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  • PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00084 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–12 under § 314(a), finding that holistic Fintiv balancing favored denial because of the early district court trial and substantial investment.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv at 5–6. “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. (citing Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (November 2019), 58).5” slip op. at 9

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,219,000
  • PTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00010 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–14, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the balance of factors favored denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “2. Factor 2: ITC Final Determination Date Fintiv provides that an ITC trial date that is earlier than the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision may favor discretionary denial if the ITC is going to decide the same or substantially similar issues to those presented in the petition. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 8. The Guidance Memo further provides that “the Board is more likely to deny institution where the ITC’s projected final determination date is earlier than the Board’s deadline to issue a final written decision.” Guidance Memo 2. Here, the ITC has set the target date for its final determination to March 2, 2026. Ex. 2010, 3 (ITC Order Amending the Procedural Schedule). Our final written decision would be due almost three months later, in late May 2026, should we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 8

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,070,755
  • PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00036 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–18, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the parallel district court case favored efficient and timely resolution.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “We are not swayed by Petitioner’s speculation as to the trial date for the parallel district court proceeding as well as arguments regarding trial dates for the other two district court proceedings. Due to the actual trial date of the parallel district court proceeding having been set to occur more than seven months before an expected final written decision in this proceeding, as well as a projected trial date based on time-to-trial statistics of more than six months before an expected final written decision, we determine that the considerations of the second Fintiv factor weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “factors. Because the analysis is fact-driven and we take a holistic view of the factors, no single factor is determinative of whether we exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314(a). The parallel district court trial date set more than six months before an expected final written decision and the significant investment by the court and parties in the parallel district court proceeding weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. Petitioner’s stipulation, however, allays to some extent concerns regarding duplication of efforts and the possibility of conflicting decisions and weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. Of the remaining factors, we find only that Petitioner and defendant being the same to weigh in favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. After careful consideration and holistically balancing all of the considerations of the Fintiv factors, on this record, we determine that the evidence before us warrants exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. III. CONCLUSION We exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 18

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,627,631
  • PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, and 11, exercising discretion under § 314(a) based on the Fintiv factors.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

      “the parallel district court proceeding as well as arguments regarding potential trial dates for the other two district court proceedings. Due to the actual trial date of the parallel district court proceeding having been set to occur more than seven months before an expected final written decision in this proceeding, as well as a projected trial date based on time-to-trial statistics of more than six months before an expected final written decision, we determine that the considerations of the second Fintiv factor weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “Accordingly, we determine that the evidence of record favors exercising our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of an inter partes review. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the evidence of record favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). IV. ORDER It is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 16

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,616,932
  • PTAB · Apr 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01465 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–19 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors overall favored discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “As noted above, the district court has set a trial date of October 6, 2025, which is almost seven months before the final written decision in this proceeding would be due in late April 2026. Although a number of cases may be scheduled for jury selection on the same day as the District Court Litigation, nothing in the record indicates a trial in the District Court Litigation would not take place months before our deadline to reach a final decision. Because the District Court Litigation will address the issues relating to the validity of the ’750 patent in a trial scheduled to occur several months before we would issue a final written decision, we weigh the second Fintiv factor as favoring discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,087,750
  • PTAB · Apr 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01464 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1–18 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors overall favored discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5–6. In considering these factors, we apply the guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding “Guidance on USPTO’s recission of ‘Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation,’” issued by the Chief Administrative Patent Judge of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board on March 24, 2025 (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).7” slip op. at 5

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,393,461
  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Comcast’s rehearing request and left in place denial of institution after finding no abuse of discretion in its construction and compelling-merits analysis.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 90 (Nov. 2019) (hereinafter, “CTPG”).5 In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); CTPG 90.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

      “discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).6 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,7 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny and instituted trial. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16. In our Rehearing Decision, however, we agreed with Patent Owner that we erred in determining the claim terms “first format” and “second format” are not limited to different formats, and determined that the proper construction of these claim terms indeed requires the two formats to be different formats. Reh’g Dec. 5–9, 19. Applying the proper construction, we further determined that none of Petitioner’s asserted challenges presents compelling merits of unpatentability as to any claim of the ’751 patent, 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_ proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20 220621_.pdf. 7 Our analysis of the first five Fintiv factors in our First Institution Decision remains undisturbed on rehearing. contrary to our initial determination in the Institution Decision. Id. at 19–20. Having determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and that the Petition does not meet the compelling merits standard of the Guidance Memo under the sixth Fintiv factor, we modified our decision and denied institution on rehearing. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 4

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

      “Contrary to Petitioner’s position, Patent Owner met its burden of showing that our Institution Decision should be modified. In our Institution Decision, we relied on claim differentiation when we determined that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. Inst. Dec. 31. We did not consider the prosecution history, which was part of the record. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have held that a court ‘should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’”). As we noted in our Rehearing Decision, however, the Federal Circuit has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” Reh’g Dec. 8 (quoting Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The Federal Circuit also has explained that “[a]lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.” Id. at 13 (quoting Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). In other words, we erred in not considering the prosecution history, which led to our erroneous conclusion that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. See Ex. 1104, 170 (prosecution history). Our Institution Decision was based on this erroneous conclusion of law, as Patent Owner argued, and we modified it accordingly.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “claim 1. As discussed above with respect to limitation 1D, Petitioner asserted that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Reh’g Dec. 12–13 (quoting Pet. 31). In other words, both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device translate commands. With respect to claim 5, Petitioner asserted that Mahajan’s abstraction module could operate at Danciu’s server. Pet. 43. Even if Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) could operate at Danciu’s server, Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to modify Danciu’s system to locate Mahajan’s abstraction module at the server, especially where both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device already translate commands. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). Petitioner does not point to anything in its analysis of claim 5 that demonstrates we misapprehended or overlooked a matter.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,048,751
  • PTAB · Oct 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing

    Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted; the Petition was denied and no trial instituted because the challenges did not meet the compelling-merits standard under Fintiv.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Our reviewing court has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.’” Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 228 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).5 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,6 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “those arguments. See Inst. Dec. 45–47. As to Petitioner’s arguments on the claimed first and second formats of limitation 1D in particular, we found the record provided “some support” for Petitioner’s position that “it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that one or more RTS Media Abstraction Modules could operate at a server, such as in [Aldrey’s] Service Provider Network 103,” even though Petitioner asserted that Mahajan teaches command conversion at the client. Id. at 45–46 (citing Pet. 66–67). Yet assuming Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could have operated at a server, as Petitioner argued, it is not readily apparent why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating the RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server based on Mahajan’s disclosure of command conversion at a client. See also Pet. 66 (“[I]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that the RTS Media Abstraction Module could be located on the client or server.” (emphasis added)). Nor did Petitioner adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server. We note Petitioner further argued that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 68; see also id. at 67 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating command conversion at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 66–68. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider––teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner did not close these logical gaps, leaving its case short of compelling.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,048,751
  • PTAB · Sep 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00607 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution for claims 1–4 because the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial and the petition did not present compelling evidence of unpatentability.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “As discussed above, Fintiv factors 2, 3, and 5 favor denial. Factor 1 is neutral, and only factor 4 weighs against denial. Thus, we determine that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and we now assess compelling merits. CommScope, Paper 23 at 5 (“In circumstances where, however, the Board’s analysis of Fintiv factors 1–5 favors denial of institution, the Board shall then assess compelling merits.”). According to the Guidance Memo, the compelling merits standard is met when “the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Guidance Memo, 4. A challenge can only meet this standard “if it is highly likely that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2021- 01064, Paper 102 at 49 (PTAB Oct. 4, 2022) (precedential) (“OpenSky”). We note that the Guidance Memo does not change the statutory standard for institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Instead, a determination of compelling merits will outweigh the other Fintiv factors, and such challenges will be allowed to proceed even if a district court litigation is proceeding in parallel. Id.” slip op. at 16

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied

      “For the reasons that follow, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “c. Summary In view of the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner’s obviousness challenges based on Lee do not meet the compelling merits standard with respect to claim 1. Petitioner does not rely on Kim to teach the recited “predetermined time from the transmission of the deactivation message.” See Pet. 34–37, 48–55 (relying on Kim for limitation “stopping downlink (DL) transmission of the secondary carrier and initializing uplink (UL) and DL retransmission buffers after transmitting the deactivation message”). Claims 2–4 depend from claim 1. Petitioner’s contentions regarding these dependent claims rely on the same analysis for the limitation of claim 1 discussed above. See Pet. 55, 57, 60. Accordingly, we also determine that Petitioner’s obviousness challenges based on Lee do not meet the compelling merits standard with respect to claims 2–4.” slip op. at 30

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,144,106
  • PTAB · Sep 3, 2024 · IPR2024-00608 · APJ Amber L Hagy · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on claims 1–4 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the Lee-Kim obviousness challenge lacked compelling merits.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of Fintiv factors 1–5. As discussed above, factor 1 is neutral, factors 2, 3, and 5 weigh in favor of discretionary denial of institution, and factor 4 weighs slightly against discretionary denial. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence of record on factors 1–5 favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. Accordingly, following CommScope, we must address the merits of the Petition to determine whether they are compelling. The Guidance Memo states that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Guidance Memo, 4. A challenge can meet this standard only “if it is highly likely that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” OpenSky Indus., LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2021- 01064, Paper 102 at 49 (PTAB Oct. 4, 2022) (precedential) (“OpenSky”). The Guidance Memo does not change the statutory standard for institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Instead, a determination of compelling merits will outweigh the other Fintiv factors, and such challenges will be allowed to proceed even if a district court litigation is proceeding in parallel. Id.” slip op. at 19

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons that follow, we exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “As noted above, our inquiry is directed to whether the Petition meets the compelling merits standard, not the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. Claim 1 recites “changing the secondary carrier to a deactivation state based on a predetermined time from the transmission of the deactivation message.” To illustrate, Figure 10 of the ’662 patent is reproduced below. Figure 10 is a diagram of a carrier state management method. Ex. 1001, 4:49–50. The ’662 patent teaches that “the base station performs the step . . . of transmitting the deactivation message to the terminal at a time t1.” Id. at 13:50–52. The ’662 patent further teaches that “[t]he base station may perform the step . . . of changing state information for a secondary carrier that is managed by the base station to the deactivation state at a time t5 after the lapse of a predetermined time (t5–t1).” Id. at 13:60–63. As discussed above, Petitioner argues that Lee’s disconnection time corresponds to the recited “predetermined time.” Pet. 43. To satisfy the limitation of claim 1 under this theory, Petitioner must show that Lee’s disconnection time is the time from the transmission of the AAI_CM-CMD” slip op. at 30

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,565,662
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