- SAP America, Inc. v. Valtrus Innovations Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00417 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied the petitions under § 314(a), declining to institute review.
RulingsDirector review decision- Settled expectationsGranted
“proceedings has been dismissed from the parallel district court proceeding with prejudice. See, e.g., IPR2025-00415, Paper 8, 2–3. As Patent Owner asserts, it is an inefficient use of Board resources to review these challenged patents that have been dismissed from the litigation. See id. In addition, the challenged patents in IPR2025-00415, IPR2025-00417, and IPR2025-00418 have been in force for approximately 20 years, creating strong settled expectations, and Petitioner does not provide any persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an appropriate use of Board resources. Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2–3 (Director June 18, 2025). These circumstances tip the balance in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“proceedings has been dismissed from the parallel district court proceeding with prejudice. See, e.g., IPR2025-00415, Paper 8, 2–3. As Patent Owner asserts, it is an inefficient use of Board resources to review these challenged patents that have been dismissed from the litigation. See id. In addition, the challenged patents in IPR2025-00415, IPR2025-00417, and IPR2025-00418 have been in force for approximately 20 years, creating strong settled expectations, and Petitioner does not provide any persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an appropriate use of Board resources. Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2–3 (Director June 18, 2025). These circumstances tip the balance in favor of discretionary denial. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,823,409 - Phison Electronics Corporation v. Vervain, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00214 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied the petitions under § 314(a), citing the parallel district court’s earlier trial and significant investment.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is appropriate in these proceedings. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialGranted
“Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In consideration of the foregoing, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,997,240 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00155 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, or 19 were unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).1 For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, and 19 of the ’187 patent is unpatentable based on the grounds set forth in the Petition, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex.2001 ¶¶ 60–64). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The failure to use the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The presumption can be overcome and § 112 ¶ 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite[ ] sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. “Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process.” Id. at 1351. “The [tribunal] must first identify the claimed function.” Id. “Then, the [tribunal] must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. There may be multiple claimed functions, each with disclosed corresponding structure. See id. at 1351–52.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner that the term “automatically” in “to automatically disengage the first and second catch structures” means that it is not just the force applied by the user that disengages the first and second catch structures, but also the bias of the mouthpiece that helps to disengage the first and second catch structures. In the first instance, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim itself recites that, upon actuation, the mouthpiece assembly is “release[d]” to “move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Ex. 1001, 21:59–64. This meaning is supported by the Specification which states: “In some examples, the mouthpiece assembly is biased toward the dispensing configuration and thus moves automatically under its bias upon release by the user-release mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 1:64–67. We further agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of “automatic” is that the user operation alone is not responsible for the action. For example, in one dictionary cited by Petitioner, “automatic” is defined as “2: having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism.” See Ex. 2007, 1.11 The district court construction is consistent therewith. The district court identified two functions, the first of which is the same as that of the ’028 patent, i.e., “Automatically disengaging the first and second catch structures upon actuation of the user release mechanism and thereby releasing the mouthpiece assembly to move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Section II.C.1, supra. In discussing that function, the district court states: “While a user may impart force upon user engagement portion 260 to release the mouthpiece, the bias of the mouthpiece towards the dispensing configuration causes the mouthpiece to move automatically, satisfying the requirements of Claim 1.” Ex. 2002, 16. We conclude that the term “automatically” in “adapted to” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,684,187 - Sportradar AG v. Sportscastr Inc. (D/B/A Panda Interactive)Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00268 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial and denied institution under § 314(a), citing the district court’s earlier trial date and investment in that proceeding.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“trial date is January 23, 2026. Id. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision will issue before the district court trial occurs. Furthermore, the parties have made meaningful investment in the district court proceeding. For example, a Markman hearing was held on May 9, 2025, and fact discovery is scheduled to close in August 2025. Id. at 13; DD Req. 6. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial. DD Opp. 6– 7. These considerations favor discretionary denial.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“Petitioner filed the Petition and an accompanying motion for joinder to IPR2024-01308, a proceeding that the Board instituted on March 6, 2025. Genius Sports Ltd. v. SportsCastr Inc. (d/b/a PANDA Interactive), IPR2024-01308, Paper 9 at 61 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2025). 