- Freightcar America, Inc. v. National Steel Car LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-01048 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution in IPR2025-01048 because it was a second, lower-ranked petition challenging the ’515 patent while the higher-ranked petition was referred to the Board.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“The Petition in IPR2025-01048 is the second petition filed by Petitioner against the ’515 patent, and Petitioner ranks the Petition in IPR2025-01047 above the Petition in IPR2025-01048. See IPR2025-01047, Paper 2, 5. In view of this, and the determination to refer the Petition in IPR2025-01047 to the Board, discretionary denial of IPR2025-01048 is appropriate.” slip op. at 4
- Director reviewOther
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the record, and in view of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in IPR2025-01046 and IPR2025-01047 but is appropriate in IPR2025-01048. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,132,515 - Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00157 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of ResMed’s challenge to claims 1–3, 6, and 12–20 under General Plastic because the follow-on petition followed an earlier petition challenging the same claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“We find that in view of Petitioner’s prior petition, this factor favors discretionary denial. Code200 is distinguishable. There, the Board exercised its discretion to deny institution of the earlier petitions under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) based on Fintiv. Code200, Paper 18, 2 n.3. Here, the Board did not discretionarily deny the previous petition, but rather denied it because Petitioner failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a threshold requirement for post-grant review, namely that the patent is eligible for postgrant review. See PGR Dec. 9–10, 24. In evaluating the eligibility issue, the Board thoroughly addressed the merits of Petitioner’s arguments that the ’284 patent claims lack adequate written description and enablement support in the priority applications such that the claims are not entitled to any of the pre-2013 priority dates listed on the face of the patent. See PGR Dec. 10–24. This issue extensively overlapped with Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on lack of written description and enablement in the post-grant petition, which Petitioner included together with prior art challenges. See PGR Dec. 6–7. As such, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, it did have “the opportunity to pursue a decision on the merits,” but failed to carry its burden to secure postgrant review. Prelim. Reply 1 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“institute review. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons explained below, we exercise our discretion to deny institution of this follow-on petition because Petitioner previously filed a post-grant review petition challenging the same claims of the same patent.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenNot reached
“III. REMAINING ISSUES Because we deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and General Plastic, we need not reach the parties’ additional arguments regarding discretionary denial or the merits of Petitioner’s unpatentability challenges.” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,602,284 - Guardant Health, Inc. v. University Of WashingtonInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 31, 2023 · IPR2022-01388 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–27, exercising § 314(a) discretion under General Plastic because the follow-on petition used lessons from earlier petitions and had weak merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“to study a patent owner’s preliminary response to, or the Board’s institution decision on, a prior petition, such that the petitioner would have been in a position to gain a benefit from having that information before filing another petition. General Plastic, Paper 19 at 17. Under this analysis, we disfavor a follow-on petition that “us[es] our decisions as a roadmap.” Id. Petitioner filed this third Petition on August 10, 2022, after Patent Owner filed its Preliminary Responses in the ’449 and ’450 IPRs on May 6, 2022, and after we issued our decisions denying the petitions in those cases on August 1, 2022. 6 Craig et al., Identification of Genetic Variants Using Bar-Coded Multiplexed Sequencing, 5 NATURE METHODS 887–93 (2008) (Ex. 1036, “Craig”). 7 Shiroguchi et al., Digital RNA Sequencing Minimizes Sequence Dependent Bias and Amplification Noise with Optimized Single-Molecule Barcodes, 109 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 1347–52 (2012) (Ex. 1010, “Shiroguchi”). Petitioner nevertheless argues that we should institute review of this third Petition because “the Board never reached the merits of patentability under the prior petition[s],” and Petitioner “derived few if any benefits” from seeing Patent Owner’s preliminary responses and our decisions denying institution in those cases. Pet. 62. We disagree. Below, to explain that this third Petition indeed uses our prior decisions as a roadmap, we: (1) summarize Kinde’s teachings; (2) summarize the parties’ arguments and our decision denying institution in the ’450 IPR; and (3) discuss Petitioner’s arguments in this third Petition.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“Petitioner that this factor favors institution, it would not outweigh considerations under the other six factors, all of which favor denying institution. This is so especially in view of the weak merits, as discussed below. H. The Merits of This Third Petition Are Weak In this third Petition, Petitioner relies on an alleged “Craig Variation” of Kinde’s method. See, e.g., Pet. 10, 26, 35–36. According to Petitioner, “all claims encompass the obvious variation of Kinde’s method utilizing barcoded adapters (i.e., the Craig Variation).” Id. at 26. Patent Owner contends the so-called Craig Variation is “imaginary.” Prelim. Resp. 7. Putting aside that issue, we found in at least three related IPR proceedings that Petitioner did not explain sufficiently why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have introduced Craig’s adapters, which comprises exogenous barcodes, to Kinde’s endogenous method. See IPR2022-00816, Paper 16, 13–15; IPR2022-00935, Paper 11, 32–35; IPR2022-01159, Paper 17, 10–14. In the current Petition, Petitioner relies on substantially the same arguments regarding modifying Kinde’s endogenous UIDs with Craig’s adaptors. In other words, the merits of this third Petition are weak. In sum, the weakness in the merits of this third Petition further favors denying institution.” slip op. at 25
