’s parallel petitions argument.” slip op. at 23
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,886,291 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00245 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 11, 13, and 15–17 would have been obvious over Costa or Costa and Oh.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“§ 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Based upon our review of the present record, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that none of the claims require express construction and the claims should receive their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 23. Patent Owner argues that no claim construction is necessary for the institution determination, and that the Petition “still fails if the claim term ‘on’ receives its plain and ordinary meaning -- e.g., physically in contact with or directly on top of with intervening objects therebetween.” Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 66). Although Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has construed “on” as including indirectly on; i.e., where there is no physical contact, the Petition addressed now-disclaimed claim 18, and the Petition does not advance any construction for the remaining claims. See id. at 16–17 (citing Pet. 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 258). Consequently, we determine that no construction is required to resolve the issues for institution.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“we consider the level of ordinary skill at the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (discussing pre- AIA obviousness). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. The earliest claimed priority date for the ’241 patent is after the effective date of the applicable AIA amendment. See Ex. 1001, (63). Thus, we refer to the AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103. 2 Costa, US 2018/001282771 (filed Feb. 28, 2017, published June 28, 2018) (Ex. 1005, “Costa”). 3 Oh, US 2017/0154892 A1 (filed June 10, 2016, published June 1, 2017) (Ex. 1006, “Oh”). some of the professional experience). Pet. 23–24. Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–40). Patent Owner does not take a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 11; see also Ex. 2006 ¶ 34 (applying Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA to the opinions set forth in the declaration but reserving the right to opine to an alternative level of a POSITA). At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA as it appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art that is reflected by the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to sufficiently show that Costa teaches a “second stacked layer disposed on the third channel structure” as required by apparatus claim element [11.E]. The Petition asserts that Costa’s second alternating stack 232, 242 is formed “on the top surface of joint-level material layers.” Pet. 64. However, Costa refers to the term “joint-level material layers” as representing layers 175–177, not the asserted third channel structure 173. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 166, 178, 184–85; see Ex. 2006 ¶ 77. Thus, under Petitioner’s characterization, which is consistent with Costa, Costa’s second alternating stack is not formed on the third channel structure, but instead, “on the top surface of the joint level material layers” that surround the third channel structure. Because Petitioner has not explained how a second alternating stack on the surface of the joint material layers teaches a second alternating stack disposed on the third channel structure, Petitioner has not met its obviousness burden for limitation [11.E].” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,482,532 - Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00194 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding no reasonable likelihood for the remaining claims except claim 13, whose potential success did not justify instituting trial.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or equivalent and at least two years of experience working with radio communication systems and machine learning.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Zhi Ding. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. We adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 16. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 4–6, 12, 14, and 16–22 would have been obvious over Jüschke and Holt. Petitioner may satisfy its burden for claim 13, but, as discussed below, that would not impact our decision to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution. See Section II.F.” slip op. at 16
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“inter partes review. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 366 (2018). Specifically, “[i]f a panel determines that a petition meets the standards for institution in relation to fewer than all the challenges presented, . . . the panel will evaluate all the challenges and determine whether, in the interests of efficient administration of the Office and integrity of the patent system, the entire petition should be denied.” See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 64 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Here, thirteen challenged claims remain after Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer. Petitioner at most demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing for one dependent claim, which has no claims depending therefrom. See Sections II.C–II.E. Thus, based on the particular facts of this case, we find that instituting trial would not be an efficient use of the Board’s time and resources, and we exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a). See Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018- 01310, Paper 7 at 41–43 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (informative); Chevron Oronite Co. LLC v. Infineum USA L.P., IPR2018-00923, Paper 9 at 10–11 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2018) (informative).