2 The Board first determines whether to institute a proceeding before considering a motion for joinder. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Accordingly, discretionary considerations are first reviewed for the Petition on its own, and then reviewed if joinder were to be granted.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,805,687 - Sportradar AG v. Sportscastr Inc. (D/B/A Panda Interactive)Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00265 · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied institution under § 314(a), citing the district-court schedule and investment and the totality of the circumstances.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“trial date is January 23, 2026. Id. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision will issue before the district court trial occurs. Furthermore, the parties have made meaningful investment in the district court proceeding. For example, a Markman hearing was held on May 9, 2025, and fact discovery is scheduled to close in August 2025. Id. at 13; DD Req. 6. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial. DD Opp. 6– 7. These considerations favor discretionary denial. Second, review of the facts as if joinder were to be granted also favors discretionary denial. The projected final written decision due date for IPR2024-01308, the proceeding that Petitioner seeks to join, is March 6, 2026. Id. at 8.3 Therefore, even if joinder were granted, it is unlikely that a final written decision will issue before the district court trial occurs.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In consideration of the foregoing, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“Petitioner filed the Petition and an accompanying motion for joinder to IPR2024-01308, a proceeding that the Board instituted on March 6, 2025. Genius Sports Ltd. v. SportsCastr Inc. (d/b/a PANDA Interactive), IPR2024-01308, Paper 9 at 61 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2025). 2 The Board first determines whether to institute a proceeding before considering a motion for joinder. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Accordingly, discretionary considerations are first reviewed for the Petition on its own, and then reviewed if joinder were to be granted.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,425,697 - Neogenomics Laboratories, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00455 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial and denied institution under § 314(a), based on the parallel district court proceeding.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“proceeding is August 14, 2026. DD Req. 9. The district court’s scheduled trial date is October 10, 2025, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest trial will begin in February 2026. Id. at 13–14. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding will issue before district court trial occurs. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial. Further, as of the date Patent Owner filed its request, fact discovery was complete, expert discovery was already underway, final invalidity and infringement contentions had been exchanged, and the district court had issued a Markman order. DD Req. 17–21. According to Patent Owner, “[n]early all substantive work other than trial itself will be complete by the time of th[e] institution decision date.” Id. at 18. The substantial time and effort the parties and the district court have invested in the parallel proceeding strongly favors discretionary denial.” slip op. at 2
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the record, and in view of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is appropriate in this proceeding. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,319,596 - Nuvei Technologies, Inc. v. Autoscribe CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00089 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Nuvei did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–27 would have been obvious over either asserted combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“providing” negative limitation of independent claim 1, and the similar negative limitations of independent claims 8, 15, 23, and 25. Accordingly, Nuvei has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on its assertions that the subject matter of independent claims 1, 8, 15, 23, and 25 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Stringfellow and Kloster.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the art “would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years’ experience working with and programming networked computer systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 36). Nuvei also argues that “[a]dditional education might substitute for some experience, and vice versa.” Id. In the Preliminary Response, Autoscribe does not address the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Nuvei’s proposed assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with both the ’621 patent and the asserted prior art, and it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“The supporting testimony from Nuvei’s declarant, Dr. Almeroth, on these issues fare no better. Dr. Almeroth provides no additional explanation beyond the arguments and evidence presented in the Petition to support Nuvei’s assertion that Kloster does not provide the payment data token to the payer during its token retrieval functions. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 100.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“argument that Kloster does not teach the “without providing” negative limitation required by each independent claim. Nuvei appears to contend that Kloster teaches this limitation in two different ways—namely, through either a “call back URL” or “API calls by the merchant.” Pet. 50–51 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 15, 23) (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 24). We address Nuvei’s contentions in turn.” slip op. at 21