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,689,699 - Apple, Inc. v. Koss Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 13, 2021 · IPR2021-00693 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims, finding no reasonable likelihood of success on the signal-strength claims and declining the duplicative remaining claims for efficiency.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Neither Seshadri nor Seshadri-818 teaches transitioning between sources of digital audio. Seshadri teaches transitioning between two types of wireless communication (e.g., from piconet to WLAN) in order for headphones (wireless headset 10) to continue communicating with the same source (e.g., cellular telephone 36) when the signal strength of the first communication type (e.g., piconet) becomes too low. Ex. 1007 ¶ 42. In another example, Seshadri teaches headset 10 transitioning between one device, wire line telephone 37, and another device, cellular telephone 36. Id. ¶ 44. However, cellular telephone 36 is connected via another path (e.g., the WLAN) to wire line telephone 37 and essentially is acting as a repeater to communicate the telephone information from its source, wire line telephone 37, to headset 10. Id. It is in this context that Seshadri teaches that “headset 10 extends the mobility of its user, extends the range of headset use and expands on headset functionality while preserving privacy and security by seeking service from base units to which it may be registered.” Id. In other words, by using cellular telephone 36 as an intermediary, headset 10 can travel farther away from wire line telephone 37, the source of the phone call, and still communicate with it. This is not, however, an example of transitioning between two sources, as required by claim 58. Wire line telephone 37 still is the only source with which headset 10 communicates in this example. Seshadri-818’s teaching is similar to this second example in Seshadri. Although Seshadri-818 describes transitioning headset 12 from one device to another (e.g., from wire line telephone 14 to cellular telephone 22) based on signal strength, the second device (cellular telephone 22) is used merely as an intermediary between headset 12 and wire line telephone 14 so that the headset can continue to communicate with the wire line telephone, the source of the data. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 11, 26, 49–50. Again, it is in the context of the second device acting as an intermediary between a headset and a single source that Seshadri-818’s invention “extends the mobility of its user, extends the range of headset use and expands on headset functionality.” Id. ¶ 26 (“Thus, a logical connection is established between the universal wireless headset 12 and the wire line telephone 14 via the cellular telephone 22 and access point 24.”). See also id. ¶¶ 11 (“[A] logical connection may be established between the new device and a host device supporting the communication,” with the benefit that “a universal wireless headset is provided that extends the mobility of the user, extends the range of the headset and expands on its functionality.”), 50 (“This enables the universal wireless headset to roam within the local area network and maintain its wireless headset functionally with one of its host devices as it roams.” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied
“The Petition further challenges claims 1–3, 5, 10, 11, 14–16, 19, 23– 25, 28, 32–36, 39, and 42. Pet. 1–2. As noted above, however, each of these claims is challenged in the ’592 IPR on nearly identical grounds. Thus, it would be a waste of resources to institute a duplicative trial on these claims when Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of success in its challenges to the non-overlapping signal strength claims. Accordingly, we exercise discretion and do not institute a trial on this Petition, which Petitioner filed to challenge the signal strength claims. See supra § II.G. 5. Summary Petitioner filed this Petition to challenge the signal strength claims, claims 4, 6, 8, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 26, 27, 29, 31, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 58– 62. See supra § II.G; Notice 2–3. For the reasons addressed above in connection with illustrative signal strength claim 58, Petitioner does not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of the signal strength claims. But for the signal strength claims, this Petition challenges the same claims as the ’592 petition. See supra § II.G; Notice 2–3. Accordingly, in the interest of efficiency and not duplicating the trial based on the ’592 petition, we exercise our discretion and do not institute a trial on this Petition.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“This, however, ignores Petitioner’s asserted evidence of reasons to combine the references, namely, to maintain a connection between a headset and a host while roaming within a WLAN network that is wider than the piconet that could be established between the headset and that host. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 44; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 26, 50; Ex. 1003 ¶ 103). Specifically, Petitioner relies on Seshadri’s and Seshadri-818’s similar “use-case[s] in which this transition between two different devices would be useful,” namely the examples in which a cellular phone is used as an intermediary between a headset and a wire line telephone, with the wire line telephone serving as the single source. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 44; 8 The Dissent also argues that a skilled artisan would have made the combination because the headset receiving some audio would have been better than it receiving no audio. We do not read the Petition as having made this argument. Ex. 1013 ¶ 26).9 Dr. Cooperstock repeats this reasoning in his testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105. Thus, Petitioner’s asserted evidence of reasons to combine, taken directly from the two Seshadri references, describes the benefits of maintaining the connection between a headset and a single source (i.e., the host device), and transitioning between devices to maintain that connection. Petitioner does not present persuasive evidence of reasons to transition a headset from playing digital content from one source to playing digital content from another source while roaming within a WLAN, e.g., transitioning among a phone call on a cellular phone, a podcast on a PDA, streaming music on a PC, and an audio book on a laptop computer as the user moves from room to room in their house, changing proximity of the headset to the various devices. Even Petitioner’s citation to Haupt does not provide such evidence. As noted above, Petitioner’s theory for claim limitation 58[h] (“wherein the processor is configured to, upon activation of a user-control of the headphone assembly, initiate transmission of a request to a remote, network-connected server that is in wireless communication 9 Petitioner’s argument, cited by the Dissent, that the method of Seshadri- 818’s Figure 8 “would ensure that the headset only transitions to a better connection and therefore improves audio transmission to the headset,” PO Resp. 30, is still in the context of maintaining a connection between a headset and a single source. In particular, the testimony of Dr. Cooperstock cited to support this argument continues that “[n]otably, Seshadri-818 teaches making a ‘determination’ about ‘which device, or access point, to hand the communication off to’ and discloses an example of ‘determin[ing] that device K is to facilitate the ongoing communication.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 101 (quoting Ex. 1013 ¶ 40). Paragraphs 39 and 40 of Seshadri-818 describe communication between headset 12 and device C, first using access point H, which has a logical connection to device C, and second using device K, which has a logical connection to device C. with the mobile, digital audio player”) has Seshadri’s PDA 30 and cellular telephone 36 both communicating and receiving audio files from the same server (i.e., the same source) “in the same manner as the operating element BE taught by Haupt.” Pet. 26. Here, Petitioner refers to the server, not either PDA 30 or cellphone 36, as “a source for the audio streams to which Seshadri teaches the base units 16 have access.” Id. at 26–27.” slip op. at 26
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner also constructs an “alternative example” or “additional configuration” in which Haupt’s headset hands off streamed audio from one playback device to another based on signal strength, e.g., “transition[ing] from playing streaming audio (e.g., internet radio) from Seshadri’s cellphone 36 to Seshadri’s PDA 30 as the headphones/headset move out of piconet range of the cellphone 36 and into piconet range of the PDA 30.” Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 106). Petitioner’s alternative theory rests on Dr. Cooperstock’s testimony which, in turn, merely repeats the Petition’s arguments without providing any basis for the testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶ 106. Here, Petitioner appears to rely on Seshadri’s general teaching that a headset could communicate with any one of several devices (Ex. 1007 ¶ 43 (“Wireless headset 10 may establish a piconet with any one of the devices 30–37.”)); that more than one of these devices would have been capable of transmitting digital audio content to the headset (id. ¶ 67); and that Seshadri-818 includes a general teaching of transitioning from one device to another based on signal strength (Ex. 1013 ¶ 50). A user wearing the headset, then, would roam from device to device, giving the user wider range of movement. The Dissent appears to accept this reasoning.8” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,469,934 - Snap Inc. v. Blackberry LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 13, 2020 · IPR2020-00392 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on § 314(a) discretionary grounds and denied joinder, citing the concluded district court case, prior petition, and delay in filing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered both the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we exercise our delegated discretion, under 35 U.S.C. § 314, to deny the Petition in this proceeding. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review. Because we deny institution of the Petition, we also deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“The precedential Fintiv Order identifies several factors to be considered in analyzing § 314(a) issues, with the goal of balancing efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. See Fintiv Order, Paper 11 at 5–6. These factors include: 1) whether a stay exists or is likely to be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2) proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline; 3) investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and parties; 4) overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6) other circumstances and considerations that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“As noted above, Petitioner filed IPR2019-00829 on March 25, 2019, which was already near the end of Petitioner’s statutory period. We denied institution on the merits on October 1, 2019. The Challenged Claims were part of this prior petition. Petitioner’s second petition, the current Petition, was filed on January 3, 2020. At that time, Petitioner had already received the Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response in IPR2019-00829 as well as our decision denying institution. Petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the current Petition at least as of April 6, 2019 – the date Facebook filed its petition in IPR2019-00940. Prelim. Resp. 3; Ex. 2001. Thus, Petitioner waited at least nine months after learning of the asserted prior art to bring the second petition. These factors favor exercising our discretion to deny institution. General Plastic Factors 5–7 Petitioner’s explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to nearly the same claims of the same patent consists of the following: Petitioner is also unaware of any basis under § 314(a) for the Board to decline to consider this Petition. As discussed in section I.B., Facebook previously filed an IPR petition challenging the ’929 patent on April 6, 2019. (Ex. 1022). Snap obtained Facebook’s petition, after it was filed and publicly available, from the Patent Office. Snap’s petition is a substantively identical copy of Facebook’s ’929 petition. (See Ex. 1022). Pet. 3. Petitioner does not address why we should institute a petition challenging claims that have already been disclaimed or found unpatentable by a district court. Petitioner also does not address the delay in bringing the current Petition even though Petitioner was aware of the prior art for at least nine months. The facts of this proceeding are unique, and Petitioner has not explained adequately why we should not exercise our discretion to deny this Petition.