- Google LLC v. Advanced Coding Technologies LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-01000 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution under § 314(a), citing likely district court trial before the projected final written decision, settled expectations, and the holistic record.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“In particular, the projected final written decision due date in the Board proceeding is December 11, 2026. DD Req. 6 n.1. The district court’s scheduled trial date is March 2, 2026, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest trial will begin between July 2026 and October 2026. Id. at 6–7; DD Opp. 45–48. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding will issue before district court trial occurs, resulting in significant duplication of effort, additional expense for the parties, and a risk of inconsistent decisions.” slip op. at 2
- Settled expectationsInstitution denied settled expectationsDenied
“In addition, the challenged patents have been in force for thirteen, seven, and six years, creating settled expectations for Patent Owner, and Petitioner does not provide persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an appropriate use of Board resources. Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2–3 (Director June 18, 2025). Additionally, Petitioner’s arguments that the Office made a material error during prosecution are not persuasive. See DD Opp. 29–38.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for patent owner
“seven, and six years, creating settled expectations for Patent Owner, and Petitioner does not provide persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an appropriate use of Board resources. Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2–3 (Director June 18, 2025). Additionally, Petitioner’s arguments that the Office made a material error during prosecution are not persuasive. See DD Opp. 29–38.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,218,995 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. Optronic Sciences LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00239 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied institution under § 314(a), citing the district court schedule and Patent Owner’s settled expectations.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Granted
“particular, the projected final written decision due date for each of these cases is in October 2026. DD Req. 5. The district court’s scheduled trial date is May 4, 2026, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest that the trial would begin in July 2026. Id. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in these proceedings will issue before the district court trial occurs, resulting in significant duplication of effort, additional expenses for the parties, and a risk of inconsistent decisions. Further, the challenged patents 1 Citations are to papers in IPR2025-00238. The parties filed similar papers in IPR2025-00239. have been in force for approximately twelve years, creating strong settled expectations for Patent Owner. These considerations favor discretionary denial, and outweigh the considerations that counsel against it.” slip op. at 2
- Settled expectationsGranted
“Petitioner argues it has settled expectations that the challenged patents would not be asserted against it because the challenged patents are directed to technology that is fundamentally different from what Petitioner uses in its products. DD Opp. 9–13. Therefore, Petitioner contends it had no reason to challenge the claims of the patents in these proceedings until Patent Owner asserted the challenged patents in district court. Id. at 12.” slip op. at 2
- Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied
“Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In consideration of the foregoing, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,502,757 - SAP America, Inc. v. Valtrus Innovations Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00417 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied the petitions under § 314(a), declining to institute review.
RulingsDirector review decision- Settled expectationsGranted
“proceedings has been dismissed from the parallel district court proceeding with prejudice. See, e.g., IPR2025-00415, Paper 8, 2–3. As Patent Owner asserts, it is an inefficient use of Board resources to review these challenged patents that have been dismissed from the litigation. See id. In addition, the challenged patents in IPR2025-00415, IPR2025-00417, and IPR2025-00418 have been in force for approximately 20 years, creating strong settled expectations, and Petitioner does not provide any persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an appropriate use of Board resources. Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2–3 (Director June 18, 2025). These circumstances tip the balance in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“proceedings has been dismissed from the parallel district court proceeding with prejudice. See, e.g., IPR2025-00415, Paper 8, 2–3. As Patent Owner asserts, it is an inefficient use of Board resources to review these challenged patents that have been dismissed from the litigation. See id. In addition, the challenged patents in IPR2025-00415, IPR2025-00417, and IPR2025-00418 have been in force for approximately 20 years, creating strong settled expectations, and Petitioner does not provide any persuasive reasoning why an inter partes review is an appropriate use of Board resources. Dabico Airport Sols. Inc. v. AXA Power ApS, IPR2025-00408, Paper 21 at 2–3 (Director June 18, 2025). These circumstances tip the balance in favor of discretionary denial. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,823,409 - Phison Electronics Corporation v. Vervain, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00214 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied the petitions under § 314(a), citing the parallel district court’s earlier trial and significant investment.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is appropriate in these proceedings. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialGranted
“Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In consideration of the foregoing, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,997,240 - Neogenomics Laboratories, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00455 · APJ Coke Morgan Stewart · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial and denied institution under § 314(a), based on the parallel district court proceeding.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“proceeding is August 14, 2026. DD Req. 9. The district court’s scheduled trial date is October 10, 2025, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest trial will begin in February 2026. Id. at 13–14. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding will issue before district court trial occurs. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial. Further, as of the date Patent Owner filed its request, fact discovery was complete, expert discovery was already underway, final invalidity and infringement contentions had been exchanged, and the district court had issued a Markman order. DD Req. 17–21. According to Patent Owner, “[n]early all substantive work other than trial itself will be complete by the time of th[e] institution decision date.” Id. at 18. The substantial time and effort the parties and the district court have invested in the parallel proceeding strongly favors discretionary denial.” slip op. at 2
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the record, and in view of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is appropriate in this proceeding. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,319,596 - Solus Advanced Materials Co, Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01460 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–11 because the Fintiv factors, including the early trial date and close merits case, favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“whether to institute an inter partes review. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not institute an inter partes review unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review. A. Real Parties-in-Interest” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Board’s projected statutory deadline to issue a final written decision. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 9. “If the court’s trial date is at or around the same time as the projected statutory deadline . . . the decision whether to institute will likely implicate other factors.” Id. Conversely, “[i]f the court’s trial date is earlier than the projected statutory deadline,” this has generally weighed “in favor of exercising authority to deny institution.” Id.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art and arguments were before the Examiner during prosecution and Petitioner’s has not demonstrated that the Examiner erred in a material manner when allowing the claims. Pet. 17–18. Given our discretionary denial of the Petition in view of the Fintiv factors, we do not address Petitioner’s further arguments with respect to § 325(d).” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s recited level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan for purposes of this decision as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,480,090 - PTAB · Apr 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01379 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claim 20, finding that the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial under § 314(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“(which we address in more detail below) turns on the determination of the meaning of the claim term “periodically.” We note that the District Court has construed the term “periodically monitor” to mean “monitor at regular intervals of time.” See Sec. II.C below. Given this construction, which we preliminarily agree with at this stage, we cannot agree with Petitioner that the Petition presents “a strong case for obviousness.” Thus, we find that Factor 6 weighs in favor of exercising discretionary denial.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“periodically” as it is used in claim 20, with Petitioner arguing that “periodically’ means “repeated . . . over time” and Patent Owner arguing that “periodically” means “at fixed intervals.” See Pet. 25; Prelim. Resp. 8. Our preliminary determination of the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “periodically” as it is used in claim 20 substantially impacts our view of the merits in this case as this issue is the principal one raised by Patent Owner in its Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. 5–22. slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears consistent with the subject matter of the ’996 patent. This is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 55–56. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision, with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” to keep the description from being vague and extending to a level reflecting that of an expert. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 18
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,809,996 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Dell Inc. et al. v. Universal Connectivity Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01482 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1, 2, 4, 8–10, 12, 13, 15, 18–20, and 25, exercising § 314(a) discretion after balancing the Fintiv factors and finding the merits not particularly strong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied
“partes review “allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts,” and strongly weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Of the three district court proceedings, the Lenovo Group case, pending in the Eastern District of Texas, is the most significant to our analysis here. In the Lenovo Group case, Lenovo Group has not requested a stay. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner argues that the Lenovo Group case is not likely to be stayed based on that court’s low grant rate in other cases and the progress of that case in particular. Id. at 17. The district court in the HP case denied a stay without prejudice and stated that a stay could be reconsidered in the future depending on the outcome at the PTAB. Prelim. Reply 3. The Dell case has been stayed. Id. On this record, we decline to speculate as to how any of the involved district courts where no stay is pending might rule on any future motion to stay. Thus, we determine that, while one stay has been granted, the lack of a stay in the other underlying district court cases, especially the Lenovo Group case, is not sufficiently persuasive to weigh this factor against exercising discretion. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative), cautions against speculating whether the district court would grant a stay if one were requested. Therefore, this factor has a neutral effect on the overall balancing of the Fintiv factors. B. Proximity of Trial Date to Projected Statutory Deadline (Factor 2) The scheduled trial date for the Lenovo Group case is November 3, 2025, which is about six months prior to the expected date for the final written decision here (i.e., late April 2026). See Prelim. Resp. 20; IPR2024- 01429, Ex. 2002 (Lenovo Group case Docket Control Order), 1. Petitioner argues this trial date is uncertain. Prelim. Reply 3. Further, Petitioner focuses its argument on what it terms a “growing backlog” in the Eastern District of Texas and “associated scheduling uncertainty.” Id. at 4. Petitioner refers to the status of the HP case, which is currently set for trial on September 21, 2026, and the stay in the Dell case. Id. Patent Owner responds that “[b]oth the scheduled trial date and the date of trial [in the Lenovo Group case] based on median time-to-trial statistics occur months before a final written decision would be expected here.” Prelim. Sur-reply 4. Patent Owner asserts that the time-to-trial statistics for the Eastern District of Texas project a median time-to-trial of 21.9 months. Prelim. Resp. 20–21 (citing Ex. 2007, U.S. District Courts Federal Court Management Statistics–Profiles—September 30, 2024). This projection yields a trial date that is prior to the expected final written decision date of April 2026. Prelim. Sur-reply 4. As with the previous factor, the status of the Lenovo Group case is our focus here. As stated, that trial is set to occur about six months before a final written decision would issue in this proceeding. The district court has stated that this trial date setting “cannot be changed without an acceptable showing of good cause.” Prelim. Resp. 20. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s unsupported argument that the trial date is uncertain. We also consider the fact that the median time-to-trial statistic discussed by both parties projects a trial date earlier than the actual date set by the district court. Ex. 2007; Prelim. Sur-reply 1. The fact that the time-to-trial statistic is earlier than the trial date set in the Lenovo Group case confirms that the schedule set by the district court is credible and should be given weight. From this evidence, we are persuaded that we should rely on the trial” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“E. Conclusion Regarding the Merits Petitioner does not present particularly strong merits. Petitioner’s arguments on the “bus limitation,” to succeed at trial, would require addressing a claim construction issue that was never addressed in the Petition and is arguably contradicted by the ’520 patent, which discloses transmitting packets representing a plurality of different control signals on a single bus. See Prelim. Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:34–38, 9:23–25, 9:50–54). Similarly, prevailing on the “modified protocol” issue would require proving that the HDMI–C protocol, which uses the same separate channel arrangement for CEC and DDC as standard HDMI, is sufficiently “modified” to meet the claim. Taking into account Patent Owner’s persuasive arguments supra in response, and for the reasons given, we do not find the merits of Petitioner’s position on either of these dispositive issues to be particularly strong.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party proposes claim constructions for our consideration. Petitioner submits that it “for the purposes of this proceeding, the terms of the challenged claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and no terms require specific construction.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s position that no terms require construction. Prelim. Resp. 11–12. We determine there are no claim terms that need to be expressly construed for this Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner states that a person of ordinary skill “would have the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training and three years of work experience with data communications systems or interfaces, including at least some experience with serial or display data communications systems or interfaces .” Prelim. Resp. 12. The differences between these nearly-identical definitions are minor and immaterial to our decision. We regard either description as consistent with the challenged patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,856,520 - PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Comcast’s rehearing request and left in place denial of institution after finding no abuse of discretion in its construction and compelling-merits analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 90 (Nov. 2019) (hereinafter, “CTPG”).5 In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); CTPG 90.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).6 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,7 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny and instituted trial. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16. In our Rehearing Decision, however, we agreed with Patent Owner that we erred in determining the claim terms “first format” and “second format” are not limited to different formats, and determined that the proper construction of these claim terms indeed requires the two formats to be different formats. Reh’g Dec. 5–9, 19. Applying the proper construction, we further determined that none of Petitioner’s asserted challenges presents compelling merits of unpatentability as to any claim of the ’751 patent, 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_ proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20 220621_.pdf. 7 Our analysis of the first five Fintiv factors in our First Institution Decision remains undisturbed on rehearing. contrary to our initial determination in the Institution Decision. Id. at 19–20. Having determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and that the Petition does not meet the compelling merits standard of the Guidance Memo under the sixth Fintiv factor, we modified our decision and denied institution on rehearing. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“Contrary to Petitioner’s position, Patent Owner met its burden of showing that our Institution Decision should be modified. In our Institution Decision, we relied on claim differentiation when we determined that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. Inst. Dec. 31. We did not consider the prosecution history, which was part of the record. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have held that a court ‘should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’”). As we noted in our Rehearing Decision, however, the Federal Circuit has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” Reh’g Dec. 8 (quoting Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The Federal Circuit also has explained that “[a]lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.” Id. at 13 (quoting Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). In other words, we erred in not considering the prosecution history, which led to our erroneous conclusion that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. See Ex. 1104, 170 (prosecution history). Our Institution Decision was based on this erroneous conclusion of law, as Patent Owner argued, and we modified it accordingly.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“claim 1. As discussed above with respect to limitation 1D, Petitioner asserted that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Reh’g Dec. 12–13 (quoting Pet. 31). In other words, both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device translate commands. With respect to claim 5, Petitioner asserted that Mahajan’s abstraction module could operate at Danciu’s server. Pet. 43. Even if Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) could operate at Danciu’s server, Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to modify Danciu’s system to locate Mahajan’s abstraction module at the server, especially where both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device already translate commands. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). Petitioner does not point to anything in its analysis of claim 5 that demonstrates we misapprehended or overlooked a matter.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,048,751 - PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01142 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, and 18 under § 314(a), concluding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“denial because district court is very likely to address patentability issues at trial before we would issue a final written decision. Factors 3 and 4 weigh marginally against discretionary denial. Factor 5 either weighs in favor of discretionary denial or is neutral, but even if it were neutral, factor 2 alone outweighs the marginal weight of factors 3 and 4. Based on our assessment, we determine that Fintiv Factors 1–5 favor exercising discretion to deny institution. With that determination in mind, we proceed to evaluate Fintiv Factor 6. G. Fintiv Factor 6: Other Circumstances that Impact the Board’s Exercise” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot reached
“We further note that Petitioner’s general view that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jung to arrive at the pertinent limitation is not well supported and somewhat circular. See Pet. 42–43. It is inadequately explained why a skilled artisan would have reasonably sought to modify Jung so that it then “expressly teaches” what is required by the claims, as is advanced by Petitioner. See id. at 42. It is a dubious proposition that simply seeking to account for the requirements of the challenged claims serves as suitable reasoning that would have prompted modification of the “express[] teach[ings]” of a reference.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’868 patent (“POSITA”) would have had a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems. Ex-1003, ¶ 48. A POSITA would also have familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks. Id. More education may supplement practical experience or vice versa. Id. Pet. 20–21. Patent Owner does not offer an assessment of its own, or dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. For this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“proceeding. See Pet. 12. Patent Owner provides a construction of the phrase “to derive, based on a beam reference signal of the network beam, a UE beam,” which Patent Owner contends is not necessary to substantiate its arguments, but is offered to “elucidate[] the distinction between the ’868 Patent and the alleged prior art from the reasons” offered by Patent Owner in its Preliminary Response. PO Resp. 8. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the above-noted phrase means “selecting a UE beam from a plurality of candidate UE beams based on a beam reference signal of the network beam.” Id. Patent Owner explains the basis for its proposed construction of the relevant phrase through citation to content of the ’868 patent including Figures 21 and 22 of the patent along with description of those Figures. See Prelim. Resp. 8–10. In reviewing the basis for Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction, we conclude that the construction has ample and adequate support in the record before us. We determine that no other claim term need be addressed expressly See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,887,868
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.