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,620,621 - Innolux Corporation v. Phenix Longhorn LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00044 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition violated Rule 42.104(b)(3) and did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5, and 6 were unpatentable as obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) “would have had at least a bachelor of science degree in physics, electrical engineering, or the equivalent thereof and three (3) years of experience in circuit design or display technologies.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). According to Petitioner “[s]uch a POSA would have had knowledge of integrated circuits, gamma correction, and storage of gamma correction voltage values within memory, and would have understood how to search available literature for relevant publications.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. This assessment is consistent with the ’788 Patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“and 5 recites “means for executing.” Ex. 1001, 7:36–40, 8:35–37. The use of the term “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. Consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments (Prelim. Resp. 36–39), the Petition does not address the presumption and, more specifically, the Petition does not provide any argument or evidence as to why the presumption is rebutted. Furthermore, even if we were to consider Petitioner’s newly presented argument that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of ‘means for executing a predetermined algorithm . . . ’ connotes a general-purpose processor, which is understood as structure sufficient to perform the function” (Pet. Reply 5), such argument is not persuasive as it is not supported by evidence earlier presented in the Petition or otherwise. Furthermore, even if the plain and ordinary meaning of means for executing a predetermined algorithm were a general-purpose processor, for a computer implemented means-plus-function term the corresponding structure must be the specific algorithm implemented by the processor as argued by Petitioner. Pet. Reply 6.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,557,788 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Sionyx, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00065 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–44 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the Petition’s strong merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“stipulation would only eliminate the District Court’s consideration of Haddad204. Despite the stipulation, the District Court would still have to consider invalidity of every claim the Petition addresses and would still have to consider the Alie, Baggenstoss, and Park references. Cf. Stellar at 4 (“Petitioner’s invalidity arguments in the district court are more expansive and include combinations of the prior art asserted in these proceedings with unpublished system prior art, which Petitioner’s stipulation is not likely to moot.”). In other words, “Petitioner’s stipulation does not ensure that [this proceeding] would be a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding.” Id. at 3–4. Because of the remaining overlap between the Petition and the District Court proceeding, Fintiv factor four weighs strongly in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“for back side illumination (BSI), which appears to teach or suggest a textured region with surface features “located on the light incident side of the semiconductor layer and configured to interact with incident [EMR].” Pet. 22–27 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 5, ¶¶ 53, 68, 96; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 88–95, 101–107). As Petitioner and its expert explain, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device because BSI devices allow more incident light to reach the semiconductor layer, resulting in more light being absorbed, an increase in the quantum efficiency, and an improvement in the signal to noise ratio. Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 68, 70; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 92, 95). Patent Owner argues that Alie does teach, suggest, or disclose “a textured region comprising a plurality of shallow trench isolation features.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. But it appears Petitioner has at least shown Alie teaches or suggests this element. See discussion supra. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner fails to present any proof that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device. Id. at 11–15. But, in our view, Petitioner has provided an adequate motivation to modify Alie—so that more light will be absorbed, yielding an increase in the quantum efficiency and an improvement in the signal to noise” slip op. at 18
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“17 Petitioner filed petitions for IPR2025-00064 and IPR2025-00065 at the same time. Both petitions address the ’682 patent but apply different art. Patent Owner also argues the second petition (IPR2025-00065) should be denied because one petition is sufficient. Patent Owner’s Response to Petitioner’s Notice Ranking Parallel Petitions, Paper 11. Because we deny institution based on Fintiv discretion, it is not necessary to reach Patent Owner’s multiple petition argument.” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,347,682 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Sionyx, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00064 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–44 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the petition’s strong merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“arguments, and evidence presented in the parallel proceeding.” Fintiv at 12 (emphasis added). “[A] timely-filed Sotera stipulation . . . from a petitioner”—“that, if an IPR . . . is instituted, the petitioner will not pursue in district court . . . any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in the IPR”—“is highly relevant, but will not be dispositive by itself. Instead, the Board will consider such a stipulation as part of its holistic analysis under Fintiv.” March 2025 Fintiv Guidance 2–3. Here, Petitioner’s invalidity contentions in the district court case cover” slip op. at 14
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“18 Petitioner filed petitions for IPR2025-00064 and IPR2025-00065 at the same time. Both petitions address the ’682 patent but apply different art. Patent Owner also argues the second petition (IPR2025-00065) should be denied because one petition is sufficient. Patent Owner’s Response to Petitioner’s Notice Ranking Parallel Petitions, Paper 11. Because we deny institution based on Fintiv discretion, it is not necessary to reach Patent Owner’s multiple petition argument.” slip op. at 22
Discretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,347,682
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.