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“not obligate us to institute in this proceeding without first considering whether to exercise discretion. The statutory provision governing joinder in inter partes review proceedings is 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), which reads: If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. Two clauses within 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) are the source of discretion to deny joinder. The first states “the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party.” Thus, joinder is not required, but remains discretionary. Second, the statute requires an additional step. Acting under delegated authority from the Director, we first determine whether the petition warrants the institution of an inter partes review under § 314. Id. (“the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”). The statute allows for a patent owner preliminary response, and we read 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) as requiring us to consider all of patent owner’s arguments, including those related to discretionary denial under section 314(a).” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,676,929 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Promptu Systems Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2018 · CBM2018-00033 · APJ Karl D Easthom · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 14–52, exercising discretion because Comcast advanced a conflicting claim construction in concurrent proceedings.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“Petitioner argues the Board should not exercise its discretion to deny this CBM Petition based on the ’344 and ’345 Petitions, because “the grounds for unpatentability identified in this petition are different than the grounds for unpatentability identified in the IPR petitions—indeed, the grounds for unpatentability raised here are not permitted in an IPR proceeding,” and Patent Owner had “not yet filed a preliminary response to the pending IPR petitions challenging the ’196 Patent.” Pet. 4, n.1 (citing General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357, slip op. at 16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (identifying relevant factors)). Nevertheless, as Patent Owner argues, General Plastic cites a non-exhaustive list of factors. See Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Petitioner fails to explain why it filed this CBM 2 “Congress enacted § 112, ¶ 6, in response to Halliburton,” 329 U.S. at 1. Warner–Jenkinson Co. Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997). Petition (filed April 2, 2018) about three and a half months after it filed the ’344 and ’345 Petitions (both filed Dec. 19, 2017) with competing claim construction arguments that impact central aspects of both trials. Petitioner’s implied argument that Congress only authorized certain grounds for inter partes reviews and limited other grounds to CBM reviews (e.g., § 112, ¶ 2), fails to explain sufficiently why the Board should entertain Petitioner’s new claim construction that potentially would impact central and major aspects of the concurrent ’344 and ’345 IPRs instituted based on a prior contradictory claim construction advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“A potential consequence of instituting the instant CBM based on Petitioner’s arguments related to the scope issue raised by Patent Owner involves at least raising the related issue of whether to terminate the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. See BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013- 00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65) (citing In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) and reasoning that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims”). Petitioner does not propose terminating the ’344 and ’345 IPRs in the event that we decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding. Without terminating the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, instituting the instant CBM proceeding based on Petitioner’s means plus function arguments would result in different Board panels proceeding under two contradictory claim constructions on a central issue––i.e., for the same claim term of the same patent, involving all of the challenged claims in the CBM and a slight majority of the collectively challenged claims in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. The Board’s reviewing court disfavors conflicting “reasoning on a point . . . central to [the Board’s] analysis” absent an adequate explanation for the conflict. See Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC, No. 2017-1866, 2018 WL 4145081, slip op. at *3 (Aug. 29, 2018 Fed. Cir.) (“Because the Board did not adequately explain its reasoning on a point that was central to its analysis and its conclusion on that point was contrary to another Board opinion on nearly identical facts, we vacate the Board’s determination as to the appealed claims and remand for further proceedings.”) (nonprecedential); Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 869 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]here a panel simultaneously issues opinions on the same technical issue between the same parties on the same record, and reaches opposite results without explanation, we think the best course is to vacate and remand these findings for further consideration.”). As noted above, Petitioner does not present an adequate explanation for the contradictory claim constructions. Whether a recitation constitutes a