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,777,540 - SML Intelligent Inventory Solutions LLC / SML (USA) Inc. v. Adasa Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00125 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’967 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Petitioner adopts the following definition of a person of ordinarily skill in the art (hereafter, sometimes “POSITA”) of the ’967 patent proposed by Patent Owner in the Avery Dennison litigation: [A]t least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or a related discipline, and at least five years of experience which would consist of, A, designing, developing, evaluating and/or using RFID or other AIDC [automatic identification and data capture] technologies in inventory management, unique object identification, and/or security; or B, studying and conducting research related to RFID technologies and using RFID and other AIDC technologies in inventory management, unique object identification, and/or security. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1030, 707:3–13). Patent Owner does not offer a definition of an ordinarily skilled artisan of the ’967 patent at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the information presented, we find that the asserted prior art itself is sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). To the extent a more precise definition is required, we apply Petitioner’s unopposed proposed definition for purposes of determining whether to institute review because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references and the problems addressed in the ’967 patent.” slip op. at 17
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner proposes the following claim constructions: “an allocated block of serial numbers” as “a pre-authorized range of binary serial numbers” and “uniquely corresponding” as the “term’s plain and ordinary meaning, consistent with the articulation of the plain and ordinary meaning” in the Avery Dennison litigation. Pet. 8–12. As to the remaining claim terms, Petitioner applies the district court’s constructions in the Avery Dennison litigation. Id. at 12 (citing Ex. 1028). Patent Owner applies the following constructions that were entered during in the Avery Dennison litigation: “object class information space” as “data field within the memory of the RFID integrated circuit chip for information identifying the class of an object, such as a company prefix, item reference code, partition value, and/or filter value,” “unique serial number space” as “data field within the memory of the RFID integrated circuit for information identifying a unique serial number,” “being assigned a limited number of most significant bits” as “includes a limited, predefined sequence at the leading end,” “remaining bits of lesser significance” as “the remaining lower order bits at the trailing end,” “is encoded with one serial number instance” as “has stored within it one serial number instance,” “an allocated block of serial numbers” as “a pre-authorized range of serial numbers,” and “uniquely corresponding” as its plain and ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 32. For purposes of resolving whether to institute trial, we adopt and apply the interpretations stated in the district court’s claim construction order and applied by the Federal Circuit on appeal, Ex. 1028.11 See 55 F.4th 900, 908–909, 912–913 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing the district court’s claim construction order).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“IBM200 and Kuhno would have made it obvious for a POSITA to commission RFID tags with unique serial numbers partitioned into MSBs and bits of lesser significance. See Pet. 34–39; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 167–176. However, on this record, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the POSITA, having read IBM200 and Kuhno, would have been led to create a serial number space in which the limited number of “most significant bits” uniquely corresponds to those bits assigned to an allocated block of serial numbers, as recited in limitation [f].” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,798,967 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00035 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Micron did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–5, 8–13, or 15 were obvious over either asserted reference combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of challenged claims 1–5, 8–13, and 15 of the ’604 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’604 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree that Petitioner has not shown that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the critical time would have been motivated to replace the wordlines in the staircase region with dielectric material if the result is that one of the memory cell arrays becomes unavailable. Petitioner relies upon two usable arrays for its combination, emphasizing Thimmegowda as desirably enabling “a single conductive contact (e.g., 334a) to bidirectionally drive memory cells in the memory arrays on either side of the bridge”; i.e., both the left and right memory cell blocks. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81– 83; Ex. 1005, 9:49–51; 7:61–64), 41 (stating that in the combination, “there Similarly, Thimmegowda emphasizes that the purpose of its bridge is to connect first and second blocks, which desirably replaces prior connection methods that consumed silicon real estate and interfered with the goal of shrinking the sizes or increasing the densities of memory arrays. Ex. 1005, 1:11–25, 3:20–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–80 (“allowing a single staircase to access both memory arrays”), 83 (“a stairstep electrically couples to a respective gate layer (wordline) in both of the blocks on the right and left”). Dr. Banerjee also underscores the importance of using both arrays, stating that the combination relies on “Thimmegowda’s bridge and array architecture (to drive two memory arrays with one wordline via)” as part of the reasonable expectation of success in such a combination Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102, 113. Petitioner and Dr. Banerjee rely upon the motivation of reducing punch-through, because punch-through causes “yield loss”; i.e., loss of the usability of the wordlines connected by the punch-through. Ex. 1003 ¶ 103; Pet. 35. However, such advantage is premised on retaining both arrays, and neither Petitioner nor Dr. Banerjee explains how the advantages of reducing punch-through should be weighed against a disadvantage of losing access to one of the two arrays. Nor do Petitioner and Dr. Banerjee discuss how the advantages of metal gate replacement should be weighed against losing access to one of the two arrays.4 Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Giapis, attests to the undesirability of such a combination, in which one array 4 Additionally, the claims of the ’604 patent do not require a metal conductor portion; Petitioner does not explain why gate replacement to a metal conductor from a polysilicon conductor, described as used in Lee’s “memory device at large,” (Pet. 40) is a benefit associated with Lee’s finger teaching relevant to the claims. Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 50–54. We agree with Patent Owner that the advantage of preventing individual wordlines from becoming unusable because of punchthrough would be outweighed by the loss of half of the wordlines if one of the memory arrays were to become unavailable because its connections were removed.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“III. DISCRETION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner argues that the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) based on the factors set forth in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (Mar. 20, 2020) additional briefing. Papers 12, 14. Because we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its obviousness contentions, we need not resolve whether Fintiv would require discretionary denial of the Petition.6” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 2 We apply AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 to the ’604 patent because it was filed after, and never claimed the benefit of an effective filing date before, March 16, 2013. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (63); Pet. 6. 3 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 89; Prelim. Resp. level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–43). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 10. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’604 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,450,604 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00793 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Micron’s rehearing requests, finding no misapprehension or overlooked matter in its denial of institution based on the failure to show the challenged claims obvious.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s own formulations of the grounds based on either Seo or Nam in combination with Choi posit the alternative theories that either Seo or Nam alone disclose Limitation [1.D], or the combination of either Seo or Nam with Choi teaches this limitation. Although Petitioner did not invoke inherency by name for the theories based on Seo or Nam alone, this is, in effect, the nature of Petitioner’s assertions, namely, voltage differentials in Seo and Nam would inherently remove fast charges. For example, with respect to Seo, Petitioner argues that “Seo teaches having a higher voltage on unselected WLs (e.g., adjacent WLs to the selected WL) during the first time period,” and “the ’342 patent recognizes [that] this voltage differential removes fast charges.” Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:24–34; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–131) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 82–83 (relying on the ’342 patent to support the contention that Nam teaches Limitation [1.D] because Nam “teaches having a higher voltage on unselected WLs (including WLs adjacent to the selected WL) relative to the selected WL during the first time period” (citing Ex. 1001, 12:24–34) (emphasis omitted)). Petitioner does not argue that Seo and Nam expressly disclose removing fast charges or sufficiently explain how a POSITA would have understood that the procedures used in Seo and Nam would have removed fast charges; instead, Petitioner effectively argues that removing fast charges is the inherent result of applying the voltage differential. See, e.g., Pet. 36 (stating Seo would have been understood to disclose “performing its read operation on chargetrap memories, which removes fast charges”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner’s reliance on Choi does not cure the deficiencies set forth above. Petitioner asserts that “Choi explains the primary mechanism and unwanted impact of fast-charge loss on verification,” which provides the motivation “to use Seo’s and Nam’s methods to achieve fast charge removal to improve verification.” Req. 7 n.1. But again, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how a POSITA, looking at Choi, would have understood that either Seo’s or Nam’s techniques result in fast charge removal. In other words, even if Choi teaches the impact of fast-charge loss on verification, Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that a POSITA would have understood that either Seo or Nam teach or suggest fast charge removal. It was Petitioner’s burden to establish that Seo and Nam, alone or in combination with Choi, disclose Limitation [1.D]. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended the nature of Petitioner’s argument when we determined that Petitioner did not meet that burden.” slip op. at 7
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“It was Petitioner’s burden to establish that Seo and Nam, alone or in combination with Choi, disclose Limitation [1.D]. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended the nature of Petitioner’s argument when we determined that Petitioner did not meet that burden.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s reliance on Choi does not cure the deficiencies set forth above. Petitioner asserts that “Choi explains the primary mechanism and unwanted impact of fast-charge loss on verification,” which provides the motivation “to use Seo’s and Nam’s methods to achieve fast charge removal to improve verification.” Req. 7 n.1. But again, Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how a POSITA, looking at Choi, would have understood that either Seo’s or Nam’s techniques result in fast charge removal. In other words, even if Choi teaches the impact of fast-charge loss on verification, Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that a POSITA would have understood that either Seo or Nam teach or suggest fast charge removal.” slip op. at 7
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,600,342 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00912 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Micron’s rehearing requests, leaving institution denied because the petitions did not show that the prior-art combinations disclose or render obvious fast-charge removal.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined “if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold Partnership v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“It was Petitioner’s burden to establish that Seo and Nam, alone or in combination with Choi, disclose Limitation [1.D]. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended the nature of Petitioner’s argument when we determined that Petitioner did not meet that burden.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“determined that the combinations of Seo or Nam with Choi were not persuasive. Dec. 14–15, 19–20. For example, we determined that “Dr. Liu’s statement that ‘[a] POSITA would have recognized that the lateral-electrical-field-inducing voltage differential, as Seo discloses, is what Choi describes as driving the lateral fast-charge loss,’ is not supported by objective evidence or sufficient explanation as to why a POSITA would have come to that understanding” and was therefore insufficient to support Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine Seo with Choi. Id. at 14–15. In particular, we were not persuaded that “Seo creates a large lateral electric field like the one described in Choi,” and, in any case, we disagreed that “Choi teaches that a large lateral electric field removes fast charges.” Id. at 15. Accordingly, regardless of the duration of the voltage application described in Seo, Petitioner failed to show that the combination of Seo and Choi would result in removal of fast charges. We further determined that Petitioner’s combination of Nam with Choi was problematic for similar reasons, given Petitioner’s reliance on similar arguments. See id. at 20.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art relating to charge-trap memory devices demonstrates fast charge removal. See Pet. 36, 81–82. And although Petitioner cites its declarant, Dr. Liu, for the proposition that “Seo discloses, and would have been understood to disclose, performing its read operation on charge-trap memories, which removes fast charges,” Dr. Liu does not cite objective evidence to support this assertion, aside from the ’342 patent itself. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 136). Moreover, Dr. Liu’s testimony simply circles back to logic similar to that relied on with respect to the inherency theory, namely that, given certain similarities between Seo and the ’342 patent, Seo removes fast charges because the ’342 patent teaches removing fast charges, even though Seo does not explicitly teach doing so. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 136 (“[A] POSITA would have immediately understood from reading Seo that Seo is disclosing its read operation as applicable to Flash memories, including Flash charge-trap memories. And as the ’342 states, Seo’s operation would remove fast charges in a charge-trap memory.” (citing Ex. 1001, Abstract)). As already discussed, we disagree with this logic based on the lack of sufficient evidence to support its conclusion. See Dec. 13 (“Petitioner and Dr. Liu do not provide any objective evidence or explanation as to how or why a POSITA would have understood that Seo’s voltage amounts applied during Seo’s time periods operate the same way [as in the ’342 patent] on Seo’s memory device to generate fields with sufficient magnitude and duration to remove fast charges.”). Petitioner’s assertions regarding Nam suffer from the same shortcomings. See Dec. 19–20; Pet 82 (“[A] POSITA would have found that Nam’s teachings are applicable to charge-trap devices”); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 293–298.” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,600,342 - PTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00910 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Micron’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7–10 were obvious over Park.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined “if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold Partnership v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“dummy source structure might not even be an inoperable structure,” and therefore “the ’872 Patent does not use ‘dummy’ to exclude the dummy source structure from being an operable, functioning element.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 85 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:41–43, 16:63–66). In support of his testimony, Dr. Banerjee points to the Specification’s teaching that “[i]n some embodiments, one or more dummy source structures are in contact with the substrate and may provide interconnect between the 3D memory device and peripheral devices” (Ex. 1001, 5:41–43), and “[w]hen conductive materials are used to fill dummy source hole 212 (e.g., contact 224), the dummy source structure 246 may function as an interconnect to connect 3D memory device 100 with other peripheral devices” (id. at 16:63–66), which we considered and relied upon in construing “dummy source structure” in the Decision. Dec. 11–13. None of the functions identified by Dr. Banerjee, however, relate to whether the dummy source structure would function as a source to the memory cells. Specification consistently describes that function as an interconnect with other peripheral devices, and does not teach or suggest that the dummy source structure may function to provide source to the memory cells. See Ex. 1001, 5:40–43 (“In some embodiments, one or more dummy source structures are in contact with the substrate and may provide interconnect between the 3D memory device and peripheral devices.”), 11:46–48 (“In some embodiments, dummy source structures 178 may function as interconnects to connect 3D memory device 100 with other peripheral devices.”), 16:63–66 (“When conductive materials are used to fill dummy source hole 212 (e.g., contact 244), the dummy source structure 246 may function as an interconnect to connect 3D memory device 100 with other peripheral devices.”). Our construction of “dummy source structure” is consistent with the Specification, and does not foreclose the dummy source structure from being operational, for example, as an interconnect to peripheral devices. Nor is it inconsistent with the Specification’s teaching that “[i]n some embodiments, dummy source structure 246 may not connect to channel structures in the inner region.” See Req. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:38–44). In the case where the dummy source structure connects with the channel structures, the other end may connect with peripheral devices, or may be a dead end. Thus, even if the dummy source structure is operable as an interconnect to connect the 3D memory device with other peripheral devices, it does not follow that a dummy source structure would function as an interconnect to a supply that provides source to the memory cells. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that we abused our discretion in our construction of the term “dummy source structure.”” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“(Paper 14, “Request” or “Req.”) of our Decision (Paper 13, “Decision” or “Dec.”) denying institution of an inter partes review of claims 7–10 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 10,861,872 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’872 patent”). The Request challenges our determination that the information presented in the Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood of showing that claims 7–10 would have been obvious over the teachings of Park.1 Dec. 19–23.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 10,861,872 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Truesight Communications LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01477 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–14 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the stipulation against denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Statutory Deadline We weigh this factor as favoring the exercise of discretionary denial. The parties agree that the projected statutory deadline for issuing our Final Written Decision (April 23, 2026) is a little more than six months after trial is currently scheduled in the District Court litigation (October 6, 2025). Supp. Br. 4; Prelim. Resp. 19–20. Because the currently scheduled District Court trial is set to begin six months before our deadline to reach a final decision, this factor favors discretionary denial in this case. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. C. Factor 3 – Investment in the Parallel Proceeding We weigh this factor as favoring the exercise of discretionary denial. Showing substantial investment in the District Court litigation, document production is substantially complete and fact discovery will be completed within two weeks of this Decision on Institution. Ex. 2001, 4–5 (Second Amended Docket Control Order). Further, a hearing on claim construction and associated briefing is complete. Id. And, the deadline to serve Institution. Id. at 4. These actions show that there has been notable investment by the parties in the District Court litigation. Furthermore, we must consider this parallel work in relation to the October 6, 2025 District Court litigation trial date, which is six months before the projected statutory deadline of our Final Written Decision. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 10. As work in the District Court litigation has moved beyond preliminary stages into more advanced stages, instituting at this time implicates at least some duplicative costs. See id. On the matter of petition timing, it is often reasonable for a petitioner to wait to file its petition until it learns which claims are being asserted against it in the parallel proceeding. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 11. Here, Petitioner filed its petition on September 27, 2024, which is four months after receiving Patent Owner’s May 29, 2024 disclosure of asserted claims and infringement contentions and nine months after it was served Patent Owner’s December 29, 2023 infringement complaint. Ex. 1017; Ex. 1018, 1. Further, Petitioner served its amended invalidity contentions in the District Court litigation on December 17, 2024, i.e., after it filed its Petition.5 We do not find the timing of the Petition in this case to outweigh the significant investment in the District Court litigation. Considering the substantial investment in the District Court litigation and the rapidly advancing District Court litigation trial date balanced against the timing of the Petition, we determine this factor weighs in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,898,803 - Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 27, 2025 · IPR2025-00049 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Here, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Thus, the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and at least two years of experience working with . . . radio communication systems and machine learning.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Zhi Ding. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. We adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“B. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim is construed using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 9–10. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. Claim 1 recites “generating a pre-distorted radio signal by processing the transmit radio signal using a nonlinear pre-distortion machine learning model.” Ex. 1001, 14:19–24. This portion of claim 1 requires processing a transmit signal using a machine learning model. Id. Claim 1 also recites “updating the model parameters based on a distance metric computed between the transmit radio signal and a received signal that is obtained from the one or more radio receivers.” Id. at 14:30–35. This portion of claim 1 requires updating model parameters based on a distance metric computed using a received signal obtained from a receiver. Id. Thus, together, these portions of claim 1 require updating parameters for a transmit model based on a distance metric computed using a signal obtained from a receiver.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,581,469
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.