means-plus-function element does not depend on whether the claim is construed in an inter partes review or a covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, based on the particular circumstances involved as discussed above, we decline to decide whether to adopt Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position asserted here. On one hand, if we decided to adopt it and institute a CBM review on that basis, concurrent trials would proceed on diametrically opposed claim construction positions––unless the panel in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs decided to terminate those trials based on our adoption of the diametrically opposed claim construction asserted here. At the least, even without a termination the ’344 and ’345 IPRs, the diametrically opposed positions would infiltrate the three proceedings and raise collateral issues, undermining the Board’s resources and effort “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). On the other hand, if we decide Petitioner’s showing here lacks sufficient support on the merits for purposes of a CBM review, a decision denying institution may serve to advise the parties on this limited record that Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs appears to be correct even though no final decision has been reached there yet.” slip op. at 11
- BurdenNot reached
“As presented, Petitioner advances the second and third theories of unpatentability as contingent upon not adopting its central argument that “program steps” represents a means plus function term. Because we do not decide the issue of whether “program steps” constitutes a means plus function term, we decline Petitioner’s invitation to investigate further its second and third contingent theories. In addition, given the prominence of the means plus function claim construction issue raised by the parties, in the event we were to decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding, the means plus function issue likely would dominate the CBM trial and may impact the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, as discussed above.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,047,196 - Viptela, Inc. v. Fatpipe Networks Private LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 3, 2017 · IPR2017-01125 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 4–15, 19, and 22–24, exercising discretion under §§ 314(a) and 325(d) based on overlapping petitions, follow-on arguments, and inefficient use of resources.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“’684 IPR, which in turn was a “copy-cat” of the ’976 IPR petition. Prelim. Resp. 2, 5. However, in deciding whether we should exercise our discretion and decline to go forward with this Petition, our concern is not only whether “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office,” as expressed in § 325(d), but also whether other factors weigh in favor of denying institution in light of the discretion afforded to us pursuant to § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“whether at the time of filing of the ’684 petition, Petitioner knew, or should have known, of Pearce, Zhang, and McCullough (“the Additional References”); the length of time that elapsed between learning of the Additional References, and the filing of the instant Petition; whether Petitioner has provided adequate explanation for the time lapse; whether at the time of filing of the instant Petition, Petitioner already had access to Patent Owner’s response in the ’976 IPR; and the finite resources of the Board. See Gen. Plastic Indus. at 16 (Paper 19) (informative). Petitioner provides no explanation of whether it knew or should have known of the Additional References when filing the ’684 petition; of when it first learned of these references; or of any time lapse between learning of these references and the filing of the instant Petition.” slip op. at 13
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“August 14, 2017, and a final decision is due by November 2, 2017. At this point, the decision in the ’976 IPR as to whether to see the matter through to final determination is squarely in our hands, regardless of whether any settlement is reached between the parties. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) (“The parties may agree to settle any issue in a proceeding, but the Board is not a party to the settlement and may independently determine any question of jurisdiction, patentability, or Office practice.”). Thus, if we deem it appropriate, we can reach a final decision on the grounds presented in the ’976 IPR with or without participation from the parties in that matter. These facts weigh in favor of us exercising our discretion not to move forward with the instant Petition, at least with respect to the ’976 instituted claims insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’976 IPR, because the issues raised are fully briefed and ripe for a final decision in the ’976 IPR, and Petitioner’s non-participation in that proceeding is at best neutral to our analysis. Petitioner is a party to the ’684 IPR, and in that proceeding the petition is directed to the same claims of the same patent as in this Petition. This fact weighs in favor of us not moving forward with the instant Petition. Also, at least with respect to the ’684 instituted claims, insofar as Petitioner’s arguments relate to Karol and are substantially identical to those in the ’684 IPR, Petitioner has the opportunity to address the same art and arguments in the ’684 proceeding. It would be an inefficient use of Office resources, and would run counter to securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the challenges to the patentability of the ’235 patent, if we were to allow Petitioner to proceed on the same art and arguments in two separate proceedings.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits a list of terms for which Patent Owner has proposed construction in a co-pending district court case. Pet. 7–8. Petitioner, however, asserts that for the purposes of this Decision no terms need to be construed. Id. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. We reviewed the parties’ arguments, and, for the purposes of this Decision, we have determined that no terms require express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,775,235
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.